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Abstract 
 
This thesis assesses the extent to which fourteenth-century Middle English poets 
were interested in, and influenced by, traditions of thinking about logic and 
mathematics. It attempts to demonstrate the imaginative appeal of the logical 
problems called sophismata, which postulate absurd situations while making use of a 
stable but evolving, and distinctly recognisable, pool of examples. Logic and 
mathematics were linked. The ‘puzzle-based’ approach of late-medieval logic 
stemmed in part from earlier arithmetical puzzle collections. The fourteenth-century 
application of the ‘sophismatic’ method to problems concerned with what might now 
be called ‘Physics’ or ‘Mechanics’ sustained the symbiotic relationship of the two 
disciplines. An awareness of the importance of this tradition is perhaps indicated by 
the prominence of logical and mathematical tropes and scenarios in the works of 
three authors in particular: Geoffrey Chaucer, John Gower and the Gawain-poet. It is 
argued that, in the poetry of all three, what may loosely be called ‘sophismatic 
tropes’ are used to present concerns that the poets share with the logical and 
mathematical thought of their time. Certain themes recur, including the following: 
problematic promises; problematic reference to non-existent things; problems 
associated with divisibility, limits and the idea of a continuum; and, most 
importantly, problems focused on the contingency, or otherwise, of the future. The 
debate over future contingency was one of the fiercest scholastic controversies of the 
fourteenth century, with profound implications for both logical and theological 
thought. It is suggested here that the scholastic debate about future contingency has a 
visible impact on Chauntecleer’s prophetic dream in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, 
Troilus’s apparent determinism in Troilus and Criseyde, Gower’s presentation of 
causation in the Confessio Amantis, and the Gawain-poet’s treatment of covenants. 
The conclusion reached is that fourteenth-century logical and mathematical texts had 
a significantly wider cultural effect than is generally recognised. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
LOGICAL IDEAS AND MIDDLE ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 
Logic and the Imagination 
There lies hidden, as if through a low door in the wall of late-medieval 
scholasticism, an enchanted world, a paradise of all things imaginary and absurd.
1
 
The landscape seems ordinary enough at first, but on closer inspection one might 
find unlikely features, such as mountains of gold and uncrossable rivers. Roses 
used to grow plentifully here: but they have all died, and the people of that world 
struggle to remember them. The inhabitants themselves are even stranger than the 
landscape. The land is populated by a breed of chameleon men, who change 
colour over time and depending on their actions. Some of the men remain 
sedentary, some walk, but most seem to spend their time running as fast as they 
can, turning white in the process. Socrates lives there, as does Plato, but they 
squabble incessantly and sometimes even fight. Aristotle also drops by 
occasionally, to walk his dead horse. Many of the other inhabitants are less well 
                                                          
1
 The low door in the wall is, of course, a famous image long associated with Oxford: it is 
borrowed from the literary work of a later Oxford logician, Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll); 
Evelyn Waugh re-uses it in his description of University life in Brideshead Revisited. If the 
medieval sophismata create a ‘Wonderland’ world for the modern reader, it is only because 
Dodgson himself stands in the long tradition of the logical imagination. See Carroll, Annotated 
Alice, p. 15 and Waugh, Brideshead Revisited, p.40. 
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known and bear common medieval names: Richard, William, Walter, Robert, 
John and Peter. Yet, quite conventionally, presentations of this bizarre society 
focus on the upper echelons, and the Pope and the King are frequent protagonists 
in any action. Some inhabitants have very unusual names: an imaginary visitor to 
this world might witness a child being christened ‘Baf’, just to see if that would 
make the word mean anything. Family relations are important, but often 
problematic. One might encounter one’s father or brother at every turn, yet never 
recognise them: perhaps because one’s father is down on all fours, parading 
around in a donkey skin, or because one’s brother actually is an ass. 
Although there are plenty of other animals native to the land (horses, dogs 
and goats among the most common), the zoology of the country tends to focus on 
more sinister and marginal creatures: the invisible chimera and the lurking 
Hircocervus or ‘goatstag’. A lucky visitor might even catch a glimpse of the 
flying donkeys with their beautiful sets of wings. Asses there can do extraordinary 
things and they are often endowed with human characteristics: some are servants 
but many are masters; they can talk; they love a good laugh; but they do reserve 
the exclusive right to bray, their defining characteristic. God himself is an ass, or 
could be if he wanted to be: just one of the many theological oddities of this 
society, where atheism, polytheism, pantheism and Monarchianism are all debated 
quite openly as intellectual possibilities. Most worryingly of all, the Antichrist is 
almost ubiquitous. One might find him walking, or going for a run with the others, 
or preaching, or laughing, or even being born. In fact, being born is one of the 
15 
 
commonest activities for inhabitants of this bizarre world, perhaps the most 
popular after dying and, remarkably, being resurrected.
2
 
Every significant element of the above description is taken, not from any 
conventionally literary source, but direct from the logical writings of the 
fourteenth-century scholastics, and more specifically from a group of treatises on 
logical puzzles and paradoxes known as the sophismata. A sophism was 
essentially a stimulus for debate-based learning in the disputation of the late-
medieval schools. The master would present a proposition, usually taken from a 
fairly standard list of recognised examples, allowing one student to argue one side 
and one student the other, before the master finally gave the ‘definitive’ solution. 
Generally speaking there were three types of ‘sophismatic’ proposition by the 
middle of the thirteenth century.
3
 First, there were the propositions known by the 
general term, sophismata: propositions seeming to follow from well-established 
principles, which yet are somehow unacceptable or present special problems, used 
for testing logical rules. Then there were two further subsets. There were 
propositions known specifically as impossibilia: propositions whose contradictory 
is evident, where the intended exercise was to demonstrate the impossible, in 
order to help students recognise logical flaws. Finally, there were the propositions 
known specifically as insolubilia: here an apparently valid form of reasoning 
produces a proposition which implies its own contradictory.
4
 Generally speaking, 
as Curtis Wilson puts it, the ‘essential characteristics of a sophistical argument 
                                                          
2
 See the ‘Selection of Sophismatic Propositions’ in Appendix 1.  
3
 Throughout this thesis, I use the coinage ‘sophismatic’ as the adjectival form of sophismata; 
‘sophistical’ is somewhat misleading in modern English. 
4
 Scott, ‘Introduction’, in Buridan, Sophisms, pp. 4-5. 
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were its subtlety, its lack of accord with common sense, its seeming to be what it 
was not’.5 
The sophism became the basic cultural and intellectual building block in 
the teaching of logic in the fourteenth century. Occasionally sophismata were 
merely descriptive statements that were interesting solely for their logical 
properties; for example, the proposition that ‘No negative proposition exists’. On 
the whole, however, there was much greater scope for inventive fantasy. The so-
called ‘thought-experiments’ which late-medieval philosophers used to test 
logico-scientific rules proceeded, in their own words, ‘secundum imaginationem’ 
(‘according to imagination’). As Curtis Wilson puts it, ‘the province of the 
[fourteenth-century] logician is the entire range of imaginable cases and 
problems’.6 It has been the habit of historians of science and philosophy either to 
cleanse this term ‘imaginatio’ of its post-Romantic connotations, or else simply to 
ignore them: these ‘imaginations’ were not daydreams but rigorous, intellectual 
investigations.
7
 Yet the laudable insistence on maintaining a precise academic 
vocabulary has led to the obscuration of the fact that the composers of the 
                                                          
5
 Wilson, Heytesbury, p. 4. 
6
 Wilson, Heytesbury, p. 25. 
7
 For a concise summary of the understanding of the term ‘imagination’ from the early modern 
period onwards, see Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms, p. 165; see also Coleridge, Biographia 
Literaria, I, chapter 4, esp. pp. 49-51. The phrase ‘secundum imaginationem’ is often glossed 
simply as ‘hypothetical’: see, for example, Tachau, ‘Logic’s God’ p. 254; as Curtis Wilson himself 
puts it, ‘The only requirement for an imaginable case or distinction or problem is that it should not 
involve a formal logical contradiction’: Heytesbury, p. 25. For an interesting discussion of 
‘ymaginacioun’ in medieval ‘psychological’ and literary discourse, see Burnley, Chaucer’s 
Language and the Philosophers’ Tradition, pp. 103-115. His definition of ‘ymagiancioun’ is ‘the 
envisaging of things which are not, or which may never appear before the eyes, such as green 
knights, golden hills, or unicorns’ (p. 105). Burnley’s interesting mixture of fourteenth-century 
literary (‘green knight’) and logical examples (‘golden hills’: see Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 67) 
itself illustrates the interplay of literary and logical conceptions of ‘imagination’. Burnley’s 
analysis does lack, however, a precise understanding of the process of formulating sophismata 
‘secundum imaginationem’ and, as a result, his readings of Chaucer’s use of the term tend to differ 
from mine (see my discussions of ‘ymaginacioun’ in the Summoner’s Tale and the Nun’s Priest’s 
Tale in Chapter 1). 
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sophismata did indeed enliven their problems with an imaginative creativity akin 
to, and no less daring than, that of medieval poets. 
It might be imagined that the sophismata typically took the form of self-
consciously logical statements such as the one given above. Yet, more often than 
not, both the problem-sentences themselves and the other propositions used as 
examples in the discussion actually took the form of little units of narrative. As 
Eugene Vance puts it, 
If an argument is a sequence of propositions, so too, a 
kernel story is a discrete discursive unit made up of a 
sequence of narrative statements or events. Like a 
proposition, a narrative event is composed minimally of a 
noun and a verb, with the verb predicating some perceived 
state or happening in time.
8
 
These miniature stories appear and disappear quite suddenly within the wider text 
of the logical treatise: ‘A man runs’; ‘The King sits’; ‘A horse has died’. Although 
at times elaborate scenarios are devised in order to make these seemingly simple 
statements contextually problematic, usually no explanation is given for the action 
described. Since their authors tend to work from a wide but limited repertoire of 
conventional examples, medieval treatises on logic can give the illusion that these 
tiny blocks of narrative are the remnants of some greater, integral plot, of which 
only disjointed threads can be glimpsed behind the remorseless argument of the 
logical voice. 
Since the bank of examples used in logical treatises was, at least by the 
fourteenth-century, highly conventionalised, the literary experience of reading 
these works can be accompanied by a sense of déjà-vu. The subtleties of logical 
discrimination that mark each text out as truly individual efforts are masked, for 
                                                          
8
 Vance, Topic to Tale, p. 20. 
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the literary reader, by the collocations of familiar units of narrative; the sensation 
may be compared to that felt by readers of texts in the English alliterative 
tradition, or even by readers of Homer, growing used to the ‘formulas’ that such 
texts employ.
9
 Although these collocations of narrative units do not form ‘plots’ 
within the logical treatises themselves, the combination of such tropes in other, 
literary texts would undoubtedly have been striking to those readers familiar with 
the conventions of the sophismata. It is the literary influence that such logical 
texts might have exerted upon writers of the late fourteenth century that is the 
theme of this thesis. 
First, therefore, this thesis will introduce the ideas, forms, central figures 
and core concerns of fourteenth-century logic, finally focusing in a little more 
detail on the logico-theological problem of future contingency. Chapter 1 will deal 
with two of The Canterbury Tales, exploring the arithmetical and logical interests 
of the Summoner’s Tale, and the logico-theological interests of the Nun’s Priest’s 
Tale. Chapter 2 will explore the possible influence upon Troilus and Criseyde of 
the sophismata physicalia (a range of sophismata which deal with topics that 
might now be counted part of Physics or Mechanics) and will attempt to draw a 
connection between such problems and the issue of determinism in the narrative. 
Chapter 3 will investigate the interplay of different logico-mathematical 
explanations of causation in Gower’s Confessio Amantis. Finally, Chapter 4 will 
discuss the application of logico-mathematical paradoxes to moral and theological 
problems in the works of the Gawain-poet. 
                                                          
9
 For two of the most influential discussions of formulas in alliterative poetry, see Turville-Petre, 
The Alliterative Revival, pp. 83-92; and Spearing, The Gawain Poet, pp. 20-23. The most 
influential discussions of the equivalent feature of Homeric poetry are, of course, Parry, ‘Studies 
in the Epic Technique’, especially pp. 272-79; and Lord, Singer of Tales, p. 30 onwards. 
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Logic in Literary Criticism 
The idea that late-fourteenth-century poetry, and notably that of Geoffrey 
Chaucer, is interested in, and influenced by, the philosophical currents and 
controversies of its time is by no means a novel one. Chaucer studies have often 
paid attention to late-medieval astronomy, medicine, moral philosophy and 
metaphysics.
10
 There has also been widespread interest in what has been broadly 
designated ‘dialectic’, generally in contradistinction to ‘rhetoric’. Nevertheless, 
the use of the term ‘dialectic’ has become, in some ways, problematic. In its 
broadest, and commonest, usage, ‘dialectic’ has too often been merely a 
convenient shorthand for any treatment of ‘binary opposition’.11 There are, 
indeed, very good etymological and, since Hegel, modern philosophical reasons 
for using the term in this way.
12
 However, as with the term ‘imagination’, more 
critical precision is needed when dealing with medieval thought. It is at least 
inconvenient that many critics of medieval literature should mean by a technical 
term in widespread currency in the Middle Ages something different from what 
their authors meant by it; and especially so, given the probable anachronism that 
will attach itself to the term in the minds of many of their own readers. In 
particular, according to Aristotle, ‘dialectic’ is to do with a form of disputation: or 
as Robin Smith puts it, Aristotle’s dialect is ‘argument directed at another person 
by question and answer and consequently taking as premises that other person’s 
                                                          
10
 See, for example, Walter Clyde Curry, Chaucer and the Mediaeval Sciences; Fox, The 
Mediaeval Sciences; Manzalaoui, ‘Chaucer and Science’; North, Chaucer’s Universe; Tasioulas, 
‘Astronomy’; Utz, ‘Philosophy’; Blamires, Chaucer, Ethics, and Gender. 
11
 See, for instance, Constance Brittain Bouchard’s broad treatment of the term: ‘Every Valley’, p. 
19: ‘the most important use of dialectic [...] was the resolution of contradictions’. See also 
Catherine Brown, Contrary Things, p. 37: ‘dialectic teaches how to manage contradiction’. 
12
 For a concise explanation of the role of Hegel’s ‘dialectic’, see Soll, Hegel’s Metaphysics, pp. 
139-40. 
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concessions’;13 perhaps something rather like the medieval disputationes de 
obligationibus (discussed further below). Of course, disputation is often 
concerned with oppositions, and sometimes binary oppositions. Thus in some 
recent criticism, the term ‘dialectic’ is beginning to be used not merely to suggest 
the tension of two contraries, but the active interest in and use of disputational 
forms in literature.
14
 Nevertheless, the term ‘dialectic’ will generally be avoided 
in the following analysis for two reasons. First, there is the simple matter of 
clarity. Second, this thesis is concerned with ‘logic’ in terms of its various 
manifestations in written treatises and literary texts. The use of ‘dialectic’ tends, in 
the minds of some readers, to reduce the fertile multiplicity of these texts to a 
single principle of binary opposition. It seems a priori unlikely that such a 
principle is the core value behind later medieval logical (and especially 
sophismatic) disputation, which tends, on the contrary, to rejoice in multiplying 
possibilities. Thus when critics like William S. Wilson declare that ‘the two words 
[dialectic and logic] mean the same thing for this [the late-medieval] period’, a 
modern reader is forced either to misunderstand how actual late-medieval logical, 
and particularly sophismatic, texts function, or somehow to purge the term 
                                                          
13
 Smith, ‘Aristotle’s Logic’, in SEP. Smith accepts that elements of his interpretation of 
Aristotle’s view of dialectic ‘would not be accepted by all scholars’. The most important passages 
of Aristotle in this regard are found in Book I of the Topics: 100a-108b, trans. by Pickard-
Cambridge, pp. 167-181. 
14
 See, for instance, Hunt, ‘Aristotle, Dialectic and Courtly Literature’. In many ways, Hunt 
typifies the problematic usage of the term ‘dialectic’ that I have been discussing: he continues to 
emphasise the importance of contraries in courtly literature, and adduces Abelard’s ‘Sic et Non’ as 
the locus classicus of medieval dialectic. He even uses the term ‘dialectic’ as a synonym for 
‘opposition’ in places (for example, he talks at different points of ‘the opposition of los-repos’ 
(p.110) and ‘the dialectic of los-repos’ (p. 114), seemingly without distinction); but his work does 
at least focus on disputational forms in courtly literature, and it is this focus that makes his analysis 
rather more fruitful. Sarah Kay is an example of a critic who takes even greater care with the terms 
‘dialectic’ and ‘contradiction’. See Courtly Contradictions, esp. pp.11-25. She also briefly 
discusses, in relation to Troubadour poetry, the Liar paradox, which I make reference to a number 
of times in this thesis (Courtly Contradictions, pp. 133-142). 
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‘dialectic’ of many of the connotations with which it is now often associated.15 
Furthermore, my own interest lies not in defining any general Zeitgeist, but in 
showing how particular exemplary scenarios, images and controversies together 
define fourteenth-century logic and logical theology.  
Another term around which much previous scholarly and critical activity 
has centred is ‘nominalism’. An interest in fourteenth-century ‘nominalism’ has 
been the catalyst for a wealth of useful, at times even ground-breaking, research. 
However, it is fair to say that literary criticism of the last century has not always 
managed to avoid what Gordon Leff described as ‘the trap which modern 
historians have been so keen to avoid, of regarding medieval thought as the 
struggle between nominalism and realism’.16 There has thus been a tendency 
within twentieth-century literary criticism to treat ‘nominalism’ both as uniform in 
itself and as totalising within medieval thought after Ockham. As a result, too 
often critics have read literary texts with the avowed aim of discovering in them a 
‘nominalist’ influence and, if disappointed, have disregarded the range of other 
ways in which their authors may have been interacting with contemporary logical 
philosophy.
17
 Both errors are traceable even in so great a scholar as Alastair 
Minnis himself: for instance, in his article, ‘Looking for a Sign: The Quest for 
                                                          
15
 William S. Wilson, ‘Scholastic Logic’, p. 181. 
16
 Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 259. 
17
 See, as just one of many possible examples of the tendency to treat ‘nominalism’ somewhat 
monolithically, Steinmetz, ‘Late Medieval Nominalism’. Alcuin Blamires complains of a similarly 
simplistic and ‘leading’ tendency in regard to Chaucer’s relationship with ‘Lollardy’, by which 
critical readings find whatever evidence they can (however slight) to support ‘an ideological 
preoccupation ascribed a priori to the poet’: ‘The Wife of Bath and Lollardy’, p. 224. Steinmetz 
also uses the term ‘dialectic’ in the sense of ‘binary opposition’ discussed above, writing, for 
instance, of ‘the dialectic of the potentia dei absoluta and the potentia dei ordinata’ (‘absolute and 
ordered power of God) (p. 39). A recent article by Jelena Marelj on Troilus and Criseyde 
demonstrates that the appetite for such an approach is by no means abating. See ‘The 
Philosophical Entente of Particulars’. Marelj also speaks of ‘a dialectical distinction between 
God’s absolute and ordained powers’, illustrating that this term too remains widely used in its 
imprecise sense (p. 213).  
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Nominalism in Chaucer and Langland’. As Minnis observes, the term has been 
‘stretched in many ways [...] which can be both confusing and sensationalizing’, 
far beyond its currency with fourteenth-century thinkers such as Ockham, for 
whom it would have denoted a particular ‘language-theory’.18 In this thesis, the 
term ‘nominalism’ will be used specifically to denote the insistence that words 
refer not to any real universals but rather to singular beings; that the word ‘man’ 
signifies not a universal abstract of what a man is, but simply all actual men.  
Yet Minnis himself accepts, and goes on to use, ‘nominalism’ as he puts it 
‘improprie and secundum communem usum loquendi, as found in much recent 
criticism’. In this way, he both recognises and exacerbates the problematic 
generalisation of the term. He attempts to demonstrate the ‘affinities [of Chaucer’s 
work] with views expressed in twelfth-century treatises on [...] logic’ but 
eventually concludes that ‘the prospects of identifying Chaucer as some sort of 
Nominalist by this route are remote and unrewarding’.19 The apparent similarities 
between late-medieval nominalist theories of language and modern structuralist 
approaches have perhaps encouraged attempts at finding ways in which Chaucer 
can be seen as philosophically ahead of his time. The real question is not whether 
Chaucer was ‘some sort of Nominalist’, but what, if any, was the nature of 
Chaucer’s interest in fourteenth-century philosophy (including logic), and what 
are the consequences of that interest for critical readings of Chaucerian texts. 
Approaching the question in this way, there is no need to discard Chaucer’s 
possible interests in logic simply because it does not further the search for 
Chaucer’s presumed ‘nominalism’. 
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 Minnis, ‘Looking for a Sign’, p. 144. 
19
 Minnis, ‘Looking for a Sign’, p. 144. 
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Literary critics have also tended to seek contexts for fourteenth-century 
literature only in twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholasticism, rather than in the 
scholastic traditions of the fourteenth century itself.
20
 Minnis, for instance, has 
explored the possible relation between Chaucer’s writings and ‘twelfth-century 
treatises on terminist logic’ (a school of (usually) nominalist logic which focused 
on the significance of the individual terms within propositions).
21
 This move 
seems especially counter-intuitive given the particular development of terminist 
logic in the later Middle Ages. After its success in the twelfth and early thirteenth 
centuries, terminism was superseded by a new approach known as ‘modism’, 
which focused logical analysis on the different ways in which terms or utterances 
can signify. In the first half of Chaucer’s own century, terminism experienced a 
sudden and ‘mysterious’ resurrection. This terminist revival was predominantly 
English, and thus it provides, much more than its twelfth-century counterpart, an 
obvious context for Chaucer’s possible interest in logic.22 
Over the last decade or so, a number of critics have begun to approach 
Chaucer’s interaction with the logical thought of his own century with more 
precision and daring. Among them is Kathryn Lynch, whose study of Chaucer’s 
logical and broader philosophical play in his dream visions is closer to the sort of 
analysis that this thesis attempts. Lynch’s work was in many ways ground-
breaking and has undoubtedly contributed to a marked increase in the amount of 
                                                          
20
 This bias in favour of older texts is undoubtedly an unfortunate consequence of the emphasis on 
the twelfth century as a period of radical intellectual development, following the work of Charles 
Homer Haskins: see his The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century; see also R. N. Swanson, The 
Twelfth-Century Renaissance, esp. pp. 207-14. 
21
 In late-medieval logic, the ‘terms’ of a proposition are the categorematic words or phrases that 
make up the subject and predicate of that proposition (see Chapter 2 for a fuller explanation). In 
this thesis, I also at times discuss the ‘tropes’ and ‘images’ of logical discourse, which are merely 
logical ‘terms’ treated in a literary aspect. 
22
 Spade, ‘Late Medieval Logic’, p. 403. 
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scholarship directed towards Chaucer’s logical, and even sophismatic, interests. 
However, she does not always entirely escape the temptation towards some of the 
totalising frameworks I have described above;
23
 nor is she really concerned with 
the analysis of specific logical problems and their manifestation in the form of 
sophismatic ‘imagery’. She sometimes notes in passing a similarity of imagery 
(for instance, the use of the common sophismatic terms ‘dog’, ‘white’ and ‘black’ 
in the Book of the Duchess); yet on the whole Lynch’s interest lies in logical 
modes of thought as general guides to, or structural underpinnings of, a broader 
interpretation of Chaucer’s poems, rather than in the precise manner in which 
those sophismatic problems are alluded to or incarnated in literary language. Here, 
for the reasons set out below, Lynch could have been even more specific and even 
more daring than she is. Her work is also limited to Chaucer, and more 
particularly to his dream visions, touching only briefly on The Canterbury Tales 
and Troilus and Criseyde. More recently, Peter W. Travis has developed this 
interest in the logical dimension of Chaucer’s work, focusing explicitly on 
specific sophismatic tropes that feature prominently in certain texts: for instance, 
the importance of ‘white’ in The Book of the Duchess, and of the idea of running 
in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.24 There is, however, much more work to be done to 
build such shared ‘images’ into a convincing and substantive reading of each text 
as a whole. My thesis will therefore avoid totalising frameworks like those 
implied by ‘dialectic’ and ‘nominalism’, concentrating instead on the particular 
textual manifestations of logical thought in the fourteenth century. In this way, it 
                                                          
23
 See, for instance, her rather simplistic description of dialectic in terms of ‘sic et non’ (Visions, p. 
71). She also confesses to ‘a preference for seeing Chaucer as a nominalist, or as something of a 
skeptic’ (p. 15). 
24
 See Travis, ‘White’; and Disseminal Chaucer, pp. 254-57. 
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will attempt to generate convincing readings of literary texts by taking an 
essentially inductive approach, working primarily from literary detail rather than 
deducing authorial concerns from broader cultural premises.  
Building the World of Logic 
Apart from the sophismata themselves, there are two other forms of logical 
discourse related to the sophismata that are significant sources of logico-literary 
tropes and topoi in this period. Both are intrinsically related to the sophismatic 
method, since both focus on the means of ‘generating’ or deriving sophismata. 
They are, as it were, sophism-factories, and as such they not only provide another 
valuable source of the sort of problems and ‘images’ that fourteenth-century 
logicians manufactured, but also shed light on the structures of thought that 
underlie those productions.
25
 
The first of these related forms of logical discourse is the treatise de 
consequentiis, a distinctively English genre in the fourteenth century.
26
 Works of 
this kind discuss the logic of consequence (that is, how one may validly reason 
from a premise to a conclusion), usually with numerous examples. Consequence 
is effectively the ‘glue’ that holds together the syllogism, which is foundational to 
Aristotelian logical thought and is therefore essential to the disputational method 
                                                          
25
 As an illustration of this point, Stephen Read points out that Bradwardine recurrently uses the 
technical terminology of the treatises de obligationibus (which I discuss below) throughout his 
treatise on Insolubilia. See, ‘Introduction’, in Bradwardine, Insolubilia, pp. 45-46. 
26
 ‘From around 1300 and throughout the fourteenth century we meet a considerable number of 
works entitled De consequentiis (On consequences). It is remarkable, however, that the 
overwhelming majority of these texts is of British origin’ (Green-Pedersen, ‘Early British 
Treatises’, p. 285). Green provides an interesting discussion of the possible reasons why this genre 
of logical treatise ‘seems to spring out of the earth in England rather suddenly around 1300’ (p. 
290). 
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of the later Middle Ages.
27
 The analysis of what constitutes a valid consequence 
naturally involves the means of distinguishing it from an invalid one, supported 
by examples of each, and it is here that the treatises de consequentiis most 
resemble collections of sophismata. One reason for this is that they make use of 
the same common pool of example propositions, so that from a purely literary 
perspective, the two genres of text have much the same effect upon the 
imagination.  
Yet there is another important, structural reason for studying them in 
conjunction with each other. Strictly speaking, a sophism is a single problematic 
proposition, such as ‘You will throw me in the water’, and the other information, 
which makes the proposition problematic, is merely much-needed context, known 
as the casus.
28
 The logical interest of many of the sophismata, however, lies 
primarily in the invalid reasoning that is used to justify them. Take, for example, 
William Heytesbury’s collection of Sophismata asinina, around forty sophismata 
identical in form (‘Tu es asinus’), yet each justified by a different syllogism, such 
as the following: 
1) Omne animal si ipsum est rudibile est asinus. 
2) Tu es animal si tu es rudibilis. 
3) Ergo tu es asinus. 
Consequentia patet. 
 
1) Every <animal, if able to bray>, is an <ass>. 
2) <You> are an <animal, if able to bray>. 
3) Therefore <you> are an <ass>.  
                                                          
27
 See Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I, 24a-52b, trans. by Jenkinson, pp. 39-84.  
28
 See Spade’s neat definition of sophismata as ‘puzzle-sentences’: ‘Late Medieval Logic’, p. 402. 
Edith Sylla, on the other hand, allows the term ‘sophisma’ to cover ‘the whole development’ of the 
discussion and solution, referring to the problematic proposition itself as ‘the “sophisma 
sentence”’. See, ‘Oxford Calculators’, p. 559. See below for a discussion of the casus that turns 
the proposition, ‘You will throw me in the water’, into a formal insolubilium. 
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The consequence is clear.
29
 
 
Here Heytesbury dresses up his sophism (‘you are an ass’) as the conclusion of an 
apparently impeccable syllogistic model – in fact, the most basic and obvious of 
all the syllogistic models derived from Aristotle, known in the Middle Ages as the 
‘Barbara’ mood:30 
1) Every B is A. 
2) Every C is B. 
3) Therefore every C is A.31 
 
The question for Heytesbury is: what is wrong with the syllogism? The answer 
here is, of course, that ‘animal, if able to bray’ should not be taken together as one 
unit, but as two separate units. Therefore ‘animal, if able to bray’ is actually able 
to mean different things in Propositions 1 and 2.
32
  
                                                          
29
 Heytesbury, Sophismata asinina, p. 414 (Sophism 19). I have set out Heytesbury’s prose in 
numbered bullet points for the sake of clarity. My translation is somewhat inexact, in order to 
preserve the apparent force of the logic. 
30
 As a further example of the imaginative and literary fecundity of medieval logic, the name 
‘Barbara’ is the first of a series of mnemonics given by medieval logicians to the nineteen ordinary 
syllogistic ‘moods’ or models. The names are packed with meaning. ‘Barbara’, for instance, takes 
the first consonant of the alphabet because it is the first ‘mood’ of the first ‘figure’ or group of 
syllogisms; its vowel pattern is dictated by the fact that each of its three sentences is a universal 
affirmative (‘every … is …’ etc), which was given the designation class ‘A’. The rules dictating 
the mnemonics of the less basic ‘moods’ are rather complex. The mnemonic names were also 
formulated into a verse in dactylic hexameter to aid the memory of their groupings. See Spade, 
Thoughts, Words and Things, pp. 21-25. Spade cites early versions of the mnemonic verses, 
including one in William of Sherwood’s works: see, ‘“Introductiones in logicam”’, p. 246 (§ 3.2 
lines 4-7); William of Sherwood’s Introduction to Logic, p. 66. Another example that Spade does 
not cite is found in John Buridan’s Summulae de dialectica, 5. 2.1-5. 2.4. For an edition of the 
section of the Summulae in question, see Buridan, Summulae de syllogismis, pp. 25-32. For an 
English translation, see Buridan, Summulae de dialectica, trans. by Klima, pp. 319-24. 
31
 As given, this syllogistic model follows the Boethian evolution of the Aristotelian syllogism, 
substituting the copula ‘est’ where Aristotle had ‘belongs to’, and thus inverting the order of the 
‘major’ and ‘minor’ terms, which is why the letters seem mixed up. For a concise discussion of 
how Boethius both preserved and developed Aristotle’s approach for the Middle Ages, see 
Lagerlund, ‘Medieval Theories of the Syllogism’, in SEP. See also Boethius, ‘De syllogismo 
categorico’ and ‘Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos’ in PL (64); and ‘De hypotheticis 
syllogismis’.  
32
 I adapt Heytesbury’s argument slightly to make it more accessible and applicable to the English 
translation, which can provide no satisfactory counterpart to ‘ipsum’. For the original, see 
Heytesbury, Sophismata asinina, p. 414. 
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Heytesbury’s sophism (‘You are an ass’) is manufactured by ‘hijacking’ a 
valid line of consequential reasoning. Treatises de consequentiis, such as that of 
Ralph Strode, the man who is probably the dedicatee of Chaucer’s Troilus, 
provided lists of rules determining valid and invalid consequences. Sophismata 
and even insolubilia could be created by using the accepted rules of consequence: 
in fact, to do so was a means of testing or demonstrating those very rules.
33
 One 
example is the famous paradox found in a fourteenth-century treatise generally 
referred to as the work of Pseudo-Scotus (due to a former erroneous attribution to 
Duns Scotus): 
God exists: hence this argument is invalid.
34
 
The question is, is the argument valid or invalid? If the argument is valid, then 
since the premise is true, the conclusion must also be true, because if you argue 
validly from a true premise, you reach a true conclusion. If the conclusion is true, 
however, the argument must be invalid, since that is merely what the conclusion 
says. Now the definition of an invalid argument is one in which it is possible that 
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 Walter Burley, for example, in his own discussion of consequentiae in his De puritate artis 
logicae, ‘proves’ syllogistically that ‘the uglier (quanto magis turpis) someone is, the more 
attractive (tanto magis pulcher) he is’: ‘The uglier you are, the more you embellish yourself; but 
the more you embellish yourself, the more attractive you are; therefore, from the first to the last, 
the uglier you are, the more attractive you are’. Burley uses this, and other similar ‘sophismata’ (as 
he calls them) to demonstrate how one must take great care in using ‘the consequent in a preceding 
conditional’ as ‘the antecedent in the succeeding conditional’. In this case, the two are not, in fact, 
identical (one uses ‘tanto’, the other ‘quanto’). See, ‘Consequences’, p. 287. 
34
 Taken from Read, ‘Self-Reference and Validity Revisited’ (2010), p. 185; I have slightly revised 
the format of this quotation for the sake of clarity. See also, Boh, ‘Consequences’, pp. 308-309; 
and Read, Thinking about Logic, pp. 154-55 and p. 170. As an example of the perils confronting a 
reader attempting to get to grips with the literary features of late-medieval logical texts, see Roy 
Sorensen’s re-presentation of the Pseudo-Scotus paradox as ‘Squares are squares, therefore, this 
argument is invalid’ (Sorensen, ‘Epistemic Paradoxes’, in SEP). Sorensen cites for his translation, 
without qualification, an article by Stephen Read (‘Self-Reference and Validity’, 1979), even 
though Read himself gives the initial clause as ‘God exists’ (see p. 266). However, I note below 
(Chapter 4) a certain looseness in some of Read’s own translations in other instances. See the 
Conclusion to this thesis for further brief comments. 
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the conclusion should be false even though the premise were true. In this case, 
however, if the argument is invalid, then the conclusion cannot possibly be false 
(because the conclusion agrees that the argument is invalid). So in this case the 
premise is true and the conclusion must necessarily be true and cannot possibly be 
false. Therefore the argument is valid. So if the argument is valid, then it must be 
invalid; but if it is invalid, then it must be valid. This paradox is a medieval 
forerunner of the famous modern problem known as Curry’s Paradox.35 
Thus, treatises de consequentiis both provide the means of understanding 
the structural defects of thought underlying certain kinds of sophismata, whilst at 
the same time securing the syllogistic structures by which ingenious logicians 
could ‘build’ new sophismata. Literarily, treatises de consequentiis read very 
much like collections of sophismata, using the same basic verbal tropes; 
structurally, they are vitally important to the process of creating new sophismata. 
 Another sort of treatise related to the sophismata concerned the disputatio 
de obligationibus, a formal exercise in which an opponent and respondent 
entertained as fact, by agreement and for a set time (the tempus obligationis), 
something that might otherwise be open to doubt or even patently false. The 
sentiment behind the discussion, therefore, was something like, ‘Let’s pretend 
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 For a brief discussion of Curry’s Paradox in the context of semantic paradoxes generally, 
including those central to medieval logic, see Read, Thinking about Logic, pp. 161-63. See also 
Haskell Curry, ‘The Inconsistency of Certain Formal Logic’. For perhaps the most famous 
presentation of the paradox, in relation to the ontological proof of God’s existence, see Prior, 
‘Curry’s Paradox’. Other medieval forerunners of Curry’s Paradox can be found in the works of 
Bradwardine, Burley and a text attributed (probably incorrectly) to William of Sherwood. See 
Bradwardine, Insolubilia, pp. 128-29 (8.4); and ‘Insolubilia Walteri Burlei’ (based on Paris, 
Bibliothèque Nationale MS Lat. 16130, fols 114
v
-118
r 
and London, BL, Royal 12 F. XIX, fols 
133
v
-138
r), p. 280; and ‘Insolubilia Guillelmi Shyreswood’ (from Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale 
MS Lat. 16617, fols 46
r
-50
v
), p. 261. 
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such-and-such, and see what would follow from that’. The disputatio de 
obligationibus was, as such, a highly imaginative form of dialogue: 
It is not simply reasoning deductively from a hypothesis. It 
is somewhat closer to what goes on in counterfactual 
reasoning (‘What would have happened if Caesar had not 
crossed the Rubicon, but the world were in other respects 
as much as possible the same?’) [...] One might try to 
express the import of these rules in terms of Leibnizian 
possible worlds as follows: when P is posited and 
admitted, one’s replies to the subsequent proposed 
sentences must be such that one concedes (or denies the 
contradictory of) a sentence if and only if it conforms to all 
possible worlds in which P is true and which are otherwise 
as much as possible like what, for all one knows, the actual 
world is like.
36
 
The question of whether God could have created alternative worlds to the one he 
did create was itself a source of controversy in late-medieval theology and logic. 
For instance, the proposition ‘that the first cause could not make several worlds’ 
was one of those condemned by the Bishop of Paris in 1277. Thomas 
Bradwardine famously considered the question in his De causa Dei.
37
  
                                                          
36
 Spade, in Swyneshed, ‘Roger Swyneshed’s Obligationes’, pp. 245-46. For more on Leibniz’s 
conception of ‘the best of all possible worlds’, see Rutherford, Leibniz. The most important of 
Leibniz’s works for this concept is his Theodicy. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays 
on the Goodness of God. For a discussion of how Leibniz’s philosophy is itself related to 
fourteenth-century logic, see Lagerlund, ‘Leibniz (and Ockham)’, pp. 99-118. Voltaire famously 
mocks Leibniz’s optimistic thesis that we live in the best of all possible worlds in Candide. See 
Mason, Candide: Optimism Demolished, esp. pp. 5-8. In the twentieth century, literary critics, 
such as Doležel, applied aspects of Leibniz’s philosophy of possible worlds, and its later evolution 
in modern modal logic, in their analysis. See, for example, Doležel, Heterocosmica, esp. pp. 12-
16. While acknowledging the importance of the ‘alternative world’ concept in fourteenth-century 
logic, my own work will focus more on what Doležel calls ‘narrative microstructures’ or motifs, 
rather than the ‘macrostructures’ of the narrative worlds themselves, with which Doležel is 
principally concerned (p. 33).  
37
 See Bradwardine, De causa Dei, I, Chapter 5 (esp. p. 177), and III, Chapter 52 (esp. p. 841). For 
a brief summary and discussion of the former, see Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, pp. 137-38. 
According to Simo Knuuttila, Duns Scotus was also influential upon a distinct but related 
question, since, as Ria van der Lecq phrases Knuuttila’s thesis, it was Duns who ‘developed a new 
modal theory [i.e. a theory concerned with the logical treatment of the possible rather than the 
actual] which may be rightly compared with a “possible-worlds”-theory in modern philosophy’. 
For example, for Scotus, ‘something that is white now, could have been black at this same 
moment’. See van der Lecq, ‘William Heytesbury on “Necessity”’, p. 252. Van der Lecq also 
refers to Simo Knuuttila’s observation that Scotus’s break with tradition became ‘a general feature 
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If the obligationes form thus allowed for the temporary creation of an 
alternative ‘world’ within which, however, the usual rules otherwise apply, it must 
have seemed a form very attractive to a writer of fiction, who must balance the 
creation of an alternative reality with the (quasi-Aristotelian) rules of probability 
and consistency.
38
 In this way the disputatio de obligationibus was in keeping 
with fourteenth-century ideas of logic as a whole: it exemplifies the thought-
experiment ‘secundum imaginationem’. A disputatio de obligationibus is also, 
therefore, necessarily different in character from strictly argumentative debate. As 
Paul Spade puts it, ‘a disputatio de obligationibus is a “disputation” without 
anything really in dispute.’39 Like the treatises de conseqentiis, obligationes both 
test the rules of logical reasoning and produce sophisms as their end result.  
To take one clear example of literature inspired by such logical treatises, a 
poem now usually known as ‘Nego’, contained in BL MS Harley 913 (compiled 
in the 1330s), is explicitly constructed as a parody of the logical disputationes de 
obligationibus.
40
 In the obligationes, one speaker may generate a string of 
                                                                                                                                                               
of fourteenth-century modal logic’ (see ‘Time and Modality’, p. 238); however, she does not agree 
with all aspects of Knuuttila’s analysis (van der Lecq, ‘William Heytesbury on “Necessity”’, p. 
257). 
38
 For Aristotle’s observations on consistency and probability or necessity within plots see, for 
example, Poetics, xv, 1454a-b, trans. by I. Bywater, p. 2327.  
39
 Spade, ‘Three Theories’, in Lies, Language and Logic, Chapter 17, p.1 (the pagination in this 
book is non-standard and in future references to items in this book, chapter numbers will be given 
instead of page ranges). 
40
 The best modern edition of the lyrics of BL MS Harley 913 is Anglo-Irish Poems, ed. by Lucas. 
Lucas christens the poem beginning ‘Hit nis bot trewth i-wend an afte’ with the name, ‘Nego’. The 
poem and translation can be found on pp. 166-67 of her edition; it is found on fol. 58
v
 of Harley 
913. It is almost universally agreed that Harley 913 was compiled during the fourth decade of the 
fourteenth century and is of Franciscan production. Michael Benskin argues that, ‘the list of 
Franciscan custodies on fols 41
r
-43
r
 is valid for Ireland only from 1325 to 1345, and for the rest of 
the contents, neither language nor scripts points beyond’. Therefore, he concludes, ‘on present 
evidence compilation during the 1330s is reasonably assumed’. See, ‘The Hands of the Kildare 
Poems Manuscript’, p. 164. Lucas agrees, since ‘the Norman French proverbs [...] are attributed to 
the first Earl of Desmond, who did not receive his title till 1329’. Thus, she argues, ‘MS Harley 
913 cannot be much later than 1330-1335’. See Lucas, ‘Introduction’, in Anglo-Irish Poems, p. 19. 
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apparently (but not necessarily genuinely) consequential propositions and his 
fellow must answer either ‘Nego’, ‘Dubito’ or ‘Concedo’. All three of these 
technical terms appear in Latin in this English poem, as does the term ‘obligo’ and 
the paradoxical phrase ‘Verum Falsum’ (all in lines 17-21). The poem is not 
necessarily unqualified in its antischolasticism: its invective is merely directed 
against ‘fals clerkes’ (24), although it is not clear whether the poet can conceive 
of any other kind. What does seem likely is that the author is directly referring to 
obligational disputes as a distinct phenomenon in scholastic discourse.  
The World of Logic and its Inhabitants 
To return to the surreal imagery of the ‘enchanted world’ with which I began, it is 
important to emphasise that those tropes occur again and again in the sophismata 
and other logical treatises of the later Middle Ages; and that any contemporary 
reader even distantly acquainted with the logic of the time would have opened a 
new collection of sophismata, or a treatise on consequentia, with a very clear 
expectation of the sort of ‘images’ that would crowd together on its pages. Some 
of the terms used in the sophismata have a long and impeccable pedigree. To take 
one instance, that of the almost ubiquitous ‘ass’, Jan Ziolkowski has traced the 
lineage through successive incarnations of logical and philosophical discourse, 
right back to the Socratic dialogues of Plato himself.
41
 Many of the other terms 
stem at least from Boethius. Others are much newer, and are assimilated into the 
well-established discourse by individual writers in need of specific examples, 
                                                                                                                                                               
See also Lucas and Lucas, ‘Reconstructing a Disarranged Manuscript’; Robbins, ‘Authors of the 
Middle English Religious Lyrics’; Cartlidge, ‘Festivity’. 
41
 Ziolkowski, ‘Humour of Logic’, p. 7. 
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which are then inherited by their followers. Without doubt, by the beginning of 
the fourteenth century at least, there existed a well-established register of images 
that logicians like the ‘world famous’ Oxford Calculators could use as building-
blocks for their sophismata.
42
 In other words, the semantic field of logic in the 
fourteenth century was much broader than the semantic field of logic in, say, the 
twenty-first century.  
For example, in the case of Buridan’s Sophismata, there are certain 
categorematic terms that recur frequently. Some of the most common are listed in 
Appendix 2.
 
There are certain results here that we would naturally expect: ‘false’, 
for example, is always going to crop up a good deal in insolubles, such as the Liar 
paradox. ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, commonly used to substitute for terms, parts of 
propositions or whole propositions, we would also expect to be prevalent. The 
frequent occurrence of ‘man’, perhaps, is not so surprising, although it does reveal 
the anthropocentric nature of Buridan’s sophismata. Other results here are perhaps 
more unexpected: for instance, together the two terms ‘ass’ and ‘horse’ occur 
more often than all of ‘false’, ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C, ‘nothing’, and ‘Plato’ put together. 
                                                          
42
 The Oxford Calculators is the name commonly applied to the remarkable group of logicians, 
mathematicians and natural scientists that flourished in that University in the early-to-mid 
fourteenth century. Since they were centered around Merton College, they are sometimes 
alternatively known as the ‘Merton Men’. A number of the ‘Calculators’ will feature heavily in 
this thesis, especially Thomas Bradwardine and William Heytesbury. Potted introductions to these 
two men, along with certain other fourteenth-century logicians, can be found towards the end of 
this chapter. There are a number of useful and accessible introductions to the Calculators as a 
group.The entirely accurate epithet, ‘world famous’, is applied by Weisheipl (‘Ockham and Some 
Mertonians’, p. 164). See, alternatively, Weisheipl, ‘Ockham and the Mertonians’, pp. 607-58. See 
also Weisheipl, ‘The Place of John Dumbleton in the Merton School’; Weisheipl provides a useful 
‘preliminary list’ of the works and manuscripts of a range of the Merton Men in his ‘Repertorium 
Mertonense’. See also Sylla, ‘Oxford Calculators’ and Sylla, ‘The Oxford Calculators in Context’. 
For a rather different approach to the application of the mathematical skills of the Merton men, see 
Kaye, Economy and Nature, esp. pp. 32-36 and pp. 200-246. For a more popular introduction to 
the ‘Calculators’, see Hannam, God’s Philosophers, pp. 167-80.  
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‘Run’ and its derivatives occur more often than ‘God’; but ‘Antichrist’ more times 
than ‘Aristotle’. 
Two things become increasingly clear from a close study of Buridan’s 
Sophismata. The first is that he is not merely selecting his terms at random: the 
clustering around certain particular terms and general themes is too marked for 
that. Yet neither does Buridan’s selection of terms conform to our modern 
expectations of what a logical text should discuss. We might expect a great deal 
more ‘scientific’ terminology within the propositions themselves: we find some, 
but relatively little. ‘Angle’, ‘triangle’, ‘circle’, ‘vacuum’, and ‘star’ all together 
occur only once more than the single term ‘chimera’: a literary fiction. Buridan’s 
choice of terms is, however, by no means atypical of fourteenth-century logical 
writings. 
For an educated medieval audience, the semantic field of logic would have 
included a large number of terms that might not immediately appear ‘logical’ or 
‘scientific’. For instance, modern readers encountering the term ‘chimera’ in 
medieval literature, or the idea of a monster generally, may turn to classical 
mythology, or even perhaps to certain medieval moralistic texts, to find a 
reference-point; but they probably would not think of consulting a treatise on 
logic.
43
 Readers encountering the phrase ‘writing on the wall’ might open the 
Bible at the book of Daniel; but they might not consider that the reference might 
be to a very well established tradition of logical philosophy, and so on. In the next 
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 One example of the use of the ‘chimera’ in a moralistic text is found in Robert Holcot’s 
commentary on the Twelve Prophets, which contains twenty-six vivid descriptions (or ‘pictures’) 
of allegorical creatures. Holcot was, however, a theologian with especially logical interests and 
approach, and his ‘pictures’ also contain at least one other shared image from the world of logic: 
the chameleon changing colour. See Smalley, English Friars, p. 173-74; citing Oxford, Bodleian 
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section, I offer a few brief examples of some of the other ways in which logical 
tropes are visible in late-medieval literature. These examples will demonstrate that 
logical ways of thinking could, and did, have an impact on literary texts in the 
Middle Ages – before I turn to a more extended analysis of fourteenth-century 
Middle English literature in particular.  
From Logic to Literature 
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, sophismatic tropes are most easily detected 
in literary works in Latin, as might be expected. Jan Ziolkowski has analysed the 
explicit presence of terms and problems from the sophismata in Latin drama, 
focusing on the Geta of Vitalis of Blois (which I will later discuss in relation to 
Gower). However, in order to maintain what may be called a certain 
‘falsifiability’ in his method (that is ‘to reduce further the risk of finding formal 
logic where it is not’), Ziolkowski restricts his attention to ‘passages that feature 
logical termini technici, that profess to employ distinctively logical modes of 
argumentation, and that include debates over the capacities and limitations of 
logic and logicians’.44 This approach is actually more cautious than it needs to be, 
especially when it comes to literature of the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, it is 
true that in this earlier period logical tropes have perhaps not spread as broadly 
into literary culture as they were to later. Although Ziolkowski himself 
acknowledges that even in the twelfth century ‘the impact of logic [was not] 
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limited to Latin, the language of the schools’, Latin literature does provide the 
richest source of explicit logical reference.
45
 
One Latin text of this period that clearly demonstrates the potential in 
broadening our analysis beyond the termini technici to what we may call the 
‘imagery’ of the sophismata is the poem De presbytero et logico (On the Priest 
and the Logician), which survives in manuscripts including BL MS Harley 978.
46
 
The reference to logical texts is explicit. A priest is engaged in a dispute with a 
logician, and provides in the process a caricature of his work: 
Sermo vester canis est, asinus, aut leo; 
semper est de Socrate, homine tam reo: 
in sermone mentio nulla fit de Deo[.] 
(You’re always talking about some dog or ass or lion. 
You’re always on about Socrates, that wicked man. In your 
teaching you never make any mention of God[.])
47
 
The reference to Socrates is not a reference to any idea of Socratic philosophy, but 
merely to the conventional character who appears almost ubiquitously in 
sophismatic scenarios throughout the later Middle Ages. The reason that the 
logician never mentions God is perhaps because of the restrictions upon those 
engaged in the arts faculties of certain universities from teaching on controversial 
theological topics.
48
 Here the logician is known not merely by his structures of 
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 Ziolkowski, ‘Humour of Logic’, p. 3. 
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 See ‘De Presbytero et Logico’, in Latin Poems attributed to Mapes, ed. by Wright, pp. 251-57. 
See also the edition based on Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale MS nouv. acq. 1544 and Paris, 
Bibliothèque Nationale MS Lat. 11867, of Haureau, Notices et extraits, VI, pp. 310-317. 
Unfortunately, the text found in Wright is, as Haureau notes, ‘très défectueuse’ (p. 310), although 
in the case of the passage quoted below, discrepancies between the two editions are negligible. 
47
 Latin Poems attributed to Mapes, p. 252; lines 49-51. The translation is taken from an 
unpublished translation by Neil Cartlidge (who first drew my attention to this text), based on 
Wright’s edition, informed by Haureau’s edition. 
48
 For a famous example of such a restriction in Paris, see ‘Statute of the Faculty of Arts’, trans. by 
Thorndike, in Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 44-45. 
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thought but also by the terms used in his examples, which are conflated with 
conventional literary imagery when the priest later attempts to prove that the 
logician is ‘not much different from a dog’. In the context of the early terminism 
of the twelfth century, just as with the resurrected terminism of the fourteenth 
century, sophismatic terms or ‘images’ are the mark of logical and quasi-logical 
texts; and they are adopted by poets and ‘cross-bred’ with more conventionally 
literary tropes to produce complex effects. 
The register of conventional terms used by logicians in their examples was 
evidently still well known in the fifteenth century, when Rabelais manufactured 
his own parody of a scholastic question for inclusion in the catalogue of the 
library of St Victor: ‘Quaestio subtilissima, utrum Chimaera in vacuo bombinans 
possit comedere secundas intentiones’; whether a chimera farting (or buzzing) in a 
vacuum is able to eat second intentions.
49
 Here it seems that Rabelais has simply 
plucked a number of otherwise unrelated sophismatic ‘terms’ and strung them 
together to produce a meaningless proposition. This episode provides significant 
clues as to the extent of popular knowledge of the sophismatic semantic field. 
There is the clichéd chimera, suggesting the problem of what such fictions, or 
what Desmond Paul Henry calls ‘empty names’, can refer to.50 There is the hint, 
in the vacuum, of the physical problems that were formulated as sophismata in the 
fourteenth century, most famously by the Oxford Calculators. There is the logical 
fascination with meaningless human utterances, such as the ‘buf’ (belch) used by 
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 See Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel, p. 152 (II. 7). Edith Sylla provides an interesting 
history of similar pseudo-sophisms in ‘Swester Katrei and Gregory of Rimini’, pp. 249-271. Peter 
W. Travis also briefly discusses this passage in relation to Chaucer: see Disseminal Chaucer, pp. 
303-304. On the relation of the Latin word ‘bombinare’ to the common medieval analogy between 
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Buridan and others.
51
 There is the trope of eating which recurs in collections of 
sophismata, as shown in the table (Appendix 2) and which brought with it 
associated and barely-concealed problems to do with Eucharistic theology. There 
is perhaps a reference to the problem of intentionality, the will and voluntarism in 
‘secundas intentiones’. Finally, Rabelais’ question treats the abstract ‘secundes 
intentiones’ as something so real that they can be eaten – perhaps a subtle 
reference to the debate over realism and nominalism. This example proves that at 
the least one late-medieval author enjoyed reconstructing sophismatic 
propositions and scenarios from the debris of deconstructed logical texts. It also 
implies, however, a widespread knowledge of these terms as individual units 
whose logical connotations can be ‘activated’ when collocated in literature, even 
without the presence of a genuinely logical thought-structure (although, of course, 
such collocations surely provide a clue that their author might be interested in the 
corresponding thought-structures too, as Rabelais clearly is). 
However, it is also true that whole sophismata sometimes survived and 
were recycled in later literary texts, essentially as jokes. One such is found in 
Love’s Labours Lost, where the absurd pedant, Holofernes, is pseudo-logically 
‘proven’ to be an ass (on the grounds that he isn’t a lion).52 Cervantes makes even 
fuller use of another famous sophism to puzzle Sancho Panza in Part II of Don 
Quixote. Sancho’s governorship of Barataria is put to the test by the problem of 
the bridge that you can only cross without being hanged if you say truly where 
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 See my detailed discussion of this logical trope in relation to the Summoner’s Tale in Chapter 1. 
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 Love’s Labours Lost, in Shakespeare, Complete Works, V. 2. 639-44. See above for one example 
of the ‘You are an ass’ tradition within medieval sophismata. Bottom’s transformation in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream, III. 1, may well have something to do with this tradition too. 
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you are going.
53
 The trope of the uncrossable river is widespread in medieval 
riddles and logical puzzles, stemming perhaps from the well-known collection of 
such problems in Alcuin’s Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes (Propositions for 
the Sharpening of Young Minds), which contains the famous wolf, goat and 
cabbage problem, usually now known as the fox, chicken and grain problem.
54
 It 
is also worth briefly noting here that some of the postulated problem scenarios in 
the logical texts are at least broadly similar to the trials that heroes in the 
romances must overcome: for instance, Chretien de Troyes’s Lancelot makes use 
of two problematic bridges (The Underwater Bridge and The Sword Bridge) and 
an uncrossable ford.
55
 The question will occur throughout this thesis whether 
literary tropes influenced logicians in their imagined scenarios or, conversely, 
logical puzzles influenced literary authors, or both. In the case of Cervantes, 
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 See Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote, p. 832 (Part II, Chapter 51). 
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 For an edition of the Propositiones (including a discussion of their authorship and influence), 
see Alcuin (ascr.), ‘Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes’ (ed. by Folkerts). For a translation, see 
Hadley and Singmaster, ‘Problems’. According to Folkerts (‘The Propositiones ad acuendos 
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‘Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes’, p. 21). The wider cultural currency of the puzzles of the 
Propositiones in fourteenth-century England is attested by a marginal illustration in the Ormesby 
Psalter (Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Douce 366, fol. 89
r
: see Appendix 3), which depicts the 
famous river-crossing with wolf, goat and cabbages (an illustration first drawn to my attention by 
Alixe Bovey in the Medium Ævum Annual Lecture 2009: ‘Ludic Margins: the Gravity of Play in 
Gothic Manuscripts’, given 03/04/2009 at Lincoln College, Oxford). The problem itself (problem 
18 in the collection) concerns a farmer attempting to cross a river in a boat that is only large 
enough to carry, at any one time, the farmer and one of his three possessions: a wolf, a goat and a 
bunch of cabbages. The problem is how to transport the farmer and his gear across the river, 
without leaving wolf and goat or goat and cabbages alone together. See Hadley and Singmaster, 
‘Problems’, p. 112. For other versions and extensions of Alcuin’s original river crossing puzzles, 
see Pressman and Singmaster, ‘The Jealous Husbands’. Lewis Carroll himself may have been 
responsible for one later development of Alcuin’s river crossing puzzles, in which four couples are 
to cross the river without any of the wives being left with any man but her own husband (even if 
other women are present). Eight crossings are needed. See Rediscovered Lewis Carroll Puzzles, 
pp. 17 and 66. 
55
 See Chrétien de Troyes, Arthurian Romances, p. 216.  
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however, the answer is fairly clear. Sancho’s problem is almost identical in form 
to a widespread fourteenth-century sophism, where Plato will only allow Socrates 
to cross his bridge if the next proposition he speaks is true; otherwise he will be 
thrown in the water. Socrates replies, ‘You will throw me in the water’, just as 
Cervantes’ cunning traveller announces that he is going to the gallows.56 Thus the 
specific imaginative scenarios that medieval logicians dreamt up as suitable 
contexts for their logical discussions were, even by the seventeenth century, still 
alive enough to exert a broader cultural influence. 
The humorous literary appropriation of logical tropes and problems stems 
from the fact that even the ‘serious’ logicians of the Middle Ages were aware of, 
and rejoiced in, the playfulness and absurdity of some of the impossible 
propositions and unlikely situations they envisaged. Jan Ziolkowski writes in 
relation to the logical treatises of the twelfth century: 
Despite – or because of – the austerity of the schoolbooks 
[of Aristotle, Porphyry and others], indications are strong 
that teachers of formal logic recognized and exploited the 
utility of humour as a pedagogic device. They made an 
ostentatious, although perhaps ultimately vain, effort to 
leaven their expositions of logic with touches of humour. 
This effort was particularly justified, since laughter was 
viewed as a uniquely human capability.
57
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 The problem is usually known as ‘Buridan’s Bridge’ since it appears in his Sophismata, 
although it was known beforehand. See Buridan, Sophisms, p. 219 (Chapter 8, Sophism 17). I 
discuss the problem, and its other incarnations, in more detail in my analysis of the Summoner’s 
Tale in Chapter 1. See Jones, ‘The Liar Paradox’, for a useful discussion of the episode in Don 
Quixote. Jones attributes the problem to Paul of Venice, but does not mention its earlier 
provenance. See Rescher, Paradoxes, pp. 62-63, for a logical analysis of Cervantes’ version of the 
paradox. Rescher relates the paradox to the ancient ‘Nasty Crocodile Paradox mentioned twice by 
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carefully,” he said, “for your baby’s life depends on your truthfulness: will I eat your baby?” After 
thinking for a moment the cagey father replied: “Yes, I do believe you will.”’ (p. 62). See also 
Read, Thinking about Logic, pp. 148-49. For a discussion of the various late-medieval forms of the 
paradox, see Ashworth, ‘Will Socrates Cross the Bridge?’. See also Ashworth, ‘Treatment of 
Semantic Paradoxes’, pp. 39-40. 
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 Ziolkowski, ‘Humour of Logic’, p. 5. 
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This thesis will present a range of evidence to suggest that at least for many 
medieval readers and writers the injection of playfulness into logical treatises was 
by no means ‘ultimately vain’. Yet Ziolkowski’s analysis of the use of humour in 
these texts is otherwise precisely correct, and the tendency of logical writers to 
utilise humour remains clear in the fourteenth century too. The term ‘risibile’ 
(meaning ‘able to laugh’) occurs in at least fifteen different textual and 
propositional contexts in Buridan’s Sophismata, in which it is made clear that the 
ability to laugh, like the ability to reason, is a quality expected of all humanity but 
of no other animal. Rationality and ‘risibility’ are inextricably linked for the 
fourteenth-century logician, and it therefore seems unthinkable that they were 
oblivious to the great potential for playfulness, absurdity and humour that their 
logical adventures yielded - especially when we remember their audience of 
‘undergraduates’, who used the language of the sophismata to construct jokes at 
each other’s expense. For instance, Euclid’s fifth proposition was nicknamed 
(perhaps in the late-fourteenth century) the Pons Asinorum, the Bridge of Asses, 
since it was considered the first non-trivial problem, and the bridge to the rest of 
The Elements, which ‘asses’ or fools were unable to cross.58 The name was also 
applied to Buridan’s technique to help his less able students find the middle term 
in a syllogism.
59
 
If it is possible to detect the comic dimension of logical terms, it is also 
clear that there is much more than mere ‘undergraduate’ humour invested in these 
words and phrases. Some fourteenth-century logicians were clearly aware that the 
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 For an interesting discussion of this and other popular names for Euclidean propositions, see 
Heath (trans.), Euclid, pp. 415-18. 
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conventional terms or ‘images’ used in their treatises were pregnant with serious 
meanings that stretched far beyond their strictly logical heritage. John Wyclif, for 
example, in his De logica, one of his earliest works, uses the twin propositions 
‘Antichristus est homo, antichristus est Rome’ (‘the Antichrist is a man; the 
Antichrist is in Rome’).60 Each of the categorematic terms in this pair of 
propositions is conventionally sophismatic (all three appear in propositions in 
both Heytesbury’s and Buridan’s Sophismata, for instance); and there is nothing 
unusual in logicians choosing provocative examples, such as Buridan’s ‘God is an 
ass’.61 Yet it is possible that Wyclif attaches more than formal significance to 
these propositions, providing a clue to the development of his ecclesiology even at 
so early a stage in his career.
62
 In other words, the fact that logical texts relied on 
a pool or bank of such terms by no means deprived them of their provocative or 
fantastic connotations, even in purely logical texts; and even less so when they 
were appropriated by literary authors. 
Logic and Mathematics 
This thesis is entitled ‘Literature, Logic and Mathematics in the Fourteenth 
Century’ because it is important to acknowledge the extent of overlap between 
what was then thought of as ‘logic’ and what is now thought of as ‘mathematics’. 
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 See Wyclif, Tractatus de Logica, I, p. 69. Dziewicki noted the theological significance of this 
proposition in his Introduction to this edition, p. VII; as did Samuel Thomson: ‘Philosophical 
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Many questions which we would now consider to be aspects of the higher 
mathematics, such as the problems De maximo et minimo in Heytesbury, were in 
the fourteenth century still considered to be questions of logic, for the simple 
reason that they are not obviously questions either of arithmetic or geometry. This 
may not be self-evident, especially to modern readers who think of problems such 
as the Mean Speed Theorem of the Oxford Calculators almost inevitably in terms 
of graphs, and thus to whom such problems seem obviously geometrical.
63
 
However, only the barest roots of what was later to become analytic geometry are 
to be found in the fourteenth century, most notably in the work of Richard 
Swineshead and Nicole Oresme;
64
 and it is important to envisage both the sheer 
difficulty and the emphatically logical status of such questions without the 
modern form of analysis. In fact, Swineshead himself explicitly refers to one such 
investigation as a ‘sophisma’, despite what one modern commentator calls its 
‘distinctively mathematical’ nature.65 The treatises of Heytesbury and others were 
really ‘about the logical effects of words like [...] “begins” and “ceases” that offer 
many opportunities for [logical] fallacies’: but those fallacies were tested in 
imagined scenarios that seem today to be more mathematical than logical.
66
 Thus 
the term ‘mathematics’ features in the title of this thesis partly as a recognition of 
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 The Mean Speed Theorem is concisely defined by John Longeway as the theorem ‘that a 
uniformly accelerated body will, over a given period of time, traverse a distance equal to the 
distance it would traverse if it were moved continuously in the same period at its mean velocity 
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the fact that, for many readers, a good number of the examples under discussion 
will concern problems that they will think of as mathematical as much as 
logical.
67
 Yet the sophismatic method, which is at the centre of what I mean by 
fourteenth-century logic, was engaged with these ‘mathematical’ problems as well 
as linguistic, semantic and epistemological ones. 
Elements of the sophismatic tradition of the later Middle Ages could also 
be seen as growing out of and then running alongside an earlier tradition of 
arithmetical, geometrical and, by the fourteenth-century, ‘algorismic’ puzzle 
collections.
68
 For example, the Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes of Alcuin, 
mentioned above, mixes straightforward problems of arithmetic and geometry 
with simple logical puzzles (such as the ‘wolf, goat and cabbage’ river-crossing 
problem) and even humorous tricks and riddles. Chapter 2 of this thesis will argue 
that fourteenth-century writers like Chaucer, with an amateur interest in 
mathematics and logic, saw the sophismata of his own time as the inheritor of, 
and perhaps the up-start competitor of, earlier, simpler ‘mathematical’ problems.69 
Thus the nature of the interaction between what was at the time deemed 
‘mathematics’ and what was deemed ‘logic’ is a relevant area of investigation in 
itself. 
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 As Edith Sylla observes, ‘if later scholars have noticed and valued the work of the Oxford 
Calculators for its physical and mathematical content, nevertheless, within the fourteenth-century 
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Chapter 2. 
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It is also possible that late-medieval developments in what we would now 
think of as ‘mathematics’ were beginning to affect at least the literary discussion 
of problems that had previously been considered purely from logical or logico-
theological perspectives. The example that I will discuss in detail is Gower’s 
treatment of the problem of future contingency in the light of the increasingly 
sophisticated methods of dealing with problems of ‘chance’ and ‘expected 
outcomes’ in the later Middle Ages. Far from being primarily logical in origin, the 
evolution of a ‘proto-probability theory’ in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
seems to stem from real-life problems of economics and entertainment, in the 
form of gambling. Nevertheless, such developments, although they were often 
originally non-scholastic and would now be considered ‘mathematical’ rather than 
logical, are relevant to this discussion because they were relevant to the central 
logical problem (in this thesis and arguably in the fourteenth century itself) of the 
nature of future contingency. It is all the more important that they be considered 
because it seems that Gower’s use of them in his treatment of the contingency 
question is rather unusual. Rather than simply imitating conventional scholastic 
lines of enquiry, Gower is using a literary text as a means of actively engaging 
with established logical problems, in a fashion that could be described as 
philosophically ‘cutting-edge’ for the time.  
Fourteenth-Century Logicians 
 
If the images and characters that populate the pages of late-medieval logical 
treatises are distinctively idiosyncratic, so too are many of their creators. In order 
to provide a context for my discussion of logic’s influence on medieval literature, 
46 
 
I provide in this section a series of introductions to some of the key figures in the 
world of fourteenth-century logic. It is worth emphasising, however, that in their 
own time, and indeed for a couple of centuries afterwards, these figures would 
have required no such introduction, especially to anyone of a philosophical bent. 
It is telling, for instance, that Ralph Strode, whose fame as a logician was well 
established in Italy for two hundred years after his death, tends to be known to 
medievalists only for Chaucer’s reference to him at the end of Troilus and 
Criseyde. 
 
Robert Holcot: 
Robert Holcot (died 1349) was a Dominican Friar who studied and taught at 
Oxford and possibly later at Cambridge.
70
 In addition to the standard course of 
lectures on Lombard’s Sentences, he lectured on the Twelve Minor Prophets, 
Matthew, perhaps Ecclesiastes and Wisdom. He also took part in, and has left 
discussions of, quodlibetal disputations. He is known to Chaucer scholars 
principally for his Wisdom commentary, which Chaucer relies upon for certain 
passages of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.71 This single fact has, perhaps, given most 
readers of late-medieval literature a rather stunted view of who and what exactly 
Holcot was. His true scholarly character was one of ‘theological acuity aided by 
brilliance as a logician’, as Katherine Tachau puts it.72 Certainly his most 
controversial writings concern the logical questions over God’s foreknowledge, 
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revelation and future contingency found in his quodlibetal quaestiones, his 
Sentences commentary and even, in a small way, in the Wisdom commentary.
73
 
His logical ingenuity was complemented by considerable powers of literary 
imagination and expression. This is demonstrated by the ‘evocative verbal 
“pictures” of [the] Wisdom commentary’, the clear enjoyment of puns and 
pseudo-etymologies in his Sermo finalis, and his probable contribution to the 
Philobiblon of Richard of Bury and his circle.
74
 Through his association with 
Richard of Bury (who was the Bishop of Durham), Holcot entered ‘a circle of 
scholars [...] which embraced the best of scholastic logicians and “proto”-
humanist literati’ and ‘his presence at London in Bury’s palace gained him an 
audience among courtiers increasingly literate and like him classicizing in taste’.75  
Philosophically, Holcot was one of the heirs of Ockham. In fact, he 
‘assumed most of Ockham’s philosophical positions as foundational, taking them 
for granted in the development of his theology’.76 Thus Holcot’s theological 
positions, though often radical, were not isolated or entirely novel, but formed 
part of the nominalist and sceptical current within English thought. As Katherine 
Tachau argues, 
an Oxford theological audience in 1331 would surely 
have recognized that few of the arguments preserved in 
the record of Holcot’s debates were novel; on the 
contrary, Holcot’s task was to come to terms with a 
common fund of problems, objections, and 
considerations that established the recent parameters of 
discussion.
77
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Through Holcot’s logical and theological explorations, Chaucer and other later 
fourteenth-century writers were exposed to one side of a particularly fierce debate 
that had flared up in the first half of the century, to be reignited by another Oxford 
logician in Chaucer’s own generation, John Wyclif. 
 
Thomas Bradwardine:  
Thomas Bradwardine was, in the words of James Weisheipl, ‘the one [Fellow of 
Merton] who most influenced the thought of the College towards a mathematical 
approach to physics’ and ‘has rightly been called the “founder of the Merton 
School”’.78 Judging from the known facts about his academic career, Bradwardine 
must have been born around the turn of the fourteenth century, perhaps as early as 
1290, but we have neither a definite date nor a certain place of birth.
79
 By 1321, 
he was a fellow of Balliol; by 1323, of Merton, presumably having already 
graduated as Master of Arts.
 
In the course of his following regency teaching in the 
arts, Bradwardine composed his tract De insolubilibus, and published his 
celebrated Tractatus de proportionibus (Treatise on Ratios) in 1328, having 
already begun his theological study.
80
 It was around this time that Bradwardine 
began to adopt his characteristic emphasis on God’s antecedent grace in the 
process of salvation, which flowered, over the next fifteen years, into his 
polemical summa, De causa Dei contra Pelagium (The Case for God Against the 
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Pelagians) (c. 1344)
81
. He was elected proctor twice in the mid-twenties and 
remained at Merton until about 1335, when it seems he joined Richard of Bury’s 
circle of philosophers and theologians. Shortly afterwards, as a papal mandatory, 
he heard, and perhaps participated in, a dispute on future contingency at Avignon. 
He was appointed Chancellor of St Paul’s in 1337, and consecrated Archbishop of 
Canterbury in 1349, holding the position for only just over a month, before he 
died of the plague.
82
  
Bradwardine’s association with Richard of Bury is of especial 
significance, given Holcot’s membership of the same circle. Holcot was a close 
contemporary ‘with whom Bradwardine might have debated at Oxford during his 
three years as bachelor’. Holcot was also one of the thinkers who developed 
radical positions on future contingency after William of Ockham, and whom 
Bradwardine famously attacked in De causa Dei.
83
 As I discuss below, the later 
controversy between Wyclif and Strode over necessity echoes this earlier 
controversy between Bradwardine and what he himself called the ‘Pelagian’ wing 
of English theology.
84
 It is notable that half a century before Chaucer weighed in 
with what I will argue is his literary contribution to the Wyclif-Strode dispute, 
Bradwardine and Holcot (at contrary extremes of the philosophical spectrum on 
the contingency question) also moved together in what was essentially a literary 
milieu, under the patronage of Richard of Bury.  
                                                          
81
 Bradwardine, De causa Dei.  
82
 Leff, ‘Bradwardine, Thomas’, in ODNB. 
83
 Weisheipl, ‘Ockham and the Mertonians’, p. 650. 
84
 For a neat, brief summary of the terms ‘Pelagianism’ and ‘Semi-Pelagianism’, see Weisheipl, 
‘Ockham and the Mertonians’, pp. 645-46. 
50 
 
Bradwardine’s theological speculations should be viewed in the context of 
his ground-breaking mathematical research, for which he remains justly famous, 
especially the Tractatus de proportionibus, ‘which continued to be influential 
until the time of Galileo’.85 Within the last decade, some research has begun to 
explore the influence of Bradwardine’s mathematical and theological works upon 
later fourteenth-century literature, partly to the detriment of the importance of 
logic in Bradwardine’s thought and reputation.86 However, it is important to note 
that Chaucer’s friend, Ralph Strode, seemed most enamoured and impressed by 
Bradwardine’s logical work on insolubles, which is significant given his own 
logico-theological controversies with another admirer of Bradwardine, John 
Wyclif. Nor is there anything unusual about Strode’s depiction of Bradwardine as 
a formidable logician. As Paul Vincent Spade notes, Bradwardine’s treatise on 
insolubles ‘was perhaps the most influential treatise on semantic paradoxes 
throughout the Middle Ages’.87 Consequently, to adopt a late fourteenth-century 
perspective, Bradwardine should be seen as a logician as much as a 
mathematician and theologian, and all three aspects of his work need to be borne 
in mind when discussing the extent and nature of Bradwardine’s influence on later 
literary writers. 
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William Heytesbury: 
William Heytesbury was born probably sometime before 1313 and lived until 
1372/3.
88
 By 1330 he was a fellow of Merton, by 1340 of Queen’s College, by 
which time ‘we may assume that Heytesbury was already a theological student’.89 
It seems, however, that he returned to Merton soon after. Some time before 1348, 
Heytesbury became Doctor of Theology, and apparently twice held office as 
Chancellor of the University, probably in 1353-54 and 1370-72. No theological 
work of Heytesbury’s has survived, if he ever wrote any. All his known works 
date from the thirties, during his arts regency, the most famous of which is 
undoubtedly his Regule solvendi sophismata (On the Rule for Solving Sophisms), 
which can be dated with some confidence to 1335.
90
 
The tendency of Heytesbury to incorporate physical problems into his 
major work on sophismata, although highly significant, has perhaps led to a slight 
over-emphasis on the centrality of physical questions in fourteenth-century logic. 
This widespread perception of Heytesbury as primarily a ‘physicist’ has probably 
been strengthened by the popularity and accessibility of Curtis Wilson’s book on 
William Heytesbury: Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics.
91
 So 
for instance, discussing the ‘ars-metrike’ of the Summoner’s Tale, Timothy 
O’Brien writes that fourteenth-century logicians were testing ‘physical laws as 
often as logical ones’ and that ‘solutions to such [logical] problems at Oxford 
during this period [...] often depended on arithmetical and geometrical 
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demonstrations’, appealing specifically to Heytesbury in justification of this 
claim.
92
 The last three chapters of the Regule do indeed introduce a large number 
of physical questions, although this is not so much the case with the first three 
chapters, which concern such standard logical fare as insolubles and 
epistemological paradoxes. However, it is clear that the physical questions fit into 
the larger context of Heytesbury’s collections of logico-linguistic sophismata. For 
instance, in his other treatise on the Sophismata, he treats propositions apparently 
taken from Ricardus Sophista’s thirteenth-century treatise for the first thirty 
sophisms, adding only two at the end on more ‘physical’ questions.93 As discussed 
above, yet another collection of sophismata, the Sophismata asinina, is entirely 
concerned with the highly conventional sophism ‘You are an ass’.94 Thus it is true 
that many of the fourteenth-century sophismata were physical in nature, and such 
questions could be referred to as ‘phisike’ even at the time, but their treatment 
was nevertheless logical, in that it was sophismatic, and the physical sophismata 
should not be torn from this logical context.
95
 My treatment of the literary 
influence of Heytesbury, whilst making use of his physical interests and 
examples, will bear in mind his primary character as a logician. 
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John Buridan: 
Born before 1300 in Picardy and educated in Paris, John Buridan had received his 
Master of Arts by the mid-twenties. He enjoyed ‘a long and illustrious career’ in 
the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris, and was made Rector in 1328 and 
again in 1340.
96
 Buridan’s writings cover many aspects of philosophy, but as a 
Master of Arts, he never wrote on theology, nor, despite his obvious philosophical 
acuity, did he ever move on to a doctorate in one of the higher faculties, as was 
usual. In addition to his treatise on the Sophismata, with which this thesis will 
principally deal, he produced a wide range of commentaries on Aristotle, a 
Summulae de dialectica and a Tractatus de consequentiis.
97
 He died sometime 
between 1358 and 1361. 
Buridan is the only non-English logician whose work will receive 
significant and repeated attention in this thesis; and this for two reasons. As 
Theodore Kermit Scott says, ‘he completely dominated later medieval philosophy 
at Paris’;98 but he was also a man who took up and developed methods that might 
otherwise be viewed as typical of the current of English logic in the early 
fourteenth century. He was a terminist after Walter Burley, a nominalist after 
Ockham, and like the Oxford Calculators, or so-called Merton men, he was a 
student of physics and mechanics.
99
 By the second half of the fourteenth century, 
and largely due to Buridan’s influence and the brilliance of some of his students, 
logic on the continent was beginning to outstrip English logical thought. Any 
account of what a late fourteenth-century author might have understood by 
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‘logical philosophy’, even specifically in relation to English culture, would be 
partial or distorted, without reference to Buridan. This is especially the case 
because Buridan’s thought is anything but narrow. As Zupko puts it, ‘logic is how 
[Buridan] makes sense of the world as a philosopher’: the impact of his logic, 
both in terms of his own thought and in the thought of those who read him, is 
intellectually and culturally far broader than that one specific field.
100
 
Second, Buridan was a figure surrounded by so much of what ‘Edmond 
Faral called the “bruits de ville” or “buzz”’, that his own life ‘quickly turned [...] 
into the stuff of legend’;101 indeed, into the stuff of logic, his own highly 
imaginative logic. Many of the reputed incidents of his life would gel seamlessly 
with the more bizarre examples from Buridan’s Sophismata: being thrown into a 
river by the King of France, or unintentionally improving a (future) Pope’s 
memory by hitting him on the head with a shoe in a fight over another man’s 
wife.
102
 Indeed it is by no means impossible that the logic inspired the legends, 
rather as the pseudo-biographical vida of the troubadours were composed in part 
by literalising their own fictions.
103
 Buridan’s Sophismata forms, quite apart from 
its philosophical value, a near compendium of sophismatic exemplars and images, 
some as old as Plato, some brand new. If one can see them spilling out even into 
the biography of a respectable scholar, it is no wonder that Buridan’s works form 
a veritable reference library when attempting to trace the possible logical 
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provenance of a particular striking image or fantastical scenario; and this is very 
often how I have used Buridan’s Sophismata in this thesis. 
 
John Wyclif: 
John Wyclif is almost famous enough to need no introduction, were it not for the 
fact that his true character as Oxford logician, and the extent to which his logic 
influenced and directed the wider effects of his theology, is probably less well 
known to readers of late fourteenth-century literature than his reputation as the 
inspiration for a popular religious movement.
104
 As Anthony Kenny put it, ‘if 
Wyclif was the Morning Star of the Reformation, he was also the Evening Star of 
Scholasticism’, since he has been seen as ‘the last of the great Oxford 
schoolmen’.105 
Wyclif was born sometime in the third decade of the fourteenth century 
and died in 1384. His place of birth is unknown, although he has often been 
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considered a northerner, from the village of Wycliffe in the North Riding.
106
 By 
1356, he was a probationary fellow of Merton, although it appears from an early 
fifteenth-century catalogue of former Merton fellows (the Catalogus Vetus) that 
he failed to last a full year. The reason for his early departure is unknown. The 
same catalogue describes Wyclif as a Doctor of Theology ‘qui [...] nimium in 
proprio ingenio confidebat’ (‘who used to trust too much in his own 
ingenuity’):107 a slur of character, perhaps, but one that may hint at Wyclif’s 
infamy among his near contemporaries rather for intellectual virtuosity than for 
the sort of popular Biblical ‘fundamentalism’ with which his name has been all 
too often associated since the Reformation, and to this day.
108
 By December 1360, 
Wyclif was Master of Balliol, and later that decade he was appointed warden of 
the newly established Canterbury College. 
By the early years of the seventies, Wyclif’s philosophical opinions were 
beginning to provoke controversy. As Robson explains, ‘the arguments of the 
Master of Arts suddenly seemed much more questionable when invoked by the 
Master of Theology’.109 Often the philosophical questions that held dangerous 
implications for Wyclif’s theology and politics were intimately related to logical 
and mathematical problems, as Norman Kretzmann has demonstrated on the 
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subject of indivisibles and the continuum.
110
 This is by no means surprising. 
Kantik Ghosh, in his study of ‘Logic and Lollardy’, notes that ‘Wyclif’s own 
contributions to the development of late-medieval logic, as recent scholars have 
begun to explicate, are substantial’.111 It was in the context of an emerging 
rejection of Wyclif’s philosophical and logical opinions (as well as his theological 
ones) that the series of controversies with Ralph Strode took place. These I 
discuss at more length below, in relation to Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde. 
 Wyclif died in 1384. As Herbert Workman wrote, ‘one difficulty in any 
life of Wyclif is to know at what point to conclude,’ adding, ‘to end with Wyclif’s 
death were absurd’.112 The reason is that significant aspects of Wyclif’s 
reputation, such as his extreme necessitarianism, were shaped in the three decades 
immediately following his death, and fixed by the Oxford commission of 1411, 
which condemned a list of propositions plucked from Wyclif’s writings: in the 
question of necessity and free will, the condemnations constitute a grossly unfair 
presentation of his views, as Anthony Kenny has argued.
113
 The extent to which 
Chaucer himself may have played a part in distorting Wyclif’s philosophy in the 
eyes of his contemporary audience will be discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
Ralph Strode: 
Concerning Ralph Strode’s life, career and connections, our information is much 
more limited and uncertain. For the majority of the twentieth century, 
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considerable doubt lingered over whether the Merton scholar by that name was 
identical with the London lawyer, friend of Geoffrey Chaucer and dedicatee of 
Troilus and Criseyde. Since Rodney Delasanta’s influential article of 1991, the 
probability that the two men were in fact one and the same has generally been 
considered sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the Troilus was indeed 
dedicated to a man philosophical not merely in temperament, but also in training 
and, at least for a time, in profession. Delasanta was rightly interested in the 
consequences for Chaucer studies of this conclusion; unfortunately his 
presentation of Strode as a ‘Thomistic philosopher’ facilitated an investigation 
into Chaucer’s own philosophy only in general terms. The Oxford Strode, it 
should be emphasised, was a philosopher in the sense that that term was regularly 
applied in the fourteenth century: that is to say, he was primarily what we could 
call a logician. All of Strode’s surviving works are explicitly logical in nature: 
treatises on Consequentiae, De arte logica, De principiis logicalibus, De 
suppositionibus, Insolubilia, and the Obligationes, which originally formed a 
single work, the Logica, written in or soon after 1359.
114
 In this field Strode 
achieved considerable lasting and widespread renown. As Delasanta himself 
acknowledges, ‘a century after his death, Strode’s works on logic were part of the 
curriculum at the University of Padua and published there and in Venice’.115 It 
will be one of the contentions of this thesis that Delasanta was far from correct to 
view Strode’s logical interests as merely ‘of limited use’ to Chaucer studies.116 
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Furthermore, it is important that Strode’s work be seen in the context of his 
predecessors at Merton, the so-called ‘Oxford Calculators’. In particular, Strode 
expressed great admiration for Bradwardine, who he called ‘the first among the 
modern philosophers of nature’ (‘princeps modernorum physicorum’) in his 
treatise on Insolubles.
117
  
As far as we can tell, Strode probably ended his scholastic career a little 
before 1373, since ‘soon after the references to Strode cease in the Merton records 
a “Radulphus Strode” obtained a reputation as a lawyer in London’, being sworn 
in as Common Pleader of the City of London in that year.
118
 Nevertheless, it was 
after this move that the series of controversies between Wyclif and Strode were 
conducted (of which only Wyclif’s responses survive), implying that Strode was 
by no means intellectually inactive during the period in which Chaucer would 
have known him. Although the logical elements of Strode’s objections to Wyclif 
are marked and of great significance, they have never been fully explored. Neither 
has the acknowledged relation between the controversy and the famous soliloquy 
on necessity in the Troilus received as much attention as it deserves. 
The Development of the Controversy over Future Contingency 
in the Fourteenth Century 
In this final section of the Introduction, I would like to describe one 
particular controversy that, in the fourteenth century, was largely conducted 
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through the medium of logic. It is a controversy that has considerable 
repercussions in Middle English literature, as I shall show. It concerns the 
possibility and nature of a contingent, rather than a predetermined, future. The 
following survey will focus largely on English thought, not merely because this 
thesis will deal with English literature, but crucially because it was in England 
that this controversy was most prolonged, fiery and fruitful. 
The background of the problem lies, unsurprisingly, with Aristotle, and in 
Aristotle the question is entirely logical, rather than in any sense theological.
119
 
For Aristotle some form of necessitarianism is an implication of the simple law of 
non-contradiction, unless that law is carefully qualified. In the ninth chapter of the 
De interpretatione, Aristotle proceeds from the principle that in the case ‘of 
contradictory statements […] it is necessary for [either] one or the other to be true 
or false’ to present the argument that ‘it is necessary for the affirmation or the 
negation to be true or false’.120 The consequence of this line of reasoning is that 
it follows that nothing either is or is happening, or will be 
or will not be, by chance or as chance has it, but 
everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since 
either he who says [that it is or will be] or he who denies is 
saying what is true).
 121
 
In other words, if I state that you will go to the library next Thursday, then that 
statement must either be true or false: you either will go or you will not – it surely 
cannot be both at once. Yet if my statement is true a week in advance of your 
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action, then, when it comes to it, you must go to the library next Thursday, 
otherwise my statement will not have been true after all; and vice versa. 
Furthermore, it makes no difference if such propositions have, in fact, ever been 
made or not, since it would be absurd to think that a man making a prediction ten 
thousand years before an event is the cause of that event, just because he predicted 
it. Thus for Aristotle the question of necessitarianism is entangled in the fabric of 
the logical nature of things: the most basic logical principle of all, the law of non-
contradiction, is the source of the problem. 
However, Aristotle asserts that future events are contingent before they 
happen, and therefore makes a distinction between saying ‘everything that is, is of 
necessity, when it is’ and saying ‘unconditionally that it is of necessity’ (in the 
Latin of the Boethian translation, ‘non enim idem est omne quod est esse 
necessario quando est, et simpliciter esse ex necessitate’).122 Thus it has been 
argued that ‘Aristotle believed that any statement which asserts or denies, 
concerning a contingent event, that it is going to occur, is neither true nor false, 
the world being yet indeterminate with regard to the existence or non-existence of 
things’.123 In order to hold this, he is forced to qualify the law of non-
contradiction as regards ‘things that are not but may possibly be or not be’.124 
Throughout the following discussion, it is important to bear in mind that what is 
really at issue in this question is the nature of logic, as much as, if not more than, 
the nature of God. 
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Boethius’ translation of the De interpretatione was one of only two 
Aristotelian works that, along with Boethius’ translation of the Isagoge of 
Porphyry, formed the Logica Vetus (the other work being Aristotle’s Categories). 
Before the rediscovery of other Aristotelian works in the twelfth century, these 
three texts alone formed the logical element of the trivium.
125
 Consequently, 
Aristotle’s treatment of the problem was much discussed, and in a Boethian 
aspect. After Boethius, ‘medieval philosophers [...] found in [Aristotle’s analysis] 
a thorny problem of reconciling liberty with divine omniscience’.126 The logical 
problem, therefore, assumed a theological dimension that became highly 
controversial in the late thirteenth century. Boethius’ own solution was 
threefold.
127
 Firstly, he distinguished between so-called absolute and conditional 
necessity, as Chaucer’s Nun’s Priest tries to explain, not entirely helpfully (VII. 
3245-50).
128
 Secondly, he asserted that ‘the nature of knowledge is determined by 
the nature of the knower rather than by that of the thing known’. Finally, he 
adduced the concept of the ‘Eternal Present’, ‘the notion that to God all time is as 
the present is to us’. This last aspect of Boethius’ solution also forms part of the 
orthodox backbone of Wyclif’s later solution to the problem. 
 In 1277, the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, published his infamous 
condemnation of 219 theological, philosophical and logical errors, which has been 
hailed by some as a kind of watershed in the history of ideas.
129
 It has been seen 
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as a response to a determinism that grew from the Aristotelian rediscoveries: ‘the 
Condemnation of 1277 was intended to subvert philosophical necessitarianism 
and determinism that had become characteristic of philosophical thought in the 
thirteenth century and that had been derived from Greco-Arabic sources, 
especially from the works of Aristotle and his ardent admirer and commentator, 
Averroes’.130 To this end, it was necessary to emphasise the potentia Dei 
absoluta, the absolute power of God, in the face of a naturalistic determinism 
which implied the ‘necessity of divine action’.131 Tempier’s list includes 
condemnations of the propositions that God cannot know future contingents, since 
divine foreknowledge would be a necessary cause of future events (15), and ‘that 
nothing happens by chance, but everything comes about by necessity, and that all 
things that will exist in the future will exist by necessity’ (‘Quod nichil fit a casu, 
set omnia de necessitate eueniunt, et quod omnia futura que erunt, de necessitate 
erunt’) (102).132 About a century after Tempier’s intervention, a proposition of 
Wyclif’s would, almost word for word, fall foul of the latter condemnation. 
Shortly afterwards, Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Kilwardby published 
in Oxford a list of 30 erroneous propositions on grammar, logic and philosophy. 
The motivations, causes and possible association of these condemnations are 
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complex and controversial.
133
 However, whether or not Kilwardby’s 
condemnations were a response to Tempier’s, the condemnation of one particular 
proposition on Kilwardby’s list is highly significant: namely proposition 8, ‘Item 
quod omnis propositio de futuro vera est necessaria’ (‘Again, that every true 
proposition about the future is a necessary proposition’).134 Kilwardby’s 
condemnations are clearly allied with the conservative reaction: God’s absolute 
power to perform his will must be saved from the threat of a logical or natural 
necessitarianism at all costs. The trouble was that Aristotle’s solution in the De 
interpretatione of refusing to assign determinate truth-values to future 
propositions itself seemed to fall foul of Tempier’s condemnations by 
undermining God’s foreknowledge: if a proposition is neither determinately true 
nor false, how can God know it absolutely to be true? Kilwardby’s condemnation 
appears to assert that a future proposition can be true and simultaneously 
contingent: that is, a statement about the future can be true even though there is a 
possibility that the opposite will happen. If granted, this position would both 
safeguard God’s ability to know the future truly and preserve his absolute power 
to have created the world, and intervene in that world, in any way He wished. 
Working out this apparent contradiction would exercise the greatest minds of the 
fourteenth century. As C. H. Lawrence observes: 
Like most attempts at censoring ideas, the condemnations 
were counter-productive. Rather than stopping debate […], 
they exacerbated it.
135
 
                                                          
133
 Uckelman gives an excellent summary of these issues: ‘Logic and the Condemnations’, pp. 
203-213. Uckleman argues, however, that the 1277 condemnations had rather less impact on the 
development of late-medieval logic than might have been expected. 
134
 Uckelman, ‘Logic and the Condemnations’, p. 217. 
135
 Lawrence, The Friars, p. 159. Lawrence is referring specifically here to the effect of the 
condemnations on the controversy over the soul and the body in the late thirteenth century; but his 
remarks are equally applicable to the controversy over necessity and contingency. 
65 
 
 
At the end of the thirteenth century, one thinker more than any other set 
the tone of much fourteenth-century thought on this question: ‘it was with Duns 
Scotus (c. 1266 or 1270-1308) above all that the seal of reaction against Thomism 
and Arabian determinism was firmly set’.136 Broadly speaking, Duns’ position 
was ‘voluntarist’: against Aquinas’ emphasis on the intellect, he argued that the 
will was primary. When combined with a strong emphasis on the potentia Dei 
absoluta after the condemnations of 1277, Duns’ philosophy produced conditions 
ripe for the growing emphasis on contingency that evolved in the fourteenth 
century. 
Although many aspects of his thought have been defined in opposition to 
Duns Scotus, William of Ockham followed the trajectory of Duns’ thought on 
contingency, and thus established the first half of the fourteenth century as a 
period of remarkable philosophical and theological daring. Following Duns, 
Ockham, in his ‘attempt to free God from human calculations, discounted the 
causality of Thomism and Aristotle, and placed all emphasis upon the 
unconstrained play of God’s will: it was a supreme law unto itself and permitted 
no order or prediction’.137 Ockham’s pronounced empiricism also helped to focus 
the attention of subsequent thinkers on the subject of future contingency, since his 
denial of the validity of many of the traditional questions upon the Sentences 
resulted in a reduction of the scope of the commentaries that followed. The 
remaining areas of inquiry henceforth received an even greater degree of scrutiny 
than they had before: ‘some of the greatest disputes were directly over grace and 
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future contingents, for it was there that faith and reason came into direct 
conflict’.138 
Ockham himself wrote a Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia 
Dei et de futuris contingentibus (Treatise on Predestination, the Foreknowledge 
of God and Future Contingents), in which he argues against ‘those who suppose 
that passive predestination and passive foreknowledge are real relations in the 
[person who is] predestinate and foreknown’.139 His method of proof is 
noteworthy because Ralph Strode utilises a version of it in his controversy with 
Wyclif over the same question. Ockham asks whether or not a man, A, who is 
now predestinate can commit the sin of final impenitence. If not, then he is 
necessarily saved, which Ockham thinks absurd. If he can, and does, then either 
the real relation of being predestinate is destroyed (in which case A was once 
really predestinate but is no longer, which makes the idea of predestination in 
itself meaningless), or A is simultaneously predestinate and reprobate (which is 
obviously absurd).
140
 As Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann point 
out, Ockham makes a similar argument, structurally speaking, concerning real 
relations in the first book of his commentary on the Sentences, demonstrating the 
growing importance of related questions within the now narrower scope of that 
tradition too.
141
 There, Ockham makes use of conventional logical and ‘physical’ 
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examples (such as ‘sitting’ and ‘standing’, and the kindling of fire) rather than 
purely theological terms, demonstrating that these were, at root, logical questions.  
Against Ockham and the sceptics that followed him stands the towering 
figure of Archbishop Bradwardine, hailed by Chaucer as an authority on this 
matter in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale (VII. 3242). Bradwardine also emphasised the 
importance of the divine will, but turned this argument into a robust defence of a 
predestinarian stance.  
The outstanding feature of De Causa Dei was its refusal 
to concede anything to fact or to natural evidence. [...] 
He judged everything in divine terms; and the effect of 
his system was to make all creation merely the 
extension of the divine will.
142
 
As such, all human actions, although freely willed, were subject to the overriding 
will of God, whose power extended to future events too. As Leff puts it, ‘the 
future was not only known to God but willed by him: hence contingency far from 
being outside his knowledge was the product of His willing’.143 Consequently, 
divine revelation was the only secure basis for knowledge of the future. It is 
important to stress, however, that Bradwardine’s reputation as an unnuanced 
determinist is undeserved, as recent accounts of him have made clear.
144
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Robert Holcot took a position that could be called the polar opposite of 
Bradwardine’s. Holcot was convinced (as indeed Bradwardine was) that a 
simplistic argument that the divinely revealed future must come about of necessity 
not only destroyed man’s free will, but God’s too: his response, however, was 
radically different from Bradwardine’s. Katherine Tachau summarises his position 
thus: ‘there is a class of statements [...] about the future such that the truth of any 
statement which is a member of the class remains contingent even after the 
statement’s revelation’.145 Holcot suggests ‘that God, rather than be misled in His 
knowledge of future contingents, knows only what is necessary: contingents are 
outside his purview’.146 The extraordinary and shocking corollary that Holcot 
drew from this argument was that God could deceive men by revealing as certain 
something that was as yet only contingent. Indeed, according to Holcot, God had 
done just this on many occasions in the Scriptures. As Gordon Leff comments, the 
sceptics’ ‘switch from God’s ordained to His absolute power involved throwing 
all certainty, morality, and indeed probability into the melting-pot: in their place 
anything could emerge’.147 
The brief survey of the development of fourteenth-century thought on 
logico-theological determinism that I have just given omits many of the characters 
and most of the detail that any historian of logic, science or theology would 
consider essential to a full analysis. However, it perhaps serves to explain the 
agenda of those particular thinkers whose work may have been known to Chaucer 
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and his circle. They include two contemporaries of Chaucer, both Oxford 
logicians of considerable stature, but the first now more famous as a theologian 
and the second as a dedicatee of the Troilus. I mean of course John Wyclif and 
Ralph Strode.  
Wyclif’s position on predestination has been misrepresented since his own 
time. As Anthony Kenny summarises,  
One of the heresies for which Wyclif was condemned after 
his death was the doctrine that everything happens by 
absolute necessity. As a result of this condemnation, he has 
been reputed an extreme determinist, and his theory of the 
relationship between the power of God and the acts of men 
has often been described as a rigid predestinarianism. But 
in fact the theory of necessity contained in his 
philosophical writings was a carefully nuanced one; his 
system left as much room for human freedom as that of 
any comparable theologian.
148
 
While Wyclif certainly held that there was a sense in which future, as well as 
present events, come about of necessity, his position was, broadly speaking, not 
too different from Bradwardine’s. At one level, Wyclif’s solution to the problem 
does seem to put less emphasis on the absolute power of God, but only by putting 
more emphasis on human free will. For Wyclif, it is both true that an individual 
acts as he does because God wills him to do so and that God wills it because the 
individual acts as he does. As Kenny argues, 
We can now see how wrong it is to suggest that Wyclif 
went beyond contemporary theologians in limiting human 
freedom in the interests of divine omnipotence. On the 
contrary, he took the highly unusual step of safeguarding 
human freedom by attributing to it control over the eternal 
volitions of God himself.  
[...] 
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Wyclif’s solution to the antimony may seem to involve the 
absurdity of causation which operates backwards in time. 
That is not necessarily so, given his doctrine that all things 
are present with God.
149
 
 Even from these remarks, it should be clear that Wyclif’s theological and logical 
positions on this question are careful and broadly orthodox, utilising aspects of the 
Boethian, the voluntarist and the Bradwardinian solutions to the problem of future 
contingency.  
Yet within half a century of his death, he became infamous for holding a 
simplistically necessitarian doctrine. One reason for this may very well be, as 
Anne Hudson suggests, that although almost all elements of Wyclif’s heresy can 
be traced back to earlier thinkers, ‘the fact that these distasteful notions were no 
longer confined within the precincts of a university debating hall’ made any hint 
of heterodoxy in Wycliffite theology much more noticeable and dangerous.
150
 
Another reason for Wyclif’s reputation as an extremist, however, must be his 
insistence that the proposition that ‘omnia que evenient de neccesitate evenient’ 
(‘everything that comes about comes about out of necessity’) is in some way 
true.
151
 The verbal proximity of Wyclif’s aphorism to the proposition, condemned 
by Tempier, that ‘omnia de necessitate eueniunt’ is probably an indication of the 
strength of Wyclif’s reaction to the increasingly radical positions of what 
Bradwardine would call the ‘Pelagian’ theologians after 1277. How late 
fourteenth-century literature, especially that of Chaucer, may have utilised this 
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dangerous proposition in the misinterpretation and parodying of Wyclif’s logical 
and theological positions will be a major concern of Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
As part of the series of controversial correspondences that the pair enjoyed 
with each other, Ralph Strode engaged Wyclif on the problem of predestination. I 
will examine the Chaucerian relevance of this controversy in some detail in the 
chapter on Troilus and Criseyde. At this point it is sufficient to note that Strode’s 
lines of attack were entirely conventional. One example of this fact would be 
Strode’s use of Ockham’s argument against strict predestination. Although 
Strode’s side of the correspondence has been lost, we know what arguments he 
made because Wyclif quotes them back to him. The third and the fourth 
arguments quoted in Wyclif’s ‘Responsiones ad argumenta Radulfi Strode’ run as 
follow: 
Tercium autem argumentum stat in isto, quod Petrus 
predestinatus non potest peccare mortaliter, vel 
excommunicari a Deo, sed omnis prescitus quantumcunque 
prelacia magna prefulgeat semper excommunicatur a Deo 
et continue peccat mortaliter. 
[...] 
Quartum argumentum stat in isto quod videtur unam 
personam esse membrum ecclesie una vice et alias ipsum 
esse dyabolum, cum Christus qui mentiri non potuit vocavit 
Petrum Sathanam, et ipse Petrus fuit membrum ecclesie 
post et ante.
152
  
(However, the third argument stands in this, that Peter, 
having been predestined, cannot commit mortal sin, or be 
cut off from God, but everyone foreknown [i.e. to be 
damned], however resplendent he might be in his great 
preeminence, is always cut off from God and commits 
mortal sin continually. 
[…] 
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The fourth argument stands in this, that it seems one 
person might be a member of the church one moment and 
another moment be a devil, since Christ, who cannot lie, 
called Peter Satan, and the same Peter was a member of the 
church before and after.) 
A strict understanding of predestination seems to imply that an elect man cannot 
sin mortally and that a man can be elect one moment (for Wyclif defined the 
Church as the sum of the elect) and reprobate the next (a member of Satan). 
Strode’s objection is nothing new, being a clear reworking of Ockham’s earlier 
objection to predestination as a ‘real relation’ in the predestinate man, nor is his 
use of St. Peter as an exemplar innovative (Ockham himself uses the example of 
Peter in his treatise on predestination and future contingency).
153
 Furthermore, in 
making his fourth argument, Strode assumes Wyclif’s reliance on the counter-
Holcotian assertion that ‘Christus [...] mentiri non potuit’ (‘Christ could not lie’), 
implicitly placing Wyclif firmly within the Bradwardinian tradition. 
The contemporary controversies about future contingency with which 
Chaucer might have been familiar, should thus be seen as continuations and 
developments of debates earlier in the fourteenth century. They are also the legacy 
of a much older tradition which viewed the problem as primarily logical rather 
than theological. In the Wyclif-Strode correspondences, its logical dimension was 
still vital, as I will argue in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
MATHEMATICS AND CONTINGENCY IN  
THE CANTERBURY TALES 
Chaucer and the Logicians 
The extent to which Chaucer knew and read the works of fourteenth-century philosophers, 
scientists and logicians has been robustly debated over the last two decades. Critics such as 
William Watts and Richard Utz have been highly suspicious of the evidence for Chaucer’s 
‘direct engagement’ with the writings or positions of fourteenth-century philosophers and 
logicians.
154
 Some, like Alastair Minnis, remain unconvinced by Robert Pratt’s argument that 
Chaucer relies on Holcot’s commentary on the Book of Wisdom for numerous details in the 
Nun’s Priest’s Tale, following it ‘closely in theory after theory, detail after detail, and 
illustration after illustration’.155 Yet over the last decade scholars have become less sceptical. 
This is not so much because of the sudden emergence of any fresh ‘hard evidence’ (which has 
always been rather thin on the ground), but more because of an increasing recognition of the 
extent to which Chaucer’s work reveals quite a precise awareness of fourteenth-century 
philosophical, scientific and logical issues. 
                                                          
154
 Watts and Utz, ‘Nominalist Perspectives’, p. 163. 
155
 Pratt, ‘Latin Sources’, p. 538; Minnis, ‘Looking for a Sign’, p. 144. Neil Cartlidge has recently argued that 
Chaucer may have been influenced by other passages from Holcot’s Wisdom Commentary in his construction of 
the Cook’s Tale and the Physician’s Tale: see ‘Wayward Sons and Failing Fathers’. See also Watts, ‘Chaucer’s 
Clerks’, pp. 151-52. 
74 
 
It could even be argued that there is more than enough explicit testimony within the 
Chaucerian texts themselves to put the validity of such approaches beyond question. As 
Rodney Delasanta more or less proved, the Ralph Strode known to Chaucer was the Oxford 
logician of that name.
156
 It is this Strode to whom Chaucer chooses to dedicate Troilus and 
Criseyde, under the epithet ‘philosophical’ (V. 1857). Given Strode’s career as a logician, 
there should be little doubt as to which aspect of philosophy Chaucer had in mind when he 
commended his poem to his friend. Yet it is clear that at least some early readers of the text 
understood very well who and what Strode was, and under what aspect he would be a useful 
critic of the poem; for as both Karl Reichl and Kathryn Lynch point out, ‘variant readings in 
two manuscripts of Troilus and Criseyde substitute “sophistical” for “philosophical” Strode, 
underscoring the linkage between philosophy and the more technical sophisms of formal 
logic and dialectics’.157 Although I am not convinced by Lynch’s attempt to argue, from 
silence, the possibility that Chaucer may have had an Oxford or Cambridge arts education, 
neither do I follow Reichl’s logic that it is therefore ‘highly unlikely that Chaucer had read 
[Strode’s] technical [...] treatises’.158 On the contrary, it seems humanly improbable that 
Chaucer, writing a poem featuring a character who could ‘wel and formely arguwe’ (IV. 497), 
would not have taken the time to read the one treatise on consequentiae that he certainly did 
have access to, especially if he was planning to ask his logician friend (and the work’s 
author) to ‘correcte’ his poem (V. 1858). Both Lynch and Reichl underestimate the tenacity of 
Chaucer as an interested amateur. There is simply no reason to assume that a man who 
translated Boethius and who wrote at least one treatise on astronomy would not have done 
some preliminary research on logical reasoning in preparation for the Troilus. There is also 
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no reason why Chaucer should have found Strode’s Consequentiae too difficult either to 
understand or enjoy.
159
 In fact, it seems highly likely that Troilus explicitly refers to a 
scholarly controversy involving Strode, as I will discuss below. If this is right, our view of 
Chaucer as an author with a general interest in philosophical questions must be modified to 
that of a diligent amateur who took specific interest in philosophy, science and logic, and 
even participated, through his own literary medium, in the controversies of his time. 
 It was perhaps through Strode that Chaucer made acquaintance with the works or 
ideas of Bradwardine, Holcot and even Walter Burley. Strode was something of a fan of 
Bradwardine’s logical work, as he makes clear in his treatise on Insolubilia. Having surveyed 
the approaches of older logicians, ‘who correctly understood little or nothing of insolubles’ 
(‘qui parum vel nihil de insolubilibus recte sapuerunt’), Strode calls Bradwardine ‘the 
foremost of the modern natural philosophers’ (‘princeps modernorum physicorum’) and ‘the 
first to discover something valuable about insolubles’ (‘qui aliquid quod valuerit de 
insolubilibus primitus advenit’).160 It is thus entirely plausible that Strode discussed with his 
poet friend, not only Bradwardine’s treatment of the problem of future contingency in his De 
causa Dei, for which Chaucer primarily seems to have known him (the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, 
VII. 4432), but also his famously innovative approach to insolubilia. As I have suggested, 
Strode’s own series of controversies with Wyclif over predestination and contingency is, to a 
certain extent, a re-run of the earlier controversy between Bradwardine and Holcot, both 
members of Richard of Bury’s literary and philosophical circle.161 
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Chaucer twice refers explicitly to the sophismata in The Canterbury Tales. The Squire 
compares the tercelet’s casuistry to ‘sophymes of [...] art’ (V. 554) in his tale, which Jack 
Bennett glosses as a reference to the ‘sophismata logicalia’. Bennett sees in this reference 
evidence that Chaucer shared ‘the delight in specious argument for its own sake which 
characterizes the later fourteenth century’.162 This is undoubtedly true. Yet, again, there has 
been less critical attention to the fact that Chaucer’s reference is to actual ‘sophymes’ rather 
than to sophistical reasoning in general. That is, if this reference is an indication of Chaucer’s 
interest, it is an interest in the specific manifestations of pseudo-logical reasoning in the arts 
syllabus, as much as in the underlying argumentative thought process. The other reference is 
in the Clerk’s Prologue, where the Host says to the Clerk, ‘I trowe ye studie aboute som 
sophyme’ (IV. 5). Timothy O’Brien suggests that the sophism in question is specifically 
Jankyn’s solution to the problem of dividing the fart. At the very least there is no reason to 
think that Chaucer’s references to sophisms could not have been informed by an awareness of 
particular sophismatical texts.
163
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The Summoner’s Tale 
The Summoner’s Tale and Ars-metrike 
O’Brien’s suggestion that the Clerk’s ‘sophyme’ is the Summoner’s problem of fart-division 
draws its strength from the prevalence in the Summoner’s Tale of a range of logico-scholastic 
technical terms: ‘probleme’ (2219), ‘question’ (2223), ‘inpossible’ (2231), ‘ymaginacioun’ 
(2218), and ‘demonstracion’ (2224).164 O’Brien’s own focus is largely ‘scientific’: he 
explains Thomas’s ‘inpossible’, an Anglicisation of the Latin impossibilium, as a kind of 
sophism with particular reference to John Buridan and Nicole Oresme.
165
 Glending Olson’s 
recent article follows O’Brien in taking a primarily ‘scientific’ interest in the tale, but 
grounds his scholarship in the physical aspects of fourteenth-century English logic: he 
discusses the Oxford Calculators’ persistent attempts to devise a systematic treatment of 
measurement, and the late fourteenth century’s renewed controversy over the divisibility of 
the continuum that was resurrected by Wyclif himself.
166
 Both readings are highly persuasive, 
and my analysis of the Troilus will touch on some of the same questions. 
  It is also possible to provide a slightly different and rather fuller account of Chaucer’s 
presentation of the evolving nature of intellectual investigation in the fourteenth century. 
Both O’Brien and Olson read Chaucer’s pun on ‘ars-metrike’ as forming one of the string of 
scholastic technical terms that I listed above; and they thus read the problem of dividing the 
fart solely in terms of later medieval logico-scientific developments. Yet it requires a certain 
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modern looseness with terms, a certain conflation of disciplines that in the late Middle Ages 
would have been regarded as largely distinct, to interpret Chaucer’s pun on ‘ars-metrike’ as 
relating simply to the fourteenth-century sophismata of measurement. When Chaucer says 
that, ‘In ars-metrike shal ther no man fynde, / Biforn this day, of swich a question’ (2222-23), 
the joke is that ‘arse-measurement’ is a problem particularly of arithmetic. If the lord is to be 
believed, there have been other, similar questions of arithmetic ‘biforn this day’, though 
nothing as devilishly problematic. As I have discussed above, the extent to which the 
fourteenth-century sophismata, especially of the Oxford Calculators, were concerned with 
physico-mathematical problems has been somewhat exaggerated. Certainly there are plenty 
of sophismata physicalia, which are of great importance in the history of the physical 
sciences. Yet to be properly understood, these questions must be seen in the larger context of 
the more typical semantic and linguistic concerns of late-medieval logic. It is stretching the 
evidence to argue that when he uses the term ‘ars-metrike’ what Chaucer really meant was 
simply the sophismata physicalia of fourteenth-century logic. Indeed, when Jankyn puts 
forward his solution to the problem, it is hailed as worthy of ‘Euclide’ or ‘Ptholomee’ (2289), 
the first a geometer and the second an astronomer, and thus both more properly associated 
with the mathematical quadrivium than the trivium. Again, the occasional use of Euclidean 
geometry in discussing philosophical problems, such as that of the continuum,
167
 or the 
references to astronomy in some sophismata, although useful for demonstrating how Chaucer 
could so easily assimilate diverse disciplines in his tale, hardly provide convincing reasons to 
account for Chaucer’s use of the precise term ‘arithmetic’. Pearcy’s rather complacent 
assertion that Chaucer’s ‘parodic licence’ means that the extension of ‘ars-metrike’ to denote 
sophismatic logic ‘need pose no real difficulty’ is not entirely satisfactory.168 The reality is 
slightly more complex: the Summoner’s Tale is influenced by, and is commenting upon, 
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more than a single, uniform academic context: Chaucer’s treatment of the fart reveals a 
concern with the evolution of logico-mathematical puzzles in the later Middle Ages.  
Chaucer uses the term ‘ars-metrike’ in relation to the expectations of his characters 
about a division problem: that is why the lord exclaims that no such question had been posed 
‘biforn this day’. First, then, what was it that Friar John was expecting to divide?  
A, yif that convent half a quarter otes! 
A, yif that convent foure and twenty grotes! 
A, yif that frere a peny, and lat hym go! 
Nay, nay, Thomas, it may no thyng be so! 
What is a ferthyng worth parted in twelve? (1962-1967) 
 
The divisions the Friar was anticipating are nothing to do with the continuum or other 
philosophical complexities: indeed, the second example is a deliberately simple sum: 24 ÷ 12 
= 2. Such examples are highly conventional problems reminiscent of the earlier arithmetical 
collections, such as the Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes. Given the influence and 
circulation of that text, discussed briefly in the Introduction, it is very possible that Chaucer 
specifically knew the puzzles of the Propositiones in some form, whether directly or through 
intermediate collections, and it is even conceivable that he knew them as the ‘arismetrica’ of 
Alcuin, as one fourteenth-century English library catalogue seems to have called it. 
169
 
The Propositiones contain a number of questions that, both in structure and imagery, 
bear remarkable similarity to the sort of division that the Friar was expecting to perform. For 
instance, Propositio 53 runs:  
Quidam pater monasterii habuit XII monachos. Qui uocans 
dispensatorem domus suae dedit illi ova CCIIII iussitque, ut singulis 
aequalem daret ex eis omnibus portionem. [...] Dicat, rogo, qui valet, 
quot ova unicuique ipsorum in portione evenerunt, ita ut in nullo nec 
superabundet numerus nec minuatur, sed omnes, ut supra diximus, 
aequalem in omnibus accipiant portionem. 
(A certain abbot had twelve monks, who, calling the steward of his 
house, gave him 204 eggs and commanded that he should give an 
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equal portion of them to each. [...] Let him tell who can, I ask, how 
many eggs will go as a share to each, such that neither has too many, 
nor too few, but all receive an equal share, as said above.)
 170
 
The abbot dividing goods between his twelve monks has recourse to his steward to solve the 
problem: the scenario is reminiscent of Chaucer’s narrative. The fact that here the division is 
204 ÷ 12=17 (as the solution makes clear) may help resolve a seeming inconsistency in the 
Summoner’s Tale. It is clear from the denouement that anything given to Friar John on the 
understanding that it be split between the whole convent should be divided between thirteen. 
Yet the Friar, giving examples of the sort of division he is expecting in the passage quoted 
above, speaks of a division ‘in twelve’ (1967). If this passage is referring to the sort of 
conventional ‘ars-metrike’ that Chaucer had in mind, then there is clearly something more 
significant about the number twelve than that it is the standard number of brothers in a 
convent: otherwise, in this passage, Chaucer would have used the example of a division in 
thirteen, as more consistent with the conclusion of the tale. In fact, the use of the number 
twelve in division exercises is common in the Propositiones. Propositio 47, for example, is 
‘de episcopo qui iussit XII panes in clero dividi’ (‘about a bishop who orders that twelve 
loaves be divided amongst his clergy’) and there are also twelve clergy to receive the twelve 
loaves.
171
  
One reason that division into twelve parts occurs particularly often in the 
Propositiones is that Alcuin, or whoever composed the collection, equated the area unit of an 
‘aripennis’ with 144 ‘perticas’: therefore in the solutions to many of the problems involving 
division of area, we find the repeated instruction ‘divide in XII partes’.172 Similarly, since 
twelve denarii made one solidus, divisions of money were more convenient when treated in 
terms of twelfths. Thus Propositio 35 runs as follows: 
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Quidam paterfamilias moriens reliquit infantes et in facultate sua 
solidos DCCCCLX et uxorem praegnantem. Qui iussit, ut, si ei 
masculus nasceretur, acciperet de omni massa dodrantem, hoc est, 
uncias VIIII, et mater ipsius acciperet quadrantem, hoc est, uncias III. 
Si autem filia nasceretur, acciperet septuncem, hoc est, VII uncias, et 
mater ipsius acciperet quincuncem, hoc est, V uncias. Contigit autem, 
ut geminos parturiret, id est, puerum et puellam. Solvat, qui potest, 
quantum accepit mater vel quantum filius quantumve filia. 
 (A dying man left 960 shillings and a pregnant wife. He directed that 
if a boy was born he should receive 9/12 of the estate and the mother 
should receive 3/12. If however a daughter was born, she would 
receive 7/12 of the estate and the mother should receive 5/12. It 
happened however that twins were born - a boy and a girl. How much 
should the mother receive, how much the son, how much the 
daughter?)
173
 
Thus division into twelfths is something of a cliché in the Propositiones, and if it was 
Chaucer’s intention to produce, in Friar John’s speech quoted above, a parody of standard 
arithmetical exercises, then his decision to invoke a division into twelve rather than thirteen 
parts is easily understood. 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that in many of the more difficult division problems of 
the collection, an apparently straightforward sum was complicated by the condition that 
greater shares be awarded to different people, depending on their rank or status. In Propositio 
47 the bishop’s steward is instructed to assign two loaves to each priest, half a loaf to each 
deacon, and a quarter to each reader, transforming the simple division of twelve by twelve 
into a more devious problem of how many of each type of clergy there are. In the same way, 
Chaucer’s steward solves the ‘inpossible’ by allowing a greater share of the fart to the lord’s 
‘noble confessour’ himself (2265), thus simultaneously solving the problem of how a twelve-
spoked cartwheel can serve to divide the fart thirteen ways.  
It is also worth noting that the Friar’s expected examples are highly conventional in 
terms of what is to be divided. Propositiones 32-34 concern a paterfamilias dividing 
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measures of grain amongst his household, just as Friar John asks for ‘half a quarter otes’.174 
Propositio 35, quoted above, is just one of a number of division exercises in the collection 
which involve money, paralleled in the Friar’s request for ‘foure and twenty grotes’. It is 
even possible, in the case of Propositio 35, that the man on his death-bed may be reflected in 
the sickly Thomas of Chaucer’s narrative. Earlier in the tale, the Friar has gone from house to 
house asking for, amongst other things, a portion of cloth, ‘a dagon of youre blanket’ (1751): 
two of the problems in the Propositiones concern the division of a large cloak and a piece of 
linen (Propositiones 9 and 10 respectively).
175
 Another problem in the collection (Propositio 
49) involves calculating the number of carts that can be fitted out from forty-nine cartwheels, 
the answer, of course, being that twelve carts can be created with one cartwheel left over.
176
 
Even the steward’s form of words in replying to the lord’s ‘Tel me how’ (2230) with ‘I koude 
telle’ (2247) is possibly a reflection of the standard challenge of the Propositiones to the 
would-be problem-solver: ‘dicat qui potest’ or ‘dicat qui valet’ (‘let him tell who can’). 
The Propositiones also contain three problems that ‘appear to be spoof questions’.177 
These questions are disguised to look exactly like the genuine mathematical problems that 
surround them. Propositio 15 is a perfectly straightforward arithmetical puzzle which asks, 
‘quot rigas factas habeat homo in agro suo, quando de utroque capite campi tres versuras 
factas habuerit’ (‘How many furrows has a man made in a field, when he has made three 
turnings at each end of the field?’).178 The problem immediately preceding appears very 
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similar at first glance, asking, ‘Bos qui tota die arat, quot vestigia faciat in ultima riga?’ (‘An 
ox ploughs a field all day. How many footprints does he leave in the last furrow?’). However, 
the solution reveals a trick:  
Nullum omnino vestigium bos in ultima riga facit, eo quod ipse 
praecedit aratrum et hunc aratrum sequitur. Quotquot enim hic 
praecedendo inexculta terra vestigia figit, tot illud subsequens 
excolendo resolvit. Propterea illius omnino nullum reperitur in ultima 
riga vestigium. 
(An ox leaves no trace in the last furrow, because he precedes the 
plough. However many footprints he makes in the earth as he goes 
forward, the cultivating plough destroys them as it follows. Thus no 
footprint is revealed in the last furrow.)
179
 
 
The other two trick questions involve impossible divisions.
 
One, Propositio 6, 
concerns two traders who manage to make a profit by selling pigs at the same price as that at 
which they bought them: here the solution is part of the joke, using as it does an erroneous 
division to explain the impossible situation.
180
 The final ‘spoof’ question, Propositio 43, runs 
as follows: 
Homo quidam habuit CCC porcos et iussit, ut tot porci numero impari 
in III dies occidi deberent. Similis est et de XXX sententia. Dicat 
modo, qui potest, quot porci impares sive de CCC sive de XXX in tres 
dies occidendi sunt. [Haec ratio indissolubilis ad increpandum 
composita est.] 
(A certain man had 300 pigs and commanded that the pigs be killed in 
3 days, an odd number each day. (There is a similar one about 30 
pigs). Say, who can, what odd number of pigs, either of 300 or of 30, 
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must be killed in each of the three days? This unsolvable division was 
composed merely for fun.)
181
 
The ‘solution’ dismisses the problem with, ‘Ecce fabula! quae a nemini solui potest [...]Haec 
fabula est tantum ad pueros increpandos’ (‘Behold a fable which is able to be solved by no 
one. This fable is largely for the amusement of children’); and clearly a mathematical 
solution is impossible. However, Hadley and Singmaster mention modern examples of the 
problem that ‘solve’ as ‘1, 1, 298, since 298 is a very odd number of pigs to kill in one 
day’.182 This ‘solution’ works on a pun that is language dependent, of course; but it is 
possible that there was some similarly absurd resolution of the problem that the compiler of 
the Propositiones did not bother to detail. Either way it is clear that humorous and impossible 
division exercises also formed part of the ‘arithmetical’ heritage of the Middle Ages, 
especially since, as both the title of this collection and the ‘solution’ to this puzzle implies, 
such problems were intended for the instruction and amusement of children.
 
Thus Chaucer’s 
own ‘inpossible’ division problem finds in ‘ars-metrike’ proper precedents even more direct 
than in the complex philosophical musings of the fourteenth century that Glending Olson has 
explored.
183
 
On the subject of the Propositiones, one final point is perhaps worth mentioning. 
Chaucer’s rather surprising decision to locate the Summoner’s Tale in a very specific part of 
Yorkshire has never received a fully satisfactory explanation.
184
 It may of course be purely 
coincidental, but supposing that Chaucer knew the Propositiones as the ‘arismetrica’ of 
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Alcuin of York, his decision to locate the tale where he does makes perfect sense. For we 
know from Alcuin’s Life of St. Willibrord that he himself inherited the ownership and 
government of a monastery or at least a ‘small maritime cell’ at Spurn Point, in ‘the mersshy 
contree called Holdernesse’ (1710), as Chaucer describes it.185 It is perhaps not implausible 
that Chaucer decided to set an Alcuinesque division problem on Alcuin’s home turf: a 
monastery in Holdernesse. 
The Summoner’s Tale and Insolubles 
However, the earlier (or simpler) arithmetical sources of the Summoner’s ‘probleme’ are only 
half the story. As the tale itself suggests, the more basic problems of ‘ars-metrike’ were 
repeatedly discussed, complicated and evolved over several centuries, and by the end of the 
Middle Ages it had become clear that originally straightforward mathematical puzzles could 
be linked with more sophismatical questions of language, reference and meaning. For 
instance, according to Hadley and Singmaster the ‘testament’ type problem exemplified by 
Propositio 35 was very popular throughout the Middle Ages and even into the sixteenth 
century. However, in attempting to solve the problem, ‘there is considerable room for debate 
and [by the end of the Middle Ages] several authors give up and declare that the will must be 
void’: rather like the response of the lord in the Summoner’s Tale (2240-42).186 The dismissal 
of such agreements is in itself reminiscent of some fourteenth-century logical responses to 
similar problems.  
One sophism that was widespread during the fourteenth century was the river-
crossing insoluble mentioned briefly in the Introduction: 
Pono casum quod Plato custodiat pontem cum forti adiutorio, ita quod 
nullus potest transire sine eius licentia. Et tunc venit Sortes rogans 
Platonem cum magna prece quod permittat eum transire. Tunc Plato 
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iratus vovet et iurat dicens, ‘Certe Sortes si in prima propositione 
quam tu proferes dicas verum, ego permittam te transire; sed certe si 
dicas falsum, ego proiiciam te in aquam.’ Tunc Sortes dicet Platoni 
praedictum sophisma, scilicet ‘Tu proiicies me in aquam’. Quaeritur 
ergo tunc quid debeat facere Plato secundum promissum.
187
 
(I posit the case that Plato guards a bridge with much assistance, so 
that none can cross without his assent. And then Socrates comes 
asking Plato with great supplication that he allow him to cross. Then 
Plato angrily vows and swears, saying ‘Surely, Socrates, if in the first 
proposition which you utter, you speak the truth, I will permit you to 
cross. But surely, if you speak falsely, I shall throw you in the water.’ 
Then Socrates will say to Plato the aforesaid sophism, namely, ‘You 
will throw me in the water.’ Thus, it is asked then what Plato ought to 
do, according to his promise.)
188
 
At first, it seems a straightforward agreement; but Socrates’ devious reply generates a 
seemingly inescapable semantic paradox. If Plato throws Socrates in the river then Socrates’ 
statement was true, and Plato ought to have let him cross. If Plato lets Socrates cross, then 
Socrates’ statement was false, and Plato ought to have thrown him in the river. Part of the 
solution that Buridan gives to the bridge problem is that Plato lied when he made his initial 
ultimatum, and so the agreement was void.
189
  
This paradox is often referred to as ‘Buridan’s Bridge’, since it appears in Chapter 8 
of his Sophismata; but it was already well known in England at around the same time. 
Bradwardine, for instance, considers exactly the same sophism in his Insolubilia.
190
 Holcot 
also discusses the bridge problem, in his Determinationes. He refers to it as a ‘sophisma 
commune’.191 He also presents the same basic problem in two other forms, the second of 
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which he also describes as ‘commune’.192 These other versions of the problem are even more 
suggestive in relation to the Summoner’s Tale. In the scenario that Holcot gives immediately 
before the bridge problem, Socrates, Plato’s prelate, promises Plato a certain reward, A, if he 
obeys his rule, that Plato should only study about the truth; Plato then studies the proposition, 
‘Socrates does not owe me Reward A’ (‘Sortes non tenetur platoni in a premio’).193 Second, 
in the example that Holcot gives immediately after the bridge problem, it is proposed that 
everyone who speaks the truth will receive a denarius, and Socrates says, ‘I will not receive a 
denarius’ (‘ponatur quod omnis dicens verum habebit decem et dicat Sortes non habebo 
decem’).194 Bradwardine discusses the same sophism, adding by means of explanation, that 
the exchange takes place ‘in aliqua distributione’ (‘in some share-out’).195 The Summoner’s 
‘inpossible’ of a friar who is conditionally promised a reward to be shared out (with the 
expectation of that reward being a coin of some sort) thus uses a great deal of the ‘imagery’, 
and much of the basic structure, of these logical problems. 
Such sophismata were by no means disconnected from the transactions and 
agreements that might give rise to them in everyday life. The bridge problem might seem 
contrived; but Buridan, for instance, also invokes the problems of commerce, devoting a lot 
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of time to discussing another sophism - the even more widespread but rather more likely 
sounding ‘I owe you a denarius’ (or ‘I owe you a horse’). Here he tackles the legal-sounding 
equivocation that since I do not owe you this particular horse, or that particular horse, and so 
on for all actual horses, then I do not owe you any horse at all. This is an especially thorny 
problem for a logician with Buridan’s nominalist emphasis on individuals rather than abstract 
universals.
196
 Such problems explicitly to do with ‘legal obligation’ link fourteenth-century 
logical discussions of meaning and reference to commercial scenarios like those found in 
Alcuin’s Propositiones and, indeed, the Summoner’s Tale.197 Discussions of similar 
sophismata are found in Ockham, Burley, Heytesbury and Wyclif.
198
 Wyclif’s treatment of 
the question is especially interesting since he ultimately (and as Read observes, ‘quite 
unnecessarily’) introduces God’s omniscience into his solution to the problem of which of 
two pennies I promise you, if I promise you a penny. As Read explains, ‘God knows which 
particular penny my confused promise obliges me to give, “for it cannot be a matter of 
indifference for God”’.199 I discuss the logical and literary effects of Wyclif’s views of God’s 
omniscience further below. 
Holcot’s treatments of the bridge and denarius sophismata are set in the context of a 
discussion of divine ordinances, in relation to the question of whether everything lawful and 
not contrary to the salvation of the soul can be reasonably commanded by God (‘vtrum omne 
quod est licitum et non contra salutem anime possit precipi rationabiliter a deo’): that is, it is 
                                                          
196
 Buridan, Sophisms, pp. 137-43 (Chapter 4, Sophism 15). The example of problematic horse-trading may well 
itself have developed from earlier arithmetical problems. Ivor Grattan-Guinness gives an example of 
arithmetically-complicated horse-trading from Fibonacci: see Rainbow of Mathematics, pp. 141-42. 
197
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 137. The extent to which logico-mathematical developments emerged from quotidian 
commercial concerns has been explored in detail by Joel Kaye, Economy and Nature. I will discuss some of his 
research in relation to medieval proto-probability theory in the Gower section below.   
198
 For Heytesbury’s discussion of the proposition, ‘promitto tibi denarium; ergo denarius tibi promittitur’, see 
Heytesbury, Sophismata (Sophism 4, p. 8, fols 89
va
-90
va
 (fol. 90
rb
)). See also Ashworth, ‘I Promise You a 
Horse’; although her focus is later, Ashworth briefly but usefully discusses the differences between Buridan’s 
and Heytesbury’s solutions to this sophism. For discussions of Wyclif, Ockham and Burley’s treatments of such 
sophismata, see Read, ‘“I promise a penny”’, pp. 335-43). 
199
 Read, ‘I promise a penny’, p. 340. See Wyclif, Tractatus de Logica, II, p. 72. 
89 
 
linked to the controversy surrounding the divine potentia absoluta.
200
 He is particularly 
interested in the problem of those divine utterances whose truth-value might arguably be 
different before and after they are uttered. As Elizabeth Ashworth points out, in fourteenth-
century sophismata ‘vows, promises and the like were treated as propositions with truth-
values rather than as performative utterances with no truth-values’.201 Hence vows, promises 
and agreements could be used to build strict insolubilia as well as simpler sophismata and 
impossibilia.
202
 The prelate’s promise to reward obedience to his commands, or Plato’s 
promise to allow Socrates to cross the bridge only in certain conditions, and all similar 
statements, could therefore be treated as propositions and analysed for their truth or 
falsehood. The problem arises that the truth-value of the promise (as well as its 
‘reasonableness’, to use Holcot’s term) appears to be contingent upon the future actions of 
the one to whom the promise is made. Buridan’s discussion of the bridge problem is also set 
in the context of the controversy over future contingency and the determinacy of the truth-
value of propositions about the future. In fact, Buridan explicitly refers to Aristotle’s De 
interpretatione as an authority for his argument that Socrates’ statement is neither 
determinately true nor determinately false.
203
 
It is thus possible to read Thomas’s ‘inpossible’ in a similar way. He makes, and gains 
the Friar’s agreement to, a proposition about the future (you will divide whatever I give you). 
The truth-value of this is contingent upon Thomas’s own actions, and what he decides to 
give, rather than on the Friar’s faithfulness to his promise:  
And in thyn hand thou shalt it have anon,  
On this condicion, and oother noon,  
That thou departe it so, my deere brother,  
That every frere have also muche as oother. (2131-34) 
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The logical precision of the agreement is worth noting here. For such paradoxes to work, the 
proposition must be biconditional (to use a modern term): that is, an ‘if-and-only-if’ 
statement. It recalls Holcot’s description of a scenario in which ‘[Sortes] faciat talem legem 
quod tenebitur quilibet implere preceptum suum in a premio, et solum tali’ (‘Socrates makes 
a law by which, and only by which, anyone who fulfils his command will be owed Reward 
A’).204 Chaucer’s ‘on this condicion and oother noon’ corresponds with the logician’s ‘talem 
[...] et solum tali’. 
 Holcot’s proposed solution to the bridge and other similar sophismata is to emphasise 
the intention of the one formulating the command or promise (‘ad mentem precipientis’ or 
‘intentio precipientis’), as opposed to the exact form of words given (‘ad virtutem verborum’ 
or ‘formam verborum’).205 Thus although the form of words seems to force a paradox, Holcot 
concludes, somewhat surprisingly, that Socrates should not be allowed to cross the bridge, 
arguing that it is fallacious to infer from Socrates’ proposition, ‘I will not cross the bridge’, 
that he will cross the bridge, since a proposition can never follow formally from its opposite 
(‘numquid vnum oppositorum sequitur formaliter ex altero’); and this solution fulfils the 
intention of Plato in making the promise.
206
 
Buridan, on the other hand, concludes that Plato himself lied. In other words, Plato’s 
ultimatum cannot actually dictate Socrates’ fate in all conceivable scenarios, but it tacitly 
assumes that it can: and so it is simply false.
207
 This solution is indicative of an evolving 
approach to the most famous type of insoluble, of which the river-crossing problem is an 
elaboration, the so-called ‘Liar paradox’. Earlier treatments of insolubles like the Liar 
paradox ‘maintained that one who utters an insoluble is simply “not saying anything”, in the 
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sense that his words do not succeed in making a claim’: a ‘solution’ known as ‘cassatio or 
cancelling’.208 It was Bradwardine, the logician so admired by Ralph Strode for his work on 
insolubles, and named by Chaucer in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale (see below), who pioneered a 
novel approach, as Paul Vincent Spade describes:  
He appears to have been the first to hold that a proposition signifies 
exactly what followed from it. Since he was also committed to saying 
that every proposition implies its own truth [...], this means that the 
insoluble ‘This proposition is false’ signifies that it itself is true. Since 
it also signifies that it is false, it signifies a contradiction, and so is 
simply false. The paradox is broken.
209
 
Bradwardine’s ingenious solution was quickly taken up and developed by contemporary 
logicians, including Buridan.
210
  
Thomas’s ‘probleme’ in the Summoner’s Tale is strictly speaking not an insoluble (as 
Chaucer himself acknowledges by using the term ‘impossible’); but all three solutions 
discussed above are proposed at the end of the tale. The Friar is unambiguously in favour of 
the Bradwardine-Buridan solution: he calls Thomas ‘false’ immediately (2153), and repeats 
his accusation in front of the lord (2213). For the Friar, Thomas lied, since the agreement he 
formulated constituted a false proposition about a contingent future. The lord’s instinct, 
however, is to take the older approach to such insolubles and simply to dismiss the agreement 
as meaningless (2242) – even though his repetition and elaboration of the details of the 
agreement emphasise the problematic fact that the precise contract is perfectly clear (2225-
2226). The steward, perhaps, comes closest to Holcot’s solution of the problem. He 
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understands that the motivation behind Thomas’s formulation of the agreement was a general 
dislike of friars, and a determination to be revenged upon this one in particular. Expressing 
himself as ironically as Thomas had done earlier, he details his own reasons for wishing Friar 
John to be repeatedly farted upon (2281-84). Since Thomas’s intention was simply to abuse 
the friars as much as possible, the steward disregards the exact form of words of the 
agreement. He surmises that Thomas will be happy if the fart he has given is not returned but 
is repeated, and not even split equally, but with Friar John taking a greater share (2276-77). 
Such a solution, the steward tells us, is according to ‘reasoun’ (2277): that is, it interprets the 
agreement ‘reasonably’ (‘rationabiliter’), as Holcot suggests. Thus, the Summoner’s 
discussion of the fart problem demonstrates the evolution of simpler arithmetical puzzles into 
much trickier, more sophismatic problems of meaning and reference in propositions about the 
future. No wonder the lord exclaims that ‘In ars-metrike shal ther no man fynde, / Biforn this 
day, of swich a question’ (2222-23)! 
Empty Utterances 
Quite apart from the question of future contingency, the fart itself also poses problems to do 
with the meaning of utterances. Here again, a closer attention to the actual manifestations, 
and precise terms of fourteenth-century sophismata can help explicate Chaucer’s writing. 
Before the fart is bestowed, Friar John regales his poor victim with the lively example of 
blasphemous gluttons: ‘Lo, “buf!” they seye, “cor meum eructavit!”’ (1934). The interjection, 
‘buf’, is, of course, supposed to represent the glutton’s belch, in humorous explanation and 
excusal of which he quotes the opening line of Psalm 44: ‘cor meum eructavit verbum 
bonum’ (‘My heart hath uttered a good word’). Such a simple glossing of the word, along 
with an understanding of the literal meaning of the Latin ‘eructavit’, is sufficient to explain 
the Friar’s crude jest. As Thomas Ross rather primly comments, ‘belches are never very 
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funny, but Chaucer does about as well as anyone’.211 However, as we might expect from 
Chaucer, the joke suggests a world of sophisticated humour and cross-reference that requires 
rather more contextual explanation. For one thing, Chaucer evidently liked this joke well 
enough to use it more than once in The Canterbury Tales. The exemplary drunkard 
apostrophised by the Pardoner makes a noise, ‘as though thou seydest ay “Sampsoun, 
Sampsoun!”’ (VI. 554). Once again we have a meaningless verbal utterance interpreted as a 
religious expression: bemused by the problem, the Pardoner can only remark that ‘Sampsoun 
drank nevere no wyn’ (VI. 555). In that case, the problem of a meaningless, or rather a 
deceitful religious utterance, stands synecdochally for the Pardoner’s whole sermon. 
 Then is there, perhaps, a broader significance to the belch in the Summoner’s Tale? 
O’Brien puts us on the right track: 
The pun occurs again at the end of the tale. Here the lord and his 
company celebrate the squire’s solution to the friar’s problem by 
saying: ‘subtiltee / And heigh wit made [Thomas] speken as he spak; / 
He nys no fool, ne no demonyak’ (2290-92). By this time ‘spake’ 
refers as much to the fart as to what Thomas tells the friar about 
dividing his gift. Speaking, farting and belching [...] are inseparable; 
they are all perturbations of the air, equally interesting as physical 
events to be measured and described.
212
 
Both O’Brien and Olson emphasise the measurement of physical phenomena. Yet the 
problem of meaningless verbal acts is a logical problem of even greater importance and 
controversy in the fourteenth century than the question of measurement, drawing as it does 
from the wider argument surrounding theories of supposition and the fourteenth-century 
revival of terminist logic. Chaucer’s belch deserves a closer look. 
In the Summoner’s Tale, the interjection ‘buf’ is almost certainly not mere 
onomatopoeia, but is related to the Middle English verb ‘buffen’, meaning ‘to speak with 
impediment, stutter, stammer’ or alternatively ‘to bark’ like a dog. Of the former meaning, 
the MED gives three fourteenth-century examples, and of the latter, one fifteenth-century 
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citation.
213
 The OED gives the definition of the verb as ‘to speak with obstructed and 
explosive utterance, to stutter’ or ‘to explode or burst into a laugh, or the like’. For the former 
sense, the earliest citation given is late thirteenth-century, but for the second sense the citation 
given is dated as 1611.
214
 As the MED suggests, it is possible that the etymology of the word 
in the former sense is the Latin ‘balbutio’, since John Trevisa thus translates it in his Middle 
English version of Bartholomaeus’s De proprietatibus rerum. It is clear, therefore, that, 
however the word developed, its connotations were always those of impeded and involuntary 
speech. What is certain is that by the mid-fourteenth century, the interjection could be taken 
to represent meaningless verbal utterance, since this is exactly how Buridan repeatedly 
employs it in his Sophismata. 
Discussing the argument that since no chimera exists, the term ‘chimera’ must 
therefore signify nothing, Buridan maintains that ‘the opposite is argued, since it would then 
be no more a significant word than “buff” or “baff,” which is not admitted’.215 Later, Buridan 
considers how significant such interjections might be if they are designated as proper nouns 
or arbitrarily imbued with meaning, such as in the sophism ‘Baf will be baptised’. In fact, 
Buridan goes one step further and discusses whether ‘buf baf’ could be considered a true 
proposition, if ‘Baf’ is taken as the boy’s proper name and ‘buf’ is taken to stand for the 
phrase ‘this boy will be tomorrow […]’ (thus ‘buf baf’, spoken the day before Baf’s 
christening, means ‘Tomorrow this boy will be called Baf’, and could thus be true).216 Later 
we find Caxton using the phrase ‘He wyste not what to saye buff ne baff’ to mean ‘to know 
not what to say’, and John Knox reported as making a dismissive reply with the meaningless 
‘buf, baf’, so it seems fairly clear that these interjections became relatively routine synonyms 
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for meaningless verbal utterance from the later Middle Ages onward.
 217
 Indeed the OED, 
following Paul Meyer, suggests the ultimate etymology of the later verb ‘baffle’ from the 
contemptuous interjection ‘baf!’218 In their dismissive, even disrespectful meaninglessness, 
such interjections truly are baffling, especially to terminist logicians. 
Yet Chaucer’s friar has the glutton equate his belch with the ‘verbum bonum’ implied 
in the citation of Psalm 44. The adjective ‘bonum’ was used in some fourteenth-century 
logical texts to mean ‘valid’, or even ‘true’.219 The line seems to suggest a sophism of its 
own, very much like Buridan’s: ‘buf’ is a valid term or a true statement. That means, 
however, that ‘buf stands for something’. The relevance of this reading to the poem as a 
whole becomes clear when we take into account the dramatic irony of the line, noted by 
Trevor Whittock and Alan Levitan amongst others, by which the belch anticipates the later 
fart.
220
 For the ‘inpossible’ problem that faces the Friar is not simply the abstract question of 
division of a continuum that Olson explores, but also the problem of how to treat as a 
concrete object something which, as the lord points out, is as diffused as ‘the soun or savour 
of a fart’ (2226).  
Thomas originates this aspect of the problem by promising that ‘Bynethe my buttok 
there shaltow fynde / A thyng’ (2142-43: my emphasis). What sort of a ‘thyng’ is a fart? If, 
like a belch, a fart can be a ‘verbum bonum’, a valid term, then what can it ‘supposit’ or stand 
for? That Friar John expects something concrete as his ‘yifte’ (2146) he has already made 
clear: he wants something more than a ‘ferthyng’, which cannot easily be ‘parted in twelve’ 
(1967). Here again the proleptic irony of the pun (ferthyng / ferting) is not simply for the sake 
of toilet humour. Donald R. Howard, amongst others, notices the basic pun. He concludes 
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that, since ‘puns are “the lowest form of humour”’, this one was primarily intended to 
demonstrate an ‘infantile or primitive response to [...] language’, in line with Chaucer’s 
presentation of ‘the Summoner at a level of pre-adolescent filth’. That conclusion seems 
somewhat naive in view of the fact that many of the most frequently debated of the 
sophismata turned, essentially, on what we might call ‘puns’. 221 Yet Chaucer’s pun is not 
merely that the word ‘ferthyng’ is similar to the word ‘ferting’, but that the word ‘ferthyng’ 
itself can be ‘parted’ into a compound word: ‘fart-thing’. Going further and allowing for the 
etymological interchange that often took place between ‘f’ and ‘p’ in the evolution of the 
English language, Chaucer’s line carries another humorous pun in ‘parted’.222 Without 
knowing it, or meaning it, Friar John really asks, ‘What is a fart-thing farted between 
twelve?’ Thomas, and later the steward, simply provide a physical enaction of Friar John’s 
unconscious ‘thought-experiment’.  
The question of what makes ‘a thyng’ is related to the nature of its unity or division. 
As the Friar goes on to explain, ‘ech thyng that is oned in himselve / Is moore strong than 
whan it is toscattered’ (1968-69): division can be a destructive process. The relationship 
between the unity of an object and its status as an object of linguistic reference is important in 
fourteenth-century logic too. This was especially the case for nominalist terminists like 
Buridan, for whom a term can only properly ‘stand for’ (or ‘supposit’ for) a really existent 
individual (what a layman might call ‘a thyng’). One common example concerned the 
situation where Socrates and Plato are carrying a stone together. Neither is carrying the whole 
stone. Nor can the stone be ‘parted’ between them: it is one stone. Therefore, neither is 
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carrying a stone. Perhaps coincidentally, Heytesbury’s discussion of the problem also invokes 
the baptism of a boy, in which, not merely the head of the boy is baptised, nor each of his 
parts, but the boy as a whole.
223
 Buridan’s ‘Baf’ baptism is introduced in the context of his 
discussion of the common sophismatic term ‘chimera’ and what it signifies, since, according 
to his theory of supposition, a term cannot signify something that does not exist. Elizabeth 
Ashworth notes that some other late-medieval logicians extended the ‘I promise you a horse’ 
sophism to discuss the meaning and validity of promises about non-existent things, of which 
the chimera was their instinctive example.
224
 The specific problem with the term ‘chimera’ 
lies in the fact that it is a composite of many different members of many different animals. 
Buridan ingeniously turns this to his advantage in his answer to the question of what the term 
‘chimera’ signifies. It is true, he admits, that the term ‘does not signify a chimera nor 
anything other than a chimera [...] but still it signifies many things that are not chimeras nor is 
any of them a chimera’.225 In fact, it refers to the simple concepts of ‘animal, head, lion, 
body, goat, tail, serpent’: the categorematic terms which are combined to form the complex 
concept for which the simple term ‘chimera’ may be substituted.226 Thus by finding a 
satisfactory means of ‘parting’ the chimera, Buridan manages to solve the sophism and 
maintain that terms like ‘chimera’ signify more than mere vacuous utterances, like ‘buf’. 
Chimeras may be fictional, with no real existence, but that does not make the term 
meaningless. 
Perhaps that is the reason for the shock that greets Thomas’s ‘inpossible’. In its 
audacity of demanding for meaningless utterances a parity of treatment with concrete 
singulars, it seems to overthrow the subtle distinctions between fact, fiction (including the 
fiction of currency that Friar John was happy to entertain) and non-sense. Perhaps that is why 
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it is hailed as the attack on intellectual order that we might expect of a ‘demonyak’ (2240). 
On the other hand, Kantik Ghosh has noted (in a rather different critical context) that in 
Wyclif’s De benedicta incarnacione, ‘Lucifer is identified as the first corrupt logician in that 
he asked the first questio, and thereby introduced into the fallen world the desire to dispute 
and win arguments’.227 Perhaps, then, Thomas is a ‘demonyak’ because he is possessed by 
almost diabolically advanced powers of sophismatic thought. Indeed, he may have to be 
demoniacal to compete with Friar John, since according to the Summoner himself, friars are 
the natural intimates of Lucifer.
228
 
Either way, Thomas’s fart thus becomes, paradoxically, inflated with meaning: it is a 
challenge sent to both ecclesiastical and secular learning and authority. If they cannot divide 
his ‘yifte’, then so much for their scholarship. As Ghosh also points out, one medieval ‘line 
of thought […] stressed that animals, children and the laity all have an innate ability to make 
effective use of the syllogism and form rational arguments’; and as Mishtooni Bose 
explained, according to such a model, even ‘idiotae, rustici […] are naturally in possession of 
the tools that academics use’.229 One such ‘cherl’ (2153), Thomas, has gone one step further 
and beaten the logicians at their own academic games. On the other hand, if the 
representatives of ecclesiastical and secular learning and authority do find a solution to 
Thomas’s problem by blurring the distinctions between concrete singulars, signifiers and 
meaningless utterances, then the whole system of fourteenth-century terminist logic is 
undermined.  
As Peter W. Travis writes, 
part of the fart-and-cartwheel’s satiric thrust is obviously directed 
against any form of elevated discourse. The ‘demonstratioun’ of the 
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solution to this ‘probleme’ in posterior analytics is clearly a send-
up of scholastic choplogic, of all manner of ‘arsmetrike[s],’ and of 
liberal-arts learning in general. The lord’s squire is a ‘kervere’ who 
[...] believes it is possible to cut reality at the joints [...]. English 
peasants, however, would typically have responded by using less 
abstract, but equally expressive, language. 
230
 
The lord’s squire tries to ‘carve up’ the fart as Buridan carved up the chimera; but both fart 
and belch remind us that there remains to the logical anarchist a weapon even more 
problematic than fictive utterances: that is, meaningless ones, which yet somehow are 
pregnant with meaning if they are adopted as tokens. Just as Buridan’s ‘Baf’ could be 
someone’s name, so Chaucer’s ‘buf’ and Chaucer’s fart may be read as the tokens of the 
uneducated who pass judgment, as they pass other things, on the subtle distinctions and 
divisions of the logicians. A much later logician, Lewis Carroll, famously has his Alice 
rebuked for thinking that to mean what one says is the same as to say what one means.
231
 In 
Chaucer too, scholars may take great care to say what they mean; but the uneducated still 
have the power to mean what they say. 
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The Nun’s Priest’s Tale 
The Bradwardine Connection 
Chaucer’s interest in logic has been illustrated by his use of the technical term ‘sophyme’ to 
describe the problem of the Summoner’s Tale. In the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, the exact nature of 
his interest is even more specifically ascertainable, since he refers by name to arguably the 
most influential of the fourteenth-century logicians who produced sophismata: ‘the Bisshop 
Bradwardyn’ (3242), whose solution to the Liar paradox I discussed above. While in the 
Summoner’s Tale the relation of the central problem to the controversy over necessity and 
future contingency was merely implied, in this case the context of the reference is explicitly 
the philosophical and theological debate about ‘determinism’.  
The relevance to the Nun’s Priest’s Tale of Bradwardine’s discussion of 
foreknowledge and contingency, along with those of Boethius and Augustine, has already 
been examined to some extent by Anne Payne. Payne argues that the Nun’s Priest 
summarises the theories of each of the three great thinkers he mentions; and her analysis is 
sufficient to demonstrate that Chaucer is not merely ‘namedropping’ in this passage. He is at 
least acquainted with the philosophical positions of these men: ‘In spite of the Nun’s Priest’s 
disclaimer[,] “I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren” [3240], he satirizes the three theories in the 
tale with every mark of accurate understanding’:232 
Wheither that Goddes worthy forwityng 
Streyneth me nedely for to doon a thyng –  
‘Nedely’ clepe I symple necessitee –  
Or elles, if free choys be graunted me 
To do that same thyng, or do it noght, 
Though God forwoot it er that I was wroght; 
Or if his wityng streyneth me never a deel 
But by necessitee condicioneel. 
I wol nat han to do of swich mateere; 
My tale is of a cok, as ye may here[.] (3243-3252) 
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As Payne explains, the opinion of Bradwardine can be found in the first three lines, that of 
Augustine in the next three lines, and that of Boethius in the following two lines of this 
passage.
233
 
However, in line with her wider reading of ‘Menippean Satire’, Payne fits this 
passage into the conventions of that genre, including ridicule of the philosophus gloriosus.
234
 
For Payne, then, the Nun’s Priest’s summary of the three philosophical positions becomes 
‘wildly derisive’: ‘the narrator is overjoyed to point out the idiocies and inadequacies of his 
cited authors, especially Boethius’.235 She then focuses on the ‘absurd’ propositions of 
medieval logic (giving an example from Boethius), which attracted the narrator’s satirical 
interest in undermining ‘the decorum of logic’s world’.236 The reason she offers for this 
ridicule of logical philosophy is that ‘the logical proposition [...] is a colourless description of 
an aspect of an event in human life’.237 
An analysis that pays more attention to the quasi-literary manifestations of late-
medieval logic allows a rather different understanding of the influence and function of logical 
philosophy in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale. Rather than the beast fable being seen as violently 
undermining or ridiculing logical formulations, a contextually sensitive reading of the tale 
must first acknowledge that the world of medieval logic was never intended to be especially 
decorous. Scholastic treatises on the sophismata regularly discuss propositions that might 
appear to the modern reader more suited to the narrative of a fable or fabliau than a textbook 
of philosophy: propositions such as Buridan’s ‘A risible ass is running’ or ‘The ass flies, so 
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the ass has wings’ or ‘This dog is your father’.238 Animals in the sophismata can talk, and 
laugh, and take the place of human beings, just as they do in fables (for example, 
Heytesbury’s ‘Brunellus [the ass] is able to be a man’).239 The logical delight in irreverent 
absurdity extends at times almost to blasphemy: Buridan even considers the proposition, 
‘God is an ass’.240 Thus the hilarious tension between the Nun’s Priest’s summary of logical 
philosophy and his ‘tale [...] of a cok’ (3252) results from an uncomfortable conjunction 
rather than the derisive disjunction of ideas and images that has been suggested in the past. 
Late-medieval logic is anything but ‘colourless’, and is in fact painted in very similar 
colours to the fable genre itself. Take, for example, the Speculum stultorum, the satirical fable 
explicitly referred to by Russell the Fox as the story of ‘Daun Burnel the Asse’ (3312). Jan 
Ziolkowski comments on the significance of Nigel de Longchamps’ ‘logical fun and games’ 
in this text: 
What are we to make of Nigel’s decision to name the donkey dunce of 
his poem after the Burnel of philosophical jargon? In the first place, 
we can be sure that he expected his readers to know enough of the 
schools to be instantly cognizant of the allusion. [...]The use of formal 
logic [...] in satires such as Speculum stultorum was playful but far 
from casual. Rather, it was essential to the very construction of the 
actions and conception of the chief characters within these poems. As 
the study of formal logic became ever more firmly institutionalized in 
higher education, and as more and more authors opted for the 
vernacular over Latin, the humorous use of logic spread from such 
mainly clerical forms of expression as the Latin comoedia and 
narrative satires into vernacular literatures.
241
 
In referring to the Speculum, therefore, Chaucer is implicitly endorsing the mapping of 
logical structures onto the ‘construction’ of his own fable. 
 The importance to the tale of the controversy over predestination and necessity, and 
especially the importance of Bradwardine’s contribution to that debate, is further 
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demonstrated by its ambiguous and much-discussed ending.
242
 The Nun’s Priest concludes 
the tale by exhorting his audience to pay attention to the fable’s ‘moralite’ (without telling us 
what precisely the moral is). Significantly, he chooses the image of wheat-sifting for this 
interpretative process: ‘Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille’ (3443). He goes on to 
justify his moralising with a mischievous quotation from St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 
(3438-42), before closing with a benediction: 
Now, goode God, if that it be thy wille, 
As seith my lord, so make us alle goode men, 
And brynge us to his heighe blisse! Amen. (3444-46) 
This simple prayer, with its vague reference to ‘my lord’, has provoked a number of differing 
readings over the last century and a half, the latest being almost a decade ago, when Peter 
Field published an analysis which attempted to resolve the ambiguity by interpreting the 
phrase as an elliptical reference to Jesus Christ.
243
 I would like to suggest an explanation of 
these lines that is both more efficient in its handling of the evidence and potentially more 
fertile as a key to the interpretation of the tale as a whole.  
 Any critical interpretation of these lines is complicated by the glosses found in 
Ellesmere and Hengwrt, which identify the ‘lord’ in question as ‘dominus Archiepiscopus 
Cantuariensis’;244 Dd.4.24 has a gloss that reads simply ‘Kantuar’.245 At face value, this 
interpretation seems a very reasonable deduction from the fact that ‘my lord’ was a highly 
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conventional form of address to a bishop, and indeed a number of modern editions do simply 
gloss ‘my lord’ as ‘bishop’.246 
 Yet to which bishop could Chaucer be referring? Skeat noted the Ellesmere gloss, 
adding merely that it ‘doubtless’ refers to ‘William Courtenay, archbishop from 1381 to 
1396’.247 Alfred Pollard agreed that ‘the reference must [...] be to William Courtenay’ and 
speculated that ‘the Archbishop was in the habit of qualifying with the words, “if that it be 
thy wille,” the prayer, “make us all good men,” for which no such qualification is usually 
thought needed’.248 Kenneth Sisam doubted that the marginal gloss bears Chaucer’s 
authority, since, unsurprisingly, he found such guesswork about Courtenay’s mannerisms 
unconvincing, nor could he find any liturgical basis for the prayer. He concluded that ‘if the 
marginal note is right, we do not know why the archbishop is referred to’.249 In fact, as The 
Riverside Chaucer notes, there has been ‘a considerable, but so far unsuccessful, search [...] 
to find a similar benediction associated with [...] William Courtenay’.250 For example, Robert 
Pratt cited a sixteenth-century episcopal benediction, ‘May almighty God have mercy on you 
and forgive you all your sins, deliver you from all evil, and preserve and confirm you in 
good, and bring you to life eternal’; but this hardly provides evidence that late fourteenth-
century bishops may have used anything like the Nun’s Priest’s blessing, which is, anyway, 
substantially different in form and content.
251
 
 A number of critics concurred with Sisam in doubting the usefulness of the glosses. 
Manly pointed out that since ‘the parish of Bromley [where the Prioress and hence the Nun’s 
Priest were posted] was in the diocese of London and the archdeaconry of Middlesex, [...] the 
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Priest’s lord was the bishop of London, who at that time was Robert Braybroke’.252 
Unfortunately he has no evidence to explain why Chaucer should wish to cite Braybroke at 
this point in the tale, and as Peter Field notes, ‘no amount of scholarly searching has shown 
that those sentiments were distinctively associated with [...] any [...] late fourteenth-century 
bishop’.253 R. F. Patterson suggested that ‘my lord’ was Christ himself, and that ‘thy wille’ 
echoes ‘Thy will be done’ from the Lord’s Prayer; the latter point being a suggestion which, 
as I will show, carries a certain amount of weight.
254
 G. H. Cowling made a similar argument, 
offering John vi.38-39 as an alternative source.
255
 Field follows Patterson, and augments his 
analysis with a quotation from Psalm 109, interpreted by Tertullian, which demonstrates the 
possibility, however distant, that Christ could be referred to as ‘my lord’, thus partially 
refuting Sisam’s assertion that ‘since Chaucer always uses oure Lord [for] “Jesus”, my lord 
should refer to a lord in this world’.256 Anne Payne goes to the other extreme, and argues that 
‘the voice of the goodly priest, Sir John, is the voice of the devil’, and that therefore ‘my 
lord’ is ‘the devil’s address to his master, Satan’.257 Robert Correale suggests that the 
benediction is based on I Thessalonians iv.3, since St Paul is the authority cited by the Nun’s 
Priest immediately before his benediction; to which Field adds I Timothy ii.4.
258
 Correale 
also provides a passage from a fifteenth-century homily for the Feast of the Conversion of St. 
Paul, which bears striking similarities to the Nun’s Priest’s words, but is obviously too late to 
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be considered a plausible source.
259
 He deduces that St Paul is the ‘lord’ in question. 
However, neither passage bears a striking resemblance to the Nun’s Priest’s benediction, and, 
as Field points out, Chaucer ‘never has any character speak of any saint as my lord’.260 ‘Like 
[...] “the man of great auctorite” who never gets around to speaking at the end of [the House 
of Fame],’ Helen Cooper concludes, ‘“my lord” remains a shadowy figure who casts things 
into doubt; but we are never quite sure what things, or how much doubt’.261 
 There is, however, sufficient evidence to give shape and colour to Cooper’s ‘shadowy 
figure’. Chaucer has used the image of wheat-sifting once already in the tale, in his earlier 
discussion of foreknowledge and determinism: 
But I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren 
As kan the hooly doctour Augustyn, 
Or Boece, or the Bisshop Bradwardyn[.] (3240-42) 
 
His reference to ‘fruyt’ and ‘chaff’ just before the closing benediction is almost certainly 
intended to direct our thoughts back to this earlier discussion of necessity and free will. Not 
only does Chaucer elevate Bradwardine to a remarkable extent by naming him in the same 
breath as two of the greatest authorities within medieval thought (Augustine of Hippo and 
Boethius), but he also goes out of his way to identify him (and not Augustine) as a ‘Bisshop’, 
and thus a proper recipient of the address ‘my lord’. We might follow the rule of William of 
Ockham, a contemporary and opponent of Bradwardine: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter 
necessitate (‘entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity’).262 Why formulate a 
reference to Courtenay, or even Braybroke, when we have one, and only one, Archbishop of 
Canterbury already ostentatiously cited in the tale? On the other hand, the solutions proposed 
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by Correale, Payne and Field all fail to ‘save the appearances’, since they discount the 
substantial evidence that the referent of ‘my lord’ is a bishop, and especially an Archbishop 
of Canterbury. As Field himself accepts, his ‘unusual’ reading only has any weight because 
‘all the other possibilities seem to have been ruled out’.263 Yet I am not aware that either 
Field, or any other modern critic, commentator or editor, has considered Bradwardine as a 
possibility. As it happens, a reference to Bradwardine makes perfect sense of the passage 
both in its own terms and within the context of the tale as a whole. 
 Bradwardine’s ‘determinism’ has been characterised with varying degrees of 
extremity by modern scholars, a problem complicated (for the Chaucer critic) by the fact that 
by the time the Nun’s Priest’s Tale was composed, Bradwardine’s nuanced determinism had 
been inherited and, to some extent, simplified and carried to the very edge of orthodoxy by 
Wyclif, which may well have given Chaucer a rather skewed view of the Archbishop’s 
theology. Nevertheless, the sentiments expressed in the closing prayer of the Nun’s Priest’s 
Tale neatly summarise the basic principle of his anti-Pelagian soteriological position: namely, 
that no man can be or become ‘goode’ except by the will of God, who also grants final 
salvation only on the basis of His predetermining will. Furthermore, the form of words 
chosen by Chaucer to express these sentiments finds specific parallels in a number of 
passages of De causa Dei. 
In the most famous chapter of the whole treatise (Book I, Chapter 35), Bradwardine 
describes how reading St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans was central to his new-found emphasis 
on God’s grace, which he equates with the will of God: ‘videbar mihi videre a longe gratiam 
Dei omnia bona merita praecedentem tempore et natura, scilicet gratam Dei voluntatem’ (‘it 
seemed to me that the grace of God (that is, the gracious will of God), taking precedence in 
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time and by nature, sees all good merits as if from a distance’).264 He goes on to recapitulate 
the fundamental premise of his argument, that God is the source of all good: ‘per primam 
supposicionem Deus est tantum bonum’ (‘according to the initial supposition, God is the 
greatest good’).265 It is therefore God who makes bad men like good men: ‘si vellet dare malo 
bona merita et seruare ea, sicut facit bono, ipse mereretur, et perseueraret similiter sicut 
bonus’ (‘if [God] willed to give good merits to a bad man and preserve them, just as he does 
with a good man, then that man would merit and persevere just like a good man’). He also 
anticipates the response of his opponents: ‘Nec potest dici, quod dat huic bona merita, quia 
praescit quod bene vsurus est illis, quia ita faceret quilibet, si Deus vellet quod bene vteretur 
illis’ (‘Nor can it be said that God gives good merits to any man because he already knows 
that this man is someone who will use them well, since anyone could do so, if God willed that 
he would make good use of them’).266 Man can only be ‘goode’, indeed he can only use well 
the goodness that God gives, if it is God’s will. Here we find all the essential elements of the 
Nun’s Priest’s benediction: the goodness of God, the necessity of His ‘wille’ to make us 
‘goode men’, and even a prominent reference to Romans, the same epistle that the Nun’s 
Priest cites immediately beforehand. 
The final chapter of Book II takes the form of an extended prayer or apostrophe to 
God, who Bradwardine addresses as ‘bone Deus’: ‘goode God’.267 Here his use of the second 
person finds its echo in the Nun’s Priest’s own prayer: ‘quem vis [...] exaltas; [...] quem vis 
praedestinas atque saluas, et quem vis reprobas atque damnas’ (‘whomever you 
wish you raise on high, whomever you wish you predestine and save, whomever you 
wish you reject and condemn’).268 Quem vis exaltas: ‘if that it be thy wille [...] brynge us to 
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[...] heighe blisse’: the similarity with the Nun’s Priest’s wording is striking. Interestingly, 
Bradwardine proceeds almost immediately to cite Nebuchadnezzar as an example of God’s 
reprobation, the Old Testament figure whose prophetic dreams, interpreted by Daniel, so 
impress Chaucer’s Chauntecleer (3127-29). 
 Field acknowledges that if his interpretation of ‘my lord’ as Christ is incorrect, then 
the similarity that Patterson noticed between the Nun’s Priest’s benediction and the Lord’s 
Prayer would imply instead ‘that the Nun’s Priest was quoting someone who was quoting 
[Christ]’.269 Once again, Bradwardine fits the bill. In another famous passage of De causa 
Dei, he discusses the problem that not all divinely given prophecies seem to come true, even 
in the Scriptures.
270
 His answer is that such prophecies are given as warnings and that since 
God intends them to bring about repentance, his revealed will does in fact come about even if 
the impending disaster is averted. However, this solution apparently leads to some thorny 
consequences for the theology of prayer, and Bradwardine finds it necessary to consider a 
common objection of his ‘Pelagian’ opponents.271 Surely if Bradwardine’s God wants 
something to happen, it will happen whether or not we pray; and if He does not want it to 
happen, then prayer cannot make it happen: ‘ergo superfluunt omnes preces’ (‘therefore all 
prayers are a waste of time’), and further, ‘non esset generaliter orandum pro omnibus, nec 
pro quolibet proximo viatore’ (‘one ought not generally to pray for all men, nor for one’s 
neighbour’), because we do not know whom God wishes to be saved.272 To solve the 
problem, he considers Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane (‘non sicut ego volo, sed sicut tu vis’: 
‘not as I will but as you will’: Matthew xxvi.39) and then the Lord’s Prayer itself. He 
concludes: ‘Vix igitur meo iudicio aliqua vtilior, aut efficacior oratio [...] poterit inueniri, 
quam quod homo [...] Domino semper dicat; Fiat voluntas tua’ (‘in my opinion, therefore, 
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there can scarcely be found any more useful or more effective prayer than that man should 
always be saying to the Lord, Thy will be done’).273 Mankind should pray for God’s will to 
be done, even in the question of our salvation. Finally, the whole treatise concludes with a 
terse restatement of Bradwardine’s faith in the supremacy of the divine will: ‘necesse est [...] 
reprobos [...] habere supplicium, et electos gaudium sempiternum’ (‘it is necessary that the 
reprobate should have punishment and that the elect should have eternal joy’).274 
Bradwardine’s ‘heighe blisse’ can be attained only if it is the will of God.275 
 Every aspect of the Nun’s Priest’s benediction thus finds both a general and a 
particular analogue or analogues in De causa Dei: ‘bone Deus’ is met with ‘goode God’; ‘if 
that it be thy wille’ answers ‘si Deus vellet’, ‘quam vis’ and ‘fiat voluntas tua’; ‘dat huic bona 
merita’ becomes ‘make us alle goode men’; and ‘brynge us to [...] heighe blisse’ blends 
Bradwardine’s ‘exaltas’ and ‘gaudium eternum’. It seems that the earlier glossators were 
making the most natural assumption in the world when they read the phrase ‘my lord’: that 
Chaucer was citing the work of the only ‘Bisshop’ identified in the text, Thomas 
Bradwardine. 
However, although the Bradwardinian controversy over predestination and necessity 
is thus repeatedly evoked in the tale, Bradwardine’s own ‘deterministic’ model does not 
appear to explain the actual narrative that Chaucer constructs. In fact, as Payne argues, none 
of the three theories of foreknowledge and free will that the Nun’s Priest summarises 
provides a suitable and comprehensive system by which to understand the action of the tale; 
not the simple necessity alleged of Bradwardine, nor the Augustinian fudge of simultaneous 
necessity and free will, nor the Boethian qualification of conditional necessity. There is, 
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however, a silent fourth contributor to the logical debate that drives the action of the tale: one 
of the ‘semi-Pelagian’ logicians and theologians against whom Bradwardine’s polemic was 
addressed and also a writer upon whose work significant portions of the tale (especially of the 
philosophical discussion between Chauntecleer and Pertelote) are substantially based. Robert 
Holcot’s influence on the tale is, I will argue, even more substantial than has been recognised 
previously. 
Holcot’s Fabulous Logic 
Although Holcot was principally a theologian and logician, much of his writing is 
characterised by an openness to a range of effects and possibilities that are generally more 
characteristic of ‘literary’ texts. His Sermo finalis, for example, is clearly light-hearted in 
nature and often highly ironic, being most probably a festive end-of-term speech.
276
 In it 
Holcot builds what Katherine Tachau describes as ‘an extended play on the notion of 
pursuing and attaining theological wisdom as a two-year courtship and marriage, leading 
eventually to sexual satisfaction’.277 He then constructs a series of humorous characterisations 
of himself and his colleagues as animals. He puns on their ‘status as [...] Dominicanes with a 
talent for racing as “the Lord’s hounds”’ and presents a parodic analysis of the name of his 
successor as cursor (the giver of what were called ‘cursory’ lectures, but also literally 
‘runner’):  
Nomen enim suum in vulgari est Roger. In quo quidem nomine duae 
bestiae designantur quae inter animalia communia inveniuntur cursui 
magis apta, viz, caprea et canis. Ro enim anglice latine dicitur caprea, 
et ipsum totum vocabulum quod est Roger canibus convenit per 
appellationem.
278
 
 
(For his name in the vernacular is Roger. In this name, two animals 
are signified which among the ‘Animal Kingdom’ are the best at 
running, namely the deer and the hound. For, in English ‘Ro’ means 
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the same as deer in Latin, and the whole word ‘Roger’ is itself used as 
a name for dogs.) 
 
As Tachau notes, ‘Holcot is inspired to find a third species of runners in Roger’s cognomen, 
Gosford, construed as a ford (vadum) for a goose (aucae).’279 Her research has demonstrated 
that neither this sort of wordplay nor the light-heartedness of the speech is unique to 
Holcot.
280
 In fact, ‘the authors of Sentences commentaries commonly embedded their own 
cognomens implicitly (and often obscurely) in the biblical tags they chose as their incipits’ 
and Holcot takes great delight in doing the same thing in his Wisdom Commentary.
281
 Yet 
Holcot’s relish for subversive innuendo, parodic etymologies and animalistic 
characterisations seems much more than merely conventional, and it would have made 
enjoyable reading for the author of the Miller’s Tale, the Second Nun’s Prologue and the 
Nun’s Priest’s Tale.282 
Examples like this serve to illustrate Holcot’s place in an intellectual milieu as much 
literary as philosophical, under the patronage of Richard of Bury: 
A determined collector of books whose Philobiblon (perhaps 
ghostwritten by Holcot) gives us the term ‘bibliophile’, de Bury 
collected scholars just as avidly, especially when convinced that their 
talents encompassed the new ‘English perspicacity and subtlety’ that 
he regarded with chauvinistic pride.
283
 
The Philobiblon, whether it is Holcot’s work directly or not, provides yet more evidence of 
the interaction of fourteenth-century scholastic thought with the category of texts that we 
would tend to call ‘literary’. In the thirteenth chapter, entitled ‘Why We Have Not Wholly 
Neglected the Fables of the Poets’, Richard of Bury (or perhaps Holcot) writes: 
How many students of Euclid have been repelled by the Pons 
Asinorum [Ellefuga], as by a lofty and precipitous rock, which no help 
of ladders could enable them to scale! THIS IS A HARD SAYING, 
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they exclaim, AND WHO CAN RECEIVE IT. The child of 
inconstancy, who ended by wishing to be transformed into an ass, 
would perhaps never have given up the study of philosophy, if he had 
met him in friendly guise veiled under the cloak of pleasure; but anon, 
astonished by Crato’s chair and struck dumb by his endless questions, 
as by a sudden thunderbolt, he saw no refuge but in flight.
284
 
This passage mingles the imagery of university mathematics, logic, philosophy and the moral 
fable, clearly illustrating the fourteenth-century awareness of the overlap in genres. Notice 
especially the presence of the man-as-ass, one of the commonest characters of the 
sophismata. The ‘child of inconstancy’ is a reference to a story told in the Pseudo-Boethian 
De disciplina scolarium. This was a text that was well known among fourteenth-century 
friars, in which the questions of Crato to the ‘filium inconstantiae’ include a number that 
share sophismatic imagery, such as the man half-black, half-white which was to become a 
staple of the later medieval sophismata.
285
  
Beryl Smalley has emphasised the vivid imagery and sheer literariness of Holcot’s 
Biblical commentaries.
286
 However, it is important to note that many of the images that 
Holcot uses in his ‘pictures’ have, as part of their complex and shared ancestry, their 
widespread use as sophismatic terms: for instance, the King turned black, the young boy, the 
chimera and so on.
287
 Holcot’s literary style is informed by his logical imagination as much 
as by the classical influences upon which Smalley focuses. In the Wisdom commentary, the 
text which Pratt has shown Chaucer might have used in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, Holcot 
                                                          
284
 Richard de Bury, The Love of Books, Chapter XIII. 
285
 De disciplina scolarium, ed. by Weijers, pp. 104-108. One of the questions is as follows (p. 106): ‘cum unum 
generancium album, reliquum nigrum, quare generatum non album et nigrum’ (‘Why, when one parent is white 
and the other black, the child is not white and black’). For more detail on the ‘Inconstant Scholar’ fable, see 
Gabriel, ‘Source of the Anecdote’. For an example of the black-and-white-man of the medieval sophismata, see 
Wilson, Heytesbury, p. 23. The sophism referred to is Heytesbury, Sophismata (Sophism 5, pp. 20-21, fols 91
rb
-
97
ra
 (fol. 93
rb
)).The hypothetical character suggested in the Pseudo-Boethian question bears a resemblance to 
Feirefiz, the ‘piebald’ son of Gahmuret the Angevin and the Moorish queen, Belacane, in Wolfram’s Parzival: 
see Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival, p. 40 (end of Chapter 1).  
286
 Smalley, English Friars, pp. 172-78. 
287
 Smalley, English Friars, pp. 172-78; Smalley is summarising the ‘pictures’ found in Oxford, Bodleian 
Library MS Bodley 722 (2648) fols 3-136. 
114 
 
explicitly links his theological concerns to broader logico-philosophical and mathematical 
questions. For instance, in discussing the question of the immortality of the soul: 
mundus incepit esse vel mundus non incepit esse; et tamen neutrum 
istorum demonstrative probari potest ... Similiter quadratura circuli 
certa est; tamen eius demonstratio tempore Aristotelis inventa non 
fuit.
288
 
(either the world began to be or the world did not begin to be: and yet 
neither of these can be demonstrably proven … Similarly the squaring 
of the circle is certain; yet how to demonstrate this has not been 
discovered since the time of Aristotle.)  
The immortality of the soul is like the logical problems de incipit and the mathematical 
problem of squaring the circle.  
Another example is the following passage from his commentary on the Sentences 
which discusses the Carmelites’ claim to have been founded by Elijah on the grounds that 
Elijah’s father had a dream of men dressed in white: 
Argumenta etiam non concludunt, quia non sequitur: vidit […] viros 
candidos […], ergo carmelitas. Tunc enim sequeretur quod 
molendinarii vel pastores communiter essent carmeliti.
289
 
(Their arguments are not conclusive, because it does not follow that, 
‘he saw men clothed in white; therefore [they were] Carmelites’. For 
in that case it would follow that a group of millers or shepherds are 
Carmelites.) 
In other words, the syllogism, ‘I saw something white; a Carmelite is something white; 
therefore I saw a Carmelite’, is invalid; for it would equally follow that millers and shepherds 
are Carmelites too. Again, the form, terminology and choice of terms are typical of logical 
treatises on sophismata and consequentiae.
290
 Thus it would be artificial to see a disjunction 
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between Holcot’s logical, theological and literary concerns: Holcot’s characteristic modes of 
thought and expression cross generic boundaries. 
Furthermore, Holcot was apparently not averse to referring to beast-fables even in his 
theological writings. For instance, Alan Fletcher has argued that Holcot makes some detailed 
use of The Owl and the Nightingale in his Moralitates. As a humorous poem featuring a 
debate between two birds, The Owl and the Nightingale is a text comparable in form, and as 
its most recent editor puts it, ‘similar in spirit’ to the later Nun’s Priest’s Tale.291 It is not 
particularly surprising that a logician should take an interest in the beast fable form, given 
that it is a common conceit of the sophismata to transfer the qualities of one species onto 
another, including onto humans: asses, horses, mules, dogs, birds, goats and cows all feature 
in Buridan’s collection, for example. Nor, then, is it a priori improbable that an intelligent 
beast fable writer should take a playful interest in the topsy-turvy world of logic: a 
philosophising chicken fits easily into a world of laughing donkeys and neighing men. If, as 
Ian Bishop suggests, Chaucer ‘writes [in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale] as one who is tired of 
hearing the medieval commonplace that Man (animal rationale) possesses intelligence in 
common with the angels and that his reason is what distinguishes him from the beasts’, then 
he certainly also writes as one who is delighted by the fact that the proposition ‘homo est 
animal’ is one of the commonest propositions of the sophismata, frequently used as part of a 
syllogism to justify ridiculous conclusions such as, ‘a man is an ass’.292 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the ‘ubiquity’ (to use Lynch’s word) of the terms ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’ in late-medieval philosophical 
treatises, especially in logical discussions. See Lynch, Visions, p. 51 and Travis, ‘White’. 
291
 Cartlidge, Owl and Nightingale, p. 142. This argument is strengthened by the fact that, as Cartlidge has 
argued, a Nicholas of Guildford who may have been the poem’s author was living in Oxford as late as 1322, a 
few years before Holcot began to study there (see Alan Fletcher, ‘The Genesis of “The Owl and the 
Nightingale”: A New Hypothesis’, pp. 2-4; Cartlidge, Owl and the Nightingale, p. 102; and Cartlidge, ‘Nicholas 
of Guildford’). 
292
 Bishop, ‘The Nun’s Priest’s Tale’ p. 257. 
116 
 
Holcot’s Wisdom Commentary 
To Pratt’s suggestion that ‘Chaucer’s selection, adaptation and transformation of Holcot’s 
materials can be better understood with a knowledge of their context in the Wisdom 
Commentary’, one might add that Chaucer’s adaptation of Holcot’s ideas can be better 
understood with a knowledge of their context within Holcot’s work more generally.293 As 
Smalley herself points out, ‘the Wisdom Books appealed to Holcot and his contemporaries as 
the biblical equivalent [...] of the philosophical “sentences” which they loved so well’.294 
Indeed, not only does Holcot maintain the logical, even at times syllogistic, method of 
enquiry used in his commentaries as exemplified above, but, in the passages referred to in 
Chaucer’s tale, he also discusses briefly the problem of divine revelation through dreams.  
What is at issue in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale is not so much the problem of divine 
foreknowledge as the problem of divine foreknowledge revealed. It is Chauntecleer’s 
‘prophetic’ dream that provokes the narrator’s brief discussion of simple and conditional 
necessity: 
Thou were ful wel ywarned by thys dremes 
That thilke day was perilous to thee; 
But what that God forwoot moot nedes bee, 
After the opinioun of certein clerkis. (3232-35) 
This in itself justifies reading the Nun’s Priest’s Tale in the context of Holcot’s theology, 
since it is in relation to divine revelation that Holcot discusses the question of future 
contingency. Arguing against an ‘unnamed Oxford colleague [...] who had insisted that, once 
revealed, the future will come about of necessity’, Holcot insists that future contingents 
maintain their contingency and that therefore ‘there is a class of statements […] about the 
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future such that the truth of any statement which is a member of the class remains contingent 
even after the statement’s [divine] revelation’.295 
Perhaps the most significant example of the problem as formulated by Holcot 
concerns the revelation by God to Socrates (who conventionally stands in the logical texts as 
a sort of ‘Everyman’ figure) that ‘Socrates will be damned’.296 He argues as follows: 
Ponatur igitur quod in rei veritate Sortes sit damnandus, ergo Deus 
potest hoc revelare Sorti. Quo facto, arguitur quod Sortes desperabit, 
quia tenetur credere Deo; ergo Deus erit auctor istius desperationis et 
sic erit auctor peccati.
297
 
 
(Therefore let it be proposed that in real fact Socrates is going to be 
damned, in which case God can reveal this to Socrates. Which done, it 
is argued that Socrates will despair, because he has to believe God: 
therefore God will be the author of his despair and thus he will be the 
author of sin.) 
 
If the reason for the despair is infallible divine Revelation, then in fact God is to blame for 
Socrates’ despair and consequent damnation. Socrates, believing God’s foreknowledge to be 
certain, despairs of salvation, and is indeed damned under the sin of ‘wanhope’. Yet at the 
point of God’s revelation, this outcome must be contingent upon Socrates’ response to it, just 
as, in the ‘Bridge’ sophism discussed above, Plato’s action in allowing or barring Socrates 
from crossing the bridge is contingent upon Socrates’ next proposition. In other words, what 
God reveals as certain is in fact, at the point of revelation, contingent. Holcot reveals the 
nettle which he is about to grasp: ‘Occurrit enim [...], si dixerimus quod oppositum revelati 
potest contingere, quod Deus potest decipere, mentiri, periurare, non solvere quod promisit, 
et fieri infidelis, et huiusmodi, quae bonis moribus repugnare videntur’ (‘For it follows, if we 
say that the opposite of what has been revealed can [still] be contingent, that God is able to 
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deceive, to lie, to break his oath, not to deliver what he has promised, and to be unfaithful, 
and so forth, which seems to be repugnant to good morals’).298 As Katherine Tachau puts it,  
if we accept this conclusion, Holcot believes, then we must admit as a 
corollary that divine deception is logically possible where this 
particular class of propositions is concerned. Nor is divine deception 
limited to the realm of possibility (however construed); for Holcot, the 
Bible provides ample instances of historical deceptions by divine 
agency, direct and indirect.
299
 
In fact, the primary Scriptural example that Holcot uses to demonstrate ‘quod Deus decipit 
per malos angelos et per malos homines’(‘that God deceives by means of bad angels and bad 
men’), and ‘etiam per bonos’ (‘even through good ones’), is ‘quod Deus iussit filios Israel 
decipere Aegyptios’ (‘that God commanded the children of Israel to deceive the Egyptians’). 
Holcot supplements this example with the stories of Ahab and the lying spirit; Rebecca and 
Jacob’s deception of Isaac; Judith and Holofernes (an example also chosen by Chaucer’s 
Monk); Joshua and the enemy cities; even adding that ‘Christus voluit nasci de virgine ut 
deciperet diabolum’ (‘Christ wanted to be born of a virgin that he might deceive the 
devil’).300 He concludes that ‘nullum inconveniens video si dicatur quod Deus possit iurare 
falsum vel promittere se facturum et non facere, sicut potest homo’ (‘I see nothing 
problematic in saying that God can swear falsely or promise that He will do something and 
not do it, just as a man can’).301 However, Holcot does qualify his controversial conclusion 
with the claim that ‘God will never deceive good men’, although he does not deny that He 
could.
302
 
The same themes, examples and logical method of inquiry are apparent in the two 
lectures of Holcot’s Wisdom-commentary that Pratt has shown Chaucer drew upon in writing 
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the Nun’s Priest’s Tale.303 In Lectio 201, Holcot again makes use of the example of the 
judgment God wrought on the Egyptians, devoting a passage to the analysis of the dreams 
which forewarned them of their inevitable destruction: we have already seen Holcot’s 
concern with the revelation of reprobation and his use of this Old Testament narrative as an 
exemplar of God’s willingness to deceive his enemies.304 It is in Lectio 102, however, that 
Holcot’s wider concerns are most apparent. In that lecture, Holcot discusses the text, ‘in 
animas sanctas se transfert: amicos dei et prophetas constituit’ from Wisdom 7:27 
(‘[Wisdom] conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets’). 
It is in this context of revealed prophecy that Holcot goes on to discuss dreaming. 
Holcot seems to approach the Book of Wisdom as a set of quasi-sophismata. He 
formulates a paradoxical syllogism from the text’s twin concepts of friendship with God and 
revealed divine wisdom: 
Deus nulli dat donum sapientie nisi illi quem diligit. Sed deus nullum 
diligit nisi illum qui cum sapientia inhabitat. Ergo nulli alteri dat 
donum sapientie. 
 (God gives the gift of wisdom to none but him whom He loves. But 
God loves none but him who lives with wisdom [according to 
Wisdom 7:28]. Therefore he gives the gift of wisdom to no one else.) 
There is what we might loosely call a ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem inherent in the text: if God 
only reveals wisdom (‘prophetas constituit’) to those he loves (the ‘animas sanctas’), and yet 
being loved by God is the effect of being given wisdom (‘amicos dei [...] constituit’), then 
how does the whole process get started? Next, following the standard method of the linguistic 
logician, Holcot attempts to dispose of any ambiguity in his own form of words, explaining 
‘qui cum sapientia inhabitat’ as an example of hypallage, meaning ‘those in whom wisdom 
lives’. Here Holcot takes a distinctly nominalistic line: ‘wisdom’ is a reference not to a 
universal abstract but to a particular individual – in this case, ‘Dei filius’, Christ himself. 
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It starts to become clear where Holcot is going. He quickly poses a provisional 
‘solution’ to this particular problem in a way that ties it into the broader concerns of his 
Quodlibetal quaestiones and Sentences commentary, and to the broader fourteenth-century 
controversy surrounding soteriological predestination. Holcot is one of the ‘Pelagians’ 
against whom Bradwardine argued so furiously in De causa Dei; and the ‘chicken-and-egg’ 
problem outlined above constitutes the essence of that debate. For Holcot, God will give 
grace to those who do what is in them (quod in se est); for Bradwardine, what is in them is 
only the gracious gift of God. So, in Lectio 102, Holcot first proposes a Bradwardinian 
‘solution’: ‘Neminem etiam diligit deus tamquam electum’ (‘God loves nobody as much as 
the elect’). In true scholastic fashion, Holcot then draws a conclusion from a proposed 
solution before proceeding to argue the contrary position. In this case, he concludes that God 
therefore only gives revelation to friends of God, that is to the elect. Against this conclusion, 
however, he posits Scriptural counterexamples, such as the case of Balaam in Numbers 22-23 
and the implications of Corinthians 13 (that one might have the gift of prophecy without 
charity). These cases demonstrate how God manipulates revelation in order to confound his 
enemies and assist his friends: ‘tunc etiam ad honorem domini est quod secretum quo est 
contrarium inimico et utile amicis per inimico potius divulget’ (‘for then it is to the honour of 
God that a secret which is harmful to the enemy and useful to [his] friends should better be 
revealed through the enemy’). Holcot’s God is, as it were, not above playing tricks, granting 
the gift of revelation to his enemies in such a way as to work against them, divulging their 
own defeat.  
Finally, Holcot tackles the question of dream revelation in relation to future 
contingency, the engine of his controversial thesis of divine deceit. Discussing whether 
dreams arise from God or from nature, Holcot posits the following syllogism:  
121 
 
Sed contra ista videtur quod divinatio per somnia non sit possibilis, 
quia divinatio importat certitudinem: sed certitudo nulla potest haberi 
de adventu futuro propter somnium. Ergo nihil est. 
 
(But against this it seems that divination through dreams is not 
possible, because divination confers certitude: but there can be no 
certitude concerning the contingent future on account of a dream. 
Therefore there is no such thing.) 
 
As we have discussed above, the question of whether divine revelation ‘importat 
certitudinem’ was central to Holcot’s solution to the predestination problem. Here he is 
tackling the same issue, albeit in rather condensed form, in his Wisdom commentary. It is in 
the context of this wider discussion that we should understand Holcot’s citation of the 
proverbial ‘Somnia ne cures’, which Chaucer’s Pertelote quotes in translation, attributing it to 
Cato. Yet as Pratt points out, 
Holcot had not quoted couplet 2.31 of the Disticha which flourished 
under the title or name of ‘Cato’: 
Somnia ne cures, nam mens humana quod optat, 
dum vigilat, sperat, per somnium cernit id ipsum. 
 
[Take no notice of dreams, for the human mind, which while awake, 
chooses and hopes, sees in a dream the thing [it hoped for].] 
 
Instead he had cited a line which has the same wording that he used – 
or nearly the same – in a number of medieval manuscripts: 
 
Sompnia ne cures, nam fallunt sompnia plures.
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[Take no notice of dreams, for most dreams are deceitful.] 
Given the wider context of Holcot’s theology and logic, his choice to use the variant form 
now becomes more explicable. His interest lies not in dreams as empty reflections of the 
human mind (‘mens humana’) but rather in that fact that dreams deceive (‘fallunt sompnia’): 
if God can use revelation to deceive and thus overthrow his enemies, dreams can be 
deceptive, even if they are of divine origin. 
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A Holcotian Reading of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale 
Robert Pratt, who argued for Chaucer’s use of Holcot’s Wisdom commentary in the Nun’s 
Priest’s Tale, has also demonstrated that Chaucer ‘was intimately acquainted with Branch II 
of the Roman de Renart’.306 In his article on ‘Three Old French Sources of the Nonnes 
Preestes Tale’, he gives a list of verbal parallels that put the matter beyond reasonable doubt. 
There is, however, a significant structural difference between Chaucer’s narrative and that of 
his source. In Le Roman de Renart, Pinte, the French equivalent of Pertelote, does not argue 
against the validity of the dream’s revelation, but rather it is she herself who urges Chantecler 
to take the dream seriously and he dismisses her warnings: the exact opposite of Chaucer’s 
tale.
307
 Partly for this reason, Pratt argues that Chaucer also knew Le Roman de Renart le 
Contrefait, in which Pinte does urge Chantecler not to be a coward.
308
 Yet the basis of Pinte’s 
rebuke in le Contrefait is not Pertelote’s out-of-hand dismissal of revelatory dreams, but 
rather a sort of ‘que sera sera’ logic: ‘Preng le temps ainsi qu’il venra, / Qui pour toy quoy ne 
se tenrra’ (‘Take the future as it comes; it will not hold itself back for you alone’).309 This 
argument, along with her repeated warnings against cowardice, leads the cock to exclaim ‘Or 
adviengne [...] qu’aviengne, / Mais que mal eür ne me tiengne!’ (‘Now come what will [...] 
but may bad luck not take me’).310 
Chaucer’s inversion of the argument in Le Roman de Renart, making Pertelote the 
sceptic and Chauntecleer the determinist, is more startling given that Chaucer’s ‘fatalistic’ 
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cock still ultimately behaves just like his French sceptic counterpart, by going outside 
anyway.
311
 As Ian Bishop comments, Chauntecleer’s ‘volte face is [...] blatant and 
outrageous’,312 especially since Chaucer adapts his sources to have the conclusion of the 
argument anticipate the opposite course of action, as Pratt explains: 
After Chauntecleer presents his exempla in support of divination 
through dreams, Chaucer takes from the Roman de Renart the cock’s 
assertion, ‘Ja nel crerai ... / Que j’aie mal por icest songe’ (268-69) 
and by omission of the negative has his Chauntecleer say the direct 
opposite: ‘I shal han of this avisioun / Adversitee’ (3152-53). Thus 
while both Renart le Contrefait and the Nonnes Preestes Tale show a 
reversal of the attitudes of cock and hen as found in the Roman, 
Chaucer’s Chauntecleer goes even further than the Chantecler of the 
clerc de Troyes in taking a strong positive stand in support of the 
significance of dreams.
313
 
 The question is why Chaucer would go to some trouble to make his rooster-philosopher 
argue so vociferously for the validity of the dream, make a strongly deterministic conclusion 
(with a tone more definite than Pinte’s general air of fatalism in Renart le Contrefait), and 
then, without further explanation, go into the yard anyway.  
 Bishop suggests that fear of Pertelote’s prescribed ‘laxatyves’ (3154) is what 
motivates Chauntecleer’s counter-intuitive behaviour, but a comparison with Renart le 
Contrefait suggests a more interesting and thematically significant interpretation.
314
 At the 
crucial moment, Chaucer chooses to leave the reasoning deliberately ambiguous by using a 
pun, when Chauntecleer announces, ‘I diffye bothe sweven and dreem’ (3171). The word 
‘diffye’ here can be read in no fewer than three different ways. First, it may simply mean 
‘renounce’, suggesting that Chauntecleer has suddenly and mysteriously changed his mind 
about the significance of dreams, despite winning the argument. Second, ‘diffye’ probably 
carries more of its modern meaning (‘defy’) in this context, and indicates that Chauntecleer is 
                                                          
311
 Pratt, ‘French Sources I’, p. 433. 
312
 Bishop, ‘Nun’s Priest’s Tale’, p. 266. Jill Mann also notices ‘the glaring discrepancy between Chauntecleer's 
position in the argument and his subsequent behaviour’: From Aesop to Reynard, p. 255. 
313
 Pratt, ‘French Sources I’, p. 433. 
314
 Bishop, ‘Nun’s Priest’s Tale’, p. 266. 
124 
 
refusing to alter his behaviour, in spite of his belief that he will have ‘adversitee’ (3153) from 
the dream: Chaucer’s cock thus shares the deterministic logic that convinces his counterpart 
in Renart le Contrefait. Third, however, there is a typically Chaucerian pun on ‘diffye’, for 
which the audience is prepared when Chaucer uses the same word a few lines earlier about 
the laxatives: ‘I hem diffye’ (3156). Here the joke is straightforward: ‘diffye’ can mean 
‘digest’, from the Latin ‘defaecare’, which is exactly what laxatives are for. The verb can be 
applied figuratively to abstractions, meaning to ‘assimilate’, and in this sense it is applied to 
religious doctrine in an early fifteenth-century Wycliffite sermon, which self-consciously 
utilises the bodily simile.
315
 Thus when Chaucer uses the same verb just 15 lines later, the 
audience has already been given a clear indication that it can be read in this way: rather than 
digesting Pertelote’s laxatives, Chauntecleer will digest the dream, much as he might accept a 
new religious truth. This reading is supported by the fact that Chaucer goes on to use a 
substance typically used as chicken feed as his image for the competing doctrines of necessity 
and free will: ‘I ne kan nat bulte it to the bren’ (3240). In his essay on laxatives in the Nun’s 
Priest’s Tale, Patrick Gallacher, who has already commented upon digestion as an image of 
assimilating religious doctrine, expounds the line as follows: 
That is, he cannot sufficiently sift the flour and bran of this problem so 
as to provide us with sustenance. Food here is a symbol of 
understanding in the context of the basic dilemma of tragedy: to what 
extent is a man free and responsible and to what extent determined by 
fate?
316
   
In other words, Chauntecleer’s alternative at the conclusion of the debate is to renounce the 
dream and digest the laxatives, as Pertelote suggests, or digest the dream and renounce the 
laxatives; and he chooses the latter. 
 In effect, Chaucer constructs a situation in which, as Grover Furr explains, 
Chauntecleer’s decision to go into the yard ‘may be seen as a logical result of his determinist 
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interpretation of his dream: he is to have “adversitee” sometime, not necessarily that day; and 
there is nothing he can do about it, so he acts as though he never had the dream at all’.317 
Chauntecleer believes the dream to be revelatory, and therefore acts in accordance with what 
he considers to be a pre-determined series of events. The irony is that while the narrator cites 
Bradwardine, the rooster silently constructs the arguments that lead him to his deterministic 
conclusion with material from the work of Bradwardine’s ‘Pelagian’ adversary, Holcot. 
Chauntecleer is thus in the same position as the unfortunate subject of Holcot’s ‘Sortes 
dampnabitur’ sophism. Holcot’s ‘Socrates’ is a determinist who believes that, because God 
has revealed his damnation to him, therefore he must be damned: he gives up hope of 
salvation, and is damned for it.  
 Once again it is essential to recognise that this is not merely a theological problem, 
but also, and at its heart, a logical one, structurally similar to the ‘Bridge’ sophism discussed 
above, only with God playing the role of Plato. God makes a promise of salvation to those 
who trust Him for salvation. Socrates trusts God when He says that Socrates will be damned: 
does Socrates merit salvation or damnation? To put it another way, those who believe the 
truth God has revealed will be saved; Socrates believes the divinely revealed proposition that 
he will be damned. If God then damns him, He should have saved him for believing His 
revealed truth; if God saves him, He should have damned him for believing falsely and 
despairing of his own salvation. This problem is also crucial to understanding the relationship 
between the Troilus and Strode’s controversy with Wyclif, to which I will return below.  
Thus the tale of Chauntecleer is not really the ‘murie tale’ for which the host mistakes 
it (3449), but a carefully constructed logical scenario, what a fourteenth-century logician 
would call a ‘casus’ and what the Nun’s Priest calls a ‘cas’ (3204), devised to present a 
                                                          
317
 Furr, ‘The Nun’s Priest’s Tale and Nominalism’, p. 143. Despite its useful analysis of the tale, Furr’s chapter, 
and indeed the book as a whole, sometimes exemplifies the over-emphasis on the slightly monolithic notion of 
‘nominalism’ that I criticise in the Introduction. 
126 
 
particular problem. It is itself a kind of ‘thought-experiment’, the hypothetical test-case 
especially beloved by the Oxford Calculators; and just as the ‘thought-experiments’ of 
fourteenth-century logicians like Heytesbury proceeded ‘secundum imaginationem’, so 
Chauntecleer’s doom is ‘by heigh ymaginacioun forncast’ (3217). The term ‘imagination’ 
here is usually explained either in terms of Chauntecleer’s vision, or God’s foreknowledge, or 
the fox’s cunning;318 but coming just a few lines after another piece of technical terminology 
(‘cas’), it is quite possibly a reference to the hypothetical nature of the narrative. The 
imagination is the hypothesising of the pseudo-logician-narrator constructing the tale.  
 As discussed above, a number of problems like that of the bridge crossing were 
developed secundum imaginationem in the first half of the fourteenth century as two-stage 
extensions of the insoluble Liar paradox; and these problems were, in turn, explicitly 
discussed in relation to the problem of future contingency. It is interesting, then, that the 
Nun’s Priest’s Tale has been said to contain at least two different versions of the ‘Liar’ 
problem, which demonstrate that Chaucer’s interest is in future contingency as a logical, as 
much as a theological, problem. First, Peter Travis argues that, in the following lines, 
‘Chaucer’s educated readers would immediately have recognized the narrator’s assertion 
concerning the truth-value of his own beast fable as belonging to that large category of 
propositions called sophismata’:319 ‘This storie is also trewe, I undertake / As is the book of 
Launcelot de Lake’ (3211-12). Travis explains that the prose Lancelot was renowned as a 
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‘lying’ text, and thus he explicates the couplet as a form of the two-stage Liar paradox, even 
making reference to one of Buridan’s sophismata.320 
Second, in a rather different context, Edward Wheatley discusses the common 
medieval suspicion of the fable form, on the grounds that ‘fable is based upon falsity or is 
itself false’, and notices how Chaucer ingeniously implicates his own fabular narrative in this 
respect: 
By stating that the tale will focus on the widow [in line 2824: ‘This 
wydwe, of which I telle yow my tale’], the Nun’s Priest makes the rest 
of the fable a lie in terms of the oral contract he has made with his 
listeners [...] (By the time the Nun’s Priest revises the description of 
his subject matter by stating, ‘My tale is of a cok, as ye may heere’ 
[3252], the listener / reader fully understands what the tale is about; 
into this revision Chaucer has structured a significant shift from what 
the authorial ‘I’ tells – a lie – to what the listening ‘you’ hears – a 
truth, of sorts.)
321
 
The point is that the fable form demands more than passive reception from its audience; 
rather it demands an active attempt to glean a moral truth from a literal lie, as the Nun’s 
Priest makes clear: ‘Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille’ (3443). Wheatley’s focus is 
the fable form and its reputation, yet he draws attention to the significant fact that the Nun’s 
Priest’s Tale is self-consciously unreliable.322 Here again the narrator plays with a reflexive 
falsehood not dissimilar to the kind explored in the insolubilia. 
Furthermore, the potential distinction between what ‘I’ tell and what ‘you’ hear is an 
extremely important element of the fourteenth-century discussion of the Liar paradox: Walter 
Burley, Bradwardine, Heytesbury and Buridan all discuss the question of whether what a 
speaker says and what a listener hears him say can be different, or have different truth-values 
– in Heytesbury’s words, ‘Quidquid auditur a Socrate profertur a Platone’ (‘whatever is heard 
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by Socrates is spoken by Plato’).323 The point is central to the late-medieval rejection of a 
cassationist approach to the Liar paradox, discussed above. In summary, one cassationist 
approach asserts that someone pronouncing an insoluble is saying nothing at all, but as 
Bradwardine succinctly puts it, ‘Sortes auditur loqui, ergo Sortes dicit aliquid’ (‘if Socrates is 
heard to speak, then Socrates says something’).324 On this basis, Bradwardine rejects 
cassationism, as a fable of the sophists (‘fabulose sophisticantibus’), highlighting not only the 
general suspicion of fables in the later Middle Ages that Wheatley discusses, but also the 
figurative extension of the term ‘fable’ into the realm of pseudo-logic in the fourteenth 
century. For Bradwardine, at least, a fable can be a piece of bad logic, perhaps because only 
in a fable can the audience hear a truth when the narrator tells a lie.
325
  
His application of ‘fabula’ to bad reasoning is perhaps not completely without 
precedent: the term ‘fabula’ is used to describe one of the spoof arithmetical problems in the 
Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes, quoted in relation to the Summoner’s Tale above. It 
could perhaps mean, therefore, any example of dubious mathematics or logic. The term 
seems to carry similar connotations even in literary texts, such as The Romaunt of the Rose: 
‘I wolde,’ seide Resoun, ‘thee ler, 
Sith thou to lerne hast sich desir, 
And shewe thee, withouten fable, 
A thyng that is not demonstrable.’326 
Here, Reasoun uses ‘fable’ not merely as a synonym for ‘lie’, but in contrast to a piece of 
logical terminology. He claims to be able to produce, without sophistry (‘fable’), a 
proposition that runs counter to formal logic: in fact, he goes on to give a whole string of 
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conventional paradoxes of love, including that of ‘wanhope’, the despairing belief in one’s 
own failure (or even damnation).
327
 Thus, in logical, mathematical and literary texts, the term 
‘fable’ was capable of holding the connotations of dubious logical reasoning; and Chaucer’s 
own fable makes capital out of the apparent bad reputation of its genre. 
Heytesbury explores the same question as Bradwardine in more detail, proposing a 
scenario in which Plato speaks a true proposition, ‘nullus homo est asinus’ (‘no man is an 
ass’), but Socrates misses the first word and only hears, ‘homo est asinus’ (‘man is an ass’): 
what Socrates hears, Plato speaks. However, the truth-values of what is heard and what is 
spoken are different, just as a fabulist might tell a lie (of sorts) and yet manage to 
communicate a truth to his audience.
328
 Perhaps this is what the Nun’s Priest means by the 
‘chaf’ and ‘fruyt’ (3443) in his tale. Heytesbury’s choice of proposition, although very 
commonplace, is nevertheless interesting: Plato’s true statement of the fact that there is an 
absolute distinction between man and beast contains within it a false statement that conflates 
man and beast, just as the beast fable attempts to produce a uniquely human moral, yet 
contains within it an application of uniquely human characteristics to other animals. 
Chaucer’s Host similarly mishears the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, as he demonstrates by describing 
its narrator in gallinaceous terms (3450-57). As Wheatley says, 
the Host fails to interpret the animals in the fable as representative of 
humans so as to glean a human, moral lesson from the fable; rather, he 
reads the body of the human before him as an animal’s, and he 
fantasizes that body back into a fabular setting, where it can abandon 
morality in pursuit of more than one hundred females. This is a 
completely inverted reading of the fable.
329
 
While the fable attempts to discuss complex, uniquely human, even spiritual questions which 
cannot possibly apply to non-rational animals (‘nullus homo est asinus’), the host, like 
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Heytesbury’s Socrates, hears only the absurd identity of man and beast (‘homo est asinus’; or, 
in fact, in the words of one of Buridan’s propositions, homo est auis (‘a man is a bird’)).330 
 How are these concerns over the problematic relation of truth and falsehood in the 
fable form relevant to the question of determinism and future contingency with which the 
Nun’s Priest is so preoccupied? The problem of propositions whose truth-value is 
indeterminate or capable of changing over time is central to the fourteenth-century analysis of 
the two-stage Liar paradox and the insolubles that evolved from it, an analysis conducted in 
terms of future contingency, as I discussed above. Thus, in the ‘Bridge’ sophism, when Plato 
puts the ultimatum that if Socrates’s next statement is true Plato will allow him to cross, but if 
it is false he will throw him in the river, Plato is making a statement about a contingent 
future: a statement that Buridan says is false. Similarly, even Bradwardine admits that,  
Si autem ponatur quod a sit nomen commune cuilibet negative 
respondenti vel responsuro et solum tali, et proponatur ista: tu es a, 
tunc est dubitandum, quia dependet a contingenti futuro.  
(But if it is proposed that A is a name common to each of those and 
only those who respond or will respond negatively, and this is 
proposed: 
You are an A, 
then it should be doubted, because it depends on the contingent 
future).
331
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If you say you are not an ‘A’, then you are one by the definition of the term, and vice versa. It 
could be argued that, in propositions such as ‘Sortes dampnabitur’ (discussed above), Holcot 
develops the problem by making God the speaker of the proposition. He reveals a ‘truth’ 
about the future which must still be contingent because it is dependent upon the response of 
the man receiving the revelation. 
In the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, it is the narrator who takes the place of Holcot’s God. As 
Pratt notes, whereas both the Roman de Renart and Renart le Contrefait have the fox enter 
the yard before Chauntecleer’s dream, Chaucer elects to follow Marie de France’s fable ‘Del 
cok e del gupil’ in only introducing the fox just before its encounter with Chauntecleer.332 He 
thus leaves space for the narrator to ‘forncast’ the coming doom to the audience, adding 
nonchalantly that ‘God woot that worldly joye is soone ago’ (see 3204-3206). Thus the 
narrator constructs the ‘casus’ in which the hero is forewarned of a coming terror, and then 
transfers the problem onto the audience by forewarning them directly too.
333
 However, the 
narrator has already proved his unreliability in forecasting the development of the tale in his 
announcement that the tale will be about the widow. His revelations (to both protagonist and 
audience) about what will happen later in his own narrative are thus overtly dubitable and, as 
it were, contingent – this is even more clearly the case when it is remembered that the Nun’s 
Priest is, within Chaucer’s framing narrative, delivering his tale orally and without a script. 
In this way it could be argued that Holcot’s God, who deceives through revelation, is 
matched by the narrator of the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, who allows his creatures a detailed 
discussion of the contingency of the future of the narrative, whilst using a cataphoric 
intervention to shape that narrative to the conclusion he desires, just like Holcot’s God. 
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However, if Chauntecleer can be seen as a naïve follower of Bradwardine, then so too can the 
Nun’s Priest. After all, as Jill Mann notes in passing, ‘the cock was frequently interpreted as a 
symbol of the preacher or priest in the Middle Ages’.334 If the ‘lord’ referred to in the 
concluding prayer of the tale is indeed Bradwardine himself, then the point seems to be to 
associate the Nun’s Priest with the determinist position, or rather with a simplistic parody of 
that determinist position. Unaware that the Nun’s Priest’s prayer might specifically recall 
Bradwardine’s theology of prayer, R. T. Lenaghan calls the benediction ‘the first 
straightforward lines of the tale’ in which ‘the sophisticated fabulist is gone and his irony and 
indirection with him’.335 If my reading of these lines is correct, then the lines are full of 
Chaucerian irony. It seems that the Nun’s Priest, like his rooster protagonist, is ostensibly a 
sincere determinist. However, just as Chauntecleer’s belief in determinism leads him to 
choose a course of action that supports Holcot’s ‘semi-Pelagian’ thesis, so the Nun’s Priest 
tries to tell (and thinks he has told) a Bradwardinian tale, but has actually (as Chaucer 
intended) demonstrated the horrible paradox at the heart of a determinist theology. I agree 
with Travis that, ‘rather than providing adequate answers to [...] vexing [logical] questions 
[...] Chaucer’s fable instead simply advertises itself as an insolubilium writ large – a self-
referential parody instantiating a series of paradoxes’.336 Nevertheless, a pattern is emerging 
that suggests that Chaucer’s interest in logical problems has a particular bent and focus. The 
logical problems surrounding the Liar paradox and the related insolubles of future 
contingency become the catalyst for a ‘thought-experiment’ in the foreknowledge and future 
contingency controversy, since they advertise the unreliability of the God-like narrator. By 
positing the ‘cas’ as he does, the Nun’s Priest, a deceitful divine, unwittingly demonstrates 
Holcot’s ‘divine deceit’.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
LOGIC AND DETERMINISM IN  
TROILUS AND CRISEYDE 
‘Termes of Phisik’ 
I have described the Nun’s Priest’s Tale as a kind of logico-theological ‘thought-experiment’. 
The term ‘thought-experiment’ is, however, more commonly associated in the modern history 
of science with the logico-physical concerns of fourteenth-century scholars, and especially of 
the Oxford Calculators. It is part of the contention of this thesis that theological, semantic and 
physical problems should be seen as vitally connected under the sophismatic method both in 
the work of logicians themselves and in the influence they exerted upon the literature of the 
time. I will now, therefore, trace the significance of ‘physical’ logic in Chaucer’s work in 
relation to the broader semantic and theological concerns that I have discussed above. 
It is not ‘wys’, Pandarus tells Troilus, to write of love with ‘argumentes tough’ (II. 
1025), or to jumble up discordant things together as, for example, ‘to usen termes of phisik / 
In loves termes’ (II. 1038-39). According to both the Riverside Chaucer and Barry Windeatt, 
‘phisik’ means simply ‘medicine’; and it is easily understandable why both editions seem so 
sure of the term’s meaning in this context.337 There is a highly conventional and well-known 
tradition of the medical metaphor of love in late-medieval literature: the sick, indeed dying 
lover, pining for the one, unattainable cure that could heal his ills. Hearing ‘phisik’ in the 
same breath as ‘love’, the meaning of the term seems self-evident. Yet if ‘termes of phisik’ 
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merely suggests the use of conventional medical love imagery, then that very conventionality 
itself poses a problem. Far from Pandarus teaching Troilus how to write a conventionally 
acceptable love letter, he must, if these glosses are correct, be doing just the opposite, 
dismissing an otherwise unquestioned staple of love poetry as ‘discordant’ (II. 1037). Even if 
this is the case, Troilus would then seem to act out of character by ignoring his friend’s 
advice and following the convention of using medical imagery in his love letter anyway, 
invoking his own death (II. 1075), and calling Criseyde ‘his sorwes leche’ (II. 1066). It is 
possible that Chaucer merely means to draw attention to Pandarus’s ineptitude in matters of 
love, but the whole reading of the passage feels somewhat forced. 
The meaning of the phrase in question more probably hangs on the word ‘termes’, a 
word derived ‘from the scholastic Latin terminus’, and which Chaucer uses time and again to 
denote what David Burnley called ‘the special forms and expressions of language which are 
associated with technical discussion’.338 It would not, of course, be conventional to insert 
technical ‘termes’ into a love letter, so Pandarus’s advice is sound. Troilus’s use of the word 
‘leche’ certainly does not constitute such a technical ‘terme’, so it seems that he does follow 
Pandarus’s advice after all.339 The problem is that if Pandarus is not in fact commenting upon 
the conventional practice of invoking medical imagery in the discourse of love, then the 
argument from the same literary convention that ‘phisik’ must mean ‘medicine’ is rendered 
much less powerful. 
‘Phisik’ need not have any connection with medicine here. It can denote, just as 
securely, the more general idea of ‘natural science’, and so function as a very loose 
equivalent of our modern term ‘physics’. In the fourteenth century, the term is inseparable 
from the logical speculation about natural processes through which logicians such as the 
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Oxford Calculators investigated the universe ‘secundum imaginationem’.340 In this 
connection too, ‘phisik’ may denote more specifically Aristotle’s own work on many of the 
logico-physical and mechanical problems that the ‘Merton men’ and others were busy 
debating and rethinking. It is in this sense that Chaucer uses the word in his translation of 
Boethius: ‘“Myn Aristotle,” quod she, “in the book of his Phisic diffynysseth this thing by 
schort resoun, and nyghe to the sothe”’ (Boece, VI. pr. 1, 62-64).341 Thus Burnley, who has 
conducted a substantial study of Chaucer’s use of technical ‘termes’, glosses ‘phisik’ not as 
‘medicine’ but as ‘natural science’. He goes on to discuss Chaucer’s use of a range of logical 
and mathematical technical ‘termes’ in Troilus and Criseyde.342 In fact, in a touch of typical 
Chaucerian irony, even as Pandarus is urging Troilus to avoid such ‘termes’, he makes use of 
two of the termini technici of natural science: ‘matere’ and ‘forme’ (II. 1039-40). 
What Burnley misses, however, is the fact that, in relation to fourteenth-century 
logical discourse, ‘termes’ is itself a technical ‘terme’: it denotes the categorematic words or 
phrases that make up the subject and predicate of a logical proposition. Thus Strode himself, 
for example, in his Tractatus de consequentiis, considers the ‘terme’ (‘terminus’) ‘homo et 
asinus’ (‘man-and-ass’).343 The use of ‘terminus’ in this technical sense is standard in late-
medieval logic. Buridan, for example, discusses ‘the term chimera’ (‘iste terminus 
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“chimaera”’) in his Summulae de dialectica.344 Speaking precisely, the ‘termes’ of natural 
science, or ‘phisik’, are not merely the technical words and phrase of logical discourse (such 
as ‘forme’ and ‘matere’), but also the whole set of ‘images’ (or ‘tropes’) employed as 
examples in the sophismata, such as ‘ass’ or ‘chimera’.345 Such an understanding of the 
phrase ‘termes of phisik’ may also explain Pandarus’s analogy for the sort of linguistic 
discord he is discouraging: a hybrid with a fish’s body, an ass’s feet and an ape’s head – in 
other words, a sort of chimera, which served as the almost ubiquitous example (or ‘terme’) of 
logical confusion and impossibility in the late-medieval sophismata.
346
 
It is, therefore, probable that Pandarus’s ‘termes of phisik’ refers to the language and 
examples of the sophismata physicalia of the fourteenth-century logicians, especially as such 
a reading fits rather better with his reference to ‘argumentes tough’ than does the simplistic 
gloss, ‘medicine’. I hope to show that Chaucer’s interest in this kind of ‘phisik’ forms part of 
a logico-philosophical scheme based on the problematics of physical, and ultimately 
emotional, change that runs throughout the narrative. The irony of Pandarus’s advice to 
Troilus will thus be shown to be supreme: for although the inept lover Troilus follows his 
friend’s advice, the mischievous author refuses to, instead carefully constructing a narrative 
that delights in using ‘termes of phisik / In loves termes’.347 
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The Frenzy to Measure 
Fourteenth-century logicians extended the physical problems of Aristotle and their own 
medieval predecessors in a number of significant directions, but perhaps most notable was 
their zeal somehow to quantify or to ‘pin down’ processes of continuous change: for instance, 
by finding a mean value, or by identifying the ‘limits’ of the process. John Murdoch 
describes their approach as ‘the near frenzy to measure everything imaginable’.348 Edith Sylla 
provides a compact appraisal of the innovative and audacious nature of the enterprise: 
According to Aristotelian theory, quantities and qualities belong to 
separate categories. One might suppose, therefore, that Aristotelian 
theorists would not attempt to quantify qualities. During the later 
Middle Ages, however, theorists who were basically Aristotelian in 
their approaches did attempt to quantify qualities.
349
 
I will discuss certain particular approaches in more detail below, but I would first like to 
illustrate the extraordinarily imaginative range of ‘quantities’ and ‘qualities’ that fourteenth-
century logicians theorised about, and provide a few examples of the sometimes bizarre 
thought-experiments that they invented to test their logical hypotheses. 
A passage from William Heytesbury demonstrates only a small part of the wide range 
of ‘quantities’ and ‘qualities’ that make their appearance in the fourteenth-century 
sophismata of change: 
Unde si Sortes erit major quam est (erit ed.) Plato aut melior vel albior 
seu calidior vel frigidior, sanior aut velocior, et jam non sit ipse maior 
quam est (erit ed.) Plato aut melior et cetera, igitur ipse incipit vel 
aliquando incipiet esse maior quam est Plato aut melior et sic de aliis. 
(Whether, if Socrates will be bigger than Plato, or better or whiter or 
hotter, or colder, or healthier, or faster, and now he is not bigger than 
Plato, or faster and so on, therefore he [Socrates] begins, or at some 
point will begin, to be bigger than Plato, or better and so on.)
 350
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Bigger, better, whiter, hotter, colder, healthier or faster: size, goodness, colour, temperature, 
health and speed all varying over time – the list is dizzying! Some of the cases posited by 
logicians, their thought-experiments, are remarkably vivid. Heytesbury, for example, 
imagines 
that, at the start of a certain hour, Socrates’ face is partly white and 
partly black; that during the hour the black area condenses to zero 
quantity while the white part expands so as to occupy the whole face; 
and that the whiteness of the white part meantime decreases 
continuously in intensity. If at the end of the hour the whiteness is still 
of an intensity greater than the medium degree in the latitude of 
whiteness, it follows that Socrates will become white, although the 
whiteness that he possesses continuously decreases in intensity.
351
 
The choice of a man’s face as the subject of colour change is striking, since it is 
physiognomic shorthand for emotional change, as we see countless times in Troilus and 
Criseyde: for example, the passage:  
‘Nay, nay,’ quod she, and wex as red as rose.           
With that he gan hire humbly to saluwe  
With dredful chere, and oft his hewes muwe[.] (II. 1256-58)  
A change of face is also a common metaphor for a treacherous change of personality or 
behaviour, as far back as the Greek ‘hypocrite’ right through to our own term ‘two-faced’. 
The physical examples of change in the sophismata suggest inner changes too. 
In fact, as the first passage from Heytesbury shows, the same sophismatic approach 
was also applied to internal ‘qualities’. The desire somehow to quantify health, for instance, 
may add interesting nuances to the conventional ‘love-sickness’ of Troilus. Pain is, perhaps, 
a still more abstract and intractable concept, yet Nicole Oresme, developing a geometric 
approach, writes in Chapter 39 of his ‘Tractatus de configurationibus’: 
let A and B be two pains, with A being twice as intensive as B and half 
as extensive. Then they will be equal simply... although pain A is 
worse than, or more to be shunned, than pain B. For it is more 
tolerable to be in less pain for two days than in great pain for one day. 
But these two equal and uniform pains when mutually compared are 
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differently figured, ... so that if pain A is assimilated to a square, then 
pain B will be assimilated to a rectangle whose longer side will denote 
extension, and the rectangle and square will be equal.
352
 
Some of the Merton men, and their contemporaries, even attempted to quantify moral 
concepts. Oresme, for instance, applied his geometric approach to similar problems 
involving ‘joy’.353 Glending Olson reminds us of two other qualities studied and quantified 
by the fourteenth-century logicians: 
The calculators and the people they influenced applied various 
‘measure languages’ (analytical terminology used to discuss such 
subjects as proportion, infinity and continuity, and local motion) not 
only to problems in logic and natural science, but also to philosophical 
and theological questions. For example, the mathematical distinction 
between the infinite and the finite was applied to the theological issue 
of distinguishing the love due God from that due one’s fellow 
creatures, and as a means of demonstrating how there could be 
variation within species and yet incommensurability between species. 
The language of intension and remission of forms (acceleration/ 
deceleration, or increase/decrease in qualities such as heat) was used 
to analyze questions of the movement of the will.
354
 
Variation in love and the movement of the will are of course issues of crucial importance in 
Troilus and Criseyde; and for Chaucer, as for the authors of the physicalia, the language of 
temperature variation provided an extremely effective analogy, and one that deserves rather 
more detailed scrutiny. 
The Heat of Love 
Although it is not at all surprising to find Chaucer using heat as a conventional metaphor for 
the intensity of love throughout the poem, certain occurrences of the trope are formulated in 
such a way as to draw attention to the natural processes of change, of which temperature 
serves as an example. Take, for instance, Pandarus’s consolatory prediction to Troilus that, 
‘Swich fir, by proces, shal of kynde colde’ (IV. 418). ‘Proces’ is a term of some interest here. 
Although this line, with its fire metaphor, finds no original in the corresponding passage of Il 
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Filostrato, it is possible that the word ‘proces’ may, in part, refer to Boccaccio’s ‘processo di 
tempo’ in a later passage spoken by Troiolo.355 However, this is also a term that was often 
applied to the structural development of quasi-logical argument: as for instance, in Book II’s 
‘paynted proces’ (424), where Criseyde is lamenting Pandarus’s specious and overly 
rhetorical (‘paynted’) analysis of her ‘cas’ (II. 422 – itself a term with connotations of logical 
argument).
356
 Thus, the phrase, ‘by proces’, may refer to the progression of time, or the 
natural (‘of kynde’) change taking place when fire grows cold; or it may be seeking to justify 
Pandarus’s assertion of the necessity of such natural change by an appeal to logical argument. 
One might now say, if you think about it logically (‘by proces’), hot things must naturally 
decrease in temperature. 
Far from being mere truism, Pandarus’s statement recalls the problems of intension 
and extension by which the Oxford Calculators made perhaps their most famous theoretical 
scientific breakthroughs, concerning the ability to quantify phenomena of varying intensity in 
terms of a ‘mean’. The famous ‘Mean Speed Theorem’ (that a body subject to uniform 
acceleration will travel the same distance over a period of time as a body travelling constantly 
at its mean speed) is probably the best example of such an approach. The same method can be 
followed when attempting to quantify, for example, the overall temperature of a body whose 
heat varies across its area: as John Murdoch summarises it, according to this algorithm, ‘a 
subject that varies uniformly in heat from zero degrees at one extreme to 8 degrees at the 
other is “just as hot” as if it were uniformly hot in degree 4 throughout’.357 
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Such concerns developed from the problem of intensity and quantity of heat earlier 
expressed more simply in terms of basic experimental phenomena: 
Scotus’s ‘faithful student’ Joannes de Bassolis adopted the concept of 
intension by degree to degree addition. He repeats and answers an old 
argument brought up against part to part addition, namely that if we 
add tepid water to tepid water both at the same degree of heat, the 
resulting mixture is not hotter. This, Joannes answers, is because we 
are adding subject to subject and getting an increase in the quantity of 
mass, but if we could put the two quantities of heat in the same 
subject, so that there would be no extensive increase of the quality in 
the subject, then we would get an increase in intensity.
358
 
By the early fourteenth century, at latest, treatment of the problem had developed in both 
sophistication and imagination: 
Omnis forma inherens recipit intensionem et remissionem: propter 
quod intelligitur tanquam exposita in linea que dicitur linea intensionis 
et remissionis. Et quia omnis forma inherens habet contrarium et 
medium, erit eadem linea intellectualis continens formas contrarias. 
Puta calor in quocunque loco dicte linee ponatur. Per intellectum 
intelligitur posse intendi supra illum punctum et similiter remitti 
donec venerit ad primum punctum medii inter calorem et algorem; 
ipsum quoque medium quia longitudinem habere intelligitur remitti 
potest sive per aliam considerationem intendi, donec venerit ad 
punctum eque distantem a contrariis. Et similiter intelligitur quod 
medium per intensionem recedit a puncto medio donec pervenerit ad 
primum punctum contrarii, et contrarium intelligitur posse intendi 
donec perveniat ad quemcunque punctum intensionis. 
(Every inherent form receives intension and remission, on account of 
which it becomes understandable when set forth as a line that is called 
the line of intension and remission. And since every inherent form has 
a contrary and a mean, that same line will be imagined containing 
contrary forms. Suppose a hotness is placed in any place whatever on 
the aforesaid line. Through the intellect it is understood that it may be 
increased above that point and similarly be remitted until it comes to 
the first point of the mean between hot and cold; that very same mean, 
since it is understood to have longitude, can be remitted or, by another 
consideration, be increased until it comes to a point equidistant from 
the contraries. And similarly it is understood that the mean, through 
intension, recedes from the middle point until it comes to the first 
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point of the contrary, and the contrary is understood to be able to be 
increased until it comes to whatever point you wish of intension.)
359
 
In other words, the temperature of an object can be conceived in terms of a unilinear scale 
with extremes and a middle point; and in terms of that scale the temperature resulting from a 
mixture can be calculated: 
Exempli gratia, detur aqua duo librarum calida in 6
o 
gradu linee 
sumpto in respectu alicuius puncti in eadem linea contenti; detur etiam 
alia aqua unius libre calida in 12
o
 gradu respectu eiusdem puncti; facta 
commixtione istarum aquarum, caliditas commixti erit elevata in linea 
intensionis per 8 gradus respectu predicti puncti, quia distantia que est 
inter 6 et 8 est subdupla ad distantiam que est inter 8 et 12, sicut aqua 
unius libre est subdupla ad aquam duarum librarum. 
 (For example, let there be given water of two weights hot in the sixth 
degree, in respect to some point contained in the same line; let there 
be given again another water of one weight hot in the twelfth degree 
with respect to the same point; a mixture of the two waters having 
been made, the hotness of the mixture will be raised in a line of 
intension through eight degrees, with respect to the aforesaid point, 
since the distance that is between six and eight is one-half the distance 
that is between eight and twelve, just as the water of one weight is half 
the water of two weights.)
 360
 
By the mid-fourteenth century, logicians were devising sophismata involving 
problems infinitely more complex:
361
 Richard Swineshead, for example, imagined  
a given subject [...] hot in degree 1 over its first half, in degree 2 over 
its next quarter, in degree 3 over its next eighth, in degree 4 over its 
next sixteenth, and so on in infinitum. As a whole, the subject is hot in 
degree 2. That is, it is finitely hot as a whole even though the heat 
throughout it increases infinitely.
362
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In the context of the ongoing development of this approach,
363
 Chaucer’s treatment of 
one of the conventional paradoxes of love in his description of Criseyde is striking: ‘Now 
hoot, now cold; but thus, bitwixen tweye, / She rist her up, and went hire for to pleye’ (II. 
811-12). The notes in the Riverside Chaucer helpfully compare this couplet to a couplet from 
the Romaunt of the Rose: ‘Thou shalt no whyle be in o stat, / But whylom cold and whilom 
hat’ (B. 2397-98). The second, more conventional, example of the trope ignores, indeed 
derives its power from ignoring, the problem of a body both hot and cold, or quickly 
switching from one to other, as a mysterious phenomenon accompanying the experience of 
love. In Criseyde’s case, however, the paradox is definitely resolved, by understanding her 
contrasting emotions as contraries on a line of intension and remission and assigning her a 
mean temperature ‘bitwixen tweye’. 
Perhaps another example of how Chaucer hints at the application of a more rigorous 
quantification of the heat of love throughout the narrative comes with Troilus’s exclamation 
to Pandarus in Book III: 
I hadde it nevere half so hote as now; 
And ay the more that desir me biteth 
To love hire best, the more it me deliteth. 
[//] 
I not myself naught wisly what it is, 
But now I feele a newe qualitee –  
Yee, al another than I dide er this. (III.1650-55) 
‘Half so hote’ may, of course, be read purely idiomatically. It may also be read quantitatively, 
and it is noteworthy, therefore, that Chaucer adapts Boccaccio’s ‘Io ardo più che mai’ (‘I 
burn more than ever’) in the way that he does.364 It is possible that Chaucer’s phrasing was 
prompted by Boccaccio’s use of the word ‘qualitate’ in the next line, which Chaucer 
translates literally with the word ‘qualitee’ four lines later. In English, however, the term, 
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with its basic Aristotelian meaning, seems a little out of place in a purely emotional account 
of the passage. Troilus seems to be mixing love and Physics again. At first he attempts to 
quantify his love (or heat) for Criseyde in terms of previous experiences (‘I hadde it nevere 
half so hote’), as if his emotions, like Criseyde’s, could be understood in terms of a linear 
scale of intension and remission. However, he soon feels forced to alter his analogy: his 
‘heat’ for Criseyde is not merely the intension of a feeling that he already had; rather it is a 
‘newe qualitee’ entirely, utterly distinct from anything that has gone before. 
Heat is used as a paradoxical image of love throughout Troilus and Criseyde, 
although it must be conceded that in many cases the image is used utterly conventionally. 
Sometimes Chaucer’s choice of the image is unmistakably due to its presence in the 
corresponding passage of his source. However, Chaucer may often be said to intensify the 
problematic nature of temperature in his treatment of the image. Compare, for example, the 
last line of Petrarch’s Sonnet 132 with that of the corresponding Canticus Troili: ‘et tremo a 
mezza state, ardendo il verno’ (‘and I shiver in mid-summer, burn in winter’) may be said to 
contain the germ of the heat paradox, although rather connotatively than precisely.
365
 
Chaucer’s ‘For hote of cold, for cold of hote, I dye’ (I. 420) foregrounds much more clearly 
the problem of a body subject to different temperatures simultaneously. Barry Windeatt also 
draws attention to line 5 of Petrarch’s Rima 182: ‘Trem’al più caldo, ard’al più freddo cielo’ 
(‘I tremble under the hottest sky, burn under the coldest’).366 Although closer to Chaucer’s 
version, in that heat and cold are explicitly named, Petrarch’s line is still less pointedly 
paradoxical, lacking the central chiastic node that forces the two contraries together in 
Chaucer’s line (‘for hote of cold, for cold of hote’). 
Another example of the heat image in Troilus and Criseyde has been interpreted by 
Christopher Brookhouse as an example of the persistent use of the rhetorical device of 
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impossibilium, or what should perhaps more precisely be called adynaton, in the poem:
367
 
‘God woot, refreyden may this hote fare / Er Calkas sende Troilus Criseyde’ (V. 507). The 
fact that Chaucer employs such a device on a number of occasions throughout the poem is 
certainly important, and contributes to a general understanding of the Troilus as a problem-
text. However, it is an important qualification, as Susan Schibanoff points out, that although 
‘earlier [classical] rhetoricians discuss the device [of impossibilium] in their treatises; 
medieval ones rarely mention it.’ Indeed, ‘when medieval rhetoricians do discuss 
“impossibility,” they classify it as a method of refutation, not as an ornament of poetry’.368  
Similarly, I think a rhetorical reading of this particular example needs to be adjusted 
for three reasons. Firstly, to be effective, examples of rhetorical adynaton must be obviously 
and immediately impossible: Criseyde’s earlier description of a river flowing uphill back to 
its own source (IV. 1548-53) is a much more plausible example: no real analysis is needed to 
ascertain the impossibility – it is self-evident. Why the idea of something hot cooling down 
should be treated as a prima facie impossibility is, however, unclear; and because of that, the 
phrase cannot function powerfully, if at all, as an example of rhetorical adynaton. 
Secondly, a comparison with the corresponding passage from Boccaccio reveals that 
in Chaucer’s source the phrase is clearly not intended so much to convey the impossibility of 
Criseyde’s return as the change a prolonged period of separation might effect on Troilus: 
Questa tua voglia sì focosa e fiera 
Si potrà reffreddar, s’el non mi mente  
Ciò ch’io udii infin quand’ella c’era; 
Ed il decimo giorno, e’l mese e l’anno, 
Pria la rivegghi, credo passeranno. 
 
(This wish of thine, so fierce and fiery, may be cooled, if I be not 
deceived by what I heard even when she was here. I believe that the 
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tenth day and the month and the year will pass before thou dost see 
her again.)
369
 
Given that Chaucer’s phrase is a highly literal translation of his source passage (‘refreyden’, 
for instance, translating ‘reffreddar’), it seems likely that it was designed to serve a similar 
function as its original: that is, to convey Pandarus’s suggestion that Troilus’s heat of love 
might cool over a lengthy passage of time, as we suspect Criseyde is beginning to cool over a 
much shorter period of time.  
Finally and most significantly, the idea of change over time fits much more closely 
with the logical problems surrounding change of state that have already been discussed 
elsewhere in the text than with the classical rhetorical understanding of impossibilium. The 
problem of a body whose state changes over time is exactly the problem of intension and 
extension, just as much as the case of a body one part of which is hot and another part cold, 
which I discussed earlier. The difference is merely that instead of the body’s state varying 
across the extension of its area, the state varies across time. Even in a basic form with a 
discrete variable, this sort of problem could give rise to simple and elegant sophismata, such 
as Buridan’s, ‘I eat something raw’, which is justified by the syllogism that since I saw 
something raw yesterday and what I saw yesterday I eat today, therefore I eat something 
raw.
370
 The problem, of course, concerns whether (and how) we can refer to an object that 
has been subject to a change of state as the same object. On the one hand, to refer to the 
object as identical is to risk the implication that it retains all its previous accidents. On the 
other hand, as Troilus himself earlier points out, ‘folie is, whan man may chese, / For 
accident his substaunce ay to lese’ (IV. 1504-505). It would be foolish to lose the ability to 
refer to an object at all simply because it has in some way changed. 
It is highly significant in its own right that Chaucer chooses to adopt these technical 
terms of Aristotelian discourse (accident and substance), which were so important in late-
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medieval theology and logic. In fact, one early reader, glossing the line in BL MS Harley 
2392, felt it worthwhile to give the same sentiments in Latin (‘non est bonum perdere 
substantiam propter accidentes’). The same reader correctly identifies Chaucer’s translation 
of the logical term ‘causa causans’ at line IV. 829 (see below), in addition to noting many of 
the other lines suggestive of similar logical concerns: for example, I. 637, I. 642, II. 1099, II. 
1385, III. 931 and others.
371
 It seems that the potential for the poem to be read more deeply in 
the light of late-medieval logical discourse was recognised early on.  
The Indivisibilist 
The problem of changing state over time becomes much more logically, and mathematically, 
challenging when one introduces the possibility of a continuous, rather than a discrete, 
variable, such as temperature.
372
 One reason for this was that the idea of a continuum of 
infinite divisibility was not quite universally accepted. Glending Olson explains that the key 
question is:  
Do continuous phenomena like lines, space, and time lack 
distinguishable constituents (thus being potentially infinitely divisible 
into smaller and smaller parts), or are they composed of a number of 
separate constituents, indivisibles, that cannot be further subdivided—
points that constitute lines, intervals that constitute space, instants that 
constitute time? Medieval discussion of this topic in natural 
philosophy was based on Book VI of Aristotle’s Physics, but the 
calculators extended Aristotle’s thinking beyond space and time into 
qualities like heat and cold.
373
 
That Chaucer was aware of at least one practical application of this question is implied by a 
passage in his Treatise on the Astrolabe. As Olson notes, ‘Chaucer says when describing the 
markings of the astrolabe, the degrees of the zodiac are divided into “mynutes,” the minutes 
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into “secundes, and so furth into smale fraccions infinite”’ (Treatise on the Astrolabe, I. 8.11–
13).
374
 
Despite the wide acceptance of Bradwardine’s Tractatus de continuo, one significant 
late fourteenth-century logical theorist still rejected infinitely divisible continua: John Wyclif 
was an indivisibilist, arguing for the existence of basic, indivisible instants, points or degrees 
that make up what we think of as continua. As Norman Kretzmann recognises, ‘One of the 
reasons Wyclif’s views on time and change take their unusual indivisibilist direction [...] is 
that they are formed in conscious, sometimes angry opposition to the Calculators’ techniques 
of logical analysis and the continuism on which they are based’.375 Still, ‘historically and 
philosophically it seems to be a very unlikely view for a philosopher to have adopted in the 
latter half of the fourteenth century’.376 Wyclif’s logical approach also influenced the 
theological outlook of his followers. Olson has demonstrated how an understanding of the 
controversy should inform our reading of the Summoner’s Tale: 
Wyclif’s indivisibilist view of continua was adopted in a long 
vernacular Lollard sermon, where it is applied to human beings’ 
relationship to God. The anonymous author of the Omnis plantacio 
(written ca. 1410) discusses how contemporary sects within the church 
(monks, canons, friars) have ‘departid’ Christian unity. (That 
sweeping charge of the division of spiritual oneness, which both 
Lollards and their opponents hurled at each other, ultimately provides 
the broadest socio-religious context for the ‘departynge of the fart,’ as 
it is called in a rubric before SumT, III. 2243, in some manuscripts.)
377
  
The question of whether human behaviour can be so neatly categorised and ‘departed’, or 
whether a character’s possible motivations and actions must be viewed more relatively, as 
occupying a notional place on an infinitely divisible continuum that allows for variability and 
fluid change – that is, the question of whether ‘goodness’ and ‘love’ are discrete or 
continuous variables – is perhaps the crucial question in Troilus and Criseyde.  
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Troilus gives his own, indivisibilist answer in his discussion of the morality of 
Pandarus’s dubious adoption of the role of, at best, ‘go-between’ to his own niece: 
But he that gooth for gold or for richesse 
On swich a message, calle hym what the list; 
And this that thow doost, calle it gentilesse, 
Compassioun, and felawship, and trist. 
Departe it so, for wyde-wher is wist 
How that ther is diversite requered 
Bytwixen thynges like, as I have lered. (III. 400-406) 
The question is not so much whether Pandarus is behaving purely altruistically, as it is 
whether Pandarus’s actions are driven by material gain or by some less tangible incentive, 
such as emotional or social motivation. Troilus, although conceding the ‘likeness’ of 
Pandarus’s action to ‘bauderye’ (III. 397), emphasises the need to make, and the possibility of 
making, a qualitative and objective distinction. That is to say, that although he recognises that 
the action varies in character as its motivation is intended or remitted (to use the scholastic 
terminology) along a notional line of the tangibility of its incentive, he asserts that the line is 
not an infinitely and arbitrarily divisible continuum, but instead a scale of objective and 
otherwise indivisible grades or degrees. In other words, he assumes that one can make a 
definite ‘diversite’ or distinction between the two motivations, so that the one does not run 
fluidly into the other. In order to emphasise Troilus’s position, Chaucer adapts the scholastic 
maxim that ‘diversitas requirit distinctionem’ (‘difference demands distinction’).378 
In the wider scheme of Wyclif’s logic, his particular finitist brand of indivisibilism is 
necessitated by his insistent emphasis upon the omniscience of God concerning his creation. 
Norman Kretzmann summarises Wyclif’s motivation for adopting this position: 
God alone knows the detailed composition of things out of 
indivisibles, but in Wyclif’s view that sort of knowledge necessarily 
includes knowing the precise number of the indivisible constituents of 
the world and of each thing in it. If there are literally infinitely many 
points in a line, then, it is logically impossible that anyone, even 
omniscient God himself, can know the number of its points. [...] [But] 
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God made them; and omniscient God must know each of his creatures 
individually. As Wyclif puts it more than once, quoting or 
paraphrasing Genesis 1:31, ‘God sees all the things that he has 
made’.379 
Thus, in Chaucer’s time, the controversy over indivisibilism is inextricably linked to the 
wider controversy over God’s absolute knowledge, and thus to the problems surrounding 
determinism.
380
 The two aspects of logic even share the same terms and examples, or what a 
literary reader might call the same imagery. Indeed, Wyclif uses the point at which ‘the 
application of fire in sufficient force to combustible material acts or begins to act’ as an 
example of what he calls ‘natural necessity’ (‘necessitas naturalis’).381 Chaucer’s own use of 
tropes connected with the indivisibilist debate is therefore best understood in the context of 
his reaction to the controversy over determinism, especially in the famous soliloquy of Book 
IV. 
Wyclif, Chaucer, Strode 
It has been suggested that Troilus’s soliloquy draws on and parodies logical modes of thought 
and expression, both in substance and in style. Howard Patch noted that the passage is full of 
‘the jargon of a self-conscious beginner in the study of logic’: for instance, the line ‘And 
ferthe-over now ayenward yit’, which Patch translates, ‘Beside, notwithstanding this point, 
however’.382 The Boethian element of the soliloquy is also ground well-trodden by Howard 
Patch, John Huber, Frank Grady and others;
383
 but the introductory stanza of Troilus’s 
monologue (IV. 953-59) finds no parallel in the Consolation and requires explanation in other 
terms. Almost forty years ago, J. A. W. Bennett offered, very much in passing, a striking 
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hypothesis about the source of a single line from that stanza. That hypothesis, with its 
potential consequences for a nuanced understanding of Chaucer’s involvement in the 
intellectual controversies of his time, has never quite received the attention that it deserves. 
Bennett simply pointed out that Chaucer’s ‘al that comth, comth by necessitee’ (IV. 
958) bears a striking resemblance to a maxim of Wyclif’s, which he quotes as ‘[nec] omnia 
que eveniunt de necessitate eveniunt’.384 In fact, it may be added that apart from ‘[nec]’ the 
English constitutes a word for word translation of the Latin. Bennett appends no further 
comment himself, merely citing the relevant page number in Loserth’s edition of Wyclif’s 
Opera Minora.
385
 In the explanatory notes to this line, both the Riverside Chaucer and Barry 
Windeatt simply cite Bennett’s quotation without further comment.386 There are two reasons 
why Bennett’s observation has prompted relatively little discussion: firstly, Troilus appears to 
be arguing for necessity whereas Wyclif, as it would appear from Bennett’s quotation, is 
arguing against it. Secondly, there is no prima facie reason to suppose that Chaucer would 
have been so familiar with this particular passage from Wyclif’s prolific output as to justify 
any extended consideration of its relevance to Troilus and Criseyde. 
Both assumptions are, as it turns out, false. Firstly, in the passage in question Wyclif 
is arguing in favour of a form of necessity and predestination, in answer to an objection 
concerning free will. Why Bennett quotes Wyclif’s maxim as he does, supplying ‘nec’, is a 
mystery. It is certainly not because that is what Wyclif could be expected to write: the typical 
caricature of Wyclif’s position on predestination both now and in his own time is 
necessitarianism, as I have discussed. However, the phrase in question was not, in fact, 
originally Wyclif’s at all. Rather it is a quotation from Bradwardine’s De causa Dei. As 
Oberman observes: 
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One Bradwardinian proposition, namely that ‘omnia quae eveniunt 
eveniunt de necessitate’ may be found in Wiclif […] and by this a 
very clear connection seems indicated. Wiclif ascribed this 
proposition to Bradwardine: ‘In primis suppono cum doctore secundo 
(i.e. Bradwardine) quod omnia quae eveniunt sit necessarium evenire’ 
[…] [.] [...] Bradwardine does not propound this theory without 
further definition. For […] he explicitly rejects as heretical the opinion 
that everything happends [sic] inevitably, for to him the ‘necessitas 
antecedens’ does not eliminate, but presupposes the free will.387 
In fact, Bradwardine strongly rejects the proposition on the grounds that it even destroys 
God’s free will, the power of which it is Bradwardine’s purpose to defend: ‘quidem haeretici 
moliuntur destruere universaliter liberum arbitrium tam in Deo quam in creatura […] dicentes 
quod omnia quae eveniunt de necessitate eveniunt’ (‘certain heretics universally try to 
destroy free will as much in God as in a creature […] saying that everything comes about of 
necessity’).388 Bradwardine would also doubtless have been aware that almost the exact 
proposition in question had been censured first by the Bishop of Paris and then the 
Archbishop of Canterbury just over half a century earlier.
389
 James Weisheipl describes the 
question of ‘whether everything that happens, happens of necessity’ as ‘the quaestio 
famosissima of [Bradwardine’s] day’.390 Radically, however, Wyclif accepts the proposition, 
albeit with caveats. He thus seems, or at least seemed to his contemporaries, to push his 
theology and logic into a form of determinism previously considered unorthodox even by 
Bradwardine, the most renowned ‘anti-Pelagian’ of the previous generation.391 Chaucer’s 
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phrase, ‘al that comth, comth by necessitee’, is therefore much more likely to be drawn from 
Wyclif than from Bradwardine, parodying the later thinker’s acceptance of a proposition 
previously rejected by the earlier. 
Bennett also failed to make clear that the Wyclif passage in question appears in the 
‘Responsiones ad argumenta Radulfi Strode’, the second in a series of two or three 
controversial correspondences between Wyclif and Chaucer’s friend, the dedicatee of the 
Troilus, ‘philosophical Strode’ (V. 1857).392 According to Williel Thomson, the series of 
correspondence between the two old university friends, which he calls ‘the most sustained 
intellectual discourse of Wyclyf’s career’, took place between late 1378 and 1384:393 that is, 
during or just before the probable period of Chaucer’s composition of the Troilus.394 In his 
article, ‘Chaucer and Strode’, Rodney Delasanta has effectively concluded the debate on 
whether the London and Oxford Strodes are identical, and it would require striking new 
evidence to alter, in the balance of probabilities, the scholarly opinion that Chaucer’s lawyer 
friend in London and the distinguished Oxford logician were one and the same Strode. 
Furthermore, that Chaucer knew, or was beginning to make the acquaintance of Ralph Strode 
in London during the period of Wyclif’s correspondence with him is attested by the fact that 
in 1381 the two went 
bail together in the complicated case of John Hend, one not unlike that 
involving Wycliffe and Strode with Beneger seven years before. 
Again, it is axiomatic that friendship preceded the mainprise because 
it is inconceivable that strangers would go to bail together.
395
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Four or at the very most six years later, Chaucer was friendly enough with Strode to dedicate 
the Troilus to him. It is also important to note that, although Chaucer would initially have 
known Strode in a professional capacity as the Common Pleader for London, the dedication 
is made to him as a philosopher, rather than as a lawyer or merely a friend, suggesting 
Chaucer’s first-hand familiarity with Strode as a man involved with quasi-scholastic 
altercations even after he had moved to London. Given that we know of no other 
‘philosophical’ work of Strode’s definitely dating from this period of his life, it seems almost 
certain that Chaucer knew of Strode’s controversies with Wyclif, and, I will argue, it is highly 
probable that he knew them first-hand.
396
 
Not only is Chaucer’s phrase a consistent and exact translation of Wyclif’s, it is also 
not unreasonable to assume that Chaucer had some sort of access, whether direct or second-
hand through conversation with Strode, to the text containing the Latin maxim. As Anne 
Hudson points out, referring specifically to both Troilus and Wyclif’s letters to Strode (but 
not to the particular phrase in question), ‘Chaucer’s interest in topics Wyclif discussed is not, 
of course, startling’.397 What is rather more surprising is that in almost forty years critical 
attention to the possible implications of Chaucer’s quotation for our understanding of the 
poem as a whole has been remarkably cool and nonchalant. Bennett developed his hypothesis 
no further than a passing reference. In 1980, Alan Gaylord devoted little more than a 
paragraph, albeit a highly insightful paragraph, to sketching out the possible ramifications of 
Chaucer’s possible quotation of Wyclif: 
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Even more to the point are [Strode’s] argumenta addressed to Wyclif, 
for these show him to be pressing Wyclif on the more severe aspects 
of his theology of predestination. We cannot tell what reasoning 
Strode followed, but it is fascinating to see much of the same 
vocabulary involved in some of Wyclif’s replies as appears in 
Troilus’s soliloquy, including the startling omnia que evenient de 
necessitate evenient [...]. Tatlock summarises his position: ‘Ralph 
Strode as a theologian seems to have been a thorough conservative, 
who fought Wyclif’s doctrine of predestination as inconsistent with 
man’s free will’, but I think he misses the point when he suggests that 
‘Strode would have been an uncompromising critic’ of Chaucer’s 
poem [...]. Chaucer is to Troilus-the-character on the subject of free 
will as Strode is to Wyclif. The dedication to Strode confirms the 
poem’s serious and elaborate development of ‘philosophical’ 
themes.
398
 
Gaylord’s assertion that Chaucer means his audience to be highly critical of the quasi-
Wycliffite view of necessity that Troilus unfolds in the soliloquy is important, and I will 
return to it later. However, Gaylord’s conclusion might also be said to understate the 
importance of the Wyclif-Strode controversy both for the poem and for our wider 
understanding of Chaucer. 
William Watts and Richard Utz, in an article on ‘Nominalist Perspectives on 
Chaucer’s Poetry’, give a brief but useful summary of one understanding of the Wycliffite 
connection in the soliloquy, made in an unpublished PhD thesis of 1972 by Gertrude 
Jurschax, which 
asserts that Chaucer’s poetry reflects Wyclif’s teachings on 
predestination and determination rather than Bradwardine’s less-
pointed views. She argues that Wyclif’s theory was especially suited 
to the period of disaster and plague in which Chaucer lived [...]. 
According to Jurschax, there is particularly strong evidence that 
Chaucer succumbed to such a pessimistic, Wycliffite frame of mind 
while writing Troilus and Criseyde.
399
 
In contrast, Utz himself has argued elsewhere that Chaucer pointedly alters the Boethian 
arguments concerning necessity and free will, specifically in order to undermine Wycliffite 
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determinism.
400
 Of the two, Utz’s position seems to me more convincing as far as it goes, 
especially given that John Huber persuasively demonstrated back in 1965 how Chaucer 
shapes the Boethian discussion of necessity in De consolatione Philosophiae, by omission, 
addition and perhaps at times by deliberate mistranslation, into a totalising argument against 
free will.
401
 
Since Huber’s analysis provides a useful basis for my own argument, I will take the 
opportunity to provide a brief summary of the five ways in which, according to Huber, 
Chaucer manipulates Boethius. First, whereas Boethius never denies free will outright, 
Troilus does so at the very beginning of his argument (Huber does not notice that Troilus’s 
denial is couched in Wyclif’s terms). Second, Troilus is much stronger than Boethius in 
attacking the idea that God’s foreknowledge may be in anyway uncertain (IV. 85-94, IV. 
1063-64). Third, Troilus overstates his case against free will, adding three lines not found in 
Boethius (IV. 1048-50). Fourth, Troilus mistranslates Boethius, adding ‘by necessite’ 
(‘necesse est’ having been already translated by ‘bihoveth it nedfully’: IV. 1051-57). Finally, 
whereas Boethius concedes that without free will prayer would be useless, Troilus never 
considers the objection at all, even though he concludes his soliloquy with a prayer. It seems 
clear, then, that Chaucer does indeed transform the Boethian discussion into a presentation of 
absolute necessity that flows seamlessly from, and acts as a specious justification of, his 
translation of Wyclif’s maxim. 
Most recently, in his 2005 book Fallible Authors, Alastair Minnis seems to support 
the thesis that the Wycliffite element of Troilus’s soliloquy is not intended as a Chaucerian 
endorsement of Wyclif’s position, but quite the reverse: ‘The fact that a view characteristic of 
Wyclif is put into the mouth of this philosophical pagan would probably have amused Ralph 
Strode, one of the addressees of Chaucer’s poem [...], particularly since at Oxford he had 
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debated with Wyclif on that very topic’.402 Minnis, however, relegates his brief comment to a 
mere endnote and again does not explore the matter in any more detail. 
There is certainly scope for a more thorough analysis of the place of Wyclif’s maxim 
in the ‘Responsiones ad argumenta Radulfi Strode’. However, although Bennett’s original 
reference was to the ‘Responsiones’, it must be conceded that Wyclif’s maxim makes an 
appearance in a number of his other works, notably in De potestate Pape and the 
Trialogus.
403
 It was, it seems, something of a catchphrase of his, at least towards the end of 
his career.
404
 After Wyclif’s death it became something else: a proof-text of Wycliffite 
heterodoxy. Wyclif’s maxim was explicitly condemned alongside eight other ‘haereses et 
errores’ from the ‘Responsiones’ by the Oxford commission of 1411: ‘Ut fidem assero, quod 
omnia, quae eveniunt, de necessitate eveniunt; et sic Paulus praescitus non potest vere 
poenitere, hoc est, contritione peccatum finalis impoenitentiae delere, vel ipsum non habere’ 
(‘I assert my belief that everything which comes about comes about of necessity; and thus the 
foreknown [i.e. to be damned] Paul cannot truly repent: that is, destroy by contrition the sin 
of final impenitence or not ever have that [sin]’).405 It is possible, therefore, that Chaucer 
knew the phrase from another of Wyclif’s works, or simply by hearsay, although the 
‘Responsiones’ seems by far the most probable source. What is more interesting about the 
1411 condemnation is that although it strips Wyclif’s assertion of all the various mitigations, 
qualifications, caveats and nuances with which it is surrounded in the original text, it includes 
another snippet of his answer to Strode that demonstrates the broader context: the problem of 
reprobation.
406
 The assertion of absolute necessity in this particular context was obviously 
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regarded as the central aggravation of Wyclif’s position, and it is to this aspect of the problem 
that I will shortly turn. Before doing so, I should perhaps offer a brief survey of the 
‘Responsiones ad argumenta Radulfi Strode’ as a whole. 
Reprobation in the ‘Responsiones’ 
Wyclif’s ‘Responsiones’ constitute a reply to a now lost piece of correspondence which 
scholars since Herbert Workman have christened XVIII Positiones Contra Wiclevum, for 
want of a better name.
407
 In this text, Ralph Strode put six objections each to three particular 
positions of Wyclif: on predestination, on ecclesiastical endowments, and on correcting the 
corruption of the church. The first of these groups of six objections is obviously of most 
relevance to the Troilus, and it is here that we find Wyclif’s maxim on necessity. We are able 
to glean something of the arguments that Strode had originally put to Wyclif, because Wyclif 
quotes, or perhaps summarises, Strode’s objection before making his response to each. 
Strode’s first objection concerns whether the Church is made up only of the elect. His second 
objection concerns whether a reprobate child can die immediately after baptism (and so in a 
state of grace). His third concerns whether one of the elect can commit mortal sin and 
whether, on the other hand, a reprobate can avoid it. His fourth concerns whether the same 
person can be a member of the Church and of Satan at the same time (in Strode’s example, 
Peter, whom Christ calls ‘Satan’, in the gospels).408 His fifth concerns whether the reprobate 
ought to hope for salvation. Finally, his sixth objection, the reply to which Chaucer probably 
is probably quoting, concerns the free will of the reprobate and the conflicting desires of God. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
different context: that of the validity of certain papal acts. The later date of the Trialogus, where the phrase is 
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At this point it is vital to reiterate that Strode was a logician, rather than a theologian, 
and a logician later to be of international regard, as Delasanta has pointed out.
409
 Each of the 
six objections that Strode makes to Wyclif’s position on predestination posit a logical 
problem or contradiction, rather than attacking Wyclif on the grounds of his heterodoxy. 
Strode had known Wyclif first as an (admittedly controversial) Oxford logician.
410
 It is 
therefore unsurprising that, upon a subject so closely associated with the philosophical 
problem of necessity, Strode chose to argue in logical terms, and probably expected a 
response in the same terms. Wyclif, it must be added, came to associate his time as a ‘logicus, 
one who has not yet become a theologian [... as] his age of infancy [...], occupied with 
dubious pursuits like the study of optics and other time-wasting philosophy’;411 although it 
seems likely, nevertheless, that he returned to and heavily revised his Summa logica before 
his death.
412
 In the ‘Responsiones’ he admits to a certain arrogance in the schools, and his 
replies to Strode tend, at times, to sidestep logical debate in favour of theological assertion.
413
 
Nevertheless, as I hope to show, certain of Strode’s objections are so clearly questions of 
logic, that Wyclif is forced to reply in kind, especially towards the end of the section dealing 
with predestination. 
Crucially, Strode’s first objection can be fully understood only in the light of Wyclif’s 
participation in the wider logical debate over continua and continuous change, as well as in 
reference to his particular position on accidents and substance in the Eucharist.
414
 In Wyclif’s 
ecclesiology we see that element of Wyclif’s thought that Chaucer is exploring in Troilus: 
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what Gordon Leff calls, a ‘rigidity [that] could scarcely go further’, and it is this quality that 
Strode seems determined to subvert.
415
 His first objection, as Wyclif gives it, ran as follows:  
Si ecclesia catholica sit totus numerus predestinatorum et continue 
per processum temporis innovatur talis numerus, sequitur quod 
continue innovatur ecclesia, et sic in articulis fidei periret certitudo 
propter incertitudinem credite veritati.
416
 
 (If the Catholic Church were the whole number of the predestined and 
over the process of time this number were continuously being 
changed, it follows that the Church would be changed continuously, 
and certitude in the articles of faith would be in vain because of this 
uncertainty of the truth believed.)  
In other words, if the Church is merely a collection of predestined individuals (‘numerus 
predestinatorum’), and the individuals are being constantly lost and replaced, then the Church 
is being continually changed ‘per processum temporis’. In that case, to extend Strode’s line of 
thought, how can one say, as the Creed says, that the Church remains at all? For if one were 
to answer that the Church has lost merely its accidents but not its substance in the change (as 
one might with Buridan’s ‘raw’ food above), then Wyclif must accept that the predestined 
members of the Church do not in themselves constitute the Church, but merely its accidents. 
In which case, what is the substance? Wyclif’s famous doctrine of the Eucharist denies the 
possibility of accidents existing without a substance, as he mentions in another 
correspondence with Strode.
417
 Even if they so exist in this case, if a body has only accidents 
and no substance, and the accidents change, then how is it still the same body?
418
 It seems 
that, in his ecclesiology, Wyclif is guilty of the ‘folie’ that Troilus himself acknowledges, of 
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forfeiting ‘substaunce’ in favour of ‘accident’ (IV.1504-505). Strode thus attempts to corner 
his adversary, either into accepting a more continuous approach in his logic, or into 
moderating his conception of the Church as a single, rigid, predestined body. Wyclif’s answer 
in the ‘Responsiones’ is twofold: first to conflate time into the present, where past and future 
meet and unify; second, to accept that the body changes its parts but to assert that it remains 
one by succession. It must be said that neither solution seems logically adequate; but 
nevertheless, the first argument is, at least in large part, a logical one, inspired by the idea of 
ampliation, the technique of expanding the reference of a term in a proposition beyond 
merely the present, and into the past or future.
419
  
As the brief summary above demonstrated, the problem of reprobation runs 
throughout Strode’s six objections to Wyclif’s determinism, and in the sixth objection the 
problem is posited in such a way as to interweave it with the problem of free will and 
necessity: 
stat in libertate arbitrii prescitorum quomodo unus eorum potest esse 
vere penitens et sic mori et per consequens esse membrum ecclesie et 
salvari; grave eciam videtur concordare voluntates divinas, quibus 
Deus vult quod iste salvetur et quod iste idem dampnetur, cum ista 
sint incompossibilia et per consequens non terminant iustam et 
incommutabilem voluntatem.
420
 
(It stands in the freedom of the will of the ones ‘foreknown’ [i.e. to be 
damned] that one of them is able to be truly penitent and to die in this 
state and consequently to be a member of the church and to be saved; 
for it seems difficult to reconcile the Divine wishes, by which God 
desires that this man be saved and that this same man be damned, 
since these [desires] are incompatible and consequently they do not 
result in a just and immutable will.) 
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If a reprobate has free will, then he might repent; and if he repents, he will be saved; but if 
this is truly contingent upon his choice, then how does that fit with God’s own free will, that 
is his overriding choice of election? Wyclif’s response begins with a string of caveats: 
Hic dicitur quod circa necessitatem futurorum est magnum scrutinium 
[...] Ideo oportet tenentem istam viam catholicam esse in materia de 
Dei preordinancia circumspectum et in sentencia de eadem 
preordinancia; […] et cum hoc tercio in aptacione verborum 
logicalium circumspectum.
421
 
(Here it is said that there is great debate about the necessity of future 
events […] Therefore it is important that, keeping to the way of 
orthodoxy, one should be circumspect regarding the preordinance of 
God, both in matter and in sentence […] and thirdly circumspect in 
the use of logical terms.) 
The laudable caution Wyclif demonstrates here – because he realises that Strode’s objections 
are matters of ‘verborum logicalium’ and is being careful not to be caught out – only makes 
his next move all the more astounding. He asserts that all that comes, comes by necessity, 
although he quickly allows for a limited understanding of contingency: ‘Ut fidem ergo modo 
assero quod omnia que eveniunt de necessitate eveniunt et cum hoc dupliciter potest 
contingencia intelligi vel condicionaliter vel eciam quoad tempus’ (‘therefore I now assert my 
belief that everything which comes about comes about of necessity and, with this, 
contingency can be understood in a double sense: conditionally or indeed according to 
time’).422 This assertion, of course, does very little to solve the problem of the free will of the 
reprobate; but Wyclif does go to on to suggest a solution, which I will return to later. For now 
it is enough to demonstrate that the context in which Chaucer most probably found the phrase 
that he gives to Troilus is concerned with from the logical problematics of reprobation. 
This context might help explain certain elements of the stanza introductory to 
Troilus’s soliloquy which do not seem to connect clearly with the Boethian discussion of 
necessity and foreknowledge: 
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And shortly, al the sothe for to seye, 
He was so fallen in despeir that day, 
That outrely he shop hym for to deye. 
For right thus was his argument alway: 
He seyde he nas but lorn, weylaway! 
‘For al that comth, comth by necessitee: 
Thus to ben lorn, it is my destinee.’ (IV. 953-59) 
After the quotation from Wyclif, the most important clue that Chaucer may have intended 
Troilus’s soliloquy to be regarded in the context of reprobation is the word ‘lorn’. It is 
striking that both in the narratorial summary of Troilus’s reasoning (957), and in his own 
initial words (959), the focus is upon the unhappy end of Troilus himself, rather than upon the 
impending departure of Criseyde (who is not mentioned at all until the next stanza, and then 
not again until the closing prayer to Jove). Neither is it made clear what Troilus means by 
‘lorn’. Perhaps the most obvious reading is in terms of ‘courtly love’, that by ‘lorn’ Troilus 
means dead of sorrow. Yet Troilus ‘shop hym for to deye’ because ‘he seyde he nas but lorn’. 
Troilus is in danger of death not because he is ‘lorn’ (whether this means lovelorn or not), but 
because of his knowledge of being ‘lorn’, and the despair consequent upon it. In any case, 
‘lorn’ need not mean ‘lovelorn’: it also has eschatological connotations. The MED allows the 
verb ‘lesen’ to mean ‘to doom [...] to perdition, damn’; ‘to consign (the soul and body) to 
(hell)’; ‘to destroy oneself spiritually, be damned’; and ‘to come to perdition, be damned’.423 
‘Lorn’, therefore, may mean simply ‘damned’; indeed, the word ‘lost’ can still hold the same 
connotations in modern English, just as the Latin verb ‘pereo’ could.424 This reading of the 
word is strengthened by the religious tenor of the lines directly preceding this stanza: ‘Ful 
tendrely he preyde and made his mone, / To doon hym sone out of this world to pace, / For 
wel he thoughte ther was non other grace.’ (IV. 950-52). Troilus, lacking ‘grace’, despairs and 
becomes suicidal; as Henryson would later put it, he falls into ‘wanhope’.425 As in the case of 
Judas, the classic exemplar of ‘wanhope’, the sin of despair tempts towards the sin of 
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suicide.
426
 The introductory stanza to the soliloquy thus reinforces the likelihood that Chaucer 
was aware of the prominence of the issue of reprobation in the source of ‘al that comth, 
comth by necessitee’. 
The Logic of Reprobation 
The emphasis on Troilus’s ‘despeir’ can, therefore, be understood in the context of the 
problematics of reprobation. Like the ‘Sortes dampnabitur’ problem that I discussed above in 
relation to the Nun’s Priest’s Tale, ‘wanhope’, despair of God’s grace, was most often 
presented as a counterargument to unqualified predestination.
427
 The basic paradox simply 
runs as follows: if a man is to be damned and, believing this truth, despairs of being saved, he 
will be damned for his sin of despair in God’s grace. Thus he is damned for believing what is 
true; but on the other hand, it is only true because he believes it. It is a self-fulfilling 
prophecy; and there seems no justice in the punishment.  
Strode’s fifth objection to Wyclif, directly before the passage from which Chaucer 
quotes, deals with this very problem, emphasising the logical nature of the paradox: 
tam stricte concipere de predestinatis et prescitis auferret meritum 
bone spei, quia, cum nemo debet supponere vel reputare falsum et 
nemo nostrum scit modo utrum sit predestinatus vel prescitus, videtur 
quod nemo nostrum debet sperare se esse salvandum, vel de alio 
reputare sive supponere quod sit de numero dampnandorum vel eciam 
salvandorum.
428
 
 
(To think so strictly of the predestined and the foreknown [i.e. those to 
be damned] takes away the merit of good hope, because, since no one 
ought to suppose or believe a falsehood and none of us knows in any 
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way whether he is predestined or foreknown [i.e. to be damned], it 
seems that none of us ought to hope that he is going to be saved, or to 
believe or suppose that anyone else may be among the number of 
those to be damned, or even [among the number] of those to be 
saved.) 
 
It would be wrong, suggests Strode, for a reprobate under a scheme of absolute predestination 
even to hope for his own salvation; or indeed for anyone to hold an opinion on who may be 
saved and who may be damned. Wyclif’s initial reply to this startling objection may seem 
strangely analytical. He attempts first carefully to differentiate between knowing, believing 
and hoping: ‘oportet diligenter cognoscere distinccionem inter hos tres actus, scilicet scire, 
credere et sperare’ (‘It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the following three 
actions: namely, to know, to believe and to hope’).  
Wyclif’s manner of reply makes much more sense in the context of the sophisms 
discussed by fourteenth-century logicians, whose general process of investigation consisted 
of analysing ambiguous or otherwise difficult propositions that led sometimes merely to 
linguistic confusion and other times to apparent insolubility. The basic version of the 
‘wanhope’ paradox not only places Socrates in an unenviable position (‘Sortes dampnabitur’, 
as Holcot puts it), but it also places a just God in an insoluble quandary. If men are only to be 
punished for wrongdoing, and to believe the truth is not to do wrong, then how can Socrates 
be damned for his ‘wanhope’? Yet if Socrates is therefore not to be damned, then his belief in 
his damnation is false and he must be punished for it; and so the paradox continues. The most 
famous example of this sort of insoluble is the so-called ‘Buridan’s Bridge’, discussed above, 
where Plato vows to throw Socrates into the water if his next proposition is not true, and 
Socrates cunningly replies, ‘You will throw me in the water’.429 In the theological equivalent 
of Buridan’s paradox, stating the truth is replaced by believing the truth, and being thrown in 
the water becomes being thrown into hell. Otherwise the problems are practically identical. 
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Buridan’s uncomfortable solution was that Plato lied when he made his ultimatum.430 Robert 
Holcot, astonishingly, had concluded something similar about God: that He is capable of 
deceit in the revelations He makes about future contingents.
431
 Of course, neither Holcot’s 
view of contingency nor of divine deceit would have been particularly palatable to Wyclif, 
and he has to find another solution. 
Epistemic verbs such as ‘to know’, ‘to believe’, ‘to doubt’ and intensional verbs such 
as ‘to wish’ and ‘to desire’ were the particular subject of extensive debate amongst 
fourteenth-century logicians. For instance, William Heytesbury, another of the Calculators, 
specifically categorises such verbs as one of the eight modes by which fallacies of 
composition and division can occur in his Regule solvendi sophismata.
432
 Strode’s 
introduction of such terms into his formulation of the ‘wanhope’ paradox mark it out clearly 
as an attempt to corner Wyclif into another logical paradox. The sort of insoluble that utilises 
these verbs can again be exemplified by Buridan, who, just a few pages before his bridge 
insoluble, poses the following sophism: 
Socrates knows the proposition written on the wall to be doubted by 
him. 
I posit the case that only the aforesaid proposition is written on the 
wall, and that Socrates sees it, examines it, and doubts whether it is 
true or false, and that he knows himself to doubt it. It is asked whether 
it is true or false.
433
 
Of course if Socrates consciously doubts the proposition, then he must know it to be true; and 
therefore he cannot doubt it. If he does not doubt it, then he cannot know the proposition to 
be true because the proposition states that he is doubting, so therefore he must doubt it again; 
and so on. This is just one of a multitude of possible examples of the seemingly insoluble 
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paradoxes that live in what perhaps could be called the ‘epistemological cracks’ between 
different verbs of knowledge and doubt. 
Strode’s proposed paradox offers something similar. Since hoping for something 
effectively involves doubting its certainty, the man in Strode’s casus could be seen as 
standing in the same relationship to the pre-ordained sentence on his life (whether he is to be 
saved or damned) as Socrates stands in relation to the proposition on the wall. Thus it is 
possible to build a paradox similar to the epistemic sophismata of the fourteenth-century 
logicians in terms of ‘hope’ and ‘salvation’. For instance, 
If he does not doubt this proposition, Socrates is to be damned.
434
 
If Socrates believes that he is necessarily to be damned, then logically he cannot doubt the 
proposition. Why? Because as Strode himself states in his treatise on Consequentiae, 
necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet, id est, omnis consequentia est bona 
cuius consequens est necessarium. [...] exemplum [...]: ‘ut tu sedes, 
ergo deus est’.  
(a necessary proposition follows after any other proposition. That is, 
every consequentia is sound of which the consequent is necessary. [...] 
An example of the [...] rule is, ‘Since you sit, therefore God is.’)435 
In other words, because God necessarily exists, that conclusion can follow from any premise, 
however seemingly irrelevant or ridiculous. God exists if you are sitting down; and he exists 
if you are standing up; and he would even exist if you were something impossible: an ass, for 
                                                          
434
 That either Strode explicitly posited some sort of conditional proposition like this one in his original 
argument or that Wyclif understood the implication of such a conditional is demonstrated by Wyclif’s 
concession in his answer to the next objection, by which he attempts to maintain his conjunction of absolute 
predestination and a sort of contingency: and in which he argues that such a man is not damned for his 
foolishness but for his demerits; Wyclif, ‘Responsiones ad argumenta Radulfi Strode’, in Opera Minora, pp. 
175-200 (p. 182). 
435
 Strode, ‘Tractatus de Consequentiis’, p. 2; translation, p. 139 (section 1. 1. 04). In the ‘Responsiones ad 
argumenta cuiusdam emuli veritati’, Wyclif challenges his opponents use of consequentia, by comparing his 
argument to the proposition ‘Deus est, ergo sequitur consequencia quam intendo’ (‘God exists, therefore it 
follows that whatever consequence I think of [is valid]’), which is a fallacious inversion of the rule Strode 
explains in the passage quoted. This must be considered further evidence both that the emulus veritati is indeed 
Strode and that Wyclif recognised, and was prepared in places to respond to, Strode’s primarily logical 
objections to his theology. See Wyclif, ‘Responsiones ad argumenta cuiusdam emuli veritati’, in Opera Minora, 
pp. 258-312 (p. 275). 
168 
 
example. Therefore, it is valid to say, ‘Since I sit, therefore God exists’ or ‘Since I am an ass, 
therefore God exists’. In the above proposition, Socrates is in a similar position. If Socrates is 
necessarily to be damned, as he believes, then the conclusion that ‘Socrates is to be damned’ 
must follow from any premise. Thus it must be valid to say, ‘Since Socrates does not doubt 
this proposition, therefore he is to be damned’. So if Socrates believes he is necessarily to be 
damned, he cannot doubt the proposition: from which it follows that he is indeed to be 
damned. A man who believes in his own necessary perdition is, by this logic, logically 
incapable of even hoping for anything else. 
Therefore, Strode suggests, to ask a man to hope for something which logic dictates 
he cannot hope for is to ask him willingly and consciously to submit himself to a lie, which 
must be sin: and by implication, the man can be damned for that sin. It is, quite literally, a 
case of ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’. Thus Strode is challenging Wyclif either 
to discard his pretence of a highly qualified contingency in his statement of absolute 
necessity, or to throw out his statement of absolute necessity in favour of a real contingency, 
like the one that Holcot is forced to adopt. 
Wyclif’s response is precisely what is to be expected of a fourteenth-century logician 
dealing with difficult epistemic and modal verbs: that is, he makes careful distinctions before 
proceeding. Having made his distinctions, he then addresses the question of how the 
imperfect hope of the reprobate, falling short of faith and inspired by fear, is itself the cause 
of his hope being false. It is the lack of hope, or at least the lack of true hope, that causes the 
reprobate’s hope also to be in fact false: ‘quia qualitas spei sue, que potest vocari desperacio, 
ipsemet est in causa; et sic spes sua sive credulitas est talis perpetuo qualis non debet esse’ 
(‘because the quality of his hope, which can be called despair, is its own cause; and thus his 
hope or belief is perpetually of a kind it ought not to be’). Thus in one sense a reprobate 
ought to hope the false proposition that he is to be saved, in that a man ought so to live as to 
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make that proposition true; but by not doing so, the reprobate causes himself to need to 
believe something that is false. The reprobate’s ‘desperacio’ or imperfect hope is the cause of 
the paradox he is caught in. Wyclif concludes, firstly, that the greatest evidence of true hope 
in an individual is that ‘iustam viam suam continuat’ (‘he continues his righteous path’); and, 
secondly and rather pointedly, that the sure sign of a reprobate is that he complains about 
God’s predestination: ‘qui autem a vel blasfemat in Dei presciencia vel predestinacione, fatue 
se ipsum intricat et ad desperacionem preparat’ (‘he, however, who blasphemes against either 
God’s foreknowledge or predestination entraps himself foolishly and prepares himself for 
despair’).436 
Troilus: The Paradox in Practice 
Chaucer’s Troilus likewise entangles himself by his own reasoning about the foreknowledge 
and predestination of God, resulting in his inability to resolve the problem in actuality. He 
believes that of necessity he is to be lost: ‘For al that comth, comth by necessitee: / Thus to 
ben lorn, it is my destinee’ (IV. 958-59). How Troilus has come to be convinced of this 
proposition at this point is unclear, although he will later receive divine confirmation through 
his dream (V. 1233-46) and through Cassandra (V. 1513-19). Salatha Griffin has argued that 
Troilus’s knowledge is intuitive, deriving from a ‘divinely inspired conviction’.437 Robert 
Holcot postulates a similar idea of a belief simply created within the mind of the subject by 
God, when positing his problems of foreknowledge, revelation, and predestination.
438
 
However, as we have seen, such a belief (however Troilus becomes convinced of it) should – 
if things really do happen by necessity – make him both logically and morally incapable of 
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really doubting it again. Troilus’s capacity to redeem the situation is from that point limited 
to some extent. In John Huber’s words, Troilus is 
eager to prove the impossibility of free choice because without 
freedom the alternatives before him are simple: either a reversal of 
fortune in his favor, or death. These are the things he asks of Jove at 
the end of his soliloquy (IV. 1079-82). The choice of death or mercy 
he resigns to Jove, just as he has previously resigned responsibility 
toward Criseyde to Pandarus and Fortune. Troilus’ soliloquy on 
predestination saves him from the need to act.
439
 
In one sense only could Troilus be said to act upon his despair: at the start of his soliloquy the 
narrator tells us that ‘he shop hym for to deye’, and although the suicide is delayed, 
ultimately Troilus does seek his own death on the battlefield: 
And certeynly, withouten moore speche, 
From hennesforth, as ferforth as I may, 
 Myn owen deth in armes wol I seche; 
I reche nat how soone be the day! (V. 1716-19) 
Troilus’s end perhaps illustrates Wyclif’s answer to Strode’s sixth objection about the free 
will of the reprobate: ‘et sic talis utendo termino proprie non potest vere penitere sicut nec 
vult, sed appetit ad suam dampnacionem perpetuam antecedens’ (‘and thus, strictly speaking, 
he is not able truly to repent nor does he want to, but lusts after his own eternal damnation in 
advance’).440 The reprobate freely strives after his own damnation as Troilus strives after his 
own death. 
Yet the whole soliloquy, and Troilus’s consequent destruction, is premised upon his 
‘despeir’, and serves as a justification of it. Troilus’s complaint or blasphemy against God’s 
prescience and predestination is also, by Chaucer’s contrivance, a simplistic defence of the 
Wycliffite maxim, ‘omnia que eveniunt de necessitate eveniunt’. Thus Chaucer puts into the 
mouth of a despairing reprobate one of Wyclif’s favourite catchphrases to support his 
doctrine of predestination, presenting it as the cause of Troilus’s despair and ultimate loss. 
This device is the perfect rejoinder to Wyclif’s answer to Strode: if it is a failure of faith on 
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the part of the reprobate that leads to the paradox of ‘wanhope’, then perhaps that failure lies 
in holding to a quasi-Wycliffite view of predestination. 
It would be simplistic to suggest that the soliloquy is intended accurately to represent 
Wyclif’s view of predestination and reprobation. Wyclif was not, in spite of his reputation, an 
extreme necessitarian. Indeed, the very fact that Wyclif happily adopts Strode’s term for the 
reprobate, ‘prescitus’, demonstrates that even he was attempting to distinguish between 
election to salvation and reprobation.
441
 It is clear, however, that Strode and (judging by the 
Oxford condemnation) others who read Wyclif’s correspondence with him, felt that the 
logical extension of Wyclif’s position led to an extreme and highly destructive form of 
necessitarianism, which directly threatened the faith and morals of those who accepted it. 
Troilus, in his soliloquy, is not the real Wyclif: but he is Strode’s Wyclif, or rather Strode’s 
Wycliffite nightmare, the result for an ordinary human being of falling into error about the 
necessity of reprobation. 
Such a reading injects irony into Chaucer’s later appeal to Strode to ‘correcte’ his 
work. It is not merely that, as Bennett puts it, Strode the well-respected logician is ‘just the 
man to spot errors [...] in Troilus’ logic’,442 but rather that the errors in Troilus’s logic have 
been particularly designed to appeal to Strode who would recognise the parody of his old 
friend and adversary. Although this is caricature, Chaucer’s quotation from Wyclif’s 
responses to Strode is, in effect, a smoking gun that provides convincing evidence both of 
Chaucer’s interaction through his friend with the logico-theological controversies of his time 
and of his willingness to incorporate immediately contemporary philosophical problems into 
his own poetry.  
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Thus, just as Troilus seems to adopt a crude and basic version of the indivisibilism 
that Wyclif held, preferring simple categorisation and ‘distinction’ to an awareness of a 
continuum of human motivation, so he adopts a simplistic necessitarianism which allows him 
to ‘depart’ or categorise the possibilities for his future equally rigidly. He thus refuses the 
experience of human life and action in its true, fluid nature. It is interesting, then, that in his 
controversies with Wyclif, Strode invokes logical arguments based on the idea of the 
continuum in an attempt to temper his opponent’s harsh and absolute moral judgments. For 
instance, he uses the idea of (effectively) infinite limits to undermine Wyclif’s restriction of 
bishops’ temporal possessions; and attempts to soften Wyclif’s tendency to see human 
behaviour in terms of binary moral judgments (‘approbata’ (‘approved’) or ‘simpliciter 
condempnanda’ (‘simply to be condemned’)) into a more fluid and sympathetic 
understanding of the ‘vita minus perfecta’ (‘life less perfect’).443 
In one of Wyclif’s other controversial letters to Strode, the ‘Responsiones ad 
argumenta cuiusdam emuli veritati’, Wyclif again demonstrates his fear of the ‘slippery 
slope’ in questions of morality, preferring a definite distinction between right and wrong. 
Strode, we are told, argued as follows. Clergy must have food and shelter. However, there is 
no logical distinction between one amount of food and shelter or another slightly larger 
amount (Strode’s phrase is ‘non est racio diversitatis’ (‘there is no reason of difference’, i.e. 
no clear limit)). Since, therefore, no logical limit could be placed on the amount of such 
things that a cleric could own, ‘videtur quod possunt super totum seculum dominari’ (‘it 
seems that they could have domination over the whole world’).444 Strode seems to be 
suggesting that it is not possible to cut human behaviour up simply into right or wrong, 
logically speaking: more or less perfect would be a better way of thinking about it. Wyclif 
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replies, using a fable of a fox and a goose to illustrate the dangers of viewing human 
behaviour in terms of such a ‘sliding scale’ of morality between right and wrong, since it will 
always slide one way: 
sicut fuit de vulpe que in aura frigida voluit hospitari; que primo ex 
auce licencia pedem unum imposuit et post secundum totum corpus in 
processu temporis introivit et sic aucam callide suffocavit.
 445
 
(Thus it was with the fox which wanted to lodge in the cool air, [and] 
which at first, by permission of the goose, put one foot in and later, in 
process of time, got his whole body in and so the goose suffocated 
with the heat.)
 
 
It is interesting, in the context of my analysis of tropes from the sophismata physicalia in 
Troilus, that Wyclif’s example here is also one of heat change over time (‘in processu 
temporis’), albeit probably of a more moralistic and less sophismatic heritage. Wyclif goes on 
to argue that there is in fact a line dividing sin from right conduct, and that, to the extent that 
there is a sliding scale at all, it is merely that those clerics who own more, sin more. His 
insistence on trying to find a ‘racio diversitas’, to use Strode’s phrase, is reminiscent of 
Troilus’s adoption of the scholastic maxim, ‘diversitas requirit distinctionem’.  
 Sadly, Wyclif’s refusal to accept any fluidity in his approach to human behaviour and 
motivations seems to poison even his own close friendships. Although Wyclif’s relations 
with Strode are generally represented as cordial (Wyclif elsewhere addresses Strode as 
‘magister reverende et amice precarissime’ (‘Revered master and most dear friend’)), 
Wyclif’s manner of disputation with his colleague gives no sign that Strode’s attempts at 
mollification had any effect.
 446
 At one point Wyclif refers to an argument of his opponents as 
‘isto merdo sophismate’ (‘this shitty sophism’);447 and the valedictory sentence of the 
‘Responsiones’ constitutes a stinging indictment of apologists like Strode, ‘qui […] 
defendunt contra Christum istud peccatum maximum, prevaricatores ingratissimi et discrasie 
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tocius ecclesie causativi’ (‘who […] defend, in the face of Christ, that greatest of sins, 
graceless prevaricators who are the cause of the disgrace of the whole church’).448 It is 
perhaps no wonder that a literary friend of Strode’s may have desired to depict the human 
cost of his adversary’s over-simplistic philosophy. 
Strange Beginnings  
The reductive logic of Troilus also manifests itself in his understanding of love and the 
experience of falling in love, and here all his logical failings work together to produce his 
‘double sorwe’. Another major sub-genre of the problems of continua was the question of 
beginnings and endings. Problems of this type are a staple of the sophismata, being of 
especial interest to logicians concerned with the physicalia. Heytesbury, for instance, 
dedicates a whole chapter of his Regule solvendi sophismata to problems ‘De incipit et 
desinit’ (‘Concerning beginnings and ends’), before continuing with chapters ‘De maximo et 
minimo’ (‘On maximum and minimum’: ‘essentially a treatise on the setting of boundaries to 
the range of variable quantities of different types’) and ‘De tribus predicamentis’ (concerned 
with problems of velocity and acceleration).
449
 The basic problem of beginnings and endings, 
which has its foundations in Aristotle, concerned the ability to identify a precise instant at 
which a process ‘begins’ or ‘ends’: 
There was, however, an additional problem about motion or change 
that had to be faced. In the fifth chapter of Book VI of the Physics, 
Aristotle introduced this additional problem by noting that, since any 
motion or change is always from something to something, it follows 
that ‘that which has changed must at the moment when it has first 
changed be in that to which it has changed.’ But how is this to be 
made to jibe with the already well-established continuity of motion or 
change? [...]The second Aristotelian ingredient also comes from the 
Physics: Book VIII, chapter 8. There, Aristotle can be found musing 
over a puzzle that arises when a ‘contradictory change’ occurs within 
some given interval of time: namely, when some subject changes at 
some instant within that time interval from (say) not-being white to 
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being white. The puzzle has to do with the status of the subject at that 
instant of change.
450
 
There are a number of different occasions throughout the poem when Chaucer describes an 
emotional change in terms of a physical or physiological change, both in terms of heat (for 
example, III. 800) and colour (for example, III. 82): and it is worth noticing that these changes 
are frequently qualified with the adverb ‘sodeynly’ or ‘sodeynliche’. The image of sudden 
(that is instantaneous), physical and, by implication, emotional, mutation (to use the 
Aristotelian term) seems to be recurrent in the narrative. Such a pattern might be discountable 
as purely idiomatic or conventional, were it not for the fact that in Troilus and Criseyde 
Chaucer twice explicitly addresses the issue of instantaneous change, once through physical, 
even scientific, metaphor and once in direct emotional terms.
451
  
 Pandarus counsels Troilus to hope for a sudden and irrevocable change in Criseyde’s 
feelings by urging analogies of physical change: 
Thenk here-ayeins: whan that the stordy ook, 
On which men hakketh ofte, for the nones, 
Receyved hath the happy fallyng strook, 
The greete sweigh doth it come al at ones, 
As don thise rokkes or thise milnestones; 
For swifter cours comth thyng that is of wighte, 
Whan it descendeth, than don thynges lighte. (II.1380-86) 
Both the oak and the falling rock or millstone are images found in fourteenth-century 
discussions of problems of intension and remission or beginning and ending: the oak 
(‘quercus’), for instance, in Heytesbury’s discussion of intension of size in the final treatise of 
the Regule solvendi sophismata; and the falling millstone (‘molarem’) in Marsilius of 
Inghen’s discussion of the point of transition from a projected object rising to falling back 
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downwards again.
452
 Pandarus’s argument is clearly directed towards convincing Troilus of 
the fact that there must be a significant point of ‘beginning’ in a physical change – in this 
case the moment the oak starts to fall – and to imply that such changes are discrete and 
permanent, rather than continuous and capable of remission. Furthermore, his use of the 
adjective ‘happy’ (that is, by chance) reinforces the probability that Chaucer was also aware 
of the problem’s classical context of the Aristotelian discussion of chance and spontaneity, as 
I noted above in relation to Chaucer’s translation of Boethius. Pandarus argues that Criseyde 
might fall spontaneously and permanently in love. He seems to view her as a discrete variable 
like Troilus himself, whose heart ‘with a look [...] wax a-fere’ (I. 229), who ‘wax sodeynly 
moost subgit unto love’ (I. 231) and who ‘sodeynly [...] wax ther-with astoned’ (I. 274).  
 It seems that the example of a man suddenly loved may have been a recurrent ‘casus’ 
within fourteenth century logic: Buridan certainly uses the example repeatedly, in his 
Tractatus de consequentiis and in his Summulae de dialectica. In both cases, the example of 
‘homo amatur’ (‘a man is loved’) is used in relation to problems of tense, centred around the 
fact that, ‘in primo instanti amoris’ (‘in the first moment of love’), ‘homo amatur’ is a true 
statement; yet at the same instant, ‘homo est amatus’ (‘a man is beloved’ or ‘a man was 
loved’) will be in one sense an untrue statement. Buridan links ‘amare’ with other verbs that 
cause similar issues, such as the infamous problem-words, ‘incipit’ and ‘desinit’.453 When the 
narrator of Troilus and Criseyde comes to discuss Criseyde’s love for Troilus, Chaucer takes 
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pains to dismiss the possibility of an instantaneous change of heart. Instead he deliberately 
inserts a narratorial parenthesis that specifically addresses the problem of sudden emotional 
change: a passage that again has no original in the Filostrato. On the contrary, Boccacio’s 
Criseida ‘subitamente presa fue’ (‘suddenly was she captivated’).454 Chaucer’s narrator, on 
the other hand, detects a potential problem with such an instantaneous (and seemingly 
spontaneous) change of feeling: 
Now myghte som envious jangle thus: 
‘This was a sodeyn love; how myght it be 
That she so lightly loved Troilus 
Right for the firste syghte, ye, parde?’ 
Now whoso seith so, mote he never ythe! 
For every thing a gynnyng hath it nede 
Er al be wrought, withowten any drede. 
 
For I sey nought that she so sodeynly 
Yaf hym hire love, but that she gan enclyne 
To like hym first, and I have told yow whi; 
And after that, his manhod and his pyne 
Made love withinne hire for to myne, 
For which by proces and by good servyse 
He gat hire love, and in no sodeyn wyse. (II. 666-79) 
Here the narrator makes a formal rebuttal of the theory of ‘sodeyn love’. ‘For I sey nought’ 
functions as the equivalent of the scholastic refutation: for instance, Wyclif’s ‘Respondeo 
negando’.455 Despite accepting the logical problem that ‘every thing a gynnyng hath it nede’, 
Chaucer’s narrator takes care to address both the problem of instantaneous and of 
spontaneous change. He answers the charge of Criseyde’s change from not loving to loving 
Troilus being discrete and instantaneous with the explanation that ‘she gan enclyne / To like 
hym first’ and came to fully love him ‘by proces’ and ‘in no sodeyn wyse’. He then answers 
the charge of spontaneity with the claim that the causes of her change of heart have already 
been discussed (‘I have told yow whi’). Later (IV. 829), Chaucer takes the opportunity to 
repeat this defence against the spontaneity of Criseyde’s love from her own mouth, 
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embellishing it with the explicitly logical terminology, ‘cause causyng’, a translation, as one 
early reader noticed, of the Latin ‘causa causans’ (the ‘primary cause in logic, as 
distinguished from a “causa causata” or secondary cause’, as the Riverside Chaucer helpfully 
explains).
456
 Chaucer’s insistence on this point provokes a striking contrast with the 
narratorial discussion of Troilus’s experience of falling in love, the suddenness and apparent 
causelessness of which leaves the narrator able only to exclaim, ‘Blissed be Love, that kan 
thus folk converte!’ (I. 308). 
 Chaucer continues, on the other hand, to emphasise the continuum of Criseyde’s 
‘proces’ of falling in love with Troilus, even at the very moment of her decision to take the 
one undeniably discrete, objective and physical step in that whole process, the sexual act. Her 
reference to ‘dulcarnoun’, that is Euclid’s 47th proposition in Book I of the Elements, better 
known to us as Pythagoras’ Theorem, is usually simply interpreted in Criseyde’s own terms: 
‘right at my wittes ende’ (III. 931). However, the proposition held a certain significance in 
late-medieval debates over the continuum, as Glending Olson notes: 
Continuists often used geometrical examples to refute the indivisibilist 
approach, as in the following argument, which became popular after 
its appearance in Duns Scotus. Imagine a square with a diagonal 
drawn through it, thus creating two isosceles right triangles sharing a 
hypotenuse. Then imagine drawing all the possible parallel lines from 
every point on the left side of the square to every point on the right. 
Continuists argued that if there were a certain number of indivisible 
points constituting each side, then every line drawn across the square 
would have to pass at one and only one point through the diagonal, 
which means that it would have the same number of points and thus 
the same length as the sides. But that consequence, of course, violates 
any common-sense observation of isosceles right triangles, and more 
importantly violates Elements I. 47, the famous Pythagorean theorem, 
also known in later medieval England by its Latin nickname, 
dulcarnon, which Chaucer mentions in Troilus and Criseyde (III, 931, 
933). ‘Dulcarnoun’ proves that the length of the hypotenuse of any 
right triangle is the square root of the sum of the squares of the length 
of the two other sides. In the case of an isosceles right triangle, the 
diagonal’s length is incommensurable with each side (√2:1), 
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inexpressible by any ratio of single (and hence of indivisible) units. 
Thus the idea that a line contains some given number of indivisible 
points leads to a geometric impossibility and must be wrong. 
457
 
 
Dulcarnon, in other words, was known as the geometric proof of the continuist view of 
processes of change, associated with Criseyde, as opposed to the more simplistic, 
indivisibilist approach, associated throughout the poem with Troilus and Pandarus: ‘these 
[geometric] arguments, too, had to be answered by the medieval indivisibilist, but in 
attempting to answer them he was often forced [...] to reveal himself quite incompetent to 
deal with the mathematics at all’.458  
 Wyclif himself addresses ‘illam famosam racionem contra dictam opinionem de 
composicione continui ex non quantis, qua probatur ex illa sequi quod omnis dyameter 
quadrati sit equalis suo lateri’ (‘that famous argument against said opinion concerning the 
composition of a continuum out of points of no quantity, by which it is proven that it 
follows from the [indivisibilist position] that every diagonal of a square would be equal to 
its side’);459 and despite maintaining his position against three objections of his opponents 
with vigour, if not with watertight logic, even he ultimately claims only that ‘nec scio 
adhuc aliquam istarum 3
m
 responsionum efficater improbare’ (‘I do not know of anything 
that effectively disproves my three responses [to these objections]’): thus he accepts, as it 
were, an epistemological tie.
460
 Rather, he recommends, ‘nec verecundetur quantumlibet 
subtilis philosophus fatere propriam ignoranciam in quotlibet particularibus, specialiter de 
finitate nature’, since ‘in quibus omnibus dicimus quod Deus ordinat istos propter melius 
ordinis universi’ (‘the clever philosopher ought not to feel at all ashamed to admit his own 
ignorance in however many particulars, especially concerning the finitude of nature’ since 
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‘in all of these things we say that God orders them for the better order of the universe’).461 
The same faith in God’s ordinance that necessitates an indivisibilist system also provides 
intellectual comfort when we face the limitations of that system in ‘getting the measure’ of 
the real world. 
 Whether Pandarus’s subsequent confusion of this proposition with the fuga 
miserorum, ‘flemyng of wrecches’ (III. 933: Euclid I. 5) is indeed intended to illustrate his 
mathematical incompetence and thus his inability to cope with the more sophisticated 
model of the universe that ‘dulcarnoun’ suggests; or whether it is intended to associate in 
the minds of the audience the fluid continuum of Criseyde’s emotional development with 
her own later miserable flight and the consequent remission of her love for Troilus; or 
whether it is merely an example of exactly the sort of technical mistake Chaucer hoped his 
logician friend Strode would endeavour to ‘correcte’ for him (V. 1858), must remain 
uncertain. One other possibility does present itself, however. Bradwardine, in his treatise 
on Insolubilia uses the phrase ‘fuga miserorum’ to dismiss a solution to the two-stage Liar 
paradox that he regards as simplistic.
462
 It seems, therefore, that the term could be used to 
ridicule bad logic as well as bad mathematics. Whatever its exact force, it is generally fair 
to say that Chaucer is particularly interested in using logical ideas about limits and 
continua as a context for the problematisation of Criseyde’s emotions. 
The Departing 
Chaucer seems deliberately to cultivate a dichotomy between Troilus’s simple or ‘discrete’ 
character and experience of love, which reflects his simplistic logic, and Criseyde’s more 
‘continuous’, composite or fluid personality and emotions. The difference between the two 
characters is, as we might expect, most explicit in the final book, where Chaucer juxtaposes 
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their descriptions. The description of Troilus emphasises his steadfastness of character, 
implying a timeless unchangeability in its use of tense:  
Trewe as stiel in ech condicioun,  
Oon of the beste entecched creature  
That is or shal whil that the world may dure. (V. 831-33)  
 
Even Chaucer’s careful use of tense here (‘is or shal’) gives a quasi-logical precision to his 
proposition of Troilus’s consistency.463 Criseyde, on the other hand, is famously described as 
‘slydynge of corage’ (V. 825); and it is no anachronism to detect in the adjective the 
implication, not merely of changeableness, but also of a fluidity of change; and with it the 
register of natural philosophy.
464
 One definition the MED gives to the verb ‘to slide’ is ‘of a 
fluid: to flow, ooze’, and so the adjective in Middle English, just as in modern English, 
suggests a smoothness of change. Even the MED’s examples of the simple definition ‘to 
change, to undergo a change’ are noteworthy in the context of the above discussion of 
problems of heat remission; for instance, that from an early fifteenth-century manuscript, 
Glasgow, University Library MS Hunterian 95: ‘synewes of her owne naturel complexioun 
ben sliden to naturel colde fro attemperaunce’.465 It is Criseyde’s sliding, continuous nature 
that prompts the imagery of temperature variation, as it creates the need for Chaucer to find a 
means of communicating the difficulty of somehow measuring, or getting a grip upon, a 
world of human experience subject to fluid, rather than merely discrete and binary, change. 
The struggles of the statutorily masculine schools to somehow measure and classify physical, 
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emotional and volitional processes of change must have seemed, and seem still, a singularly 
effective analogy for the inability of the poem’s ‘black and white’ male protagonist to come 
to terms with a stereotypically more feminine emotional variability. 
 As a composite continuum of dissimilar parts which cannot be clearly demarcated or, 
to use Chaucer’s term from the Summoner’s Tale, ‘departed’ (III. 2214), Criseyde is like the 
chimera, the archetypal image of logical problematics, or like Pandarus’s monster, the hybrid 
with a fish’s body, an ass’s feet and an ape’s head. I have discussed above how some 
fourteenth-century logicians, such as Buridan, attempted to ‘chop up’ the chimera into its 
various bodily components in order to get a referential (or suppositional) handle on it, just as 
Jankyn devises a system for dividing up the fart. Similarly, I have discussed how Chaucer is 
concerned with processes of change, and whether it is possible to cut up the continuum of 
time, as Troilus (and Wyclif) wanted to do, in order to find a specific moment at which an 
action, such as Criseyde falling in love, really begins. Criseyde is, in that sense, a sort of 
chimera herself – she is a fantastical monster of a kind that Troilus cannot even conceive. It is 
significant, therefore, that Holcot, in his commentary on the Twelve Prophets, explains that 
the chimera is to be understood as an image exactly of Criseyde-like figures: ‘chimera enim 
interpretatur idem quod fluctuans in amore’ (‘for the chimera is interpreted as one fluctuating 
in love’).466 The most persistent image of logical paradox is thus also an image of the 
paradoxical workings of love and the difficulty of pinning down or classifying those who are 
inconstant. 
 We see again Troilus’s inability to comprehend Criseyde’s essential fluidity, 
immeasurability and composite nature when Troilus finally accepts, but cannot really 
understand, the fact that Criseyde’s love for him has diminished over time to nothing. Whilst 
he is making an almost geometric study of Diomede’s ‘cote’, ‘avysyng of the lengthe and of 
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the brede’ (V. 1657), he sees the brooch he gave Criseyde, and ‘ful sodeynly his herte gan to 
colde’ (V. 1659: my emphasis: again, the temperature image is Chaucer’s own). The physical 
evidence finally convinces him of Criseyde’s unfaithfulness, and prompts him to complain to 
Pandarus of ‘hire hertes variaunce’ (V. 1670: my emphasis). Yet he still cannot understand 
what has happened in any but his own, simplistic and discrete terms: love and ‘unlove’.  
Thorugh which I se that clene out of youre mynde 
Ye han me cast – and I ne kan nor may, 
For al this world, withinne myn herte fynde 
To unloven yow a quarter of a day! (V. 1694-1698) 
To Troilus, Criseyde’s feelings seem to have instantaneously and spontaneously changed: and 
since his philosophy is not sophisticated enough to appreciate that her emotions have always 
been the result of ‘proces’, and that not even gradual but ‘slydynge’, he can no more deal 
with it than he could with the sophismata that black will be white, or hot will be cold. No 
more can Pandarus, who for once is struck dumb, ‘astoned’, ‘as stille as ston; a word ne 
kowde he seye’ (V. 1728-29). For it was he who encouraged Troilus to see the world as 
composed simply of ‘contraries’ (I. 645): ‘whit by blak’ (I. 642). Neither can comprehend 
Crisedye’s behaviour since that behaviour is irreconcilable with their own simplistic model of 
emotional processes.  
The End of Troilus 
However, Chaucer’s generous humanity and the fullness of his characterisation certainly 
prevent Troilus from merely fulfilling a philosophical function in the poem. He has won our 
pity in spite of, and perhaps in part because of, his intellectual flaws; and even in 
philosophical terms, Chaucer gives us reason to hope for him. At the close of his 
deterministic soliloquy, Troilus prays to Jove, asking either for death or for a resolution of the 
crisis. If, as Strode argued, it would be illogical for a predestined reprobate even to hope for 
his salvation, then, as Holcot argued, certainly ‘non debet pro se orare’ (‘he ought not to pray 
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for himself’): thus Troilus’s prayer still suggests a glimmer of hope.467 Then, although 
Troilus later seeks his death on the battlefield, he does not technically commit suicide, the 
ultimate act of despair, despite drawing his sword when Criseyde faints (IV. 1184-90). 
Furthermore, logicians like Holcot were considering the case of a man whose fate is 
irresistibly revealed to him by God. Troilus is given a divine revelation of Criseyde’s 
infidelity first through his dream and then through Cassandra, but he utterly rejects it: ‘“Thow 
seyst nat soth,” quod he, “thow sorceresse, / With al thy false goost of prophecye!”’ (V. 1520-
21). This suggests that he would rather ‘gon to helle’ than doubt his lady (V. 1532). Troilus, 
in fact, only really despairs of Criseyde when he sees her brooch on Diomede’s tunic, and 
even then he does not fail in charity, swearing that ‘yow, that doon me al this wo endure, / 
Yet love I best of any creature!’ (V. 1700-1701). 
What, finally, of the end of Troilus, which Chaucer fits into the Christian conclusion 
of the poem after the envoy? 
And in hymself he lough right at the wo 
Of hem that wepen for his deth so faste, 
And dampned al oure werk that foloweth so 
The blynde lust, the whiche that may nat laste, 
And sholden al oure herte on heven caste; 
And forthe he wente, shortly for to telle, 
Ther as Mercurye sorted hym to dwelle. (V. 1821-27) 
 
The nature of Troilus’s laugh is one of the great enduring ambiguities of English literature. 
Our appreciation of it is perhaps dependent upon the even more glaring ambiguity of the final 
line: where exactly was Troilus ‘put’ after his death? In contrast to ‘heven’ to which we 
should aspire, the introduction of the rhyme word ‘telle’, in the first line of the next couplet, 
sets up an expectation that by the end of the next line, Troilus will have been assigned to 
‘hell’: yet the expectation is subsequently undercut. Again, in line 1823, our ‘werk’ may be 
‘dampned’: but are we to understand from Chaucer’s use of the word that Troilus is damned 
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too? Why, in that case, should we not ‘wepen for his deth’? Perhaps after all Troilus escaped 
damnation. Having teased us with contrary insinuations and ambiguities, Chaucer ultimately 
does not tell us, and that is the point. As Frank Grady argued, throughout the poem the 
audience has been almost oppressed with our own quasi-divine prescience of Troilus’s 
‘sorwe’ and Criseyde’s infidelity.468 Her behaviour and his reaction to it were, in that sense, 
authorially fore-ordained; but Troilus’s ultimate fate is, from the point of view of the 
audience, undecided even to the end. Contingency, not necessity, has the last laugh in the 
poem. For all our apparent foreknowledge, we are left only with the advice given to us back 
at the beginning: ‘And preieth for hem that ben in the case / Of Troilus, as ye may after here, 
/ That Love hem brynge in hevene to solas’ (I. 29-31). As for the paradoxes generated by 
God’s omniscience of an infinitely divisible universe and a contingent future, they take root 
in, and can only find resolution in, the ‘oon, and two, and thre, eterne on lyve, / That regnest 
ay in thre, and two and oon, / Uncircumscript, and al maist circumscrive’ (V. 1863-65): the 
Godhead that limits all things but cannot itself be limited, by necessity or anything else.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
CAUSATION AND THE FUTURE IN THE 
CONFESSIO AMANTIS 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the interest in maths, logic and logico-literary tropes that I have 
identified in Chaucer can also be found in the work of another member of the London literary 
‘circle’ of his time, John Gower, and that both may have actually shared one means of access 
to scholastic logic, namely the friendship of Ralph Strode. I also argue that, despite his 
‘moral’ label, Gower has just as much to say about the problem of future contingency as 
Chaucer, and that he too could be regarded as working at the logico-mathematical ‘cutting 
edge’.  
Chaucer’s Dedicated Friends: Gower and Strode 
 
O moral Gower, this book I directe 
To the and to the, philosophical Strode. (V. 1857)  
 
Thus Chaucer dedicates Troilus and Criseyde to Gower and Strode, whom he mutually 
opposes even as he places them in parallel. These two lines are potentially significant for a 
critical understanding of Gower’s work for two reasons: first, because of the implications of 
the parallel for Gower’s own probable friendship with Strode; second, because Chaucer’s 
‘pigeon-holing’ of Gower as ‘moral’, as opposed to ‘philosophical’, has led critics to 
overlook aspects of Gower’s writing by the conscious or unconscious application of a 
distinction that Gower himself, I believe, ultimately rejected. One such example would be R. 
F. Yeager’s portrayal of a rather solid ‘moral’ Gower, repeatedly contrasted to the ‘sliding’ 
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nature of Chaucer’s poetry in Troilus and Criseyde.469 I have already explored the ways in 
which such Chaucerian ‘sliding’ could be interpreted as a sophisticated interrogation of 
contemporary logical, mathematical and theological concerns. My analysis of Gower will aim 
to demonstrate that his interaction with the same concerns was equally robust. 
That Strode was a ‘friend’ of Gower is almost ubiquitously assumed on the basis of 
their both being members of a critically constructed ‘Chaucer’s circle’.470 I see no reason for 
doubting this speculation, although on this evidence alone it is mere speculation – it is quite 
possible for a man to have two friends who are mutually ignorant of each other. However, 
there is, apart from Chaucer’s dedication, good reason to suppose that Gower and Strode 
knew each other, and that they would have had plenty to talk about. For one thing it is almost 
certain that the two would have known each other professionally, as civil officers of some 
sort. John Fisher persuasively argues for Gower’s legal profession, in spite of the ‘bitterness 
of [his] denunciations’ of the vices of lawyers. He deduces from Gower’s admission, in the 
Mirour de l’Omme, to wearing ‘a garment with striped sleeves’ (‘ai vestu la raye mance’: 
21774), that he was probably a court or other corporation official, adding that ‘Ralph Strode 
was Common Sergeant during the 1370s, and so would have been covered by such a custom’. 
He concludes that in Gower’s writing,  
specific allusions bespeak a firsthand [legal] knowledge [...], the 
reference to rayed sleeves suggests a professional involvement in the 
law, and the criticisms of the profession might just as well come from 
an outraged member of the fraternity as from an outsider. [...] Gower’s 
description of the training of the lawyer, the degree of coif, and the 
privileges of serjeancy (MO, 24373), and his technical descriptions of 
the functions of the plaidour, client, tort, deslayment, cas (MO, 
24206), advocat (24258), president, apprentis, attourné (MO, 24794) 
accord well with the early state of the profession.
471
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If Fisher’s deductions are correct, Gower’s profession would have certainly encouraged a 
fairly thorough acquaintance with Ralph Strode, and there is every reason to suppose that 
Strode in turn would take an active interest in Gower’s writing. After all, for over a decade 
Strode ‘prosecuted victuallers, vintners, and artisans on behalf of the Corporation for exactly 
the sort of fraud that Gower criticized in the Mirour de l’Omme.’472 
Almost a century ago Ernest Kuhl pointed out another probable connection between 
the two, again through Chaucer, but this time in relation to more worldly affairs: 
It has been pointed out that Strode, as Standing Counsel for the City in 
which he was to plead for the orphans and the like, had had abundant 
experience as Common Pleader. Chaucer students will recall that in 
1375 the poet was made guardian of the heirs of Edmund Staplegate, 
of Canterbury and of John (de) Solys, of Kent. Is it not possible that 
Chaucer owed his appointment – indirectly, to be sure – to his friend 
Strode? [...] However that may be, we may be pretty certain that the 
two men often discussed matters pertaining to guardianship. [//] In 
connection with the Staplegate affair can be mentioned the name of 
another person inseparably linked with Troilus and Criseyde – John 
Gower. In 1386 and 1387 John Gower and Edmund Staplegate were 
among the purveyors of victuals at Dover Castle. Macaulay points out 
this fact but does not say it is the poet Gower. In view of the fact that 
Staplegate is his associate, the probabilities are that it is Gower the 
poet. Simon Burley, the Queen’s favorite, was constable of Dover 
Castle at this time. Accepting these statements, then, we are forced to 
the conclusion that Troilus and Criseyde was dedicated to two friends 
who were members of the King’s faction.473 
Leaving aside Kuhl’s speculation about the involvement of the men in court factions, these 
facts do further increase the probability that Gower and Strode knew each other and would 
have had a wealth of shared interests, even business interests. 
The Philosopher’s Poem 
Perhaps the most interesting and certainly the most contested evidence of Gower’s 
association with Strode is literary. The sixteen-line Latin verse known generally by its 
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opening words, ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’, purports to be a commendatory poem sent to Gower by a 
certain philosopher: 
Carmen, quod quidam Philosophus in memoriam Iohannis Gower super 
consummacione suorum trium librorum forma subsequenti composuit, et eidem 
gratanter transmisit. 
Eneidos, Bucolis, que Georgica metra perhennis 
Virgilio laudis serta dedere scolis; 
Hiis tribus ille libris prefertur honore poetis, 
Romaque precipuis laudibus instat eis. 
Gower, sicque tuis tribus est dotata libellis 
Anglia, morigeris quo tua scripta seris. 
Illeque Latinis tantum sua metra loquelis 
Scripsit, ut Italicis sint recolenda notis; 
Te tua set trinis tria scribere carmina linguis 
Constat, ut inde viris sit scola lata magis: 
Gallica lingua prius, Latina secunda, set ortus 
Lingua tui pocius Anglica complet opus. 
Ille quidem vanis Romanas obstupet aures, 
Ludit et in studiis musa pagana suis; 
Set tua Cristicolis fulget scriptura renatis, 
Quo tibi celicolis laus sit habenda locis. 
(A poem, which in remembrance of John Gower a certain philosopher 
composed in the following form and happily sent to the same man, to 
commemorate the completion of his three books. 
The meters of the Aeneid, Bucolics, and Georgics, woven together 
By Virgil, have given matter of perennial praise to the schools.  
On account of these three books he is preferred in honor over all poets,  
And Rome bestows upon them its chief praises.  
Thus, too, O Gower, with your three little books is England endowed, 
Where you accommodate your writings to serious things. 
He wrote his poems only in the Latin tongue,  
So that they might be appreciated by the famous Italian worthies. 
But it is clear that you wrote your three poems in three languages, 
So that broader schooling might be given to men. 
First the French tongue, Latin second, then at last English, 
The speech of your birth, completes the work.  
He indeed astounded the ears of the Romans with vanities, 
And the pagan Muse played in his studies. 
But your writing glows for reborn Christians, 
Whereby praise will be given you in heavenly places.)
474
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In a note to his edition of the poem, Macaulay ‘ventured on the conjecture that this 
philosopher was in fact Ralph Strode, whom Chaucer couples with Gower in the last stanza 
of the Troilus with the epithet “philosophical”, and of whom we know by tradition that he 
wrote elegiac verse’.475 Macaulay’s casual reference to Strode’s apocryphal poetic efforts 
might in itself be enough to frighten off critics who recall Israel Gollancz’s suggestion that 
Strode was the true author of Pearl.
476
 Nevertheless it is not at all unlikely that Ralph Strode 
wrote some Latin verse: ‘a 1422 list of Merton Fellows includes a “Strood” who composed a 
poem, now lost, entitled Phantasma Radulphi’, the title of the piece and the name of author in 
conjunction suggesting that Ralph Strode composed the piece.
477
 As a result, Strode’s 
authorship of the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’ was for a long time, and remains to an extent today, ‘the 
usual assumption’.478 
The poem itself lends some limited support to this speculation in two ways. First, 
there is the repeated emphasis on ‘the schools’ and ‘schooling’. The first five lines imply that 
just as Virgil’s poetry ‘perhennis [...] laudis [...] dedere scolis’ (‘have given matter of 
perennial praise to the schools’), so too with Gower (‘Gower sicque’). In other words, Virgil 
was praised by the schoolmen of his day, and now, in this very poem, Gower is praised by a 
schoolman, ‘quidam Philosophus’, of his own day. The second reference to the schools goes 
even further: ‘Te tua set trinis tria scribere carmina linguis / Constat, ut inde viris sit scola 
lata magis’ (‘But it is clear that you wrote your three poems in three languages/ so that 
broader schooling may be given to men’). As Michael Kuczynski puts it, 
Roman schoolmen and worthies venerated Virgil. [...] But unlike 
Virgil’s audience of literati, Gower’s cuts across the medieval classes 
or estates: churchmen (those who read Latin), polite members of the 
aristocracy (who can appreciate French), and – a rapidly expanding 
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group in the second half of the fourteenth century – those capable of 
reading only the vernacular.
479
  
 
Kuczynski’s summary is neat, but rather misses the point. These lines are not just 
commending Gower’s accessibility; they are suggesting that Gower’s poetry is itself the 
vehicle for spreading scholastic knowledge (‘scola’) to the masses, even to those who know 
no Latin, the language of scholastic discourse. The anonymous poet’s concern with the 
scholastic element of Gower’s writing obviously lends support to the hypothesis that he is 
himself a man of the schools, and a man with an interest in how literature treats and 
popularises scholastic concerns. By far the most likely candidate amongst Gower’s known 
acquaintances is therefore surely Strode, a man famous not only for his logical writings but 
also for his role as Gower’s ‘co-corrector’ of the Troilus. 
There is another piece of internal evidence to suggest that Strode is the author, in line 
6: ‘morigeris quo tua scripta seris’. R. F. Yeager seems to allow various possible translations 
of this clause. In his edition of the poem, he translates it, ‘where you accommodate your 
writings to serious things’ (given above). In the translation given in Kuczynski’s chapter of 
On John Gower: Essays at the Millennium (edited by Yeager), the line is rendered, ‘You 
accommodate yourself to the one to whom you disseminate your writings’.480 Both 
translations miss, in my opinion, the most significant aspect of the line, which Yeager himself 
acknowledges in passing in a footnote to his essay on ‘Moral Gower’: ‘in addition to the 
comparison with Virgil, we find Gower described as “morageris”’ [sic].481 In their 
translations, both Yeager and Kuczynski seem to understand ‘morigeris’ in terms of the older 
Latin usage of the verb ‘morigeror’: ‘to be compliant or indulgent to’.482 However in his note 
Yeager is, I think, closer to the mark: ‘morigeris’ is almost certainly from the adjective 
‘moriger(us)’, which in medieval Latin came to mean, not compliant or accommodating, but 
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‘informed with good character’, that is ‘with good morals’.483 The line should therefore 
probably be translated something like, ‘where you sow your writings with moral things’. 
Gower’s poetry, the anonymous poet asserts, is characterised especially by being ‘moral’ in 
nature. It seems highly plausible that Strode, conscious of the epithets of the Troilus, should 
have chosen thus to commend his friend: from a philosopher to a moralist. Such a reading is 
all the more likely if Derek Pearsall is right to detect in the poem a resonance of, or even a 
bid to outdo, Chaucer’s presentation of himself in the envoy of the Troilus: ‘[“Eneidos, 
Bucolis”] represent[s] the English poet in an extraordinary light, not merely kissing the steps 
on which the classical poets stand, which is what Chaucer modestly advises his book of 
Troilus to do, but clambering up them’.484 If the poem does indeed contain deliberate echoes 
of Chaucer’s envoy, then the silhouette of the ‘philosophus’ takes on the features of Ralph 
Strode very strongly. 
Thus on internal evidence alone, Strode’s authorship of the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’ must 
be considered probable. Indeed, the poem itself may be regarded as evidence of the closeness 
of Gower’s friendship with the Oxford logician; and if this is accepted, it must be allowed 
that ‘many of the philosophical generalizations in [...] Gower’s works [...] could have 
originated with him’.485 If Strode was indeed the author of the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’, it seems 
clear that he played audience, and perhaps even ‘corrector’, to Gower’s work just as he did to 
Chaucer’s. Critically, then, we may apply the same kind of logical and ‘scientific’ scrutiny to 
the Confessio Amantis, reading it with the eye of the ‘philosophus’, as I have applied to 
Chaucer’s Troilus. 
Nevertheless the authorship of the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’ has always been regarded as 
uncertain. Macaulay, in spite of his attribution of it to Strode, included it in his edition of 
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Gower’s Latin works, an ‘unusual editorial maneuver [sic] [which] indicates ambivalence on 
Macaulay’s part as to Gower’s hand in the poem’.486 Recent critical opinion seems to favour 
possible Gowerian authorship of the poem. Amongst others, ‘Derek Pearsall has suggested 
that the lines may have been “solicited, or composed by Gower himself”’.487 The reasoning 
behind this shift is largely chronological. By praising Gower’s English work, the poet seems 
to imply a knowledge of the Confessio Amantis, especially given the ironic reference to the 
‘tribus [...] libellis’, which acts, ‘like most modesty topoi, [...] at once to deprecate and to 
elevate the author in the reader’s esteem’.488 Such a conceit of ‘modesty’ can only really 
function in an authorial, rather than a critical evaluation, however friendly. Gower’s only 
‘book’ of English poetry that could even compare in stature to the Mirour de l’Omme and the 
Vox clamantis is the Confessio, the first recension of which was not completed until 1390. 
The problem is that Strode, ‘the London lawyer, [...] died in 1387, perhaps too early to have 
written Eneidos, Bucolis’.489 
The poem itself does not necessarily imply that the Confessio was already finished. 
Indeed, the use of the present tense of the verb ‘compleo’ in line 12 leaves open the 
tantalising possibility that the book ‘lingua [...] Anglica’ may have been a work in progress. It 
must be granted that the reference to ‘Avynoun’ in line 331 of the Prologue to the Confessio, 
and its accompanying marginal reference to 1390 
would appear to set a date before which the first version cannot have 
been completed. However, a poem so long must have been some time 
in process, and [...] the account of the meeting with Richard in the 
Prologue and the allegorical portions of Book I (lines 1-288) and 
Book VIII (lines 2149-2940) are closely related to Chaucer’s Legend 
of Good Women and appear to date from about 1385.
490
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It is therefore still possible that Strode knew enough of the Confessio by 1387 to have 
anticipated its publication in the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’. Nevertheless, both the use of the past 
tense elsewhere in the poem (‘tuis tribus est dotata libellis / Anglia’ (‘with your three little 
books England is [or was] endowed’)) and the unequivocal statement of the colophon that the 
poem was composed ‘super consummacione suorum trium librorum’ (‘upon completion of 
his three books’ (my translation)) seem to rule out the possibility that the Confessio was as 
yet unfinished. It must be conceded, of course, that by its own account the colophon does not 
form part of the original text of the commendation, being in the third person. It is still 
possible, therefore, that its statement concerning the circumstances of composition contains 
later inaccuracies; but again this seems unlikely. ‘Eneidos bucolis [...] appears in five 
manuscripts (including two that Gower may have overseen in production, S and F)’,491 and 
‘while none of these manuscripts is a holograph, they can all be connected with Gower and, 
as Macaulay explains, all of them display evidence of carefully managed authorial 
revision’.492 For instance, ‘The All Souls copy of the Vox [which also contains the ‘Eneidos, 
Bucolis’], Macaulay observes, was “certainly written and corrected under the direction of the 
author, and remained sometime in his hands, receiving additions from time to time”’.493 
Furthermore, Macaulay makes a not unreasonable assumption when he speculates that 
‘the author is probably the same as that of the four lines “Quam cinxere freta,” &c., appended 
to the Confessio Amantis, which are called “Epistola super huius opusculi sui complementum 
Iohanni Gower a quodam philospho transmissa”’ (my emphasis).494 Once again the verse 
itself offers no definitive information: 
Quam cinxere freta Gower tua carmina leta 
Per loca discreta canit Anglia laude repleta. 
Carminis Athleta satirus tibi sive Poeta 
Sit laus completa quo gloria stat sine meta. 
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(O Gower, enclosed by the sea and filled with praise 
England, throughout many regions, recites your joyous poetry. 
Master of verse, satirist – or poet – for you 
May praise be full where glory stands without end.)
495
 
It is also not entirely clear that the phrase in the colophon, ‘super huius opusculi sui 
complementum’ must necessarily refer to the Confessio; but once again the contextual 
evidence points very strongly in that direction. If the Confessio was completed only in 1390, 
Strode’s authorship seems unlikely. 
Philosophical Gower? 
We are left with two reasonable possibilities regarding the authorship of ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’: 
either Ralph Strode was indeed its author, most probably along with ‘Quam cinxere freta’, 
and Gower deliberately misapplied his commendations to the completed Confessio, a work 
which Strode could not have known in completion; or Gower himself penned two 
commendations purporting to be written by a ‘philosophus’ friend, probably with the 
conscious intention that certain of his audience would infer Strode’s approbation of his work. 
Either way the implications of the text are not straightforward, and ‘either way, Gower seems 
to have made sure that this Latin encomium to his achievement appeared in multiple, 
textually sound, and well-designed copies of his work intended for circulation amongst 
dignitaries, in effect publicly endorsing its views of his poetic character’.496 
But why exactly was such an endorsement, real or otherwise, so important to Gower? 
Why, perhaps we should rather ask, did Gower consciously choose thus to shape his 
audience’s reaction to his text, as the sort of book a schoolman, or even particularly a 
logician, would enjoy and consider a source of ‘scola’? In order to understand this, I think we 
need to return to our starting point: the dedication of the Troilus. 
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Chaucer’s distinction between ‘moral Gower’ and ‘philosophical Strode’ was by no 
means a new one: 
These epithets correspond to the conventional distinctions made first 
by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics: ‘Now, on this division of the 
faculties is based the division of excellences; wisdom and 
understanding and prudence we call intellectual, liberality and 
temperance we call moral virtues or excellences.’ In Quaestio LVIII of 
the Summa Theologica, ‘Of the Distinction of Moral Virtues from the 
Intellectual,’ St. Thomas repeats the distinction: ‘If virtue perfects 
man’s speculative or practical intellect in order that his action may be 
good, it will be intellectual virtue: if it perfects his appetitive part, it 
will be moral virtue’.497 
 
Chaucer is perhaps merely categorising two fellow writers according to a well-established 
distinction. Nevertheless, ‘philosophical’ is not necessarily identical with ‘intellectual’; it is 
perhaps more precise, suggesting an interest in the logical approaches of the fourteenth-
century schools to various controversies, both ‘scientific’ and theological:  
To Chaucer ‘philosophical’ denoted speculative and intellectual 
excellence. Of the forty-four uses of the various forms listed in the 
concordance, nineteen refer specifically to natural science. [...] 
Judging by these meanings, Strode would have been expected to be 
interested in the astronomical and astrological lore [...] in Troilus [...]. 
Most especially, he would have appreciated the Boethian treatments of 
necessity and free will, false felicity, fortune, and destiny.
498
 
 
However, the problems surrounding astrology, fortune, necessity, false felicity and destiny 
are also central to the Confessio, and Gower’s treatment of them is innovative and daring, as I 
shall later argue. 
By dedicating the Troilus to Strode and Gower, Chaucer is highlighting some aspects 
of the interpretative possibilities implicit in his own work: 
In Gower and Strode, Chaucer invokes what might be considered a 
‘special interpretative community’ within the larger community 
comprised by his whole contemporary audience. The two are a 
particular subset of his larger audience, designated to reinforce or 
complete a meaning that Chaucer wishes his passage to have. Here, 
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concerned to advance a moral/philosophical perspective from which 
Troilus is seen as free to choose divine love over earthly pleasure, 
Chaucer finds ‘audience’ by directing his words to those members of 
his circle most likely to understand his words as he wants them 
understood.
499
 
 
In other words, the point is much less that Strode should read the Troilus than that the 
audience should be aware that such a ‘Strodean’ reading, as well as a ‘Gowerian’ one, is both 
possible and authorially intended. But in applying the traditional distinction to Gower in this 
way, Chaucer’s dedication, whether intentionally or not, limits their shared audience’s 
appreciation of Gower’s work to the purely ‘moral’. 
 I would therefore argue that, whether by simply advertising or by effectively 
inventing a ‘Strodean’ commendation of the Confessio, the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’ represents 
Gower’s attempt to recover for his audience the ‘philosophical’ dimension of his own work. 
Indeed, if Gower did compose the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’, and perhaps even the ‘Quam cinxere 
freta’, then he is, in some sense, the ‘philosophus’ himself. As Yeager points out,  
it would not be the first or only time that he adopted a ‘philosophical’ 
detachment to comment on himself in the third person. The chapter 
headings in VC [and …] the address/prayer prefacing the dedication of 
S to Archbishop Arundel [...] come to mind; and, although their level 
of invention is less than creating an alterego to praise one’s own 
achievement, the Latin note at CA I.60 ff., ‘fingens se auctor esse 
Amantem’ [‘the author feigning to be the Lover’], strikes closer. [...] 
If Eneidos bucolis is by Gower, it presents an advance on his 
demonstrated fictive self-fashioning, but not an inconceivable one; 
and it would tell us much about how he wished to situate himself 
memoria in aeterna.
500
 
 
In the ‘Eneidos, Bucolis’, then, Gower partially collapses the distinction between ‘moral’ and 
‘philosophical’, between ‘morigerus’ and ‘philosophus’, with which Chaucer had 
unfortunately trapped him. The Confessio is indeed well sown with morally instructive 
things, but it is equally the sort of book Strode might recommend: a book for a philosopher.  
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Cause and Contingency in the Confessio 
One major concern of the framing narrative of the Confessio is the mutability of the world, 
and the resultant uncertainty of human experience. In his adoption of this topos, Gower 
makes considerable use of a number of highly conventional tropes: 
The see now ebbeth, now it floweth, 
The lond now welketh, now it groweth, 
Now be the trees with leves grene, 
Now thei be bare and nothing sene, 
Now be the lusti somer floures 
Now be the stormy wynter shoures, 
Now be the daies, now the nyhtes, 
So stant ther nothing al upryhtes. 
Now it is lyht, now it is derk, 
And thus stant al the worldes werk 
After the disposicioun 
Of man and his condicioun. 
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The tides, the seasons, day and night, light and dark – there is nothing unusual in Gower’s 
selection of imagery; nor, especially, in his anaphoric use of ‘now’, which emphasises the 
near-paradox inherent in the vicissitudes of life, although it is worth noting that such 
expressions are often also applied to the paradoxical effects of love, as for example, Chaucer 
does in the Troilus (II. 698). Nor again is there anything particularly surprising about Gower’s 
adoption of the widespread conceit of man as ‘microcosm’ in the final three lines of this 
passage: he had already made use of the idea in both the Mirour de l’Omme and the Vox 
clamantis.
502
 Nevertheless, Gower’s assertion that the world’s mutability is a reflection of 
man’s ‘condicioun’ is significant for understanding the quasi-logical concerns of the 
Confessio, since Gower’s discussion of mutability forms part of his analysis of the 
fourteenth-century logico-theological controversies over causation and future contingency. 
In the Prologue, Gower addresses the idea of future contingency at some length, 
discussing various conventional understandings of causation and generally exposing their 
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weaknesses. The first thing to notice, however, is that, as in the Troilus, the whole discussion 
is prompted by the recent controversies of ‘Lollardie’ (PR. 349). Yet far from depicting ‘this 
newe secte’ as a grass-roots or even lay movement, Gower’s main criticism of it is its hyper-
clerkliness. The clerks ‘argumenten faste’ (PR. 370) amongst themselves about the papacy: 
‘this clerk seith yee, that other nay’ (PR. 373). From these lines it is not hard to imagine 
Gower’s possible reaction to, for example, Wyclif’s series of controversies with Strode. 
Gower objects to the fact that while the clerks ‘thus [...] dryve forth the day’ (PR. 374), each 
of them is only really interested in his own affairs (PR. 382-83), rather than the common good 
(PR. 384-85), and so nothing gets done about the state of the Church (PR. 386-87). It is into 
this context that Gower introduces his first posited explanation of causation:  
Thei sein that God is myhti there 
And schal ordeine what He wile 
Ther make thei non other skile  
Where is the peril of the feith[.] (PR. 378-81)  
 
It is because of the apparent Wycliffite belief in predestination, absolutely unqualified (‘Ther 
make thei non other skile’), that ‘non of hem [...] underfongeth / To schapen eny resistence’ 
(PR. 386-387). The conviction of determinism leads to passivity, here in the Confessio as in 
Troilus; and, as in the Troilus, the vehicle used to demonstrate this fact is a caricature of 
Wycliffite thought.  
The implication that it is man’s actions that determine the future, that we are 
responsible for what will happen, becomes explicit a little later in the Prologue: 
His God, which evere stant in on, 
In Him ther is defalte non, 
So moste it stonde upon ousselve 
Nought only upon ten ne twelve, 
Bot plenerliche upon ous alle, 
For man is cause of that schal falle. (PR. 523-28) 
The argument here is that since God is both good and consistent, but the world is mutable and 
events are often evil, then future events (‘that schal falle’) must be contingent upon (‘stonde 
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upon’) faulty ‘man’, rather than being simply predetermined by God. Gower is not rejecting 
divine predestination outright in these two passages: rather he is rejecting what he sees as the 
reductionist and unqualified position of the Wycliffites, who ‘make [...] non other skile’ in 
asserting absolute predestination. 
Gower then goes on to mention other conventional explanations of causation: 
And natheles yet som men wryte 
And sein that fortune is to wyte, 
And som men holde oppinion 
That it is constellacion, 
Which causeth al that a man doth. 
God wot of bothe which is soth. (PR. 529-34) 
 
Some say that fortune is the cause of what happens, others blame the stars. For Gower the 
problem with both explanations is that they are equally unknowable, except to God (PR. 534). 
Fate and fortune make no practical difference to man if he knows neither: the future is 
equally uncertain, and he is left once again only with the fact that God knows what will 
happen, because only God knows the truth about fortune or astrology. Referring an 
unknowable future to an unknowable cause sheds no new light on the problem. Gower’s 
position can be further understood in the light of Genius’s discussion of the ancient Chaldean 
astrological beliefs, in Book v: 
For th’elementz ben servicable 
To man, and ofte of accidence, 
As men mai se th’experience, 
Thei ben corrupt be sondri weie;  
So mai no mannes reson seie 
That thei ben god in eny wise. 
[...] 
These elementz ben creatures,  
So ben these hevenly figures,  
Wherof mai wel be justefied 
That thei mai noght be deified. 
And who that takth awey th’onour 
Which due is to the Creatour, 
And gifth it to the creature, 
He doth to gret a forsfaiture. (V. 762-80) 
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The heavenly bodies are subject to the Creator, and exist for the service of mankind, not the 
other way around: but like all things within man’s ambit, they are ‘corrupt’ and imperfect. 
Thus, we might deduce, they are to be regarded not as causes either of God’s will or the 
world’s mutability, but rather effects. Here his explanation is interestingly reminiscent of 
Bradwardine’s own discussion of this matter in De causa Dei, as I will demonstrate below. 
In the Prologue, in answer to the conventional explanations of causation, Gower 
asserts man’s actions as causational: 
So that the man is overal 
His oghne cause of wel and wo. 
That we fortune clepe so 
Out of the man himself it growth[.] (PR. 546-49) 
 
The ‘falle and rise’ (PR. 544) of man in a mutable world is comprehensible only in terms of 
his actions, for ‘fortune’ is simply the consequence of a man’s character and behaviour. 
Specifically, the sinfulness of man is the cause of his misery, as the history of ‘Irael’ (PR. 
551) demonstrates. Therefore, concerning the mutability of the world:  
The man himself hath be coupable, 
Which of his propre governance  
Fortuneth al the worldes chance. (PR. 582-84) 
 
In other words, you make your own luck. Yet Gower’s emphasis very definitely seems to be, 
you make your own bad luck. He presents the ‘conclusioun’ (PR. 575) of the Biblical story of 
Nebuchadnezzar’s dream, 
     that upon divisioun 
Stant, why no worldes thing mai laste, 
Til it be drive to the laste. 
And fro the ferste regne of alle 
Into this day, hou so befalle, 
Of that the regnes ben muable 
The man himself hath be coupable[.] (PR. 576-582) 
Everything in the world ultimately comes to nothing, like the statue in Daniel’s dream which 
‘so forth torned into noght’ (PR. 624). Kingdoms might last for a certain time, but in the end 
man’s sin is the cause of their destruction. Man’s progress thus seems inevitably downwards, 
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interrupted only by interludes of stagnation before the next catastrophe. Gower proceeds to 
give the reason for the Book of Daniel’s pessimistic presentation of man’s predicament: 
Bot al this wo is cause of man, 
The which that wit and reson can, 
And that in tokne and in witnesse 
That ilke ymage bar liknesse 
Of man and of non other beste. 
For ferst unto the mannes heste 
Was every creature ordeined, 
Bot afterward it was restreigned. 
Whan that he fell, thei fellen eke, 
Whan he wax sek, thei woxen seke; 
For as the man hath passioun 
Of seknesse, in comparisoun 
So soffren othre creatures. 
Lo, ferst the hevenly figures, 
The sonne and mone eclipsen bothe, 
And ben with mannes senne wrothe[.] (PR. 905-920) 
 
Thus the effect of the fall was to lock man into an inescapable downward spiral of change: 
although the sea might ebb and flow, the post-lapsarian world’s mutability seems, in the long 
term, only to be a change from bad to worse. In that respect, the general aspect of the future is 
inevitably negative. 
 In the Prologue, then, Gower seems to set up two perspectives on the nature of the 
future that are in tension. In places his treatments of the effects of the human action suggests 
a general alignment with logico-theological positions that attempted to safeguard the freedom 
of the will and the contingency of the future. Yet the consideration of the result of man’s will, 
the fall, leads him to emphasise the irreversible difference between the prelapsarian and 
postlapsarian world, an emphasis which may be seen as symptomatic of an anti-Pelagian and 
even, at times, a rather pessimistically deterministic, viewpoint. This general pessimism in 
respect of the future emerges more clearly in his treatment of temporal processes, especially 
ageing, in the framing narrative of the Confessio. 
203 
 
Time for a Change: ‘Asymmetric’ Logic and the Confessio 
Many fourteenth-century sophismata are also concerned with irreversible or inevitable 
temporal processes, which also, naturally speaking, only work one way. One reason for this is 
that, in spite of what one might expect, valid logic is often asymmetrical. Ralph Strode’s own 
treatise on consequentiae, for instance, emphasises the asymmetrical nature of valid 
reasoning. Take, for instance, Strode’s use of the maxim, ‘ex falsis verum; ex vero non nisi 
verum’ (‘From false things come the true; / From the true, nothing except the true’).503 If 
one’s reasoning is valid, a false premise may still give rise to a true conclusion: to take one of 
Strode’s examples, in the proposition, ‘ut tu sedes, ergo deus est’ (‘Since you sit, therefore 
God is’), the conclusion (‘deus est’) is true even if the premise (‘tu sedes’) happens to be 
false. This is because the proposition, ‘deus est’, is necessarily true in all circumstances.504 
However, it doesn’t work the other way around: if one’s reasoning is valid, a true premise can 
never lead to a false conclusion. A similar asymmetry is apparent in twenty-two of the 
twenty-four rules concerning consequentiae that Strode gives. Strode emphasises this fact by 
pairing rules off together, like so: 
Unde prima regula est, si antecedens est verum, et consequens est 
verum. 
2a regula: si consequens est falsum, eius antecedens est falsum. 
 
(Whence the first rule is, if the antecedent is true, the consequent is 
also true. 
The second rule, if the consequent is false, the antecedent is false.)
505
 
 
Assuming a basic symmetry, from a quick glance at the first rule we might assume that the 
second rule would run, ‘if the consequent is true, the antecedent is true’, simply exchanging 
consequent and antecedent symmetrically. On the contrary, however, we find that if we want 
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to ‘convert’ the first rule, we must also negate the predicates, turning ‘true’ into ‘false’. One 
cannot simply reverse the order of the terms in the argument and expect it still to be valid.
 506
  
Gower employs exactly this asymmetric quality of logical thought in his exploration 
of the unfairness of love, especially in respect to the sin of supplantation in Book II. Genius’s 
description of the vice of supplantation identifies it immediately as a case of bad logic: 
The vice of Supplantacioun 
With manye a fals collacioun, 
Which he conspireth al unknowe, 
Full ofte time hath overthrowe 
The worschipe of another man. (II. 2327-31: my emphasis) 
The term ‘collacioun’ here is significant. It is piece of logical terminology, which refers to 
the collection of premises used to draw a logical consequence. It is in this sense that Chaucer 
uses the term in his translation of Boethius: if a man wants to dispute an argument, ‘it is ryght 
that he schewe that some of the premysses ben false, or elles he mot schewe that the 
collacioun of preposicions nis nat spedful to a necessarie conclusioun’.507 In order to 
demonstrate that a conclusion is invalid, one must either demonstrate that one of the premises 
is false or that from the premises taken together one cannot necessarily infer the conclusion. 
If, therefore, one does not have an appropriate ‘collacioun’ of premises, one cannot make a 
valid inference, and so the phrase ‘fals collacioun’ came more generally to mean also ‘false 
inference’.508 Here Gower clearly links the vice of making an unfair exchange or substitution 
(‘chalk for chese’, II. 2346) in matters of commerce, politics, or love with making an invalid 
inference in logic. Thus the vice of supplantation ignores Strode’s rules for consequentia: it 
treats everything in life, including the places of lover and stranger, as if they were simply 
‘convertible’. In life, as in logic, this can only lead to a bad conclusion. 
Gower’s choice of exempla for this vice are interesting. His first major illustration of 
supplantation is the story of Geta and Amphitrion, two friends (II. 2459-2495). Amphitrion 
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imitates Geta’s voice and so gains access to his wife Almeene’s bed; when Geta turns up and 
knocks at the door, Almeene refuses him entry, reasoning that, since her husband is with her 
in bed, the man at the door must be an imposter. The poor husband is left terribly confused. 
Here again the simple exchange of terms within a consequentia has led to a false conclusion. 
Almeene should have reasoned, ‘My husband is at the door; therefore someone else is in my 
bed’. In fact, she reasons, ‘My husband is in my bed; therefore someone else is at the door’. It 
is not Almeene’s consequential logic per se that is at fault here: it is her ‘collatioun’, her 
premise (‘my husband is in my bed’). 
This story is one with distinctly logical associations, especially in the version in which 
it seems Gower knew it. Stephen Wright has argued persuasively that Gower is probably 
relying on Vitalis of Blois’ twelfth-century version of the narrative, because, among other 
reasons, the other possible sources would not have supplied Gower with the name of 
‘Geta’.509 As I mentioned in the Introduction, Jan Ziolkowski has explored the precise logical 
concerns of this Latin text in detail.
510
 Gower simplifies the narrative somewhat, making it a 
clearer exemplar for his purposes. However, he maintains what he obviously sees to be the 
two essential ingredients of the story: firstly, supplantation in love; and secondly, the invalid 
logic leading to the conclusion that a man is not himself. From Gower’s retelling of the story, 
it seems that worldly love, in its unfairness, even has the power to override the rules of logic, 
cheating the true lover out of what is rightfully his. 
Gower’s interest in supplantation fits into his broader interest in causation and 
irreversible temporal processes. Fourteenth-century logical discussions of cause and effect 
and other temporal processes often emphasised their asymmetry or irreversibility. One 
example of this asymmetry is birth and death: someone who has been born can die; but 
someone who has died cannot be born. One of Buridan’s sophisms, then, is, ‘The corrupt can 
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be generated’.511 Of course, part of the logical problem Buridan addresses in this sort of 
sophism is the validity of reference to an object that has undergone, or will undergo, change 
across time. If the same man who is now dead and rotten was once born, then something 
(now) dead must have the ability to be born (because he was once born). That reasoning, 
however, leads to the ridiculous notion that a dead man can be born. Another example of the 
sort of irreversible changes discussed by Buridan is the cooking of raw food, from which he 
builds the sophism ‘You ate raw meat today’.512  
One group of sophismata of particular relevance to the Confessio centred specifically 
on the changes effected by the ageing process, ranging from examples such as ‘Young 
Socrates was going to argue’ to ‘Every old horse is going to die’.513 Perhaps most striking is 
the widespread sophism ‘An old man will be a boy’, which is discussed in a range of variant 
forms in, for example, the works of Kilwardby, Ockham and Buridan.
514
 Buridan considers 
the argument that the sophism is equivalent to the proposition that ‘he who is or will be an 
old man will be a boy’, which is true, for instance, of the future Antichrist (who will be a boy 
and eventually, presumably, an old man). His use of the example of ‘Antichrist’ ties his 
analysis of the problem even more closely to the broader questions about determinism and 
future contingency. However, the most obvious (and most obviously erroneous) argument in 
favour of the sophism is, as Kilwardby notes, the fact that the sophism is merely the simple 
‘conversion’ of a perfectly valid proposition (‘A boy will be an old man’).515 As Strode later 
emphasised in his treatise on consequentia mentioned above, logic is not quite as 
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straightforwardly symmetrical as that. The true proposition that ‘a boy will be an old man’ 
converts into a false proposition, that ‘an old man will be a boy’, because the ageing process 
is irreversible. The passage of time, like the passage of narrative, can turn a youth into an old 
man; but nothing on earth can turn an old man back into a youth. That is the tragedy. The 
ageing process is thus a very neat example of the problems, both logical and human, 
associated with the ‘asymmetric’ mutability of the post-lapsarian world, a world which is, in 
this respect, not only predictable but also a one-way street, from better to worse. There is 
mutability in the fallen world, but not reversibility; contingency, but not without its limits. 
Growing Old Gracelessly: Ageing in the Confessio and the De vetula 
The inescapability and irreversibility of ageing is, of course, crucial to the framing narrative 
of the Confessio. Nicolette Zeeman explains the importance of age thus: 
The framing narrative exploits the hyperboles and tropes of endless 
possibility which characterize courtly love verse; like this verse, it 
espouses a playful yet resolute commitment to youth, narrative 
atemporality and poetic stasis, and deals evasively with all material 
which might contradict this. But then the lover is revealed to be old: the 
resulting collapse of the framing narrative turns the narrative itself into a 
figure of worldly instability.
516
 
The ‘atemporality’ and ‘stasis’ of the framing narrative thus hides the passage of time, and 
with it the ageing process, allowing the reader to conform his expectations entirely to the 
youth-obsessed conventions of fin’ amors. 
Amans certainly seems to represent the ‘true’ young lover and poet of the 
verse of fin’ amors. [//] At the end of the framing narrative, it transpires 
that Amans is old. [...] It places Amans in a world governed by change 
and time, Fortune and Nature, Christian morality and philosophy.
517
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The revelation of Amans’ age reintroduces the negative effects of the passage of time into the 
idealised world of courtly love: the tragic irony is that ‘Amans has already referred to earthly 
mutability, without recognizing its implications’ for himself.518 
 The way in which Gower chooses to express his fascination with the passage of time 
is as much logical as literary. Venus concludes her exhortation to ‘John’ with the lines: ‘The 
thing is torned into was; / [...] Remembre wel hou thou art old.’ (VIII. 2435-39). Thus Gower 
presents man’s experience of time in terms of a proposition with a changing tense: in this 
case, the proposition ‘Amans is young’ (the reader’s assumption throughout the text) has 
becomes ‘Amans was young’; or alternatively ‘Amans is old’. This is exactly the sort of 
change that underlies many of the sophismata of irreversible change. In his discussion of the 
aforementioned sophism ‘Young Socrates was going to argue’, Buridan analyses the 
propositions, ‘Whoever is or was young Socrates was going to argue’ and ‘Whoever is or will 
be young Socrates will argue’, where the choice of tense determines the truth-value of the 
proposition. Such problems formed part of the larger discussion of ‘ampliation’: the extent to 
which the reference of a term in a proposition can be extended to include past, present and 
future realities. Thus as the passage of time effects changes in the real world, remarkably it 
also seems to effect changes even in the truthfulness of formal propositions, and indeed, the 
truthfulness of literary depictions – to the extent that Zeeman characterises Gower’s initial 
portrayal of Amans as a sort of ‘deception’.519 
Indeed, elsewhere in the Confessio, Gower has tantalised his audience with the 
possibility that true love could be powerful enough to overthrow even the remorselessly 
asymmetric logic of ageing. In the tale of Florent in Book I, it is the grandmother of 
Branchus, a lady ‘so old sche myhte unethes go’ (I. 1444), who contrives the mechanism of 
bringing Florent to his own premature death. It is the old ‘lothly’ woman (I. 1530) who is the 
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only person that can save Florent from his death. Like the rest of humanity, Florent’s death is 
ultimately inevitable; a point Gower reminds us of again later, describing Florent’s horror at 
having to take the old woman as his bride in oxymoronic terms: he ‘liveth, as who seith, 
deyinge’ (I. 1710). Ageing is simply the physical manifestation of the paradox that for all 
human beings what we call life is merely the long drawn out process of dying. The Latin 
gloss accompanying the vernacular narrative presents the story as being centrally concerned 
with the miraculous transformation of the old woman back into a young girl.
520
 In fact, as 
Patricia Batchelor argues, the gloss ‘is more concerned with the situation of this exemplum in 
the framing fiction than with the tale itself’.521 The apparent reason for this is that the story 
seems to hold out the hope of a miraculous solution to the problem of ageing. It seems to 
suggest the possible validity of Buridan’s sophism, ‘An old man will be a boy’ (or rather, ‘an 
old woman will be a girl’). Gower thus plants in the minds of his audience the possibility that 
there may be a miraculous resolution for Amans too, even once his age is revealed in the final 
book; hopes which must then be the more cruelly dashed. 
As Zeeman notes, one text that probably influenced Gower’s use of the ageing trope 
in his framing narrative is the widely-circulated pseudo-Ovidian De vetula of the thirteenth 
century, another story in which old women confront the reader, and the protagonist, at every 
turn.
522
 The De vetula was a text well known in the fourteenth century for much more than its 
basic narrative, which seems not to have been regarded as its most interesting feature by late-
medieval readers. The central storyline is relatively simple, as Dorothy M. Robathan 
summarises: 
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This is the tale of a hoax in which an old lady (Vetula) substitutes herself 
for the beautiful maiden with whom Ovid had an assignation. Twenty 
years later, upon the death of her husband, Ovid marries his lady, but by 
that time she too is Vetula. Disillusioned he turns his back on the 
frivolous life he has been leading, embraces a good mediaeval curriculum 
of mathematics, music, and philosophy; turns for consolation to religion; 
and in Book III predicts the Virgin birth of Christ and becomes a 
Christian.
523
 
The De vetula’s concern with the sort of temporal processes of change discussed in the 
sophismatic treatises is explicit from its subtitle, De mutatione vitae (On a Lifestyle 
Change).
524
 ‘Mutation’ was also a technical term to do with logical consequence, meaning 
the reordering of premises in a syllogism.
525
 Clearly ageing is an irreversible ‘mutation’ that 
takes place over the course of time, and over the course of the narrative: by the end of Book 
II, the protagonist realises that by now he himself could be called ‘vetulus’, and it is this 
moment of self-recognition that prompts him to eschew the life of love.
526
 The subtitle refers 
primarily, therefore, to the protagonist’s resultant conversion to a life of study and faith, 
which is explored in Book III, and the story is thus in one sense an optimistic one. 
 The pseudo-Ovidian topos of the ageing lover is clear enough in the Confessio, but 
the treatment of it is innovative and much less optimistic. Whereas in the De vetula the theme 
of ageing is explicit right from the very title, in Gower’s work the lover’s age is hidden until 
almost the end of a lengthy narrative. For one thing, this means that there is no real ‘afterlife’ 
for Amans, no real detail of the dignified old age that the De vetula’s protagonist enjoys. It 
thus feels much more pessimistic in tone. 
Up to this point, I have been exploring one way of looking at the problem of causation 
in Gower, focusing on logical approaches to valid consequential reasoning, particularly in 
relation to cause and effect and temporal processes of change. However, Gower’s treatment 
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of the problems to do with causation and future contingency is complex. Despite his 
emphasis in places on the inescapable deteriorative nature, or ‘one-wayness’, of temporal 
processes in a fallen world, he sometimes hints that the outcome of the love-game is not 
necessarily subject to such totalising and inevitable logic. His discussion of supplantation is 
one example, which returns briefly at the denouement of the poem, just before Amans’ age is 
revealed (VIII. 2382-84). His treatment of the Florent story is another, shaping an initially 
optimistic response even to that damaging revelation. So when Amans’ age is ultimately 
revealed, and revealed to be an insoluble problem, it is a surprise. One reason for this is that 
throughout the Confessio Gower weaves into his discussions of causation another crucial 
factor, one that, at first glance, appears to encourage the reader to think of the narrative future 
as rather more contingent: chance – which is also a theme prominent in the De vetula. 
Dicing with Love? Chance in the Confessio and the De vetula 
In my analysis of the Prologue, I discussed the conventional explanations of causation that 
Gower explores: divine predestination, astrological fate, fortune and human free will. In 
addition, I remarked upon the seemingly paradoxical double assertion of the unpredictable 
mutability of the world (PR. 933-41) and of direct or indirect human responsibility (PR. 941-
43) with which Gower essentially concludes his initial analysis of the problem. Into that mix, 
Gower introduces one other dimension to his discussion of future contingency that is radical 
not only in literary but also in philosophical terms. This new dimension, in the absence of a 
more precise term, we must call ‘chance’. The term ‘chance’ is, of course, not at all 
uncommon in late Middle English, and I have already quoted Gower’s use of the term in the 
Prologue. The point of interest is not the term itself but its late-medieval connotations, 
specifically connotations of what we might now call a ‘probabilistic’ assessment of future 
contingency. 
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Almost immediately in Book I we see the application to Amans of Gower’s discussion 
of future contingency in the Prologue: love defies rational prediction or measurement. 
And natheles ther is no man 
In al this world so wys, that can 
Of love tempre the mesure, 
Bot as it falth in aventure. (I. 21-24) 
 
Getting the measure of love is not a matter of intelligence, and the outcome of love cannot be 
forecast: 
Bot what schal fallen ate laste, 
The sothe can no wisdom caste, 
Bot as it falleth upon chance. (I. 39-41) 
In both these passages, which deliberately parallel each other in the last line, love is described 
as something which rational wisdom attempts to measure and predict but fails, being 
dependant only upon an apparently nebulous ‘chance’ or ‘aventure’. As Gower goes on to put 
it, love is that ‘which wol no reson understonde’ (I. 46).  
However, the most interesting feature of Gower’s discussion of love’s ‘chance’ is the 
analogy he uses for it: 
For love is blind and may noght se, 
Forthi may no certeineté 
Be set upon his jugement, 
Bot as the whiel aboute went 
He gifth his graces undeserved, 
And fro that man which hath him served 
Ful ofte he takth aweye his fees, 
As he that pleieth ate dees; 
And therupon what schal befalle 
He not, til that the chance falle, 
Wher he schal lese or he schal winne. (I. 47-57) 
There are three important things to notice about this passage. The first is the reference to the 
‘whiel’, presumably of Fortune, which reminds the reader that Gower’s discussion of 
‘chance’ in Book I is to be held in tension with his discussion of causation in the Prologue. 
There, Gower argued, fortune grows out of man himself; here man is the passive subject of 
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love’s chance ‘jugement’. The tension, in the Confessio, between seeming ‘chance’ and an 
explicable human causation will be discussed later. 
 The second point of interest here is that a fourteenth-century reader might have found 
in these lines a passing allusion to the fate of poor old ‘Ovid’ in the De vetula, who laments 
over ‘quid fortuna michi dedit et quid casus ademit’(‘what Fortuna gave me and what chance 
has taken away’) (II. 681). Notice that in the passage from the Confessio, when Love ‘gifth’, 
he is decked out with Fortune’s ‘whiel’; but when he ‘takth’, he is associated with ‘chance’: 
Fortune gives and chance takes away, just as ‘Ovid’ says in the De vetula. While this 
resemblance between the two passages would probably have eluded much of Gower’s 
audience, it is possible that some of the more astute may have gleaned from it a hint of the 
ultimate denouement of Amans’ love-suit, even as the narrator is ostentatiously protesting 
that no such prediction is possible. 
The third and most significant feature of this passage is Gower’s analogy for 
‘chance’: ‘he that pleieth ate dees’. Here again we find an echo of the previous passage: ‘as it 
falleth upon chance’ becomes ‘til that the chance falle’; but here the verb ‘falle’ takes on an 
added significance. Once the ‘dees’ have fallen, or have been cast, only then is the outcome 
of the game made clear (‘wher he schal lese or he schal winne’). Until that happens, although 
the gambler may feel that he deserves a positive result (I. 52), ‘what schal befalle / he not’ (I. 
55-56). Similarly, in line 24 quoted above, it is impossible to get the measure of love, ‘bot as 
it falth in aventure’. ‘Aventure’ is a deliberately ambiguous word, able to denote chance of 
course, but also fate and fortune, two other possible sources of causation discussed in the 
Prologue. Or the word can simply denote an event itself, without suggestion of cause. The 
ambiguity stands at the centre of the narrator’s profession that the result of the love game is 
utterly unpredictable. However, Gower also uses the phrase ‘in aventure’ in the final book of 
the Confessio explicitly to describe a sort-of financial gamble (VIII. 1118), and in the context 
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of his dicing analogy here, the use of the phrase in line 24 would seem to carry similar 
connotations.
527
  
The analogy of playing at dice adds a further significance to the verb ‘caste’ in line 
40, reminding the audience that the casting of lots, dice or the astragali was a common and 
traditional method of divination; that is, of forecasting future events. It was thus associated 
with the problem of future contingency and divine predestination. As the book of Proverbs 
puts it, ‘sortes mittuntur in sinu sed a Domino temperantur’ (‘lots are cast into the lap, but 
they are disposed of by the Lord’: 16:33). Bradwardine himself quotes this verse in De causa 
Dei, in his chapter ‘De casu et fortuna’. He adds to it Ephesians 1:11: ‘nos sorte vocati sumus 
[prædestinati secundum propositum eius, qui operatur omnia secundum consilium voluntatis 
suæ]’ (‘we are called by lot, [being predestinated according to the purpose of him who 
worketh all things according to the counsel of his will]’), clearly relating the question of 
chance to the question of divine predestination.
528
 He glosses ‘sors’ as referring generally to 
‘fortuna, vel casus’, rather than strictly to sortilege, which could be considered 
blasphemous.
529
 As might be expected given his reputation as a quasi-determinist, 
Bradwardine denies the reality of chance as a cause of anything that happens. Rather to talk 
of ‘chance’ is merely an unfortunate manner of speaking, used when we do not know the real 
causes. Indeed, all the events that man may be tempted to ascribe to chance or fortune are in 
fact ultimately ascribable only to the will of God, as the verse from Ephesians suggests. Thus, 
he concludes, ‘videtur mihi quod nihil dicitur absolute nomine casuale’ (‘it seems to me that 
nothing is spoken of in absolute terms as caused by chance’).530 To speak of chance is merely 
to confess human ignorance: chance cannot be a cause in itself. Thus, the image of casting 
dice may have contained, for a fourteenth-century audience, not merely a generalised 
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suggestion of unpredictability, but also a pretty strong whiff of the logico-theological 
controversy over future contingency. 
However, the connotations of prophetic dicing in Gower’s image cannot stand alone, 
for his focus is upon dicing as a game, rather than as an act of divination, with the expected 
winnings of the gambler the central concern. In Book VIII, just before his age is revealed, the 
narrator laments that  
Venus which stant withoute lawe  
 In noncertein, bot as men drawe  
Of Rageman upon the chance, 
Sche leith no peis in the balance 
Bot as hir lyketh for to weie[.] (VIII. 2377-79)  
 
Here again Gower puts success in love down to ‘chance’, his metaphor once again being a 
game that according to some commentators may have involved dice, amongst other things 
(‘Rageman’).531 The game was, apparently, playfully horoscopic, elegantly combining the 
ludic and the prophetic in Gower’s image. 
 Apart from its links to divination, then, was there anything about gaming with dice 
that inspired Gower to choose it as his image of the uncertainty of the outcome of Amans’ 
love-suit? The answer to this question may lie in the De vetula, which is a text of interest not 
only to literary scholars but also to historians of mathematics, since it contains the earliest 
evidence of the medieval inception of a nascent understanding of what would later become 
‘probability theory’.  
Discussing the pastimes of his youth, the ‘Ovid’ of the narrative disparages dicing as 
a vice that leads frequently to penury (‘egestatem’: I. 402), as well as occasional violence (I. 
492-94), concluding that ‘Solus inest casus quem non sequitur nisi stultus’ (‘There is only 
chance in it, which none but a fool follows’): I. 495. Nevertheless, the poet entertains the 
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counterargument that dicing is not merely a matter of simple chance, since certain combined 
totals are more likely to come up: (‘Forte tamen dices quosdam prestare quibusdam / Ex 
numeris, quibus est lusoribus usus’: ‘Perhaps, however, you will say that certain numbers 
used by the gamblers are better than others’: I. 428-29). Remarkably, fifty-six lines are given 
over to a detailed exploration of this claim, in addition to three different tables setting out the 
various possible combinations and totals possible with three six-sided dice. The 
mathematically significant aspect of this passage is the link the poet draws between the 
combinatorial calculations and the likely outcome of a given throw: 
Cum decius sit sex laterum, sex et numerorum 
Simplicium, tribus in deciis sunt octo decemque, 
Quorum non nisi tres possunt deciis superesse. 
Hi diversimode variantur et inde bis octo  
Compositi numeri nascuntur, non tamen eque 
Virtutis, quoniam maiores atque minores 
Ipsorum raro veniunt, mediique frequenter. 
Et reliqui, quanto mediis quamvis propiores, 
Tanto prestantes et sepius advenientes[.] (I. 430-38)
 532
 
 
(Since there are six sides to a die, and six simple [i.e. non-compound] 
numbers, there are eighteen on three dice, of which no more than three 
can be on the top of the dice [at the end of the roll]. These vary in 
different ways and from them sixteen compound numbers are 
produced, but they are not all equally good, because the bigger and 
smaller ones come up rarely and the middle ones come up frequently. 
As for the others, the closer they are to the middle ones, the better they 
are and the more often they come up.) 
 
Thus the author of the De vetula is not merely commenting on the possible combinations, but 
clearly deduces on the basis of his combinatorial calculations that some totals are ‘better’ and 
come ‘more frequently’: in other words, they are more likely to come up than others. Thus it 
has been argued that ‘the poem provides direct evidence that an elementary probability 
calculus was established and known in Europe from about the year 1250’.533 This date is far 
earlier than was thought by many twentieth-century historians of science. I will now turn to 
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the broader question of ‘chance’ and ‘probability’ in late-medieval thought, before returning 
to Gower to discuss the significance of such logico-mathematical developments for a literary 
reading of the Confessio. 
The Rise of the Probable: The De vetula in Context 
The calculations in the De vetula might be put into the context of two distinct but interacting 
areas of medieval thought, both as yet merely incipient but evolving together. The first is 
what would now be called ‘combinatorics’, and the second is the broader notion of 
‘probability’. In relation to combinatorics, Boethius, in his commentary on Porphyry, 
demonstrates his knowledge of ‘the rule for finding the number of combinations (without 
repetition) of n things taken two at a time’.534 Yet the context of the passage is not 
specifically mathematical and indeed, as Norman Biggs remarks, ‘the rule does not appear in 
the mathematical writings of Boethius, although the numbers given by his rule are just the 
triangular numbers, which he does discuss at some length’.535 Other quasi-combinatorial 
problems appear in the form of puzzles such as the famous river crossing, with wolf, goat and 
cabbages, from Alcuin’s Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes, which, as I have discussed, was 
a problem still celebrated in the fourteenth-century.
536
 However, as Biggs points out, this 
problem ‘differs significantly from most other mediaeval puzzle-problems, in that it has no 
arithmetical or geometrical content whatsoever’; it demonstrates an interest in choosing 
different combinations of objects, but lacks the necessity for any systematic analysis of the 
number of possible combinations.
537
 Another example of this sort of puzzle is the infamous 
Josephus problem, originally based on the story that the Jewish historian, trapped in a cave 
with forty other Jewish rebels who had decided upon mass suicide, suggested that they work 
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round the circle of men, killing each third man. He then positioned himself in the thirty-first 
position, in order to ensure that he was one of the last two survivors; whence, after a bit of 
persuasion, both men surrendered to the Romans. The puzzle was also adapted into other 
forms, such as a circle of fifteen Christians and fifteen Turks, and is found, at least, in 
manuscripts of the tenth, eleventh, twelfth and fifteenth centuries,
 
including an eleventh-
century French manuscript that also contains a range of mathematical texts along with the 
Propositiones ad acuendos iuvenes.
538
 There was certainly some interest in combinatorics in 
later medieval Jewish thought:  
From the 12th century onward, calculations involving the formula for 
combinations without repetition began to appear in a variety of 
languages and in a variety of contexts. The Jewish scholar Rabbi ben 
Ezra (ca. 1140) discussed the possible conjunctions of the planets and 
seems to have used the general rule without stating it explicitly [...]. 
(There is some evidence of an interest in permutations and 
combinations in earlier rabbinic literature [...].) Levi ben Gerson 
(1321) stated the rule in words.
539
 
Thus it can be seen that although an interest in combinatorial problems was certainly not 
absent in medieval thought, it was in many ways a ‘fringe’ concern. The connections with 
puzzles and games on the one hand, and with astronomy on the other are worth noting, 
however, given the De vetula’s use of combinatorics in the context of dicing and the text’s 
broader interest in astrological fate. 
The concept of ‘probability’ is more difficult; but once again it is clear that the idea 
was evolving throughout the later Middle Ages. Significantly, the term was most often 
applied to propositions of uncertain truth-value. In the twelfth century, however, scholastic 
thought seems merely to restate, perhaps with minor developments, the classical definitions 
of probability. Thus in the Metalogicon, John of Salisbury ‘initially defines probable logic as 
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concerned with propositions which seem to be valid to all or to many or to the wise’.540 His 
definition of probability is, in this case, merely a corollary of his view that reasoning should 
bear the moderation of common sense, rather than being forced or extreme. Yet he also goes 
on to re-define ‘probable’ as follows: ‘Quod enim semper sic, aut frequentissime, aut 
probabile est, aut videtur probabile, etsi aliter esse posit’ (‘Something that is always or 
usually so, either is or seems probable, even though it could possibly be otherwise’).541 
Although the relationship of empirical frequency and probability seems to be germane in 
John’s work, his presentation of probability is almost entirely rhetorical, as Daniel Garber 
and Sandy Zabell point out, who compare John’s definitions with a passage from his hero 
Cicero’s De inventione, in which he too refers both to general approbation and ‘quod fere 
solet fieri’ (that which ‘for the most part usually comes to pass’).542 As Garber and Zabell put 
it, ‘approbation by one’s audience is necessary if persuasion, the goal of dialectic and 
rhetoric, is to be achieved; frequency of occurrence is necessary if approbation is to be 
achieved’.543  
It seems to be in the fourteenth century that a significant shift took place. While 
Ockham, writing in the first quarter of the century, still defines probability in terms of general 
approbation, Oresme, writing after the remarkable period in which the ‘Oxford Calculators’ 
and others had applied the sophismatic method of logic to a range of mathematical problems, 
seems to emphasise frequency of occurrence much more clearly and mathematically. For 
instance, in his treatise De proportionibus proportionum, he argues that two unknown ratios 
(‘duabus proportionibus ignotis’) are likely to be incommensurable (‘verisimile est eas 
incommensurabiles esse’) because of the greater number of such ratios than commensurable 
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ones. Similarly, he argues that if one were to take an unknown number, such as the number of 
hours that will pass before Antichrist comes (‘sicut forte numerus horarum omnium que 
transibunt antequam antichristus’), that number is unlikely to be a cube, because there are 
fewer cubes than non-cubes. The same is true, he says, in games where one is asked to guess 
if a secret number is a cube number (‘sicut est in ludis si peteretur de numero abscondito 
utrum sit cubicus’): it is more probable (‘probabilius’) that it is not.544 
 Oresme’s work stands squarely in the fourteenth-century tradition of logic and 
mathematics. For one thing, there is his interest in proportions, following Bradwardine.
545
 For 
another, there is his use of standard sophismatic tropes. In this very passage, for instance, he 
adduces the coming of Antichrist as the staple example of a certain but unknown future event. 
There is also his adaptation of the ‘number-guessing’ scenario. Buridan, for example, had 
used the sophism ‘You know the coins in my purse to be even in number’.546 However, 
Oresme’s explicit treatment of what is probable in terms of numerical frequency of 
occurrence is highly significant. The concept of the probability of a proposition is now no 
longer merely rhetorical; rather it implies an ‘expected’ result that can be mathematically 
calculated. Thus by the third quarter of the fourteenth century, a major shift was beginning to 
take place in the understanding of probability, which, while partially expressed in 
mathematically innovative terms, was still nevertheless directly connected with its 
contemporary logico-theological concerns, such as prophecy and future contingency.
547
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Furthermore, Oresme’s association of frequency-dependent probability with gaming 
(‘sicut est in ludis’) is significant. Oresme, like Bacon, Bradwardine, Burley, Richard of 
Bury, and Holcot, knew the De vetula, and refers to it in his work.
548
 
[One] reference is in Oresme’s treatise arguing for the 
incommensurability of celestial motions [...]. The reference is taken 
from Book III of De Vetula and concerns a discussion of the ‘nobility’ 
of the number three. Oresme’s incommensurability argument is based 
on [his] earlier work, De Proportionibus Proportionum [...] It is 
tempting to speculate that Oresme’s idea to look at the relative 
frequency [...] came from De Vetula.
549
 
Another reference appears in the context of Oresme’s consideration of false (or faked) 
prophecies, in which category he places the ‘Ovidian’ prophecy about Christ in the De 
vetula.
550
 Thus it is possible that the De vetula directly inspired Oresme’s mathematical 
development of the concept of probability and it is clear that he also took an interest in the 
text’s relevance to the widely debated problems of prophecy and future contingency.  
A Risky Business: Commercial Probabilities 
Evolving semi-independently from the idea of the probability of propositions was the late-
medieval interest in commercial risk. Some late thirteenth- or fourteenth-century Franciscan 
thinkers proposed the view that 
the aleatory element of a commercial contract could be evaluated in its 
own terms, and possibly sold separately. It is remarkable that this 
process fits in exactly with the way in which maritime insurances 
were invented in Tuscany, in the first half of the XIVth Century, the 
‘risk’ of a specific commercial operation being ‘bought’ by an insurer 
against the payment of a premium.
551
 
Despite never fully reaching a precise measure of what we would call probability, such 
thinkers 
supposent néanmoins qu’une mesure de l’incertain est possible, 
puisqu’elle peut être exprimée au présent par une valeur monétaire. Se 
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dévoile de la sorte une fonction cognitive majeure de la monnaie. 
Constituant l’unité en laquelle sont exprimées les valeurs des biens 
marchands, c’est elle qui permet de rendre pensable, dans le présent, 
la valeur de biens futurs.
552
 
It is significant that, in such treatises, ‘les termes les plus courants sont le substantif dubium 
ou le verbe dubitare’.553 These terms presented great interest and great challenges for the 
fourteenth-century logicians, who used them to formulate sophismata such as Buridan’s 
‘Socrates knows the proposition written on the wall to be doubted by him’, which formed part 
of the wider discussion about uncertain ‘knowledge’ that I will return to below.554 In 
particular, the work of the late thirteenth-century Franciscan philosopher and logician, Peter 
John Olivi (De contractibus) has presented significant examples of how late-medieval 
scholastics treated the concept of ‘risk’. Olivi’s work demonstrates a significant break from 
the philosophy of Aquinas, who had ‘denied the lender’s right to demand compensation for 
possible lost profit, since doing so involved selling what had only probable, rather than real 
existence’.555 Olivi, on the other hand, argued that ‘probable profit has a real and measurable 
existence as a kind of fructifying power within the capitale itself’.556 Olivi’s position would 
seem to demand a correspondingly strong philosophical emphasis on the contingency of 
future events, otherwise the transaction might involve the sale of something that does not, 
will not, nor could ever exist. If the future is viewed probabilistically, it must be viewed 
contingently (although not as totally incapable of generalised prediction). 
Merchants themselves also developed ways of estimating risk ‘to build up 
sophisticated contracts in order to cope with the perils of trading activity’, even without a 
systematically statistical approach, although ‘in some cases they did adopt a form of “proto-
statistical” estimation of risk, based on the rough observation of the frequency of the 
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accidents that occurred in the sea trade (i.e. “factual probability”)’.557 This shows how the 
evolution of ‘probabilistic’ reasoning and calculation began to emerge from the confluence of 
late-medieval philosophy and everyday, practical problems, such as ‘the problem of division 
of stakes between partners in a game [or] problems arising on the occasion of commercial 
associations that have to be split before the scheduled term’.558 It is not surprising, then, given 
the context, that some of the Oxford Calculators and other fourteenth-century mathematicians 
and logicians, such as Oresme, took an interest in the De vetula.  
The Influence of the De vetula 
Bradwardine twice makes use of passages from the De vetula in his De causa Dei.
559
 The 
first is given in the context of a discussion of the possible causation that can be attributed to 
astrological influences, along with other prophetic signs. Bradwardine inserts a fairly 
extensive quotation from Book III of the De vetula into a consideration of the astrological 
signs that, along with the prophecies of the Sybil, anticipated the Virgin Birth. Having quoted 
lines 611-644 of the third book, which concern these astrological phenomena, Bradwardine 
writes: 
Nec quia talis constellatio, aut talis coniunctio Christum præcessit, 
ideo Christus fuit de virgine nasciturus, aut legem daturus, sed potius 
è contra; haec enim non erant causa istorum sed signum, nec ideo 
Dominus stellarum & temporum ipsis subijcitur, sed haec sibi.
560
 
 
(Nor [is it the case that] because such and such a constellation or 
conjunction preceded Christ, therefore Christ was about to be born of 
a Virgin, or the law was about to be given, but rather the other way 
around: for these [astrological phenomena] were not the cause of 
those events but the sign of them – the Lord of the stars and seasons is 
not subject to them, but they to him.) 
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One must beware the ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ fallacy when dealing with questions of 
causation. Whereas it is valid to argue that ‘There are certain astrological conjunctions 
because Christ is about to be born’, it is not valid to argue that ‘Christ is about to be born 
because there are certain astrological conjunctions’. Terms within syllogisms of consequence 
and causation are not simply exchangeable like that: inherently, cause and effect is a ‘one-
way’ system. One should not think of the movements of the stars as causes, but as effects of 
God’s will; not, that is, as creators but as creatures. Gower argues the same thing in the 
passage from Book V quoted above.
561
 Bradwardine’s reasoning here is central to how he 
addresses, throughout his work, the core concern of much fourteenth-century logic and 
theology, which is also a major theme of the De vetula: the problematic interrelation of God’s 
foreknowledge with contingency. Certain future events, although uncertain and humanly 
unpredictable, seem nevertheless to have been predicted through prophecy. 
In the case of Bradwardine’s other citation of the De vetula (I. 722-741), it is 
significant that it occurs in the context of his anti-Pelagian argument that whatever other 
qualities fallen man may possess, ‘charitas […] et gratia non sunt nobis innatæ’ (‘charity and 
grace are not innate to us’).562 The fall, in other words, was humanly irreversible: a one-way 
street, which man of his own causation cannot return along. As such, the implication is that 
although fallen man’s future actions may be unknown in the particular, they will follow a 
predictable tendency or pattern in general. Although Bradwardine does not explicitly refer to 
the passage on dicing, his interest in the De vetula focuses, like Oresme’s later, on the 
problems surrounding the prediction of future events in general. 
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Robert Holcot quotes four short passages from the De vetula in a single Lectio of the 
Wisdom Commentary.
563
 Two are taken from the terminal invocation of the Virgin, 
beginning with ‘O Virgo felix, o Virgo significata / Per stellas [...]’ (‘O, happy Virgin, O 
Virgin signified through the stars’) (III. 773-812). As with Bradwardine, the context of 
Holcot’s use of the text is astrological signs accompanying the Christian narrative. 
Apparently because of the allegedly prophetic content, Holcot leaves the question of the 
authorship of the De vetula to God’s omniscience: ‘an sit liber Ouidii deus nouit’ (‘whether 
or not the book is by Ovid, God knows!’).564 The other two quotations are taken from a 
passage in Book I of the De vetula, lamenting the prostitution of the ‘virgo scientia’ and the 
exile of ‘philosophia’ that ‘philopecunia’ might reign in its place (I. 711-768). The last two of 
these four quotations also appear in the Philobiblon – perhaps further evidence that Holcot 
may have had a hand in its composition. There was a certain irony, perhaps deliberate, in the 
fact that, in the De vetula, this lament comes shortly after a passage applying a mathematical 
analysis to the professedly vicious and avaricious pastime of dicing; and further irony in the 
fact that while some fourteenth-century philosophers were busy quoting the lament, others 
were equally busily applying similar methods to commercial processes. Yet either way, it is 
clear that 
the interest in this spurious Ovidian poem for many people lay less in 
the erotic material than in the philosophical, religious, and scientific 
content [and this fact] is indicated by the kind of works which are 
often included in the manuscripts of the De Vetula [... including] 
treatises of an astronomical and arithmetical nature.
565
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Thus the De vetula was of interest to the fourteenth-century scholastics both as a useful 
scientific source in general, and as one with particular relevance to the controversy raging 
over foreknowledge, prophecy and future contingency. 
Nor was the De vetula devoid of interest for authors and readers of vernacular 
literature. Petrarch, albeit writing in Latin, questioned its Ovidian authorship in his Epistolae 
seniles, and ‘Piero di Dante Alighieri in his commentary on his father’s Divina Commedia, 
written about the middle of the fourteenth century, quotes twice from the Vetula’; Jean 
Lefevre, the fourteenth-century French author of the Livre de leesce, also produced a 
vernacular version of the De vetula.
566
 In the fourteenth century the Dante commentary 
tradition became itself a fertile source of proto-probabilistic speculation. In Canto 6 of the 
‘Purgatorio’, Dante uses an analogy from dicing: 
Quando si parte il gioco de la zara, 
colui che perde si riman dolente, 
repetendo le volte, e tristo impara[.] 
 
(When dicing’s done and players separate, 
the loser’s left alone, disconsolate –  
rehearsing what he’d thrown, he sadly learns.) 567 
 
At least three different fourteenth-century commentaries use this passage as a springboard to 
discuss the basic combinatorics of dicing, although much more briefly and, in places, less 
accurately than the De vetula. For example, as M. G. Kendall points out, Jacopo della Lana, 
writing in the 1320s, notes in passing that certain totals occur more frequently than others 
because there are more ways in which they can sum up (‘quello numero che gli è più volte, 
dee più spesso venire’); therefore the number that can sum up in most ways is the best (‘quel 
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numero che in più modi può venire, quella è detta miglior volta’).568 Although errors appear 
when the commentator gets down to specific examples, ‘the necessary conceptualization of 
the perfect die and the equal frequency of occurrence of each face are explicit’.569 Kendall 
does not mention, however, that Jacopo della Lana clearly envisioned such calculations being 
used predictively, writing of the unfortunate gamer:  
poi dice: se io non avessi chiamato XI, non avrei perduto. E così 
ripetendo le volte, elli impara di non chiamare un’altra fiata XI[.]  
 
(Then he says, ‘If I had not called “eleven”, I would not have lost.’ 
Therefore in repeating the throw, he learns not to call ‘eleven’ 
again.)
570
 
 
 It is clear, therefore, that such combinatorial calculations formed part of a wider, although 
perhaps hazy, understanding that probabilistic chance played a part in future contingent 
events, and could be used roughly to predict them. 
Kendall, like almost all the historians of statistics that have written on this passage 
both before and after him, follows the nineteenth-century historian of science Guillaume 
Libri in dating this commentary to the late fifteenth-century (1477), which is in fact the date 
of the edition, rather than the original.
571
 The error was only quietly identified in 1988, and 
the later date was still used in scholarly analysis at least as recently as 1997.
572
 Yet this 
correction is highly significant. Whereas Kendall could write that ‘it seems clear that by the 
end of the fifteenth century the foundations of a doctrine of chance was being laid’, the fact 
that such calculations were being made 150 years earlier demonstrates that the De vetula was 
not so uniquely ahead of its time as was once thought. Rather, it seems that by the middle of 
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the fourteenth century ‘the foundations of a doctrine of chance’ were being laid; especially 
since, as has been recently recognised, the Jacopo della Lana commentary is not alone, even 
in the fourteenth century. Both L’Ottimo Commento (c. 1333) and the commentary of 
Francesco da Buti (c. 1385-95) contain similar calculations, and the tradition is well-
established enough to continue into the fifteenth century (in, for example, Johannis de 
Serravalle (c. 1416-17)).
573
 
The real significance for literary critical purposes here is that the late-medieval 
development of a concept of probabilistic chance, which not only plays a part in determining 
future contingent events but can also therefore be somehow calculated in order to predict 
those events, took place at least as much within literary and literary critical contexts as 
within philosophical or commercial contexts, and was influencing even vernacular literary 
and literary critical texts throughout the fourteenth-century. 
Chaucer provides one relatively clear example that English literature was neither 
immune to the influence nor isolated from the general evolution of probabilistic ideas. 
Bellhouse and Franklin, in their fascinating study of ‘The Language of Chance’, notice an 
interesting instance in the Pardoner’s Tale: 
When two players, say A and B, play at dice, the events by which A or 
B win are called A’s chance and B’s chance. [...] The Pardoner gives 
several examples of swearing, one of which is [...]: 
 
‘And “By the blood of Crist that is in Hayles, 
Sevene is my chaunce and thyn is cynk and treye,”’ 
[VI. 652-53] 
 
[...] Here Chaucer must be referring to the sum of the faces which 
show [on two dice], since seven is listed as one of the chances. Now 
the event of a seven showing has the same probability as the event of 
five or three showing.
574
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More precisely, the chance of rolling a total of seven is 6/36=1/6; the chance of rolling a total 
of five is 4/36= 1/9; and the chance of rolling a total of three is 2/36= 1/18. 1/6 = 1/9 + 1/18. 
Thus it seems probable that Chaucer was capable of using basics combinatorics to calculate 
the likelihood of certain totals. Franklin and Bellhouse conclude that Chaucer was using the 
term ‘chances’ to mean events which had the same weight of probability. This is, of course, 
merely a minor example of the influence of such ideas upon late fourteenth-century literature. 
In the Confessio itself, ‘chance’ has a bigger part to play. 
Reading the Odds: Chance and Determinism in the Confessio Amantis 
As discussed above, Gower’s interest in ‘chance’ forms part of his wider interest in the 
competing late-medieval explanations of causation: divine predestination, human free will, 
astrological fate and the somewhat nebulous idea of ‘fortune’. According to Tatlock and 
Kennedy, the term ‘chance’ (including all its forms as noun and verb) occurs in the entire 
Chaucerian corpus twenty-five times. By comparison, ‘chance’ and its forms appear in 
Gower’s Confessio alone sixty-seven times.575 Gower’s emphasis is unmistakeable, as is the 
repeated contexts of dicing and prophecy in which he uses the word. There are, in addition to 
the passage from Book I quoted above, two passages from Books IV and V noted by Franklin 
and Bellhouse in their survey of the rise of proto-probabilistic language in the Middle Ages. 
The first ‘is written in the context of the casting of dice for fortune-telling in matters 
of love’:576 
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And whanne it falleth othergate, 
So that hire like noght to daunce, 
Bot on the dees to caste chaunce 
Or axe of love som demande, 
Or elles that hir list comaunde 
To rede and here of Troilus, 
Riht as sche wole or so or thus, 
I am al redi to consente. (IV. 2790-97) 
 
At first glance, this passage constitutes a simple list of pastimes. However, there is an implicit 
antithesis here between the activities of dicing and reading: by the first is implied a view of 
future contingency related to ‘chaunce’; the second evokes a deterministic or predestinatory 
perspective. Gower’s repeated use of ‘chance’ and the ‘dicing’ metaphor to describe the 
outcome of the love-game impels his audience to think of the future conclusion of the 
narrative as still contingent and undecided. Gower’s reference to the act of reading, however, 
reminds his audience that the conclusion is already written. Gower’s juxtaposition of ‘read’ 
and ‘here’ emphasises these two contrasting modes of experiencing his narrative. If one is 
reading a written text, then one is conscious that the ending is in fact predetermined; if one is 
listening to a story told aloud, one is arguably more conscious of the narrative’s inherent 
instability. 
Gower’s choice of Troilus is thus highly significant, it being the narrative of a lover 
overwhelmed by his own simplistic reasoning about predestination and contingency, as I 
discussed in the previous chapter. It is only natural that the reader or audience of the 
Confessio should in turn apply this dichotomy to the narrative of Amans himself. While it too 
is authorially predetermined by Gower, it is nevertheless styled as a conversation, a kind of 
text shaped reactively by the interaction of two parties, for both of whom the course of the 
discussion is contingent upon forces external to themselves. In this sense it is comparable to 
the logical disputationes de obligationibus, whose power to imagine an infinite number of 
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fictive ‘worlds’ I discussed in the first chapter; or comparable to the ‘conversational’ two-
stage evolutions of the Liar Paradox, such as ‘Buridan’s Bridge’, where one speaker’s 
seemingly straightforward assertions about his future action are problematised by the reply of 
the other speaker. This ‘conversational contingency’, if I may call it that, lies in stark contrast 
to the simplistic predeterministic philosophy of Troilus, which emerges in the solipsistic 
context of his soliloquy.  
We are explicitly pre-warned in Troilus about the tragic disappointment of the lover’s 
hopes. Gower, on the other hand, deliberately drops ambiguous and tantalising hints. In the 
context of late-medieval discussions of probability, it is important to emphasise that, for 
Gower, ‘chance’ might not mean total unpredictability: some bets are better than others. A 
clever gambler will not pick a likely loser. The reference to the Troilus in this passage is thus 
even more significant. Russell Peck points out that 
lovers are often presented as wishful readers where the subject of their 
text offers an unheeded warning. [...] Criseyde is reading the ominous 
‘romaunce … of Thebes’ [II. 100] when Pandarus approaches her with 
his ‘uncle’ proposition. In a felicitous touch Gower has Amans’ 
fantasy feasting on the story of Troilus (presumably from Chaucer’s 
text, which was dedicated to Gower), as the lover panders his 
imagination with happy love thoughts, heedless of the poem’s dark 
conclusion.
577
  
In spite of such hints, it is crucial to the function of the Confessio’s frame-narrative that the 
revelation of Amans’ age is reserved until the final book. By thus holding the revelation back, 
Gower opposes ‘chaunce’ and determinism and allows his audience to think of his narrative 
in terms of either, or both at the same time.  
This or That: Chance and Choice in the Confessio Amantis 
Gower’s other reference to probabilistic chance, in Book V, is found in the Tale of the 
Beggars and the Pasties, in which a King sets two pasties before two beggars, one of whom 
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trusts in men’s riches and the other in God’s providence. Although the pasties are outwardly 
identical, one contains a capon and the other a wealth of florins. The mercantile beggar 
chooses first, and chooses wrongly, leaving the pasty of florins to his God-fearing 
companion. His disappointment teaches him to put his trust in God, not riches. Yet the 
conclusion to the tale is highly ambivalent: 
Thus spak this begger his entente, 
And povere he cam and povere he wente; 
Of that he hath richesse soght, 
His infortune it wolde noght. 
So mai it schewe in sondri wise, 
Betwen fortune and covoitise 
The chance is cast upon a dee; 
Bot yit fulofte a man mai se 
Ynowe of suche natheles, 
Whiche evere pute hemself in press 
To gete hem good, and yit thei faile. (V. 2431-41) 
 
Once again, as Bellhouse and Franklin point out, we have ‘chance’ in the context of dicing, 
another significant piece of evidence that there was ‘a very rich representation of 
probabilistic ideas in the English culture’ in the later Middle Ages.578 Yet there is a lot more 
to this tale than that. 
The narrative is perhaps partially derived from a story in the Gesta Romanorum, in 
which a man finds a miser’s lost fortune.579 When the miser arrives looking for the money, he 
is invited to choose one of three ‘pastillos’. Unbeknown to him, one contains earth, one bones 
and the other contains the miser’s money. Being greedy, the miser weighs the pastries and 
chooses the heaviest, which turns out to be full of earth. Thus the man concludes ‘quod 
voluntas dei non est, quod ille miser pecuniam habeat’ (‘that it is not God’s will that the 
miser should have the money’), and distributes the money to the poor instead.580 Gower is at 
some pains to emphasise the element of ‘chance’ in his version of the story: far from having 
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the choice determined by the relative weights or other apparent merits of the pasties, Gower 
tells us that ‘outward thei were bothe tuo’ (V. 2413) and that the first beggar 
sih hem, bot he felte hem noght,  
So that upon his oghne thoght  
He ches the capoun and forsok  
That other, which his fela tok. (V. 2417-20: my emphasis) 
 
 In other words, Gower ensures that there is no external or material reason for the beggar’s 
choice. 
Significantly, he does the same thing in his version of another story that finds a 
possible source in the Gesta, The Tale of the Two Coffers, which immediately precedes the 
Tale of the Beggars and the Pasties, and is possibly adapted from the Gesta’s ‘Story of the 
Three Caskets’.581 Again, in the Gesta there are visible differences between the caskets, 
which provide a reason for the choice: they bear different inscriptions describing their 
contents, one promising just deserts, one promising nature’s desires, and the other promising 
what God has ordained. In the Gesta, the heroine chooses the third casket and is amply 
rewarded, just as the second beggar who trusts in God’s providence is rewarded in Gower’s 
Tale of the Beggars and the Pasties. However, in Gower’s Tale of the Two Coffers, the 
inscriptions are dropped and, on the contrary, the coffers are 
of o semblance and of o make,  
So lich that no lif thilke throwe  
That on mai fro that other knowe. (V. 2296-98) 
 
 As Macaulay notes, ‘The coffers are exactly alike, and the very point of the situation lies in 
the fact that the choice is a purely fortuitous one’.582 Or as Gower puts it, ‘It stant upon youre 
oghne chance’ (V. 2346). 
Gower’s decision to remove any possible reason for choosing one coffer or pasty over 
another is significant in the light of the fourteenth-century controversies over free choice, 
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between ‘the intellectualist or naturalist tradition associated with Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas, according to which the will is always subordinate to the intellect, and the voluntarist 
tradition of Augustine and Franciscan thinkers such as Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, 
which held that the will is sometimes capable of autonomous activity’.583 The most famous 
example of the problems associated with this controversy has been known since at least the 
seventeenth century as ‘Buridan’s Ass’.584 In fact, John Buridan was neither the originator of 
this puzzle (it is much older), nor, as far as modern scholarship can ascertain, did he ever use 
the example of a donkey to demonstrate it. The problem was known to late-medieval 
philosophy from Aristotle’s treatise De caelo, in the second book of which he discusses 
possible explanations of why the earth stays at the centre of the universe. He refers to, and 
dismisses as inadequate, the argument that the earth is ‘indifferently related to every extreme 
point’, which he explains with the analogy of a man ‘who, though exceedingly hungry and 
thirsty, and both equally, yet being equidistant from food and drink, is therefore bound to stay 
where he is’.585 Buridan’s presentation of the problem appears only in his little known 
Expositio libri De caelo et mundo (not in the better known Quaestiones super libris quatuor 
De caelo et mundo), where he imagines a dog, not an ass, in place of Aristotle’s man:586 ‘in a 
question to the Metaphysics, he explains why: A human being, by a mere act of will, can 
choose to go left or go right or stay in the same place; “otherwise he would not have more 
freedom of will than a dog.”’587 Buridan’s argument that a man’s free will might for a time 
consist in deferring action when intellectual judgment is inconclusive is probably the reason 
that his name was popularly associated with a ‘dilemma [which] was a favorite one in logical 
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analysis both before and after him, particularly with reference to determinism and free 
will’.588 
Late-medieval literary texts not only bear witness to the widespread knowledge (and 
basic understanding) of such controversies, but are also in turn the vehicles of them. A similar 
analogy is found, for example, in Dante’s ‘Paradiso’: 
Intra due cibi, distanti e moventi 
d’un modo, prima si morria di fame, 
che liber’omo l’un recasse ai denti; 
sì si starebbe un agno intra due brame 
di fieri lupi, igualmente temendo; 
sì si starebbe un cane intra due dame[.] 
 
(Before a man bit into one of two 
foods equally removed and tempting, he 
would die of hunger if his choice were free; 
so would a lamb stand motionless between 
the cravings of two savage wolves, in fear 
of both; so would a dog between two deer[.])
589
 
Here Dante supplements Aristotle’s starving man with a hungry dog; it is even just 
conceivable that Buridan’s dog was inspired by Dante’s. Yet the fact that this analogy 
originated and continued to be used in an astronomical context even after it had entered the 
literary sphere illustrates once again the inseparable nature of the nexus of ideas surrounding 
causation in the Middle Ages, which Gower discusses in the Confessio, and which I have 
already discussed in relation to the De vetula, Bradwardine, Oresme and others: free will, 
determinism, astrology and chance cannot be treated separately.  
How is all this relevant to Gower’s two tales of choice? Gower removes all external 
indications of the difference between the two caskets or two pasties, but it is crucial that, 
unlike Dante’s two dishes, the two objects are actually very different. Although they look the 
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same, one is full of gold and the other is not, but the chooser simply does not know which is 
which. Gower therefore employs the language of ‘chance’ to explain the choice, and the Latin 
gloss takes it further, asserting that the beggars chose the pies ‘sorte’, by lot.590 In medieval 
Latin, ‘sors’ could also denote a share or invested capital. The pie-choice is indeed a kind of 
investment: each beggar has a pie, but one pie contains a return and the other does not, just as 
Olivi and others thought that a ‘sors’ (investment) ‘contained’ a potentiality, or probability of 
making a return.
591
 
In the context of late-medieval assessments of probability, both Gower’s choice of 
dicing as an analogy and the gloss’s possible association of the pie-choice with capital 
investment suggest that not all outcomes are equally likely. In fact, that is the whole point of 
both tales: there are hidden factors in each game that are not fully revealed until its 
conclusion. In the Tale of the Two Coffers, the King’s intention is to reveal to his 
unadvanced subjects that ‘fortune’ is against them. In the Tale of the Beggars and the Pasties, 
it is God’s help (V. 2426) that, implicitly, influences the outcome of the contest. The 
scenarios seem designed to illustrate that, although men undoubtedly make choices, human 
choice is not in itself a sufficient explanation of why one gambler (or lover) wins, and 
another loses. However, neither is chance itself entirely a matter of luck: there are deeper, 
mathematical factors involved, which, when grasped by the intellect, allow a more rational 
choice to be made. There are also other causative factors lurking behind the scenes, especially 
the hidden will of God. Thus Gower conducts, in philosophical and literary terms, a highly 
complex discussion of the competing fourteenth-century explanations of causation, including 
those elements of it which involved ‘cutting edge’ mathematics. 
Gower’s playful but erudite exploration of the philosophy of causation has a direct 
effect on the experience of an informed reading of the Confessio. The audience are 
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themselves put in the position of gamblers, trying throughout the text to predict the ultimate 
outcome of Amans’ love-game. Gower drops hints throughout the text that encourage such 
readerly guesswork, thus making the audience themselves participants in a sort of gambling 
game. At the same time, however, Gower’s presentation of a dazzling array of causative 
theories (divine predestination, fate, fortune, human choice, probabilistic chance) is designed 
to obscure the end result, right up until the moment of the denouement. Even then, Gower’s 
hints in some of his exempla that love is immune to the hard, cold logic of ageing preserve a 
faint hope for a miraculous solution to the problem, just to keep the guessing game going. 
The sheer intellectual fun of Gower’s playful narrative technique must not be 
underemphasised.  
 At the same time the literary failure of most readers to predict the outcome of the 
love-suit also serves as a metaphor for the philosophical failure of human beings to get to 
grips with the complexities of causation. After his disappointment, and in order to assuage it, 
the narrator provides a long list of other great thinkers and writers who have fared no better. 
Within this list appears, not entirely unexpectedly, Aristotle himself, whose legendary 
amorous escapade and subsequent humiliation was a story widely told.
592
 However, it is 
interesting that Gower chooses to emphasise, not Aristotle’s lack of self-control or 
indiscretion, but the failure of his ‘logique’ (VIII. 2709). Lacking the power to resist love’s 
‘Silogime’ (VIII. 2708), he was ‘concluded / To love’ (VIII. 2712-13). The return to the 
technical terminology of consequential logic, which Gower employed earlier in the Confessio 
to discuss supplantation, is striking. Confronted with love in fact, Aristotle ‘foryat al his 
logique’ (VIII. 2709). In particular, Gower means, I suspect, that Aristotle forgot that he, like 
Amans, was old and that he, like Amphitrion, was not the lady’s husband. He too, in other 
words, was guilty of ‘a fals collacioun’ (II. 2328). 
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 Just as Amans is consoled by the distinguished company with which he shares his 
failure in the game of love, the audience too is consoled in our failure to predict the outcome. 
Yet the explicit emphasis on logic in this passage broadens that consolation beyond our 
literary failure, to our philosophical failure. Even Aristotle’s logic was not good enough to 
keep a firm grasp on the complexities of causation. Even with the best will in the world and, 
more to the point, with the best mind in the world, things happens that we do not expect and 
are not prepared for. There is no simple explanation of why things happen as they do. That is 
why, as Gower points out in the Prologue, the Wycliffite heretics are wrong to hold onto a 
simplistic view of causation and ‘make […] non other skile’ (PR. 380). Life is not as 
straightforward as that. 
 Ultimately, however, Gower is not recommending that we give up altogether the 
attempt to deal with the mutable world rationally. His emphasis on quasi-probabilistic 
chance, through his recurrent use of the gambling motif, implies that, although our 
knowledge of the contingent future and its causes could never be total, nevertheless there are, 
broadly speaking, patterns that will emerge. Some bets are safer than others. Yet the essential 
point here is that Amans’ age is a hidden variable throughout the majority of the Confessio. 
The audience’s lack of knowledge about his age parallels the narrator’s own lack of self-
knowledge, leading both him and us to judge the ‘chances’ of the gamble incorrectly. The 
overarching confessional framework is, of course, designed precisely to encourage the same 
sort of self-knowledge. The irony is that Amans’ fails to ‘confess’ (or indeed to recognise 
himself) the one really important piece of information that will sway the game. He fails to 
recognise his place in a fallen world, subject to a broad, ultimately inescapable process of 
temporal decay. Similarly, human choice is, for Gower, just one piece of the puzzle of 
causation; but we are more likely to make the right choices, to place winning bets in the game 
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of life, if we do not hide from ourselves the relevant facts about ourselves and about life in a 
mutable, postlapsarian world. 
 At the very end of Book VIII, Gower turns away from his discussion of this world and 
its erotic love, and towards another, immutable world of ‘endeles’ joy (VIII. 3172). Such a 
conclusion is, of course, standard in late-medieval literature. However, in this instance, 
Gower’s employment of the technique carries philosophical weight. Throughout the 
Confessio, he has been exploring the logico-theological complexities of causation and future 
contingency. His discussion is inherently inseparable from the controversy over the 
interaction of divine predestination and free will in the matter of human salvation (even his 
use of the dicing metaphor, as Bradwardine shows); but Gower also takes pains explicitly to 
address that controversy early in the Prologue. He returns to it here, and the problem thus 
frames almost the entire text.
593
 By doing so, Gower allows the possibility that his 
presentation of the complexities of attaining love throughout the Confessio can be read as a 
metaphor for the difficulties in attaining salvation itself. Gower’s final conclusion seems to 
be that such a question is just as inscrutable as the question of the causation of love, and that 
Christian ‘charite’ (VIII. 3164) is the only safe bet, if you want to escape this world of decay 
and uncertainty, and get to heaven. To return to my starting point, does my reading of the 
Confessio yield a ‘moral’ Gower or a ‘philosophical’ Gower? The answer, I think, is both. 
Moral Gower he may be, but he reaches his morality only via his philosophy, which is 
perhaps more rigorously attuned to logic and mathematics than his modern readers have 
generally recognised.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
EXTREME PROMISES AND PARADOXES IN  
THE WORKS OF THE GAWAIN-POET 
In this chapter, I consider an author whose connection to a known logician or school is 
impossible to demonstrate, simply because nothing is known of his biography: namely, the 
Gawain-poet. One purpose of this move is to show how logical dimensions can be discovered 
even in the work of authors who we have no verifiable biographical reason to suspect had 
particular connections with the world of scholastic logic.  
Sir Gawain and the Green Knight 
Tied up in Knots 
It makes sense to begin an analysis of the Gawain-poet’s employment of logical tropes and 
concerns with a brief examination of the most obviously paradoxical image he uses. I have 
discussed elsewhere how the mathematical qualities of the pentangle, both arithmetical and 
geometrical, make it the perfect symbol of paradox in Sir Gawain.
594
 Thomas Farrell has also 
demonstrated that the pentangle ‘was the most difficult polygonal construction known to the 
Middle Ages’, and Euclid’s exercise to construct a pentangle ‘presupposes the mastery of 
forty-seven previous propositions’.595 He goes on to note that ‘at Oxford in the fourteenth 
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century, the study of six books of Euclid (including therefore the construction of the 
pentangle) was required before inception [...], and Bradwardine’s Geometria Speculativa, still 
influenced by Euclid [...], contains a discussion of the pentangle’.596 The pentangle could 
therefore also represent, for a fourteenth-century audience, the complex operations of 
arithmetic and geometry, and might be used as a convenient symbol of a scholar who had 
mastered both aspects of the quadrivium. More specifically, it could also be interpreted both 
as a symbol of paradox and as a proud boast of the intellectual ability to solve difficult 
mathematical problems. It is the perfect emblem for Sir Gawain, a man who is caught in a 
puzzle that is much harder to solve than he first thought. 
The Gawain-poet, however, not only employs the Greek term, pentangle, but also 
complements it with what he identifies as an English equivalent, the ‘endeles knot’ (629-
30).
597
 Just as Sir Gawain begins his quest for a resolution of the beheading game under the 
symbol of an ‘endeles knot’ (630), so Thomas Bradwardine begins his quest for a resolution 
to the logical insolubles, which so puzzled late-medieval thinkers, with the same image: 
‘Solvere non est ignorantis vinculum,’  
3
o
 Metaphysice, capitulo primo. 
 
Qui ergo insolubilium vinculi sunt ignari nodum illorum ambiguum 
nequerunt aperire, sed huiusmodi vinculo ut bruta fubiculo [in] 
demum adducuntur. Ut igitur illorum facilius solutio habeatur, istud 
vinculum latenter absconditum volumus denodare. 
 
(‘To untie a knot is not a job for the nitwit.’  
(Aristotle, Metaphysics B 1) 
 
Aristotle means that those who are unaquainted with the tangle of the 
insolubles are unable to release their Janus-faced [ambiguum] grip, 
but are sure in the end to be brought to heel by a knot of this kind like 
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an animal on a short leash. In order to obtain their solution more 
readily, we need to release this secretly hidden knot.)
598
 
Bradwardine is recycling a quotation from Aristotle that was also employed by Aquinas in his 
commentary on the Metaphysics:
599
 
Manifestum est autem in solutione corporalium ligaminum, quod ille 
qui ignorat vinculum, non potest solvere ipsum. Dubitatio autem de 
aliqua re hoc modo se habet ad mentem, sicut vinculum corporale ad 
corpus, et eumdem effectum demonstrat. Inquantum enim aliquis 
dubitat, intantum patitur aliquid simile his qui sunt stricte ligati. Sicut 
enim ille qui habet pedes ligatos, non potest in anteriora procedere 
secundum viam corporalem, ita ille qui dubitat, quasi habens mentem 
ligatam, non potest ad anteriora procedere secundum viam 
speculationis. Et ideo sicut ille qui vult solvere vinculum corporale, 
oportet quod prius inspiciat vinculum et modum ligationis, ita ille qui 
vult solvere dubitationem, oportet quod prius speculetur omnes 
difficultates et earum causas.
600
 
 
(Now in loosening a physical knot it is evident that one who is 
unacquainted with this knot cannot loosen it. But a difficulty about 
some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, 
and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled 
about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are 
tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward 
on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose 
mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of 
speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a 
physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it 
is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first 
survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.)
601
 
 
Both Aristotle and Aquinas apply the simile to philosophical problems in general; 
Bradwardine, on the other hand, applies the figure specifically to the insolubilia. 
He returns to it twice more in the course of his treatise. He explicitly draws out the 
physical parallel, as Aquinas had done, but again goes further in tying the image to a 
specifically logical methodology: 
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Scias ergo quod insolubile accipitur dupliciter secundum quod 
solubile sive solutio. Solutio vero quedam est corporalis et propria, 
scilicet nodi sive ligamenti corporalis aperitio; quedam est 
intellectualis et similitudinaria, scilicet ligamenti mentalis, id est falsi 
sillogismi manifestatio. 
(You should know that ‘insoluble’ can be taken in two ways according 
to what is soluble or the solution. Indeed, some solutions are physical 
and literal, namely, the releasing of a physical tie or knot, while others 
are intellectual and by analogy, that is, <the releasing> of a mental 
tangle, namely, the revealing of a false syllogism.)
 602
 
‘Scias’ here perhaps implies that Bradwardine is dealing with a staple of his subject, already 
generally accepted. The invocation of the ‘falsi sillogismi’ implies a much more careful 
mapping of the metaphor in Bradwardine than is found either in Aristotle or Aquinas. The 
lines of a sophismatic syllogism are like the threads of a knot: give the right one a tug and the 
whole thing will fall apart easily; pick the wrong one, and you make the problem worse. 
Aquinas had developed Aristotle’s image by describing a man, tightly bound by the knot. 
Bradwardine takes the idea even further, comparing the man caught by the insoluble knot to 
an animal on a leash. On the one hand, the ‘nodum [...] ambiguum’ leaves the mind 
wandering around (the literal meaning of ‘ambiguus’);603 on the other hand, one ends up 
getting tied in knots and unable to move. The basic simile is picked up by at least two other 
treatises on the insolubilia, one of which is apparently attributed to William Heytesbury in 
one manuscript.
604
 It appears that by the fourteenth century, the insoluble knot had evolved 
from an image of the philosophical experience in general to become a fairly common conceit 
of the sophismatists in particular, at least amongst followers of Bradwardine.  
                                                          
602
 Bradwardine, Insolubilia, pp. 62-63. See also pp. 146-47. 
603
 Boethius similarly linked the ideas of knottiness and aimless wandering, using as an image of sophistical 
argument the ‘house of Didalus, so entrelaced that it is unable to ben unlaced’ (Boece, III. pr. 12, 156-57). 
Kathryn Lynch relates this passage of Boethius to the labyrinth in the ‘Domus Dedaly’ in the House of Fame, III. 
1920-21: Visions, p. 70. Piero Boitani has similarly discussed certain logical aspects of the House of Fame: see 
‘Chaucer’s Labyrinth’.  
604
 Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Canon. class. lat. 311, fols 33
v
-35
v
: see manuscript description in the online 
Jordanus catalogue. Alternatively, see Coxe, Catalogi codicum manuscriptum Bibliothecae Bodleianae, cols 
246-47. See also the anonymous treatise given in Appendix C to Bradwardine, Insolubilia, pp. 206- 223 (pp. 
208-209). 
244 
 
 The experience of Sir Gawain maps very neatly onto the experience of attempting to 
unravel the insolubilia, as described by Bradwardine.
605
 In fact, the word ‘nodus’, used 
repeatedly by Bradwardine to describe an insoluble, can also denote both a girdle and a 
human bond of obligation.
606
 Thus, under a bond of obligation, Gawain sets out upon his own 
literally ‘ambiguus’ journey (‘Mony wylsum way he rode’: 689) under the sign of an ‘endeles 
knot’, and ends up himself being literally tied in a ‘knot’ (2487), the girdle, and caught in a 
trap like one of the animals hunted by Bertilak.
607
 The Gawain-poet even describes the poem 
itself as being written ‘with lel letteres loken’ (35), which Helen Cooper interprets as 
referring to his use of alliteration.
608
 Similarly, the poet draws attention to the fact that in the 
symbol of the pentangle, ‘vche lyne vmbelappez and loukez in oþer’ (628), and, by reading 
the word ‘lyne’ literarily, this description can also be applied to the interconnectedness of the 
text itself. Together the lines of the poem form an insoluble knot, just like the lines of 
Bradwardine’s syllogism. The complex interweaving of the text itself is part of the poet’s 
presentation of the ‘knottiness’ of the paradoxes with which it is concerned.609 Bradwardine 
himself applies the image of the knot to the Liar paradox, and particularly to the two-stage 
evolutions of that paradox which he is credited with developing. All these knotty images take 
root in the initial beheading contest at Arthur’s festive dinner party. First I will discuss the 
context of the dinner itself; then I will explore the precise logical analogues of the mutual 
beheading scenario. 
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A Sophistical Supper 
Near the beginning of Sir Gawain, we are told of an apparently peculiar custom of King 
Arthur: 
   he wolde neuer ete 
Vpon such a dere day er hym deuised were  
Of sum auenturus þyng an vncouþe tale,  
Of sum mayn meruayle þat he myȝt trawe, 
Of alderes, of armes, of oþer auenturus, 
Oþer sum segg hym bisoȝt of sum siker knyȝt 
To joyne wyth hym in iustyng, in jopardé to lay, 
Lede, lif for lyf, leue vchon oþer, 
As fortune wolde fulsun hom, þe fayrer to haue. (91-99) 
 
Arthur’s desire for someone to ‘devise’ for him a strange tale is arguably satisfied by the 
account of the beheading contest with which the narrator fills the narrative space before 
Arthur eats. This reading is strengthened by the fact that the poet pointedly describes both his 
own tale and the tale that Arthur wishes to hear in terms of an ‘adventure’: in fact, he uses the 
term twice in each case (‘aunter’ (27); ‘awenture’ (29); ‘auenturous’ (93); ‘auenturus’ 
(95)).
610
 Alternatively, Arthur would be happy to watch a physical contest of ‘iustyng’, where 
lives are at stake (97-98). This desire, too, is fulfilled in the beheading game. 
Yet it also has been suggested that Arthur might be half-expecting a battle of brains, 
as much as of brawn. Thomas Rendall has argued that Arthur’s desire for pre-prandial 
entertainment is broad enough to include a wager on a chess game. He does so by reading the 
term ‘jopardé’ in line 97 not merely as ‘hazard’, but specifically as referring to the jeu parti, 
the sort of chess problem perhaps also alluded to by Chaucer in the Book of the Duchess.
611
 
Rendall’s suggestion is valuable, but I would like to suggest an alternative. There is no real 
evidence that a fourteenth-century audience might have expected Arthur to watch specifically 
a game of chess at dinner, and neither is it clear how the beheading contest is to be seen in 
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terms of a chess game. Rendall’s reading of jousting in ‘jopardé’ as a reference to some sort 
of intellectual contest is more justifiable if the scope of the puzzle intended is broadened 
beyond chess. 
The uses of the term ‘jopardé’ in Middle English are various. In the context of the 
above passage, the word’s primary denotation seems simply to be ‘danger’. Yet it is clear 
that, in addition to its relation to chess, it could carry connotations of debate, or more 
generally of a trick. Guillemette Bolens and Paul Taylor argue, for instance, that Chaucer’s 
use of ‘jeupardyes’ in the Book of the Duchess is also to be associated with the jeu-parti, the 
‘form of poetic débat particularly popular in the thirteenth century’, through the medium of 
the ‘jugement’ genre’, upon which, as has been well established, Chaucer’s poem draws.612 In 
addition, the term ‘jopardé’ can denote a ‘trick’ or piece of cunning, as in Dame Sirith, 275-
76: ‘For I shal don a iuperti / And a ferli maistri’.613 Here the ‘trick’ forms part of a 
sophistical argument made on behalf of a clerk, to convince his victim that her daughter is a 
dog: a proposition that is in itself very reminiscent of the recurrent strain of ‘animal 
transformations’ in the sophismata.614 Therefore, it is not implausible to read into the 
Gawain-poet’s use of the term a secondary implication that some kind of puzzle or more 
intellectual contest will accompany the physical ‘joust’ of the beheading game. There is also 
a fairly extensive range of evidence to suggest that the consideration of an intellectual puzzle 
in the middle of a feast would not have been entirely unexpected by a fourteenth-century 
audience. 
                                                          
612
 Bolens and Taylor, ‘Game of Chess’, pp. 331-32. See also Långfors (ed.), Recueil général des jeux-partis, 
esp. I, pp. v–vi: ‘Le jeu-parti, dans son type normal, est une pièce lyrique de six couplets suivis de deux envois: 
dans le premier couplet, l’un des deux partenaires propose à l’autre une question dilemmatique et, celui-ci ayant 
fait son choix, soutient lui-même l’alternative restée disponible. Dans les deux envois, chacun des deux 
partenaires nomme un juge. Il n’y a dans les textes aucune trace d’une jugement que ceux-ci auraient prononcé.’ 
613
 Dame Sirith, ed. by Eve Salisbury. See also MED, ‘juparti’, 4.b, which cites this passage. 
614
 Buridan, for example, discusses the proposition ‘This dog is your father’: Buridan, Sophisms, p. 121 (Chapter 
4, Sophism 7). 
247 
 
 The idea that a king might engage in some sort of intellectual puzzle before dining is 
attested in literature and in fact. One example is Arthur’s seating puzzle, ‘a fourteenth-
century problem or game in numbers and moves set by King Arthur during an Easter feast at 
Paris while rewarding his knights for their service in conquering France from the Roman 
Frolle [which] occurs as a chapter in a few of the manuscripts of the Anglo-Norman Prose 
Brut’.615 The puzzle concerns how the knights are to sit at table, and after dinner Arthur 
complicates the challenge further by introducing other moves involving four Cornish knights. 
The solution is not explained but ‘the Royal MS. drawing shows a hollow square with three 
pieces at each corner and three on each side; four additional pieces placed outside of the side 
groups represent the four Cornish knights’. Although on face value it seems similar, ‘Arthur’s 
game does not seem to be related to such medieval games as tables’ or, it may be added, 
chess. Rather the problem is an intellectual teaser. Understood in this way, the table seating 
episode could perhaps be taken as a semi-realistic depiction of the sort of pre-prandial 
entertainment enjoyed in some courts of the later Middle Ages.  
Jan Ziolkowski details a letter to Manegold of Paderborn from Wibald of Stavelot 
(1098-1158) which ‘relates how such sophismata were greeted in the twelfth-century 
equivalent of cocktail parties’, narrating how King Conrad had been ‘captivated’ by the 
sophisms of ‘lettered men’ over dinner, including one proving that he had three eyes (Do you 
have an eye? Do you have two eyes? 1+2=3). Reference is also made to the infamous 
sophistical proofs that man is an ass. As Ziolkowski remarks, ‘this anecdote demonstrates the 
extent to which sophistries were judged humorous: a ridiculous sophism constituted suitable 
entertainment for a king at a banquet’.616 The example of the three-eyed man is no mere 
popular riddle, but a very accurate reflection of the stock examples used by late-medieval 
sophismatists, even into the fourteenth century, both in terms of imagery and structure. 
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William Heytesbury, for instance, tackles the sophism ‘Neutrum oculum habendo tu potes 
videre’ (‘Having neither eye, you can still see’), which he ‘proves’ by demonstrating that you 
are able to see without your right eye and you are able to see without your left eye, therefore 
you are able to see having neither eye.
617
 Similarly, in denying the sophism ‘Omnis homo et 
duo homines sunt tres’ (‘Every man and two men are three’), he gives the example that 
‘Socrates et duo homines non sunt tres homines: quia Socrates et Plato non sunt tres, et 
Socrates et Socrates et Plato sunt aliquis homo et duo homines’ (‘Socrates and two men are 
not three men: because Socrates and Plato are not three men, and Socrates and <Socrates and 
Plato> are a man and two men’). In other words, the basic addition that one man and two men 
equals three men does not hold in the case where Socrates is the one man, and Socrates and 
Plato are the two men. Thus Heytesbury repudiates the faulty arithmetic underlying 
Manegold’s example.618 
Another anecdote, from Gerald of Wales (1147-1223), also situates sophismatic 
exploits at the dinner table, albeit a humbler one than Conrad’s. He tells of 
a young man who, after spending five years at great expense in Paris, 
returned home qualified to prove to his father that the six eggs on the 
table were twelve. After he had offered his proof, his father devoured 
the six eggs that could be seen and left him the six that the hen of his 
logic had laid. With this admonition, the young man was allowed to 
return to Paris.
619
  
More generally, Brian Lawn has argued that ‘the method of the short quaestiones et 
responsiones was [by the later Middle Ages] being used not for purely didactic purposes in 
the classrooms, but also as the basis for “polite conversations” among men “of divers states 
and conditions” – a form of informal converse which was to be of increasing importance in 
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the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries for the discussion and propagation of scientific ideas’.620 To take 
another literary example, Timothy O’Brien points out that even the debate and ultimate 
solution of the ‘inpossible’ in the Summoner’s Tale is drawing on the context of Lawn’s 
‘informal converse’ about the latest logico-scientific ideas taking place in everyday life far 
beyond the universities.
621
 It is surely no coincidence, then, that Chaucer chooses to set the 
discussion about how to divide the indivisible fart when the ‘lord of that village […] sat etyng 
at his bord’ (III. 2165-67). Evidently dinner-time was the conventional occasion for 
discussing such sophismata, even one as naturally distasteful as the Summoner’s. 
There is also perhaps a hint of a dinner-time association in the repeated use of food 
and dining references in the sophismata themselves. Buridan, for example, posits the sophism 
‘Socrates wishes to eat’. In explanation, Buridan describes a rather awkward-sounding 
dinner-party in which Socrates will not eat unless his companion (in this case Plato) eats too, 
for as Buridan explains, ‘men often wish so to have company in eating, so that without 
company they do not wish to eat’.622 Socrates, it seems, shares the good manners of Arthur in 
Sir Gawain, who ‘wolde not ete til al were serued’ (85). Rather rudely, however, Buridan’s 
Plato only wants to eat if Socrates does not eat. Buridan concludes: 
But you ask whether, therefore, Socrates wishes to eat or not. I say 
unless Socrates and Plato have other acts of willing than the 
preceding, neither wishes to eat here, since the will is determined to 
that which one wills. And the will of neither of them is determined to 
eating.
623
 
Thus, it seems, the whole meal is indefinitely delayed by paradox. Yet there is more to 
Buridan’s sophism than that: it can also shed some logical light on the beheading game itself. 
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Sophismata of Mutual Action and the Beheading Game 
Buridan’s ‘eating’ sophism is an example of a kind of sophism that is very similar in structure 
to the impossible proposition put by the Green Knight, which also creates a paradox. The 
agreement between Gawain and the Green Knight is that Gawain may deal a blow to the 
Green Knight if and only if he agrees to receive the same kind of blow (‘such a dunt as Þou 
hatz dalt’: 452) in return. The formal agreement that Gawain makes with his opponent speaks 
unconditionally of the return blow: 
‘In god fayth,’ quoþ þe goode knyȝt, ‘Gawan I hatte, 
þat bede þe þis buffet, quat-so bifallez after, 
And at þis tyme twelmonyth take at þe an oþer 
Wyth what weppen so þou wylt, and wyth no wyȝ ellez 
on lyue.’ (381-85) 
Gawain is clear that he will ‘take […] an oþer’ blow from the Green Knight a year later. His 
two brief additions to the agreement suggest that he has by no means missed the absurdity of 
the proposition. He gives the blow ‘quat-so bifallez after’ (an indication that he doubts that 
the return will ever be made); and he is careful to specify that no one else can fill the place of 
the Green Knight in the second leg of the contest (‘wyth no wyȝ ellez’: if the Green Knight 
does not behead Gawain, then no one is allowed do it for him). The Green Knight notices 
Gawain’s equivocation, and alludes to it light-heartedly, pointing out that unless he is able to 
tell Gawain where to find him after he is beheaded, Gawain will escape his fate: 
And if I spende no speche, þenne spedez þou þe better, 
For þou may leng in þy londe and layt no fyrre –  
bot slokes! (410-12).  
 
Importantly for a ‘moral’ reading of the narrative, Gawain’s hedging of the agreement to his 
own advantage rather undermines the profession of ‘god fayth’ with which he begins his 
speech. 
251 
 
 At the same time, Gawain’s second addition to the agreement also serves to 
emphasise its sophismatic nature. His careful clarification that he will take the return blow 
from the Green Knight and from ‘no wyȝ ellez’ imbues the agreement with the precise style 
of a logical proposition. It functions in a similar way to the phrase ‘and not otherwise’: at the 
end of Buridan’s curse sophism, for example.624 It also shuts out the only real possibility for 
the agreement to be kept: Gawain could behead the Green Knight, and someone else could 
behead Gawain on the Green Knight’s behalf. Gawain’s exclusion of that option turns the 
agreement right back on itself, forcing it into something very close to the shape of the 
sophismata of mutual action discussed above: 
A) Gawain will behead the Green Knight if the Green Knight (and 
only the Green Knight) will behead Gawain. 
This move is perhaps deliberate on Gawain’s part, but it is ultimately futile. Gawain’s vain 
hope of emerging unhurt from the conflict is founded in his belief in its impossibility, since 
impossible conditions were, in theory, non-binding in medieval law. However, Gawain’s 
belief in the contract’s impossibility would not, in medieval law, have invalidated the 
contract once it emerged that this belief was mistaken, and he finds himself still bound by his 
agreement.
625
 
Still the proposition above is not quite a complete sophism. One final clause is 
needed: 
B) Gawain will behead the Green Knight if the Green Knight (and 
only the Green Knight) will behead Gawain, and not otherwise. 
The additional clause in B) closes down Gawain’s ‘wriggle-room’ in A): namely, that he will 
give his blow, ‘quat-so bifallez after’. In A), Gawain will behead the Green Knight even if, as 
Gawain expects, the Green Knight will not behead him. Yet when the Green Knight emerges 
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from the conflict still impossibly alive, Gawain finds that he has got more than he bargained 
for. The paradox has tightened, as it were, around his neck. He has been transported into the 
impossible world of the logical imagination, trapped in the ‘endeles knot’ of a fourteenth-
century sophism. 
As with many of the other interactions between fourteenth-century logic and literature 
that I have explored, it is not merely general structural concerns that the beheading contest 
shares with the sophismata, but specific imaginative tropes. The basic paradox underlying 
Gawain’s agreement with the Green Knight, that a dead man can himself kill the man who 
killed him, is actually treated in some detail in one of the Sophismata of William Heytesbury. 
Heytesbury is dealing with a sophism adapted from one of the sophismata of the thirteenth-
century logician Ricardus Sophista, that ‘Quilibet homo morietur quando unus solus homo 
morietur’ (‘Any man will die when just one man dies’).626 However, Heytesbury, unlike his 
predecessor, spends the majority of his time on the question of the following casus: 
ponatur quod Socrates vulneret Platonem laetaliter et e contra. Ponatur 
tamen quod Plato per duos dies postquam sustinuerit vulnus Socratis 
vivat et quod Socrates solum vivat per unum diem postquam 
sustinuerit vulnus Platonis, ita tamen quod uterque istorum morietur 
propter vulnera sibi illata.
627
 
 
(The scenario is proposed that Socrates should mortally wound Plato 
and vice versa. Let’s assume however that Plato should live for two 
days after he has sustained the wound from Socrates and that Socrates 
should only live for one day after he has sustained the wound from 
Plato, while, however, each of them will die because of the wound 
inflicted on them.) 
 
The problem is that, however you define ‘to kill’, whether it refers to the point at which the 
fatal wound was delivered or the point at which the victim died, still Socrates killed Plato 
after he had been killed by Plato. For if ‘to kill’ refers to the point of wounding, then, 
Heytesbury imagines that Socrates wounds Plato just after Plato wounds Socrates: so 
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Socrates has already been ‘killed’ before he strikes the return blow. If, on the other hand, ‘to 
kill’ refers to the point of death, then because Socrates dies before Plato, Socrates can still be 
said to have killed Plato after he himself had died. Heytesbury goes to some length to make 
the casus as plausible as possible: for although in this instance it seems clear that Heytesbury 
is imagining a private combat (rather like the beheading game), he later adds the example of 
an archer, presumably on the battlefield, who kills a man from long distance, but is himself 
killed before the arrow has hit its target. In that case, even the fatal wound is inflicted after 
the death of the killer, which is still more problematic.  
The Limits of Logic and Law 
One possible explanation for the effort Heytesbury makes to posit a realistic scenario is that 
his discussion, like other fourteenth-century sophismata, is logically concerned with a 
problem associated with fourteenth-century English law. Such an overlap between logical and 
legal problems is by no means rare: one favourite group of sophismata, for instance, 
investigated sophistical methods of eluding debt (in relation to a nominalist doctrine of 
supposition).
628
 This is perhaps not surprising. As Neil Cartlidge has pointed out in relation to 
the contract at the heart of the Franklin’s Tale, 
it is precisely because the law is so characteristically concerned with 
its own limits that legal discourse seems to contain a narrative drive 
towards the limits of plausibility – and with it a love of the improbable 
and the absurd that is sometimes just as rich as that to be found among 
practitioners of literature.
629
 
Logic too is concerned with ‘cases’ (‘casus’) that verge on the very limit of the plausible: 
take, as just one example, Buridan’s extraordinary suggestion that you might see, from a 
distance, your father dressed up in a donkey-skin, walking around on his hands and feet, and 
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therefore give grounds for the assertion that you believe yourself to be the son of an ass.
630
 
Late fourteenth-century texts that take a clear interest in intellectual problems, like Sir 
Gawain or indeed the Franklin’s Tale, appear to harness the imaginative power of all three 
disciplines in devising (to use the Gawain-poet’s term: Sir Gawain, 92) what could be called 
puzzle-stories.  
In Heytesbury’s case, the legal issue which his ‘casus’ of mutual killing seems 
designed to address is the amount of time a man may live after receiving a wound for his 
assailant still to be considered guilty of murder. The limit imposed on such a survival term 
was ultimately, of course, a year and day. Historians of law have tended to portray the rule as 
a later development of a statute of limitations first found in the 1278 Statute of Gloucester, 
which originally governed ‘the time in which an individual might initiate a private appeal for 
murder’ after the act of alleged murder was committed.631 However, it seems that by the 
beginning of the fourteenth century the rule could be tied specifically to the timing of the 
infliction of the ultimately fatal wound, rather than to the later time of death. D. E. C. Yale 
draws attention to the following case, which strangely resembles the opening of Sir Gawain: 
In the Easter term of 1301 the king’s bench received an appeal of 
felony in which Richard of Shaftesbury accused Richard of Sotwell of 
his father’s death. […] His father had been assaulted with an axe on 7 
December 1299 and had died on 6 January 1300. The writ was sued 
out on 27 January 1301. The appellee invoked the statute. He pleaded 
that a year and six weeks (unus annus et sex septimanae) had elapsed 
between felony done and writ sued out. The court accepted the plea. 
The plea can only refer to the time of axing and not the time of death. 
It is clear that the appellee counted from the death-dealing stroke, not 
the death.
632
  
Since the murder writ could only be sued out after the victim’s death, the implication is, of 
course, that if the time between the assault and the death is over a year, then the homicide is 
not actionable; and Yale argues that this logical extension of the rule is evident from another 
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case of 1329-30.
633
 It is therefore plausible that Heytesbury’s discussion, of whether a man is 
killed at the moment of the fatal blow or at the moment of subsequent physical death, should 
be related to the evolution of the ‘year and a day rule’ in homicide. 
Although there are original aspects to Heytesbury’s treatment of this sophism, he is 
absolutely conventional in choosing the death of Socrates as a vehicle for examining 
temporal problems, especially in dealing with futurity. Buridan also makes use of it in his 
discussion of ampliation, and in an interesting way. Treating the sophism ‘Socrates will die 
today’ (Chapter 5, Sophism 10), Buridan posits that in fact ‘for this whole day, or rather for a 
whole year after this, he will continue to live in good health’. Yet, Buridan goes on, it might 
still be argued that the sophism is true: 
[it] is a sophism of the future. Hence, it is true, if sometime in the 
future a proposition of the present corresponding to it will be true. 
And yet it will be so, because I posit that he will die on the first day of 
next year.
634
 
Buridan goes on to dismiss this argument, but it is sufficient to show that delayed deaths, 
especially those delayed beyond a year, were as logically problematic as they were legally 
disputable. It is unlikely that Buridan, in Paris, should have chosen this interval of time out of 
any concern with English law. Rather the first day of next year was probably chosen as a 
simple shorthand for a future time incontrovertibly distinct from the present, which is, 
presumably, the same reason that it was chosen for the statute of limitations in English law.
635
 
Thus by setting the second phase of the combat a year and a day after the first (298), or on 
New Year’s Day (the first day of the next year) (1054), the Gawain-poet places it at the 
furthest limit of the logical and legal present, as a logico-legal test case.
636
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The paradoxical agreement of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight can therefore be read 
as a literary sophism. It shares the new interest in mutuality by which insolubles such as the 
Liar paradox were being further developed. It seems to allude to problematically delayed 
deaths and the elision of present and future. In addition, it shares the same basic narrative 
structure as one of Heytesbury’s sophismata, the same basic logical structure as a number of 
Buridan’s, and it has the dinnertime setting conventionally ascribed to such puzzles. 
The Limits of ‘Trawþe’ 
What then is the function of the sophismatic agreement at the heart of Sir Gawain? As I read 
it, the Gawain-poet deliberately sets a ‘casus’ that tests the very limits of literary, legal and 
logical possibility. He thus generates a scenario in which he can rigorously examine a moral 
principle that stands at the heart of all four of his poems: ‘trawþe’ or covenant-keeping. The 
importance of keeping one’s agreements is explicit in Sir Gawain and has been explored from 
various angles, both legal and theological.
637
 The idea that the Gawain-poet may be testing 
the extreme limits of such contractualisation has been noticed but perhaps not fully explored. 
Paul Taylor, for example, briefly discusses one way in which Gawain’s agreement is 
designed to stretch human ‘trawþe’ to its limits: 
From his first sight of the Green Chapel he concludes that his 
opponent’s identity is demonic (2193) – his five wits tell him so, and 
he is perfect in his five wits – and yet does not hesitate in his quest as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Blanch argues that the year-and-a-day rule was important to a range of different procedures in medieval English 
and Germanic law, including murder, since it would have been the soonest possible court date after a year. Thus 
the year-and-a-day limit sets up the Green Chapel encounter as a court date, with the Green Knight as a judge. 
He also refers to the medieval legal idea of ‘mayhem’ (loss of a body part) to be punished by the criminal losing 
the same body part. He therefore argues that Gawain’s ‘crime’ of beheading the Green Knight would have 
ended up in a similar scenario to the Green Chapel scene a year and a day later, even if there had been no 
agreement. 
637
 See, for example, Green, Crisis of Truth, Chapters 8 and 9; Shoaf, Poem as Green Girdle, esp. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3.iii; Burrow, A Reading of ‘Sir Gawain’, esp. pp. 22-23 and 66-69; Blanch and Wasserman, ‘Medieval 
Contracts’; Paul Taylor, ‘Commerce and Comedy’; Harwood, ‘Gawain and the Gift’. Harwood (p. 488) touches 
upon late-medieval ‘Pelagian’ understandings of divine covenants, which I will discuss from a slightly different 
angle in relation to Pearl and Patience, below. 
257 
 
if a bargain with the devil must be respected like any other courtly 
obligation. All this is the stuff of comedy.
638
 
Taylor concludes that this and other elements of the narrative are designed comically to 
undercut the hero. As he presents them, certain details of Gawain’s behaviour do indeed 
produce humour. Such absurdities of human behaviour are also reminiscent of the fantastical 
scenarios of the sophismata. Why, to return to the example given earlier, would your father 
dress up as a donkey and walk towards you on all fours, as Buridan suggests? No motivation 
for such humanly inexplicable behaviour is given, because that is not really the point. The 
point is that if he did, would the logical principles under investigation still function correctly? 
The absurdity of such scenarios springs from their extremity, and their extremity springs from 
the need to test logical principles by pushing them to their limits. That is how reductio ad 
absurdam works. Just so in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight: an important aristocrat is to 
leave the court and travel to a mysterious ‘Green Chapel’ to have his head cut off by a ‘dead’ 
man, who is in some ways a monster, and also bright green, for no other reason than that he 
promised that he would. In spite of heading voluntarily towards his probable death, the 
nobleman is deemed to have failed to keep his ‘trawþe’ simply because he has dressed up in 
his opponent’s wife’s clothing in the belief that this might protect him. The absurdity of the 
‘casus’ is its whole point: to what extreme can the chivalric notion of ‘trawþe’ be stretched? 
Under such conditions, can it maintain itself as a coherent and workable principle? 
 ‘Troth’, in the sense of contractual fidelity, is not merely a moral principle in the 
poem: it is also inextricable from ‘truth’, in the philosophical sense of the word. Again, this 
general point has been made by others who have looked at the covenantal aspects of the text, 
but its significance becomes clearer in a specifically sophismatic context. As I discussed in 
Chapter 1, contracts or promises between two parties concerning future actions constitute a 
substantial subset of the fourteenth-century sophismata. Such sophismata are used in 
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discussion of the most important logical issues of the day: the Liar paradox, the nature of 
propositions about the future, and nominalist supposition theory. All of these logical concerns 
interact in the works of the Gawain-poet, as I will demonstrate in the rest of this chapter. 
 One example of the ‘contract’ sophismata that I mentioned briefly in Chapter 1 is the 
scenario, found in Bradwardine and Holcot, in which Plato (or whoever) promises Socrates a 
penny if the next thing that Socrates says is true, and not otherwise.
639
 Just as in the ‘Bridge’ 
sophism of which this is a form, and again for no rational motive that we are ever told, 
Socrates makes a rather unhelpful reply: ‘You will not give me a penny’. This witty retort 
turns an otherwise straightforward commercial transaction into a sophism of mutual action 
like Heytesbury’s combat sophism, and into a two-stage insoluble like Buridan’s dinner-party 
sophism. The sophismatic agreement in Sir Gawain is also an agreement of reward and 
recompense: Gawain is given a material incentive to accept the proposition in the form of the 
axe.
640
 In Chapter 1, I also explored Buridan’s novel solution to the ‘Bridge’ sophism, which 
focused on the truth or falsehood of the various statements made within the ‘casus’ when 
understood as propositions about the future. The usual question asked in relation to the 
‘Bridge’ and ‘Penny’ sophismata was, what should Plato do next? Should he let Socrates 
cross the bridge or not? Should he give him a penny, or not? In addition to addressing this 
question, Buridan considers the truth-value of the initial agreement as a statement about the 
future, concluding that Plato lied in his initial ultimatum, because although he could act as he 
promised in most cases, there are certain extreme cases in which he cannot fulfil his promise 
– and Socrates has found one of them. 
In such sophismata, therefore, the ‘trawþe’ of an individual in keeping a promise and 
the ‘truth’ of the promise itself as a statement about the future are somewhat conflated. Plato 
is ‘untrue’ (he cannot satisfactorily keep his promise) because the promise itself was ‘untrue’ 
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(as a proposition about the future). In Sir Gawain too, Gawain is ‘falce’ (2382) and guilty of 
‘vntrawþe’ (2383) because he has made (what at least he thought at the time to be) a false 
proposition about the future, in swearing that he will take a blow from the Green Knight a 
year and a day after he has cut off the Green Knight’s head. Thus Gawain’s failure to keep 
his covenant must be seen in the context of the fourteenth-century logico-theological 
discussions of the future, and I will return to this point in relation to the Gawain-poet’s other 
works. 
 I mentioned above the association of the pentangle with the most difficult late-
medieval mathematics, and I have argued elsewhere that its geometrical and arithmetical 
properties make it a uniquely potent symbol of medieval paradoxes to do with mathematical 
infinity and infinitesimality.
641
 The ‘beheading’ agreement fulfils this aspect of its symbolism 
too. Other fourteenth-century ‘contract’ and ‘reward’ sophismata take a distinctly 
mathematical approach to problems relating to contracts of merit and reward. For example, 
Holcot considers the question ‘Vtrum aliquis in casu possit ex precepto obligari ad aliquid 
quod est contra conscientiam suam’ (‘Whether anyone in any situation could be obliged by 
command to do anything that is against his conscience’).642 This is essentially the same 
problem that Roger Rosetus tackles in his treatise De maximo et minimo, as summarised by 
Curtis Wilson: 
whether a frater can be obligated by a precept of the prelate to the 
performance of a task – say, the reading of sacred scripture – which is 
against his conscience. One of the arguments contra is that there is 
neither a maximum act of studying which would conform to the 
prelate’s precept nor a minimum act of studying which would not so 
conform, since the intensity of the act of studying may be increased in 
infinitum.
643
 
Holcot goes on immediately to give the example of being commanded to study sacred 
Scripture, and his argument contra also revolves around maxima and minima. In a broadly 
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similar way, the Gawain-poet seems to be interested in finding a scenario which demands the 
very maximum conceivable level of ‘trawþe’ and equally concerned with finding the 
minimum conceivable action that Gawain can take in order to breach the agreement. Gawain 
is asked to maintain an almost infinite ‘trawþe’, in a scenario that pushes the very limits of 
literary, logical and legal plausibility. He fails (at least in his own eyes) because he breaks an 
agreement of hospitality with Sir Bertilak only in what is arguably the least possible way that 
his courtesy to the lady will allow, rejecting her sexual advances, and her ring, instead 
accepting only a mere token, a ‘symple’ piece of her clothing, and that under an immense and 
quite understandable desire for self-preservation (1770-1847).  
The Man Who Wasn’t There 
Other ‘contract’ or ‘promise’ sophismata were designed to test questions to do with 
reference, and specifically nominalist supposition theory. I discussed some of these 
sophismata in Chapter 1, including another widespread example in which a dishonest debtor 
who has promised to give someone a penny wriggles out of his debt by asking which 
particular penny in the world he must give. Since, for any particular penny in existence, he is 
not specifically obliged to give that particular penny in order to fulfil his debt (and this is true 
for all pennies in existence), therefore, it is argued, he is not actually obliged to give a penny 
at all. This sophism does bear certain similarities to Holcot’s ‘minimum study’ sophism: 
Holcot asks exactly how much study he must do, and works down to an infinitesimal amount. 
Ockham, the originator of the ‘Penny’ sophism, asks which of all the pennies in the world he 
must give, and works down to no particular penny at all. There is a similar interest in limits at 
play in the two examples. However, the focus of Ockham’s sophism is his nominalist 
understanding of supposition: the debtor cannot owe some universal abstract ‘penny’ because 
no such universal exists, as it might for a realist. Therefore he must owe a material, ‘real-life’ 
penny, and he seems entitled to ask which specific penny it is that he owes. 
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 Reference to Ockham’s penny is problematic because the debtor seems to have no 
particular coin in mind when he promises to pay a penny. His ‘penny-debt’ is a sort of fiction, 
constructed out of an amalgamation of all the real pennies in existence. Buridan chooses not a 
penny, but a horse, when he discusses the same basic problem.
644
 One possible reason that he 
does so is that his discussion of the sophism thus ties in more neatly with his discussion of 
another of the most widespread sophismata of the fourteenth century: ‘A chimera exists’.645 
The horse that Buridan’s debtor owes is, to speak loosely, a ‘fictive’ animal somehow 
constructed out of all the real horses in existence, as opposed to a real universal of a ‘horse’. 
A chimera is similarly a creature constructed out of a whole range of other creatures. A 
chimera is also undoubtedly ‘fictive’: for a nominalist like Buridan, the word ‘chimera’ in a 
logical proposition cannot possibly ‘supposit’ for (or stand for) a chimera, because there are 
no real chimeras. In fact, as I discussed earlier, Buridan is forced to cut up the chimera into 
its constituent parts (a lion’s head, a goat’s body and so on) and let those supposit for real 
animal body parts instead.  
 This helps explain another way in which the Gawain-poet pushes the beheading 
contract to a logical extreme. Fourteenth-century sophismata explored the problematics of 
keeping promises which involved terms with no specific material reference. Gawain has to 
keep just such a promise: he must be beheaded by a fictive man. I have discussed above how 
the Gawain-poet foregrounds the possibility that the whole beheading sequence is an 
embedded fiction, supplying Arthur’s desire for a strange story. The Green Knight is also, in 
broader terms, rather like a chimera: he is, as Dorothy Yamamoto explores, part man, part 
Wodewose.
646
 He is, in fact, a huge, swaggering example of the proposition, used almost ad 
nauseam in building sophismatic syllogisms, that ‘A man is an animal’.647 He resembles 
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Buridan’s chimera even more when, thanks to Gawain’s deft handling of an axe, he is cut into 
distinct pieces, and yet continues to function as a single entity (444-47). The Green Knight’s 
literary features thus draw attention both to the logical problems that fiction causes, and to the 
extremity of the conditions in which the Gawain-poet is testing the principle of ‘trawþe’. 
 Finally, the devilish connotations that the Gawain-poet gives the Green Knight (2192-
93) enable him to be seen in the light of another common sophismatic symbol of problems of 
reference: the Antichrist. Certainly the Green Knight fits the biblical description of this 
devilish figure, who is himself represented in Revelation as both a chimera and a creature 
who survives a mortal head injury: 
bestiam quam vidi similis erat pardo et pedes eius sicut ursi et os eius 
sicut os leonis […] et unum de capitibus suis quasi occisum in mortem 
et plaga mortis eius curata est. (Revelation 13:2-3) 
(The beast, which I saw, was like to a leopard, and his feet were as the 
feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion. […] And I saw 
one of his heads as it were slain to death: and his death’s wound was 
healed.)  
As I have discussed before, the Antichrist serves in late-medieval logic as an example of 
epistemologically certain propositions about an as-yet contingent future, in the context of the 
wider debate about God’s foreknowledge and determinism. Holcot is one of the many 
logicians who use the term in this way.
648
 The Antichrist was also used as an example by 
which to discuss nominalist reference to things that do not exist at the moment, as Buridan 
does in his discussion of the sophism ‘Non-being is known’.649 In this sense, the function of 
the term ‘Antichrist’ is very similar to that of the term ‘chimera’. Buridan also discusses the 
proposition ‘A chimera is non-being’ and Holcot actually considers the proposition 
‘Antichristus non est chimaera’.650 
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 For instance, ‘Antichristus est futurum contingens’: in Holcot, Seeing the Future, p.61 (Quodlibet III, 
Quaestio 1, A1: ‘Utrum clare videns Deum videat omnia futura contingentia’ (‘Whether, seeing clearly, God 
sees every contingent future event’)). 
649
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 152 (Chapter 5, Sophism 7). 
650
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 70 (Quodlibet III, Quaestio 1, A3). 
263 
 
 The apocalyptic aspect of Sir Gawain has been noticed by other critics, as has the 
Gawain-poet’s broader interest in questions to do with soteriology, although without 
discussion of the logical debate over future contingency with which such questions were 
inextricably bound up.
651
 Importantly, although the chimera and the Antichrist both served as 
examples of the problemata of nominalist supposition-theory, they tended to function in 
slightly different ways. The chimera was used to illustrate problems caused by fiction, as I 
have discussed. The Antichrist was used in relation to problems of tense and time: as a future 
figure, he illustrated the problems of referring to things not yet in existence (but which 
certainly will be). Logical discussions of such problems of tense often resulted in sophisms 
that seemed to refer to the resurrection of the dead, such as ‘The corrupt is to be generated’, 
deepening the presence of eschatological imagery in the sophismata.
652
 
 There was a similar problem in how to refer to things that were once in existence and 
no longer are: two common examples used to exemplify that question were ‘Caesar’ and 
‘Aristotle’.653 Buridan enjoys referring to ‘Aristotle’s horse’ instead, using this single 
example more than ten times in his Sophismata. The problem he is confronting is for what the 
term ‘Aristotle’s horse’ can possibly supposit (or stand), since ‘Aristotle’s horse is dead’ and 
therefore ‘Aristotle’s horse does not exist’.654 Buridan also makes use of the suggestive 
sophism ‘Omnis homo fuit in arca Noe’ (‘Every man was in Noah’s Ark’), which he argues 
on the grounds that at one point in time every man alive was in the ark (‘quia sequeretur quod 
omnis qui fuit homo fuit in arca Noe’).655 This example once again links logical problems of 
tense with the general idea of covenants, and specifically a covenant that features 
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prominently in Cleanness.
656
 The agreement with the Green Knight addresses this specific 
problem too: Gawain must keep his bargain not merely with a fictive man, or with an 
‘antichrist’, but emphatically with a dead man, or a resurrected man.  
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 Cleanness, in Poems of the Pearl Manuscript, lines 294-496. All further reference to Cleanness will be 
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Pearl 
The Hidden Gem 
Like Sir Gawain, Pearl seems to incorporate sophismatic imagery. Just as the knot was a 
recurrent metaphor for the nature of a sophism, so too the gem, and specifically the pearl, was 
an image both used as a term in the sophismata and used by logicians as a metaphor for the 
nature of a sophism. Thus, in one mid-thirteenth-century treatise on insolubles sometimes 
attributed to William of Sherwood (probably wrongly), the author explains how the term 
‘insoluble’ itself is ambiguous: 
Circa tractatum de insolubilibus, primo sciendum quod hoc nomen 
insolubile dicitur tripliciter: uno scilicet modo, quod nullo modo 
potest solvi; alio modo, quod bene potest solvi quantum est de se, 
propter tamen aliqod impedimentum nunquam solvitur; tertio modo, 
quod propter sui difficultatem difficile solvitur. Ad similitudinem 
primi, dicitur ‘vox invisibilis’; ad similitudinem secundi, dicitur ‘lapis 
absconditus in terra invisibilis’; ad similitudinem tertii, dicitur ‘sol 
invisibilis’. Ultimo autem modo intendimus nunc de insolubili.657 
(Concerning the tract on insolubles, one has to know first that the 
noun ‘insoluble’ is used in three senses. In one sense it means that 
which can in no way be solved. In another sense it means that which 
can very well be solved as far as it itself is concerned, and yet because 
of some obstacle is never solved in fact. In a third sense it means that 
which because of its difficulty is hard to solve. After an analogy to the 
first sense, the voice is called invisible. After an analogy to the second 
sense, a stone [lapis] hidden in the ground is called invisible. After an 
analogy to the third sense, the sun is called invisible. It is in this last 
sense that we intend to speak about insolubles now.)
658
  
 
As Spade himself has pointed out, the first hint that the logical problems called insolubilia 
might actually be insoluble comes only with Heytesbury, and then it is only implicit.
659
 For 
the majority of late-medieval logicians, an insoluble was a problem they expected to be able 
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to solve, and in many cases claimed they had in fact solved. There were, however, problems 
that, although few doubted they could be solved, never had been, in spite of centuries of 
effort. Rather inconsistently, Heytesbury himself, earlier in his chapter on insolubles, gives us 
one such example, comparing insolubles to the squaring of the circle, which Aristotle claimed 
to be knowable but not yet known.
660
 Our anonymous logician’s analogy of a gem buried in 
the earth seems to gesture towards one of these solvable but unsolved problems: one could 
find the gem, but no one has yet dug in the right place. 
Another unknown logician of the mid-thirteenth century uses the gem as an image 
within a sophism, and this time he chooses a specific stone: a pearl. He formulates the 
following syllogism:  
Nullus homo est lapis. 
Omnis margarita est homo. 
Ergo nulla margarita est lapis.
661
 
 
(No human being is a gem. 
Every Pearl is a human being. 
Therefore no pearl is a gem.) 
The trick here is simple but profound: ‘Pearl’ can be a proper noun, signifying all human 
beings with the name ‘Pearl’; or, of course, it can refer to the gem-stone, signifying all (or 
some) gems commonly called pearls. By applying the first of these meanings to the second 
premise, the syllogism seems valid; by applying the second of these meanings to the 
conclusion, the apparently valid syllogism seems to produce an obviously false conclusion. 
Thus far the problem is merely an impossibilium: we know that pearls are gems and so we 
must reject the syllogism. Our anonymous logician, however, immediately presses the 
argument further, in order to produce an internal contradiction:  
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Sed quaedam margarita est lapis. 
Ergo quaedam margarita non est homo. 
(But some pearl is a gem. 
Therefore some Pearl is not a human being.) 
What we all know is now introduced as a formal proposition: some pearls are gems; therefore 
some pearls are not people. The internal contradiction takes this problem beyond a simple 
impossibilium, to become a more difficult sophism based on the ambiguity and arbitrariness 
of language, especially proper nouns. 
 A great many fourteenth-century sophismata were generated in a similar way. 
Buridan, for instance, discusses, in the context of a nominalist theory of supposition, the 
proposition that ‘Man is a species’662. The problem is that the term ‘man’ cannot, for Buridan, 
refer to some universal abstract. So, does it refer to a specific man? But no man is himself a 
whole species. Or does it refer to the word ‘man’? But no word is a species either, and so on. 
The ‘human-being-as-gem’ trope also remains current in fourteenth-century logic. Buridan is 
one writer who uses it recurrently throughout his work, and although it must be conceded that 
‘lapis’ can also simply mean ‘stone’ (and Buridan does clearly use it to mean a heavy rock in 
places), his description of the term ‘lapis’ in relation to the ‘lapis-as-human’ trope in his 
Quaestiones in Aristotelis Physica seems to suggest that, at least in some instances, he may 
have been thinking of pearls in particular: ‘illi lapides sint albi secundum aequalem gradum 
intentionis […] et ambo sphaerici’ (‘let these stones be equally white […] and both 
spherical’).663 Again, the wider issue that Buridan is discussing here is the singularity of 
nominalist supposition, as opposed to a realist doctrine of universals: the gems are identical, 
and you are presented with one today, and the other tomorrow, and cannot tell the difference 
between them. Thus the ‘pearl’ also functions as an example in fourteenth-century logic of 
the sorts of problematic reference that I have just examined in relation to Sir Gawain. 
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 In his treatment of the central, eponymous image of Pearl, the Gawain-poet plays up 
all of these logical connotations. The poem begins by supplying, in its very first word, the 
term whose meaning is ambiguous: ‘Perle’. By the end of the first four lines, the poet has 
provided several different ways in which that term can be taken to refer or supposit: 
Perle plesaunte, to prynces paye 
To clanly clos in golde so clere, 
Oute of oryent, I hardyly saye, 
Ne proued I neuer her precios pere.
664
  
The opening lines are perhaps most easily read as describing the nature of pearls in general, 
as W. H. Schofield argued over a century ago.
665
 Schofield compares the opening of Pearl to 
a passage in Cleanness:
 666
 
Perle praysed is prys þer perré is schewed, 
þaȝ hyt not derrest be demed to dele for penies. 
Quat may þe cause be called bot for hir clene hews, 
þat wynnes worschyp abof alle whyte stones? 
For ho schynes so schyr þat is of schap rounde, 
Wythouten faut oþer fylþe ȝif ho fyn were, 
And wax euer in þe worlde in weryng so olde, 
Ȝet the perle payres not whyle ho in pryse lasttes. (1117-24) 
The similarity of the first line of each passage makes a comparison between the two 
inevitable. In Cleanness, although the pearl is an image of something else (salvation and its 
related purity – both ideas explored using the image in Pearl too), there is no doubt that the 
gem, rather than a girl, is being referred to. Pearls here are ‘clene’, ‘rounde’ ‘whyte stones’, a 
basic material description rather like that of Buridan quoted above. Schofield also compares 
the opening lines of Pearl with the descriptions of gems found in medieval lapidaries.
667
 The 
first word of Pearl, therefore, can be read as referring to pearls in general, in what fourteenth-
century logicians would call ‘confused common personal supposition’.668 According to 
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Schofield it is not until line 9 that it becomes clear that the narrator is referring to anything 
other than the idea of a pearl in general. In my opinion, the shift towards specific reference 
comes somewhat earlier, first when the sort of pearl being described is specified in line 3 
(‘oute of oryent’) and even more clearly when its singularity is emphasised in line 8 (‘I sette 
hyr sengely in synglure’). This allows a second possibility of reading the first word of the 
poem as referring to ‘some pearl’, in what fourteenth-century logicians would call 
‘determinate common personal supposition’. 
 The first word of the poem can also be read as referring by means of ‘discrete 
personal supposition’: that is, ‘Pearl’ could be a proper noun, the name of a particular person 
or thing. The clearest indication of the possibility of such a reading is the poet’s use of the 
possessive pronoun, ‘her’. Schofield was undoubtedly correct to point out that, as a feminine 
object, the description of a pearl with the feminine pronoun is by no means grammatically 
impossible.
669
 Nevertheless, the poet’s variation between the feminine and the neuter pronoun 
(for example, ‘hit’ in line 13) seems designed to draw attention to the duality of his reference 
to both stone and human being. It is by confusing ‘discrete personal supposition’ and 
‘common personal supposition’ that the thirteenth-century sophism referred to above works. 
 Finally, it is possible to understand the first word of Pearl as referring to the actual 
word ‘perle’ itself, in what fourteenth-century logicians would call ‘material supposition’. I 
have discussed how, in Sir Gawain, the poet draws attention to his alliterative style as 
symbolic of the text’s sophismatic ‘knottiness’. In Pearl, the poet arguably adopts an even 
‘knottier’ style, supplementing his use of alliteration with an interwoven rhyme scheme and 
the concatenation that ties each stanza together. It is possible to read the first line of the poem 
as, in a secondary sense, an advertisement of this style, just as the passages cited from Sir 
Gawain advertise it there. The word ‘perle’ is ‘plesaunte to’, that is ‘alliterates with’, the two-
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word phrase ‘prynces paye’. Thus in the very first line of the poem the poet links the image 
of pearl-as-sophism to the image of knot-as-sophism in Sir Gawain, manifested through the 
‘knotty’ alliterative style of both poems and additionally through the concatenation and 
rhyme scheme of Pearl. 
 The Gawain-poet’s ‘pearl’ may therefore be read as a symbol of how different forms 
of reference introduce logical problems into human speech and thought patterns. In that 
sense, it plays a similar role to the quasi-semantic belch (‘buf!’) in the Summoner’s Tale.670 
The ‘pearl’ in the opening stanzas of the poem is also emphatically lost or hidden in the 
‘grounde’ (10), just like the gem that served as a symbol of the insolubilia in the thirteenth-
century treatise quoted above. The use of the ‘buried gem’ motif suggests that Pearl is a 
‘problem poem’, which will demand, of its reader as much as of its protagonist, the ability to 
think clearly to solve the puzzle. In addition, the emphasis on the ‘singularity’ of the Pearl 
suggests a more mathematical interest to do with indivisibilism, which I will discuss below. 
More importantly, however, the opening ‘sophism’ of Pearl sets the scene for a broader and 
more powerful evocation of the problem of linguistic reference as a metaphor for the 
difficulties of emotional and spiritual reference in the rest of the poem. Under this aspect, the 
emphasis on the ‘singularity’ of the pearl highlights the central problem of the poem.671 
Under a nominalist theory of supposition, ‘pearl’ must stand for someone or something really 
there – except it (or she) is not really there, not anymore. The pearl is lost; Pearl is dead. The 
Gawain-poet uses logical problems to do with supposition to communicate the bewildering 
sense of loss and grief that the ‘jeweller’ is faced with. 
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Getting a Grip 
From one point of view, almost all the logico-linguistic problems of late-medieval thought 
were in some way concerned with ‘getting a grip’ on the non-tangible elements of human 
experience. This is essentially the motivation at the heart of the realist-nominalist debate: 
how can one refer to the idea of ‘Man’ generally without either meaning a particular man or 
men one has met or some super-physical realist ‘form’ that somehow encapsulates the 
essential qualities of being man? Similarly, the desire to ‘get a grip’ on (that is, to be able to 
make clear and specific reference to) problematic entities is the source of many, if not most, 
of the fourteenth-century sophismata. I have discussed, in relation to Sir Gawain, examples 
of reference to past and future entities, such as Aristotle’s dead horse, the Antichrist and the 
resurrected dead. As I have emphasised throughout this thesis, such sophismata form part of 
the wider context of the debate over future contingency and, more specifically, a 
predestinatory soteriology. In Pearl, the Gawain-poet’s concerns with death, eschatology and 
soteriology is, of course, even clearer than in Sir Gawain. 
 Perhaps the most striking and beautiful image of death used in the whole poem is the 
metaphor of the dead rose with which the Maiden attempts to console the Jeweller: 
For þat þou lesteȝ watz bot a rose 
þat flowred and fayled as kynde hyt gef. 
Now þurȝ kynde of þe kyste þat hyt con close 
To a perle of prys hit is put in pref. (269-72) 
The image gains its potency in this passage, as others have noticed, from its conflation of the 
courtly and religious connotations of the rose: the symbol of mutable worldly beauty here, 
becomes later (906) the rosa caritatis, the symbol of divine love.
672
 However, it seems that 
the Gawain-poet saw in the dead rose a powerful image of the death of a child, for it is in 
relation to the pain and dangers of labour that he uses the same metaphor in Cleanness, 
describing the peace and safety of the nativity: 
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For þer watz seknesse al sounde þat sarrest is halden, 
And þer watz rose reflayr where rote hatz ben euer[.] (1078-79) 
Here too the image of the rose is associated, by implication, with decay and death. The rose 
was a widespread trope in the sophismata, used specifically to discuss the problematics of 
supposition theory. Thus Holcot, for example, discusses whether, if no rose existed (‘nulla 
rosa existente’), one should concede the propositions ‘A rose is conceived of’ (‘rosa 
concipitur’) and ‘A rose is understood’ (‘rosa intelligitur’). In his discussion, he compares it 
both to the problem of referring to a ‘chimera’ (a fictive referent) and to the problem of 
referring to past and future referents: ‘such propositions as “Antichrist is understood” [or] 
“Caesar is conceived of”’ (‘tales propositiones “Antichristus intelligitur,” “Caesar 
concipitur”’).673 Buridan’s use of the term is even closer to the Gawain-poet’s. In one passage 
of his Questiones longe super Librum Perihermeneias, he discusses how one can refer to last 
year’s roses, which are now gone.674 The term ‘rose’ occurs 17 times in Buridan’s 
Consequentia, and on every single occasion it is a conceptual rose, usually because it no 
longer exists or does not yet exist. On one occasion it is specifically used in the context of 
problematic terms of change, including ‘corrumpitur’.675 The logical rose is usually a ‘fayled’ 
rose, a rose of ‘rote’. 
 The rose is thus a common logical symbol of the problems of reference created by 
death and decay, as well as by futurity. It serves perfectly to communicate the inability of the 
‘Jeweller’ to get a mental grip on what he has lost, and she refers to his state of mind as 
‘mad’, obsessed with a ‘rayson bref’ – a ‘transitory cause’, as Andrew and Waldron gloss it 
(267-68).
676
 He does not realise, as the Maiden tries to explain in lines 271-272, that the rose 
has been transfigured into a symbol of immutability and stability. As the passage from 
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Cleanness quoted above makes clear, a pearl is something that ‘lasttes’ (1124). It is also, as 
the sophismatic heritage of the image suggests, the solution to a problem buried in the 
ground, the problem, perhaps, of getting a grip on a mutable world, this side of the grave. 
 One more aspect of the pearl and rose imagery is significant. Buridan discusses a 
conceptual ‘rose’ involving the proposition ‘rosae sunt tibi promissae’ (‘roses were promised 
to you’).677 This is another example of the ‘promise’ or ‘contract’ sophismata which I 
discussed in relation to Sir Gawain above. The rose, as a gift, can also function as a symbol 
of the logical problematics of covenants. The Gawain-poet, in his description of the pearl in 
Cleanness, also relates it to a context of commercial exchange: ‘hyt not derrest be demed to 
dele for penies’ (1118). This line perhaps evokes the sophismata of promise and reward, 
which usually do deal in pennies (as I observed above) and with them it evokes the problems 
associated with the mathematics of merit that I discussed above. As part of its discussion of 
earning heavenly reward, Pearl explicitly addresses this concern too, and thus at the same 
time introduces problems of mutual action in which God himself is one of the participants. 
 
Measuring Merit  
 
In his debate with the Maiden, the ‘Jeweller’ protests about the paradoxical understanding of 
heavenly reward implied by Matthew’s parable of the labourers in the vineyard, who are paid 
the same amount regardless of how long they have worked. To be precise, in the parable they 
are each paid a ‘pene’ (510), or, in the Biblical Latin, a denarius (Matthew 20:1), just as in so 
many of the promise sophismata; and the Maiden quite conventionally interprets the penny in 
terms of heavenly reward (614). The ‘Jeweller’ emphasises the logical problem that arises 
from the extension of the principle: ‘Þenne þe lasse in werke to take more able, / And euer þe 
lenger þe lasse, þe more’ (599-600). The crucial phrase here is ‘euer þe lenger’, which could 
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be taken to transform a protest about the fairness of heavenly reward into a sophism about the 
intension and remission of forms discussed by the Oxford Calculators. E. V. Gordon glosses 
the lines as ‘the less work done, the greater the capacity for earning, and so continually in a 
constant (inverse) ratio’:678 in other words, if everyone is rewarded equally, then the fewer 
meritorious acts one performed, the more each of those acts merited proportionally. That is 
the paradox the Jeweller objects to, not merely on account of its injustice, but also because of 
its ultimate absurdity. 
Carleton Brown has also read this passage in terms of fourteenth-century theological 
approaches to the idea of proportionality, concluding that the Gawain-poet takes an even 
more thoroughly anti-Pelagian soteriological position than Bradwardine.
679
 He sees a possible 
pun in the use of the word ‘pretermynable’ (595), referring to God’s character as a judge of 
each according to ‘hys desserte’ (594). The word, he argues, may be equated with the 
scholastic term ‘predeterminatio’, thus demonstrating the poet’s interaction with the 
theological disputes over predestination.
680
 The MED, however, gives no account of this 
precise term, defining ‘terminable’ as ‘susceptible of a final disposition, resolvable’, citing 
the early fifteenth-century Rolls of Parliament.
681
 Furthermore, ‘pretermynable’ is, in fact, a 
critical emendation of the manuscript’s ‘pertermynable’, which suggests that the central 
concern here is more with the finality or finitude implied in the stem of the word (-‘termyn’-), 
than with any suggestion of predestination adduced from the emended prefix.
682
 I would like 
to suggest that the word carries connotations which, without being directly incompatible with 
Carleton Brown’s reading, may make more sense of the text as it is actually written.  
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It is interesting that this highly unusual, Latinate term should find itself in such a close 
proximity to the logical paradox described above, since it is at the terminus, or limit, of this 
inverse correlation between work and reward that one encounters exactly the sort of physico-
logical problem that formed a substantial part of the interests of the Oxford Calculators. It 
seems to follow that in the case of one who does an infinitesimally small amount of work, 
that infinitesimal amount of meritorious action hypothetically merits infinitely, since it 
produces a non-infinitesimal, finite reward. I discussed in Chapter 3 above one example from 
Richard Swineshead in relation to the intension of heat that exemplifies the problem clearly, 
and for the sake of convenience, I will repeat it here: 
 [imagine] a given subject […] hot in degree 1 over its first half, in 
degree 2 over its next quarter, in degree 3 over its next eighth, in 
degree 4 over its next sixteenth, and so on in infinitum. As a whole, 
the subject is hot in degree 2. That is, it is finitely hot as a whole even 
though the heat throughout it increases infinitely.
683
 
 
 In Swineshead’s example, the intensity of the heat in the subject increases even as the 
extension of the segment in question decreases, terminating in a segment infinitely hot but 
infinitesimal in extension, just like the ‘intensity’ of merit in question in Pearl. That is why 
the ‘Jeweller’ is perplexed at finding the Maiden to have received so great a reward: her 
situation is the terminal or limit case of a mathematically problematic ratio. Here in Pearl, as 
in Sir Gawain, there is an interest in whether the usual principles of merit work in extreme 
cases. 
 A striking example of a similar problem is again found in Holcot: 
In his ‘Sentences’ commentary of 1331–3, the English Dominican 
Robert Holcot raised a difficulty based, like Gregory’s divine 
supertask, on the proportional parts of an hour. Holcot did not specify 
a proportion, but let us take it to be a half. Now suppose that a man is 
meritorious over the space of half an hour, sinful over the next fifteen 
minutes, meritorious over the next seven and a half minutes, and so 
on, and suppose that he dies at the end of the hour. Then God cannot 
reward or punish him, because there was no final instant of his life 
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that would determine whether he died a bad man or a good man. 
Holcot followed this up with eight similar arguments based on the 
continuum.
684
 
Holcot’s ‘casus’ is another example of the rigorous application of problems from the 
sophismata physicalia to moral and theological questions that I explored in Chapter 3.
685
 The 
interest in infinitesimal moments of ‘merit’ in Holcot’s example finds a neat parallel in the 
Jeweller’s argument in Pearl. Furthermore, it is clear that if Holcot had to be assigned a voice 
in the poem, it would be that of the Jeweller, not that of the Maiden. 
The Maiden’s response to the problem is verbally and philosophically suggestive: ‘Of 
more and lasse in Goddeȝ ryche, / […] lys no joparde’, she asserts (601-602). Margaret 
Williams translates ‘joparde’ as ‘unfair play’ here, apparently reading ‘joparde’ as ‘trick’; or 
perhaps she draws the connotations of play from the use of the term in chess and the Pearl 
Maiden’s use of ‘mate’ (that is, checkmate) a few lines later (613).686 Probably the Gawain-
poet’s mind followed a similar train of association. Yet another plausible reading of ‘joparde’ 
in its immediate context is simply ‘contradiction’, or perhaps ‘puzzle’: ‘there is nothing,’ says 
the Pearl Maiden, ‘to be perplexed about’ – ‘there is,’ if you like, ‘no paradox here’. Such a 
usage of the term perhaps sheds light back upon Arthur’s desire to watch two men jousting in 
‘jopardé’ (Sir Gawain, 97). Either reading is fertile. The Gawain-poet is interested in how 
agreements between God and man can create puzzles, sophismatic paradoxes of the kind that 
fourteenth-century logicians were discussing in relation to the problem of future contingency. 
However, the Maiden also possibly feels the need to defend God from the charge of trickery 
in his soteriological dealings with man, and that reading of the passage links it to the radical 
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understanding of God’s foreknowledge urged by Holcot and others. These concerns stand 
equally at the heart of another of the Gawain-poet’s works, Patience. 
  
278 
 
Patience 
A Problematic Prophecy 
Sir Gawain and Pearl are both concerned with human merit, and both feature conceits that 
seem to resonate with fourteenth-century sophismata of mutual action. As I discussed above, 
one of the proposed solutions to the famous ‘Bridge’ problem involved the idea that Plato 
lied in making his original ultimatum, since his statement about a future contingent was, in 
fact, not true. I have also discussed in Chapter 1 how Holcot complicated the problem 
theologically by putting God in the place of Plato, making revelations about future 
contingents that need not, and in fact sometimes do not, come true. Patience, like the other 
three poems, is interested in problematic promises or covenants, and here fourteenth-century 
concerns over future contingency and divine foreknowledge are perhaps most clearly 
invoked. 
Bradwardine, responding to arguments ‘contra immutibilitatem diuinæ voluntatis’ 
(‘against the immutability of the divine will’), discusses the problem of divine revelations 
that do not seem to be fulfilled.
687
 The example he chooses is striking: 
Multæ quoque tales prophetiæ comminatoriè multa prædicunt, nec 
eueniunt; non enim hec prædicunt vt eueniant: vnde Ieronymus in 
Glossa auctoritatis Ezechielis 33. allegatae: Non statim sequitur, vt 
quia Propheta dicit, eueniat quod prædicit; Non enim prædicit vt 
veniat, sed minatur ne veniat. Nec quia Deus loquitur, necesse est fieri 
quod minatur, sed vt pœniteat cui minatur, et non fiat quod futurum 
est, si verba Dei contemnantur; ita quòd in talibus prophetijs videtur 
semper intellegi conditio quædam talis, nisi pœnitueritis de peccatis. 
Vnde et in prologo Glosse super Psalterium, ponitur duplex prophetia, 
scilicet secundum prædestinationem, quam necesse est semper impleri 
secundum tenorem verborum; et secundum comminationem, vt 40. 
dies sunt et Niniue subuertetur, quæ non semper impletur secundum 
verborum superficiem, sed secundum tacitæ intelligentiæ 
significationem; [...] etiam vult Augustinus super illud Psalmi 50. 
Incerta et occulta sapientiæ tuæ manifestati mihi, dicens; Sub hoc 
merito Niniuitæ pœnituerunt, et certam misericordiam meruerunt. 
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Stetit ergo Niniue, et non est euersa. Ego autem puto impletum esse, 
quod Propheta dixit; Respice quæ fuit Niniue, et vide quia euersa est 
in malo, et ædificata in bono[.] 
(Also many such prophets foretell many things as a warning that do 
not come to pass; for they do not foretell [things] in order that they 
should come about: hence Jerome wrote in the authoritative Gloss of 
Ezekiel 33: ‘it does not immediately follow, that because a prophet 
speaks, that what he speaks should come to pass; for he does not 
foretell in order that it may come to pass, but to warn lest it should 
come to pass. Nor because God speaks, is it necessary that what he 
warns should happen, but [it is] in order that he whom he warns 
should repent, and that it should not happen as it was about to happen, 
if they despised the words of God’; thus it seems that in such 
prophecies a certain condition is always to be understood, ‘unless you 
repent of your sins’. Whence also in the prologue to the Gloss on the 
Psalms [the Glossa Ordinaria], a double [meaning] of prophecy is 
proposed: namely in accordance with predestination, which is always 
necessarily to be fulfilled according to the sense of the words; and in 
accordance with a warning, such as, ‘In forty days Nineveh will be 
overthrown’, which is not always fulfilled in accordance with the 
surface [meaning] of the words, but in accordance with a signification 
of tacit understanding; [...] For Augustine wants [to make] this point 
about Psalm 50: ‘Uncertain and hidden things of your wisdom [have 
been] made clear to me’, saying: ‘on this basis [i.e. on the basis of an 
uncertainty] they repented, and certain mercy they merited. Therefore 
Nineveh could stand, and it was not overthrown. I however consider 
what the Prophet said to have been fulfilled: look at what Nineveh 
was, and see that it was overthrown in evil and built up in good’ [i.e. 
‘evil’ Nineveh was destroyed, because it became ‘good’ Nineveh’].688 
It is apparent from Bradwardine’s quotations of Jerome, Augustine and the Glossa Ordinaria 
that the story of Jonah had been considered a problematic case of prophecy from the Church 
Fathers onwards. In the fourteenth century it becomes a battleground in the logico-theological 
controversy between Bradwardine and the ‘Pelagians’. 
Ockham invoked Jonah’s prophecy about Nineveh as a problematic example in his 
Tractatus de praedestinatione, where he proposed one of the views that Bradwardine 
mentions above, that such prophecies are really ‘concealed conditionals’.689 As Richard 
Gaskin notes, ‘this solution to the problem found almost no support among Ockham’s 
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successors’: Adam of Wodeham, for instance, rejected it ‘on the ground that if revealing 
conditional propositions about the future is the best God can do, He is in no better position 
than you or me’.690 On the other hand, Bradwardine is apparently unhappy with this too, 
preferring to find a solution by which he can claim that the prophecy was indeed fulfilled, 
albeit figuratively, thus supporting his own emphasis upon predestination. Holcot’s own 
position I have discussed above: in some sense, God is capable of deceiving, and indeed has 
deceived, those to whom he makes revelations about the contingent future; and through such 
‘deceptions’, God manipulates events to his own purposes. 
 In Patience, the Gawain-poet chooses to emphasise Jonah’s concern that God is guilty 
of deceit: first, in falsely revealing Nineveh’s coming destruction; and, secondly, in His 
manner of overturning Jonah’s choice to resist His will. In his bitter remonstration with God 
at the close of the poem, Jonah chooses to characterise the divine manipulation of human 
affairs by collocating two alliterative words implying trickery: 
A, þou Maker of man, what maystery þe þynkez 
þus þy freke to forfare forbi alle oþer? 
With alle meschef þat þou may, neuer þou me sparez[.]
691
  
 
The ambiguity of ‘maystery’ is particularly significant here: most commonly it connotes 
either some kind of skilful manipulation or trick, or some kind of dominance or control. 
Indeed it can actually denote ‘necessity’.692 Into this one word is condensed a debate over 
God’s intervention in human action that has manifested itself more explicitly earlier in the 
poem. 
Introducing the exemplum of Jonah, the narrator discusses the problem in logico-
theological terms: 
ȝif me be dyȝt a destyné due to haue, 
What dowes me þe dedayn, oþer dispit make? 
Oþer ȝif my lege lorde lyst on lyue me to bidde 
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Oþer to ryde oþer to renne to Rome in his ernde, 
What grayþed me þe grychchyng bot grame more seche? 
 
[...] 
 
Did not Jonas in Judé suche jape sumwhyle? 
To sette hym to sewrté, vnsounde he hym feches. (49-58) 
 
Here the narrator seems at first to endorse a highly deterministic view of human action in his 
use of the word ‘destyné’, and then perhaps to complicate the matter by subtly evoking 
common sophismatic tropes. Rome and travelling to Rome, even specifically running to 
Rome (52), occur frequently in the sophismata collections. Buridan, for instance, uses the 
following proposition in his discussion of the two-stage ‘eating’ insoluble that I mentioned 
above in relation to Sir Gawain: ‘I wish to go to Rome if Socrates goes’.693 Here again the 
concern is with the kinds of impasse that can result from mutually dependent wills: if 
Socrates wishes only to go to Rome if Plato does not go, or even if Socrates wishes only to go 
to Rome if Plato does go, then stalemate is the logical outcome. This sort of sophism 
represents an evolution of the two-stage Liar paradox, with mutually dependent human will 
and action replacing mutually dependent truth-values, and thus emphasising the problem of 
future contingency and determinism. Heytesbury gives the example of running to Rome as 
part of his discussion of the sophism ‘Anima Antichristi necessario erit’ (‘the soul of the 
Antichrist will necessarily exist’). As I have mentioned, the coming of the Antichrist was the 
most conventional example of a contingent future event known by divine revelation, and 
hence it is a parallel of the problematic prophecy against Nineveh.
694
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 The narrator describes Jonah’s behaviour in the tale as a ‘jape’. ‘Jape’ means, 
primarily, a ‘trick’ or ‘deceit’, according to the MED, but it can also connote a lying 
statement (especially in a religious context).
695
 Thus in the Summoner’s Tale, Friar John 
applies the term to Thomas’s unsatisfactory donations to his convent (III. 1961), just before 
Thomas tricks the Friar with his sophismatic fart, which also serves as a problematic 
statement about the future. On the other hand, in one of the exemplars adduced by 
Chauntecleer in the Nun’s Priest’s Tale (an episode which Chaucer probably knew from 
Holcot’s Wisdom Commentary), the sceptical traveller refuses to accept the validity of 
prophetic dreams, calling them ‘japes’ (VII. 3091). 
In this passage of Patience, the first meaning is clearly primary: Jonah attempts to 
trick God by fleeing from his presence. Initially, Jonah suggests that his flight is motivated by 
the fear that God wants him ‘slayn’ (81-88). Towards the end of the poem, however, in a line 
that has no original in the Biblical text, Jonah admits a different reason why he resists 
prophesying as God commands him: ‘For me were swetter to swelt as swyþe, as me þynk, / 
Þen lede lenger þi lore þat þus me les makez’ (427-28). Preaching divine revelations, Jonah 
fears, makes a liar of him, when God fails to fulfil his threats. When the narrator introduces 
the narrative as being about Jonah’s ‘jape’, it is therefore left open whether it is Jonah’s futile 
attempt to trick God, or Jonah’s complicity in God’s own tricks and deceits. 
This point is logically significant: Jonah breaks his ‘trawþe’ with God because he 
thinks that God himself has been, or is about to be, ‘untrue’. We can read God’s ultimatum to 
the Ninevans as a theological equivalent of Plato’s ultimatum on the bridge. Buridan’s 
solution to that logical problem was that Plato lied in making the ultimatum. Holcot’s 
solution to the theological problem is that God somehow ‘deceives’ when he reveals similar 
propositions about a contingent future. In Sir Gawain, the poet seemed to hint that Gawain’s 
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agreement to the beheading covenant was already not entirely in ‘god fayth’ (381). That 
covenant is, by the standards of fourteenth-century logic, a proposition about the contingent 
future: Gawain explicitly draws attention to its contingency (‘quat-so bifallez after’: 382). By 
accepting the agreement, he does not merely swear his ‘trawþe’ but he also swears to the 
‘truth’ of the proposition. Yet at the same time he is entertaining doubts about the ‘truth’ of 
the agreement as a statement about the future, and thus the audience can entertain doubts 
about his own ‘trawþe’. In Patience, the Gawain-poet highlights the fact that the same 
accusation might be (indeed, had been) thrown at God, by theologians like Holcot. The 
question is whether the poet endorses that view or rebuts it.  
Later on the narrator does seem to implicate God in a reflection of Jonah’s ‘jape’: 
‘For þe Welder of wyt þat wot alle þynges, / þat ay wakes and waytes, at wylle hatz He 
slyȝtes’ (129-30). God’s ‘slyȝtes’ are more than a match for Jonah’s ‘japes’. Here again, the 
problem of God’s intervention in human action is condensed into a single ambiguity. 
‘Slyȝtes’ can suggest either wisdom and skill, or cunning and deceit. The MED hedges its 
bets to some extent, giving this passage under the first group of meanings, but under the 
qualification of ‘a clever device, stratagem, plan; a technique, trick, feat’.696 The question of 
whether God is a cunning trickster or an all-knowing, all-controlling plan-maker is central to 
the poem. The narrator’s own use of ‘slyȝtes’ is ambiguous enough to prefigure Jonah’s 
accusation that God is guilty of spreading lies, whilst superficially remaining a testimony to 
God’s omniscient wisdom (‘wyt þat wot alle þynges’). For the narrator, God’s ‘slyȝtes’ are 
his wise plans: for Jonah, they are his cruel tricks. 
 In contrast to the narrator’s faith, Jonah is repeatedly shown to question God’s 
omniscience. He announces his intention to find ‘sum oþer waye þat He ne wayte after’ (86), 
a delusion that the narrator ridicules by reminding the audience that God ‘ay wakes and 
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waytes’ (130). The narrator also calls Jonah a ‘wytles wrechche’ (113) for limiting God’s 
omniscience of all human action: ‘Hit watz a wenyng vnwar þat welt in his mynde, / þaȝ he 
were soȝt fro Samarye, þat God seȝ no fyrre’ (115-16). Jonah’s lack of ‘wyt’ and his attempt 
to use ‘japes’ against God contrasts with God’s own effortless and omniscient rule. 
Moreover, just as Jonah accuses God of spreading lies through his revelations, one of the 
sailors calls Jonah himself a ‘losynger’ (170): it is apparently Jonah who is guilty of deceit, 
not God. 
 Towards the end of the narrative, another deliberate ambiguity encapsulates the 
problem: ‘And God þurȝ His godnesse forgef as he sayde; / þaȝ He oþer bihyȝt, withhelde His 
vengaunce’ (407-408). ‘He sayde’ is generally taken to refer back to the King’s previous 
statement (404); but given that the other pronoun in the line and both in the next line clearly 
refer to God, it would be more natural to read ‘he sayde’ as referring to God. Clearly this 
reading is problematic, appearing to make the last clause of 407 contradict the first clause of 
408. In fact, the two clauses work together to provide a thoroughly Bradwardinian 
explanation of the Ninevan prophecy. ‘Bihyȝt’ can mean ‘threaten’, rather than promise, 
especially in the context of divine punishment.
697
 Thus although God warned the Ninevans of 
what would happen ‘nisi pœnitueritis de peccatis’, their repentance and His forgiveness 
somehow still fulfil what ‘he sayde’. In fact, God’s forgiveness actually works to establish 
both his sovereignty and the trustworthiness of His word, according to His closing rebuke of 
Jonah: ‘Why schulde I wrath wyth hem, syþen wyȝez wyl torne, / And cum and cnawe Me 
for Kyng and My carpe leue?’ (518-19). 
 Indeed, in another addition to the Biblical account, God claims to have guided the 
actions of the Ninevans even before their repentance: ‘I loked hem ful longe and hem on lode 
hade’ (504). This admission represents a view of God’s predestination much more in 
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sympathy with the ‘determinist’ than the ‘Pelagian’ position. In fact, if there is a voice in the 
poem that seems to mimic, or even parody, Holcot’s logic and theology, it is not the voice of 
the narrator, but the dubious voice of Jonah himself. It is he who imputes deceit to God and 
who is dissatisfied with forgiveness as a fulfilment of the prophecy against Nineveh and it is 
he who questions God’s omniscience and power in directing human action. The poet 
concludes his narrative with God’s angry statement of his supremacy and initiative in human 
action, including bringing men to repentance and forgiveness, adding only a final exhortation 
for penitence, submission and patience (528-31). As Richard Firth Green has put it, the tale 
ends with God teaching Jonah ‘the completely orthodox lesson that while we owe him 
absolute obedience, God owes us nothing in return’.698  
A Point of Principle 
Jonah’s final remonstration with God also links the poem’s discussion of submission to the 
will of God with the more logico-mathematical problems relating to infinity and 
proportionality that I have discussed in relation to Sir Gawain and Pearl: 
[‘]Why art þou so waymot, wyȝe, for so lyttel?’ 
‘Hit is not lyttel,’ quoþ þe lede, ‘bot lykker to ryȝt[.]’ (492-93) 
 
This passage should be compared with the lines from Pearl discussed above: 
[‘]Þenne þe lasse in werke to take more able, 
And euer þe lenger þe lasse þe more.’ 
‘Of more and lasse in Godez ryche,’ 
þat gentyl sayde, ‘lys no joparde, 
For þer is vch mon payed inlyche, 
Wheþer lyttel oþer much be hys rewarde[.’] (599-604) 
 
Pearl is answering the Jeweller’s sophism of intension and remission in which the intension 
of meritorious action increases in inverse proportion to its extension, like Swineshead’s 
thought-experiment of the variously heated bar. The point of interest to the Jeweller is not 
simply why his daughter has been granted such a reward, but the principle that God’s action 
                                                          
698
 Green, Crisis of Truth, p. 359. 
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of unconditional grace seems to imply. Similarly, God’s demonstration of his absolute power 
to punish or forgive just as he wishes is the question at issue between Jonah and Himself. In 
both cases, it is up to God to decide what is ‘lyttel oþer much’, but in both cases His gracious 
action confuses and annoys human beings for whom an extrapolated principle is more 
important. That is the implication of Jonah’s assertion that the question is not so much a little 
thing but ‘lykker to ry3t’: it is not a single point of disagreement but rather a whole line of 
reasoning. For the Jeweller, the littler the thing becomes, the clearer the problem becomes. In 
a way, the same is true for Jonah: the extent of his anger at each of God’s unilateral actions 
(the forgiveness of Nineveh and the destruction of the woodbine) seems inversely 
proportional to their importance. 
 This exchange between God and Jonah seems to allude to the old debate between 
individualists and infinitists that was still very much alive at Oxford, and elsewhere, in the 
first half of the fourteenth century. The controversy was largely put to bed by Bradwardine 
himself, but did, to a certain extent, gain a new lease of life in the second half of the 
fourteenth century, thanks to Wyclif’s endorsement of what was, by then, the discredited 
individualist position.
699
 Laurence Eldredge has suggested, without mentioning this passage, 
that the Gawain-poet’s recurrent interest in the word ‘point’ is related precisely to that 
controversy. For instance, Eldredge argues that ‘the poet insists that patience is a point, not 
merely by means of the repetition in the first and last lines of the poem, but also by stressing 
its place as the last of the eight beatitudes and thus the point with which the line of beatitudes 
ends’.700 In other words, the principle running through the beatitudes terminates in a single 
distinguishable virtue: patience. 
 The indivisibilist position was, at least from the time of Grosseteste onwards, 
associated with a strong emphasis on the omniscience of God. I have discussed above how 
                                                          
699
 Eldredge, ‘Late Medieval Discussions’, p. 98 (note) and pp. 109-110. 
700
 Eldredge, ‘Late Medieval Discussions’, p. 110. 
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Wyclif’s predestinarian theology related to his indivisibilism. Eldredge also notes the 
‘perennial objection’ of the indivisibilists that ‘if a line really were infinitely divisible, then 
not even God would know exactly how many parts it had’.701 God’s ability to identify each 
particular that makes up his own created universe is as essential a point of theology to 
Wyclif, as it is a point of logic. Eldredge argues, therefore, that the Gawain-poet is utilising 
an indivisibilist position for his own purposes in Patience. 
 Eldredge does not quite suggest, and I think he is right to avoid the suggestion, that 
the Gawain-poet simply endorses the indivisibilist position. The complex manner in which 
the topos of singularity is treated in Pearl would be sufficient to counteract such a reading. 
Nevertheless, the balance of probabilities seems to be that the Gawain-poet did indeed incline 
towards an indivisibilist position. It is quite true that the naivety of the ‘Jeweller’s’ obsession 
with the ‘singularity’ of Pearl is exposed by the vision of the joyful heavenly continuum into 
which she seamlessly fits. Nevertheless, the Maiden’s response to the ‘Jeweller’s’ objection 
about proportionality of merit seems to carry authorial support. Her (and therefore perhaps 
the author’s) argument is dependent upon a quasi-indivisibilist emphasis on singular 
instances, which is found again in God’s response to Jonah’s similar objection in Patience.  
 Thus although it certainly cannot be claimed that the Gawain-poet was a 
straightforward indivisibilist, two things seem probable. Firstly, he was aware of the logical 
controversies surrounding the continuum, still alive although largely decided by his day, and 
was comfortable enough to use the potent imagery it provided in his poetry, sometimes 
loosely but sometimes more precisely and with the eye of a thinker not wholly ignorant of 
contemporary logic. Secondly, he was more attracted by the indivisibilist position than its 
contrary and, significantly, the more precisely his poetry deals with the entwined logico-
theological problems of predestination, free will and merit, the more he tends to invoke 
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indivisibilist patterns of thought, as if the indivisibilist and predestinarian positions were 
associated in his mind. 
The Sophistication of the Gawain-poet 
The Gawain-poet confronts some of the most emotionally and intellectually difficult 
problems of human existence: the labyrinthine quest for truth, the tragic (and comic) 
limitations of loyalty, the irreconcilable conflicts of human social contracts, the mental 
bewilderment of grief, the apparent unfairness of human merit and the infinite complexity of 
man’s relationship with God. Within his works the intellectual is itself inseparably tangled up 
with the emotional and the ethical; and to miss the ‘sophistication’ (in both senses) of his 
philosophical concerns is to diminish irreparably the potency of the other two. The problems 
that he addresses are, from a human perspective, generally ‘insoluble’. This does not mean, 
however, that the Gawain-poet wants his audience to give up thinking about them. As I 
discussed in relation to Pearl, the gem buried in the ground was a late-medieval logical 
metaphor for the fact that a solution may be one day found for apparent insolubilia. The 
Gawain-poet is certainly not arguing that divine action is essentially immune to reason or 
logic, as has been suggested: indeed far from it.
702
 Struggling intellectually with such 
problems is an important part of human and spiritual progress, even though the answers are, 
in this world, unsatisfactory. 
 Although the Gawain-poet’s presentations of contemporary philosophical concerns 
are subtle enough to defy simplistic deductions about his own intellectual and theological 
positions, nevertheless his poems do, in places, take a precise enough interest in the specifics 
of logical, mathematical and theological problems to allow a degree of cautious speculation. I 
will advance one possible interpretation of the material. Philip F. O’Mara has argued that the 
Gawain-poet was influenced by Holcot, possibly through personal acquaintance, and that the 
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 Owen, ‘Prudence of Pearl’, esp. pp. 426-27. 
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poet may even have been one of Holcot’s students.703 He thus sees the Cotton Nero poems as 
validating a Holcotian (or, in Bradwardine’s eyes, ‘Pelagian’) view that God will save all 
who do ‘quod in se est’. The emphasis of O’Mara’s analysis is almost entirely theological and 
focuses on whether non-Christians can be saved, the main example being Bertilak (in spite of 
the fact that he is ostensibly a Christian in Sir Gawain, which fact O’Mara mentions briefly 
but inexplicably disregards). I agree that the Gawain-poet was probably acquainted with 
Holcot’s work. A more thoroughly logico-theological approach, however, seems to lend more 
weight to ‘anti-Pelagian’ theological readings of his work. The Gawain-poet does not entirely 
sympathise with a Holcotian understanding of the problem of future contingency, especially 
the conception of divine action as trickery or deceit. In Sir Gawain, human covenants and 
human faithfulness are demonstrated to be incapable of meeting the almost limitless demands 
that may be placed upon them. That is human nature, and the Gawain-poet is, I think, 
sympathetic to human failure. However, both Pearl and Patience make clear that God is no 
trickster, his covenants must not be regarded as broken, and man is not defrauded. 
There are therefore firmer grounds to speculate, with Richard Firth Green and 
Carleton Brown, that, as a thinker, the Gawain-poet can be positioned somewhere along the 
logico-theological continuum between the Bradwardinian and Wycliffite positions. Due to his 
seeming emphasis on the indivisibilist paradigm, it might be argued that he is at least partially 
in sympathy with the Wycliffite evolution of early fourteenth-century predestinarianism. 
Israel Gollancz rather rashly proposed Strode as the author of Pearl.
704
 If my speculation is 
correct, however, the Gawain-poet offers a very interesting counterpoint to Strodean thought 
as glimpsed in the poetry of Chaucer. Strode greatly admired Bradwardine for his strictly 
logical insight, but seems to have differed greatly with him on the logico-theological 
questions of free will and predestination, and especially to have regarded Wyclif’s 
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development of Bradwardine’s position as both dangerous and illogical. If the Gawain-poet 
admired Bradwardine for his predestinarian theology, but tended to find in Wyclif’s logico-
mathematical position a more appealing literary inspiration, then he can in some ways be 
viewed as Strode’s intellectual mirror-image. Both were, to some extent Bradwardinians, but 
each was, in different ways, a dissenting disciple of their master. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is unfortunate that for too long the logical texts of the Middle Ages have been read only by 
logicians. Modern logicians have in one way performed a great service in keeping alive the 
traditional motives and concerns of their predecessors. Modern historians of logic have done 
much to make otherwise inaccessible texts increasingly available to a wider audience. Yet 
both tend to be interested, quite understandably, in the structures of thought, to the detriment 
of the means of expression. For this reason, any reader of medieval logical texts interested in 
the literary expression of their ideas must approach modern translations and commentaries 
with considerable caution, since they occasionally substitute alternatives to the ‘imagery’ 
employed by medieval thinkers, in order to preserve the same basic thought structures for a 
modern readership. Such scholars can hardly be blamed for not paying closer attention to the 
literary formulations within these texts: that is not their job. It is, in fact, the job of literary 
scholars and critics. 
Only really within the last decade or so have students of English literature begun to 
appreciate the value of utilising with more precision what is, in fact, a vast range of carefully 
constructed logical ‘literature’, and even so it has been difficult to get away from 
preconstructed, totalising conceptions of late-medieval philosophy, such as ‘nominalism’ and 
‘dialectic’. It is my contention that there are advantages in reading fourteenth-century logical 
texts with an unashamedly literary eye; indeed, it is my contention that it is in precisely that 
way that poets such as Chaucer, Gower and the Gawain-poet would probably have read such 
texts. Chaucer would have been more immediately interested in an absurd image than a 
complex syllogism, although his interest in the one may well have led to a more precise 
understanding of the other. The Gawain-poet saw in the knotty image of the insolubilia or the 
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extreme ‘casus’ of the sophismata delightful literary possibilities; through them, his more 
complex intellectual and moral concerns found a means of fictional expression. To put it 
another way, much of the scholarship of medieval literature, even when it has embraced the 
philosophical concerns of the writers it deals with, has tended to be overly deductive: it 
begins with a generalised manifesto, such as ‘nominalism’, and then coerces the author’s 
concerns into that framework. It seems to me that in relation to late-medieval logic and 
philosophy, literary scholarship ought to be more inductive: it must begin with the details of 
linguistic expression, imagery and structure and so gradually build a sympathetic 
understanding of the writer’s broader interests.  
I would also suggest that the preceding chapters point towards something like a re-
evaluation of the intellectual categories that we have become used to inhabiting. Despite the 
modern western world’s rather hubristic confidence in the rigour of its commitment to 
‘science’, what it often lacks is the precision, curiosity and persistence with which medieval 
logicians asked questions about the world. Furthermore, due to the modern (and peculiarly 
English) emphasis on disciplinary specialisation, mathematics and logic have, in effect, been 
ghettoised, even in (and perhaps particularly in) academic contexts. The context in which 
literary criticism is written inevitably shapes the preconceptions that underpin it, so that the 
effect of this has been to make it much more difficult for modern readers of medieval texts to 
appreciate the importance of their logical and mathematical contexts. I hope that the 
preceding analysis of the cultural influence of late-medieval logic has demonstrated that 
readers and writers of literary texts in the fourteenth-century were interested in their 
contemporary logic because late-medieval logicians were themselves interested in being 
interesting. 
 Conversely it seems that the most influential literary writers of the late fourteenth 
century were concerned with having something to say to the world of logic and mathematics. 
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This should by no means come as a surprise, given the longstanding interplay between logic, 
mathematics and poetry. It was not uncommon for mathematical and computistical treatises 
to be set down in verse. By means of the transmission of Aristotle from Averroes and other 
Arab philosophers, to schoolmen such as Vincent of Beauvais and Aquinas, ‘the idea that 
poetry was part of logic was firmly established in scholasticism’.705 Mnemonic verses were 
used to memorise logical procedures.
706
 It is by means of a medieval literary poem, the De 
vetula, that the early development of proto-probability theory has been demonstrated. 
Chaucer makes his desire to appeal to logical readers explicit in his dedication of Troilus and 
Criseyde to Ralph Strode; Gower seems to demonstrate a similar ambition to be seen as a 
literary favourite of ‘philosophical’ Strode; and although earlier assertions of the identity of 
the Gawain-poet and Ralph Strode were undoubtedly misjudged, the poems of Cotton Nero 
A. x nevertheless pulsate with a love of logical controversy that would have been quite at 
home in that extraordinary literary circle. Chaucer’s work may well have been instrumental in 
shaping an understanding of Wyclif’s logic and theology that lasted almost six hundred years. 
Gower’s work may have helped to cement a more sophisticated understanding of 
mathematical probability, to the extent that scholars searching for the roots of modern 
probability theory are still quoting his poetry over half a millennium later. These are no small 
achievements, no insignificant testimonies to the power of medieval literature and its 
relevance to later thought; and yet literary scholars have left it to others to explore them. The 
most basic conclusion to be drawn from my research is that there is such a powerful 
symbiosis between medieval literary and logical texts that the comparison between the 
literature of logic and the logic of literature is almost inevitably productive.  
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294 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: A Selection of Sophismatic Propositions from the Fourteenth Century 
• It is not possible to imagine a mountain of gold.707 
• You will throw me in the water.708 
• Roses are promised to you.709 
• The white will be black.710 
• Every man who is white runs.711 
• Plato will be damned.712 
• I wish to go to Rome if Socrates goes.713 
• Socrates the traveller will be damned.714 
• Socrates the astronomer knows some stars to be above our hemisphere.715 
• Aristotle’s horse walked.716 
• You are the Pope therefore you are a priest.717 
• The King may sit.718 
• Baf will be baptised.719 
• You believe your father to be an ass.720 
• You are the brother of an ass.721 
• A horse is an ass.722 
• I owe you a horse.723 
                                                          
707
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 67. Sophismata given in Latin in the edition cited appear here translated. 
708
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 219 (Chapter 8, Sophism 17). 
709
 Buridan, Tractatus de consequentiis, 1. 6. 16.  
710
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 110 (Chapter 4, Sophism 3).  
711
 Heytesbury, Sophismata (Sophism 5, p. 1, fols 91
rb
-97
ra 
(fol. 91
rb
)). 
712
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 131. 
713
 Buridan: Sophisms, p. 221 (Chapter 8, Discussion of Sophism 18). 
714
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 105.  
715
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 131 (Chapter 4, Sophism 14). 
716
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 83 (Chapter 2, Sophism 2). 
717
 Strode, ‘Ralph Strode’s Consequentiae’, p. 337. 
718
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 170. 
719
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 161 (Chapter 6, Sophism 2). 
720
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 134 (Chapter 4, Solution to Sophism 11). 
721
 Heytesbury, Sophismata asinina, p. 418. 
722
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 64 (Chapter 1, Sophism 2). 
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• A chimera is not a hircocervus.724 
• The ass flies, so the ass has wings.725 
• Socrates is able to be an ass.726 
• God is an ass.727 
• Every God is the Son, every Father of God is God, so every Father of God is the 
Son.
728
 
• Antichrist is not a chimera.729 
• The corrupt is to be generated.730 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
723
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 137 (Chapter 4, Sophism 15). 
724
 Holcot, Seeing the Future, p. 67. 
725
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 180 (Chapter 8, Discussion of Sophism 1). 
726
 Heytesbury, Sophismata (Sophism 1, p. 12, fols 77
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(fol. 79
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727
 Buridan, Sophisms, p.196 (Chapter 8, Sophism 7). 
728
 Buridan, Sophisms, p. 146 (Chapter 5, Discussion of Sophism 2). 
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Appendix 2: 
Table 1: No. of occurrences of selected categorematic terms (and derivatives) in different textual or 
propositional contexts in Buridan’s Sophismata. 731 
                                                          
731
 The numerical results given in the table are not intended as strictly statistical, but as loosely indicative of 
general trends. The numbers given are based on my own working concordance of terms and propositions in 
Scott’s translation. Briefly, terms are not counted more than once if they appear in the same propositional 
context more than once in the same sub-section of the treatise (e.g. in a single continuous discussion of a single 
sophism, or under the same ‘conclusion’ etc). Thus, if the proposition ‘Socrates is white’ were to appear more 
than once in the same sub-section, each term would still only be counted once; however, if ‘Socrates is black’ 
were to be used in the same sub-section, the term ‘Socrates’ would be counted twice, since it is being used in a 
different propositional context; or if ‘Socrates is white’ were to appear again in a different sub-section of the 
treatise, both terms would be counted again, because they are being used in a different discursive context, and so 
on. Proper names are included only when they appear as terms in a proposition (such as ‘Aristotle is a chimera’), 
not as references to works (of which, in the case of Aristotle, there are many). 
Term No. of Occurrences Term No. of Occurrences 
Man 147 Eat 11 
Socrates 100 Robert 11 
Ass 72 Father (excluding divine contexts) 11 
Horse 66 Stone 11 
Run 62 Nothing 10 
God 56 Wall 9 
Animal 52 Creation 8 
White 36 Young 8 
‘A’ 35 Star 8 
Plato 34 Curse 7 
Antichrist 27 Old 6 
Aristotle 26 ‘Baf’ 6 
‘B’ 25 Angle 6 
False 25 Vacuum 5 
Chimera 24 Non-being 5 
Generation 21 John 5 
Owe 20 Heaven(s) 5 
Death 18 Triangle 4 
Black 16 ‘C’ 4 
‘Risible’(able to laugh) 15 Circle 3 
Walk 15 Peter 3 
Corruption 13 Goat 3 
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Appendix 3: 
An illustration depicting the ‘wolf, goat, cabbage’ puzzle, in the Ormesby Psalter (Oxford, 
Bodleian Library MS Douce 366, fol. 89
r
). 
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